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METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1884.

ART. I.—PRAYER AND SCIENCE.

A Review of Mr. Wakeman's "Science and Prayer," in the North American Review.

"JEHOVAH is dead!" was the jubilant exclamation of a German agnostic philosopher. "Theology is the past tense," is the first sentence of Mr. Wakeman, more modest in expression, but synonymous in import and equal in its mistake. "Theology is the past tense," we cheerfully grant; a glorious past tense; and statistical science predicts a future tense far more illustrious. The Christian Church is growing more rapidly than the world's population; and our evangelical Christianity is growing the most rapidly of all the forms of Christian doctrine. And the spread of Christianity has never been so rapid as in the last fifty years. These facts have been critically and arithmetically demonstrated in Dorchester's "Problem of Religious Progress," so that after all these hostile jubilations, derived from "science," science herself declares that Jehovah still lives, and that Christianity will rule in beneficent power long after Mr. Wakeman and myself are forgotten.

Mr. Wakeman maintains the mechanical nature of the system of the universe, and the exclusion therefrom of any controlling Mind. This mechanical universe he holds to be governed by unintelligent laws, without any intellective lawgiver. "These laws are: the indestructibility of matter, the correlation and equivalence of forces, gravitation, and the law of evolution." Brevity, of course, precludes him from being able to

demonstrate that so adaptive and so planned a system excludes the planning mind; and he therefore refers us for that demonstration to Herbert Spencer's "First Principles," chaps. 4–9. The same brevity, as well as the absence of any argument presented, precludes our answering Mr. Spencer's supposed demonstration. We can only, in like manner, refer for its refutation to Janet's celebrated work on "Final Causes."

Next, from this high *priori* ground of Agnosticism, Mr. Wakeman comes down to the issue upon the platform of our theism, and boldly maintains that the attributes of our God, humanly though we state them, shut his ears to prayer. "The ism," he says, "assumes a God who is *anthropomorphic* and yet"—. Pause a moment there. We respectfully suggest to Mr. Wakeman whether that epithet "*anthropomorphic*," so popularly reiterated by our agnostic philosophers, is not below their intellectual level; whether it has not too much of an *ad captandam* quality. Between God and man we hold there to be no other resemblance or identity than that they are both SPIRIT. It is not likeness of physical image, but an analogy of spiritual nature. And our Christian theism holds that there, doubtless, are grades and ranks of spirit beings, invisible "principalities and powers," occupying the immense vacuity between the infinite God above and finite man below, practically infinite in number; so that to say that God is anthropomorphic is simply to say that God is at the summit of the sublime spiritual column of which man is the lowest base. Moreover, there are countless instances in which the finite thing unquestionably is a miniature, and even the reduced identity of an infinite. Newton, it is said, conceived the idea of gravitation from the fall of an apple, so that Newton conceived the astonishing absurdity of supposing that the universe is *appleomorphic!* Space we suppose our learned friend conceives as infinite; and yet space can be inclosed in a quart bottle, and so infinite space is *bottleomorphic.* Law we know is proclaimed by these illustrious thinkers to be universal, all pervading, almighty. But law does condescend from its infinity to rule the humblest ultimate atom of matter; and so universal, all-pervading, almighty law is *atomomorphic.* Force, we suppose, is conceived to be practically infinite and all-controlling. But this same force does reside in the living human body; inclosed, as we

may say, within the human skin; and so is truly shaped to and incarnated in the human form. And so infinite, almighty force is *anthropomorphic!* So Mr. Wakeman himself holds to an almighty anthropomorphic but unintelligent ruler of the cosmos. If there can be an infinite and a finite force, why not an infinite and a finite spirit? And wonderful it is to conceive how as truly perfect is infinite, omnipresent law in the infinitely small as in the infinitely great. Herschel and Clerk Maxwell affirm that the ultimate atom has the character of "a manufactured article." An English rhymester has illustrated the downward travel to infinite littleness in quaint style nearly as follows:

> So naturalists affirm the flea
> Hath lesser fleas on him that prey;
> And these have lesser fleas that bite 'em,
> And so descend *ad infinitum.*

And thus the infinite condescends to finite itself to the infinitesimal! Science itself therefore demonstrates that the infinite can move in the slightest movements, can incarnate itself in the minutest objects, and operate under guise of most truly finite causes.

And next, as our thought peers down and down this descending line of fleas, not only is each flea mentally seen to be perfectly shaped by infinite force, and that force *to be ruled* by infinite law, but that law *obeys the authority of mind.* For, as experience reveals that the shaping of matter is ruled by the pressure of force, and force is by experience seen to be ruled by law, so it is as clear that law is modified and ruled by reason, and reason can be conceived as existing in mind alone. More literally we might drop law out, and say that force itself is ruled by mind, law being nothing more than the *way* in which reason consistently and regularly controls and directs the course of things. Mind we know, by conclusive psychological experience, does volitionally compel force to shape matter to its own purpose and model; and Mr. Wakeman can find nothing else than mind in the universe that does so compel. As there is nothing that solves the operation of matter but force, and nothing solves the control of force but law, so nothing solves the imposition and direction of law on force but mind. The proof that the solar system is ruled by mind,

is just the same as the proof that my fellow man is ruled by mind. I know, indeed, my own individual mind by consciousness; but I cannot walk into my fellow being's consciousness and know his mind, and can only *infer* the existence of his mind by external rational-like effects. There is, therefore, the same reason to infer that intelligence rules in that mass of matter called nature as there is in that mass of matter which I call my fellow man, namely, the intelligential effects seen. The atheist ought to deny the existence of any consciousness but his own. If the rational effects in human mechanism demonstrate human mind, so the rational effects in a superhuman mechanism demonstrate superhuman mind. Why do we recognize mind in the formation, the adaptation, of the parts of a flea? Because every thing is known by its *properties*, and this shows the objective *properties* which experience proves to belong to mind. And then, if infinite force is ruled by mind, that mind is also as infinite as force. And that unity of infinite force and infinite mind we call God. And if being intelligent is being anthropomorphic, Mr. Wakeman is welcome to the conclusion.

And this condescension of infinite Perfection to the finities —to their imperfections, contingencies, and littlenesses—is the very result of its perfection. An infinite unable to reach the humblest infinitesimal would fail to be an infinite. It is its perfect extension to the minutest particle of existence that constitutes infinity. A perfect force impels the minutest atom, a perfect law descends to the minutest event, a perfect Providence takes care of the minutest animalcule. It is not confused by infinities of number or immensities of space. It takes care of one animalcule with as concentrated an omniscience as if that one animalcule were the only object in universal space. And this results from the very infinitude and perfection of that Providence. In the force, the law, or the providence, the omission of the care of one infinitesimal would be an absolute imperfection.

And, what is specially to my purpose, this infinite law-ruled force, whether ruled by mind or not, and whether anthropomorphic or not, condescends to the *prayers* of the minutest flea. In order to live, the flea must have all the parts of his body put together and symmetrized; the apparatus and the material for eating and nutriment must be supplied; the

appetites and instincts be placed in the organism, prompting and directing it to perform the self-nourishing process. These needs and wants for self-completeness and conservation are his unconscious *prayers;* and infinite law-ruled force adjusts itself to and answers those *prayers.* Much more may it condescend to the prayers of man, who is in the very image of God. The expressed prayers of man, which are only his vocalized needs, are comprehended in the completeness of his being, and, therefore, embraced in that divine condescension.

One of the noblest sentences, indeed, ever penned by human hand was that sentence of Moses, "God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him." This says, not so much that God is anthropomorphic, as that man is *theomorphic;* not, indeed, so much so in his corporeal frame as in his nature and spirit. And the author of the Book of Wisdom explains this sentence by saying, "God made man for immortality." And herein man, unlike the animal races, has an eternity done up in his nature, a wonderful parallelism with God himself. And how has that divine sentence ennobled the thoughts and character of man through the ages of Christendom! And hence, too, the profound consistency of our Christian theism in believing that God condescends to man. It is a great *a fortiori*, that if God condescends to the voiceless needs of the infinitesimal insect, much more will he condescend to the vocal needs of the being created in the image of his own eternity.

After this anthropomorphic banter, Mr. Wakeman's first argument against prayer-fulfillment is drawn from the divine perfection. "If the laws of nature be but the order of continuous manifestations of his power, they are invariable because they must *be perfect*, for they are the action of a Perfect Being who omnisciently knew all things for all time, and had infinite power to execute all that he knew or wished. Such a being is, therefore, commonly and properly described as unchangeable, and "without a shadow of turning."

It does not follow, we reply, that, because a being is absolutely perfect, the products of his power are absolutely perfect. A created being is inferior to his creator, and is, therefore, not absolutely perfect. A created universe is not absolutely perfect, for it is inferior toi ts creator. There can, therefore, be no absolutely perfect creation. The dependence

of a living being is an imperfection. Limitation in the magnitude or amount of a being is an imperfection. Hence all finities are but relatively perfect. And that is relatively perfect which is best adapted to its end or place. And in order to the variety of a world, and to deliver it from monotony, there need be ranks and grades, and so superiorities and inferiorities; the highest superior being inferior to the Most High, and so all beneath him and dependent upon him; and, therefore, imperfect, but relatively perfect. Yet an infinitely wise being would create a universe, however necessarily imperfect, if its existence were better than its non-existence. If the alternative be between a defective universe and universal nothingness, wisdom would probably prefer the former. Wisdom would create the best possible universe. And the admission of defects might be necessary to that best possible. In this little music-box I have on my table there is a polished revolving cylinder, from whose solid circumference projects a large number of needles, standing in the most lamentable disorder. That disorder is plainly *seen* to be an imperfection. And yet every one of these projectives is so positioned as to strike upon its proper metallic key in such precisely successive order as to produce the most perfect strain of music. That is, disorder is a necessary condition to a higher order; imperfection is the condition of perfection. And that imperfection is relatively perfect, and that relative perfection is absolutely imperfect. We justify the imperfection by pointing to the high perfection it conditionates and to the more perfect system that results.

Nor does Mr. Wakeman rightly claim, that the invariability of the divine nature, without shadow of turning, prohibits an infinite variety of divine actions. The basis of all natural laws is the supreme law of reason in the divine mind, in accordance with which those laws are but *the uniform course of divine volitions.* Uniformity of law is maintained by the divine will in order that finite intelligences may be enabled to know what to expect, and *to calculate the future* and regulate their actions; a uniformity without which intelligence would be unintelligent. And of course, should a given law have finished all the purpose of its existence, and have performed its whole mission, then, by the same reason, which is the supreme law of laws, would it be changed. This would follow from the

very immutability of that reason which, in itself, is without "the shadow of turning," but which is carrying finite things through an infinite variety of turnings and changes.

But it is a mistake to suppose that a supernatural interposition, a prayer-hearing, a MIRACLE, is a *change*, violation, or suspension *of law*. It is simply *a change in the particular course of events under the law* by the interposition of a new impulse. Thus a ball is flying through the air, whose course by natural law is to gradually curve down in a given direction to the earth. But a player suddenly interposes a blow by which its course is deflected into a new direction. This is not a *change of law*, but a *change of result under law*. The new sequence is produced by the introduction of a new antecedent. And whether that new antecedent is a human or divine interposition makes no difference as to the invariability of the law. Nor is it a change, as Mr. Wakeman assumes, in the "general order," for it is contemplated by reason as within the divine programme. We know no law, science knows no law, that incapacitates Omnipotence from so interposing. The question whether such an interposition ever has taken place is not a question of science, but of historical fact. And the man who knows that no such fact has taken place in the past eternity, and none will take place in the future eternity, is simply omniscient. As laws are interposed in order that finite intelligences might be intelligent, so interpositions may most wisely take place to raise finite intelligences in thought above the finite routine into recognition, contemplation, and sympathy with the supreme intelligence. Thence are they developed and educated into a nobler nature by that Infinite, who, as already shown, is infinitely condescending to the finities and even to the infinitesimals.

The next argument of our learned friend against efficacy of prayer is from God's foreknowledge. He says: "All things must have been fore-ordained by himself, in order to be knowable by him. But if he knew and ordained the result he must be morally responsible for it; and if he is also perfect, the result ordained by him must be perfect. But it could be perfect in one order only; for there cannot be two perfect orders. Therefore the actual order must have been eternally perfect and eternally ordained, and the prayer for any change must be useless

and absurd." Our Calvinistic brethren, we reply, might concede that God must fore-ordain in order to foreknow, but we are Arminian, and hold no such conception. God's foreknowledge is but a phase of his omniscience, by which he knows all things, past, present, and future, possible or necessary. And as fore-ordination is an act, and omniscience is an attribute, of God's nature, so the act must be subsequent and the nature antecedent. That is, God must know before he ordains. And even if his fore-ordination and his omniscience are both eternal, still, in the order of necessary thought, the omniscience must be antecedent to the fore-ordination, as an eternal cause is in the order of thought and nature antecedent to its eternal effect, as the eternal Father is antecedent to the eternal Son. And that fore-ordination of a particular finite fact may be in its nature conditional upon a foreknown antecedent event. God may know that an agent can freely, unnecessitatedly choose either of several ways. And then he may know which one of the several ways which the agent is *able* to choose will be the way he *will actually* choose. God's omniscience no more compels this agent's special action than the light of the sun, falling upon his body, cramps it to a particular course. The foreknowledge adjusts itself to the choice, not the choice to the foreknowledge. And so the most perfect cosmos is the cosmos which, having a base fixed in its own material laws and substance, is the stage on which a free history is evolved and made by free agents. And the most perfect order of God and plan of the historic world is that which is finally the grand *resultant and sum total* of *free action* under divine overrule. And in the very perfection of that plan are included such sympathy between Infinity and the finities, between God and man; and such condescensions and special interpositions, and divine interferences and commands, as are wonderful; as wonderful as those condescensions we have already shown to exist in nature. And "the responsibility" for the free alternative choice in favor of evil rests, not "upon God," but upon him who, with full power for good choice instead, originated from himself the actual evil choice. For man is not a thing; far less an infinitesimal thing. As a living, intelligent being, he is of more importance than the whole material universe; for that universe might just as well be so much pure space, so

much absolute nothingness, except in so far as it contributes to the well-being of a thinking, feeling being. It results, therefore, from the perfections, and especially the immutability, of God, that alternativity and change and interposition should be embraced in his system.

Mr. Wakeman argues, above, that as perfection is one, and "there cannot be two perfect orders," so there can be but one way possible to God. Absolute perfection is, we admit, one, and "cannot be two;" and is realized in God alone. But relative perfection, approximative perfection, is a thing of degrees; and who can say that there may not be several perfects in equal degree? But even the oneness of perfection requires not one stiff procedure, one iron stereotype; for variability, possibility of substitution, itself may often be the one best and most perfect course of things.

Mr. Wakeman next raises and answers a theistic inquiry: "But it is said, may not God, in some way, adjust his fixed laws so as to effect answers to prayer much as human beings do, or are supposed to do? The answer is, that scientific laws are unvariable, and therefore always unadjustable. They cannot be adjusted by either God or man." We ask the proof that He who imposed these laws cannot withdraw, modify, or change them. A distinguished scientist, Professor Cooke, of Harvard, in a noble volume, entitled "The Religion of Chemistry," has shown with great beauty and force that the laws of nature themselves exhibit luminous proofs of having been primordially planned for the construction of a cosmos by an all-comprehensive will. Freedom of choice is a divine perfection, and so the planning will that imposed those laws can suspend or repeal them. And both that imposition and that change may, like any other divine act, be part of a still more primordial plan, and be required by divine perfection.

Next, Mr. Wakeman considers a theistic case of adjustment. "Let us," says he, "suppose that prayer was foreknown and fore-ordained by the Supreme Being as a thing to happen as a part of his government by which man would procure a benefit that God had fore-ordained thereupon to grant. Then the prayer would be useless; for the event would happen as a part of the perfect world-order, without prayer, or, if prayer were decreed to be inseparably connected with the event, then it would be

simply a part of it, a superfluous concomitant of the event, and useless, since the event would happen without it. The maker of the prayer would be only an automaton working for nothing." The case, as we understand it, is this. A storm, we will suppose, is about to happen in the natural order of elementary sequence, which will suddenly relieve a long and destructive drought. God divinely arranges so that a prayer of faith is immediately followed by the bursting of the storm. Barely this sequence would not approve itself an interposed answer. But if the prayer anticipated a variety of peculiar facts and events in the coming of the storm, those anticipations might be so special as to prove the prayer predictive. The prayer would be "useless" as to changing the special sequence; but it would be profoundly beneficent as proving the great truth we have illustrated, the divine condescension to the finite. Such was the prayer of Elijah for the storm which God promised to succeed his performance of the prayer-gauge with the priests of Baal. It was a predictive prayer of faith; and the fulfillment proclaimed that "Jehovah is" not "dead." And so the deluge of Noah may have been a natural event, and yet so concurrent with the preceding wickedness of men and the inspired anticipations of Noah as to come into the order of the supernatural, testifying Jehovah's existence and his divine retribution.

A further argument against prayer-answer is, that to affix a special result to a prayer "would be conditioning the order of events and the order of a perfect world upon the volition of an imperfect being." Have we not shown that imperfection in the world is often the condition of perfection? Surely the learned reasoner will not maintain that the world and its events are not modified by man's volitions, however imperfect. Professor G. P. Marsh shows how man's volitions have changed the face of the earth. And the reasoning is especially malapropos in the case of answered prayer; since we shall soon show reason to believe that such prayer is always inspired and guided by God himself, so that the act of the imperfect being is sure to be, if not perfect, tributary to a perfect result.

Finally, a prayer-answering God, he declares, is "the reverse of worshipful," "a limited imperfect, *quasi* human agent." Please just reverse that statement. An infinite that cannot condescend to a finite, even to an infinitesimal, is limited and

imperfect. He is not truly infinite nor truly perfect. Infinite force can run down the infinite line, *diminuendo*, of fleas. Infinite law condescends to the ultimate particle, and yet, forsooth, the power that energizes that law to the ultimate minimum cannot condescend to mortal man! Mr. Wakeman can at once see that such a limitation of the reach of *law* would be infinitely absurd. Why not equally absurd this limitation of omniscience and omnipotence?

But let us, with our learned friend, put the question to an experimental test, the "prayer-gauge." Mr. Tyndall proposed, if we rightly recollect, that there should be two hospitals, in one of which all prayer should be offered for the patients, and for the other all Christians should be prayerless. We will then know whether prayer is effective of answer and fulfillment. Mr. Wakeman tells us those scientists who proposed such contract were "vociferously accused" of "profanity and blasphemy," etc. I never heard or read those vociferous accusations; but it seems to me that, if he will for a moment contemplate the Christian idea of the Divine Being, he would candidly confess that such a performance, if not the proposition, would justly seem to Christians profoundly irreverent. Mr. Wakeman assures us that "no advocate of prayer dares to imitate Elijah" in trying such a test. Our friend is mistaken. We accept his challenge, and are ready to "imitate Elijah." But before we do so, we will make three all-important discriminations.

Prayer directly affecting an external physical thing, changing the order of physical events, we will admit to be miracle and miraculous interposition. But, *first*, note that the direct interposition of the Divine Spirit within the human *spirit* belongs to a different order. We believe that the Spirit of God can pervade the spirit of man, as the light of the morning sun pervades the atmosphere of our earth. And within that sphere there is a spiritual order of cause and effect, which, in the sense of being regular, is an order of nature. The Spirit of God, pervading the spirit of man, produces conviction of sin, of which the consequence may be repentance, and the fixed sequence of that may be faith, and the sequence of that pardon, justification, peace with God, happiness, and heaven. This, as a regular order, may be called nature, but from its elevation may be called supernatural, but scarcely miraculous. And, *second*, the

divine energy may also at will enter the lower regions of our psychological nature, with sequences that can be orderly and yet interposed. Not only the spirit, but the intellect, may be pervaded with brightening or obscuring influences, the emotions may be heaved or allayed, the springs of the will may be touched. And, *third*, and lower still, and unequivocally *miraculous*, the physiological regions may be reached, the vital forces, the corporeal energies, the vigor of courage, the fountains of health, and the issues of life. These three mysterious chambers of operations are ruled by God himself as "the hidings of his power." No scale can weigh, no rule can measure, this divine efficiency; no science can bring it into the circle of physical "correlations." The current of sequences may here be reversed at the demand of prayer, and human science be none the wiser for it. Thence may go forth the most momentous results into the world. Under this divine agency the individual fortune may be controlled, nay, national destinies may be decided, and man never know the secret springs of action. The "order of nature" may thus take either of a variety of ways, and science perceive no loss of invariability. We are now prepared for the prayer-guage.

As, however, Mr. Wakeman has specified the precedent of Elijah, as a good jurist he must accept the case as it stands on record. And the record is this: Elijah was sent expressly by Jehovah to this experiment of prayer, undertaken under prophetic impulse, with a divine promise that a miraculous rain should, after the prayer-test performed, remove the general drought. Elijah therefore *waited for a special command*, a divine authority, and a prophetic impulse. We shall do the same. We "imitate Elijah." And let it be understood that this is no quibble, for it is easy to show that, by the biblical view, it is a universal law that miracle-working is a χάρισμα, *charisma*, a special divine gift. And so the miracle-working prayer is itself miracle-wrought. Every miracle is thus double, internal and external. The example of Elijah in depending on special inspiration accords with the biblical law of the New Testament. Of this special faith Jesus declared in the gospels that if a mustard-seed amount were imparted for a given work, though it were moving a mountain, it could be done. An infinitesimal particle of bestowed omnipotence could achieve

its mightiest mission. In the Acts of the Apostles the power of "healing," especially, was a *charisma*, a gift. And in the epistle St. James tells us that the faith that "availeth much" is ενεργουμένη, *inwrought*, and quotes Elijah as a case in point.

The possession of that charismatic power is either *conscious* or *unconscious*. When *consciously* possessed and given as correlative to a certain act, that act is in full faith executed. If that act be to engage in a "prayer-gauge," then a man or a church may, as Elijah did, undertake the mission. Otherwise no man may without presumption enter into contract for the Almighty to perform a certain work. But if, on the other hand, the power for miraculous result be not *consciously* realized, then the Christian fervently prays for the externality with a cheerful "peradventure God may give" the boon, and with the underlying reserve "thy will be done," the blessed result of which prayer is to retain the human spirit in calm, resigned communion with the Divine Spirit. And the Church and the New Testament are chary of specifying external things in prayer to God. No one claims that prayer-skill can dispense with the medical profession, or that prayer-force can take the place of steam-force in running rail-cars. The most Christian of ancient pagans, Socrates, as Xenophon tells us, "prayed to the gods to give us good things, realizing that the gods best know what things are good; but he thought that those praying for gold and silver and power, or any of such things, prayed as it were for a game of chance, not knowing how it might turn out." When the parent prays for the life of his sick child, perhaps that child, if made to live, would be the curse of himself, family, and country. When a prayer is offered for a national specialty, its fulfillment may interfere with the divine administration of the affairs of nations. The specialty is unbestowed, but the reflex moral and spiritual benefit on the supplicator is immeasurable.

As an actual physiological miracle, the restoration to health by prayer must have the rarity of miracle, and require the most unequivocal proof, especially as means of convincing an unbeliever. The prayer ordinarily offered, and that should be ordinarily offered, at the sick-bed, is modest and submissive. It is ordinarily but the earnestly expressed *wish* of human sympathy, reverently addressed to God, graciously by him

accepted as such, and resulting only in benign influences upon the human feelings. Conscious communion in the devout heart with God is itself to the feeble a tranquilizing, sustaining, and restorative power. It is a supernaturalism, bringing us nearer to him, and shading imperceptibly toward miracle. And as there is something intrinsically spiritual also in the secret, life-touching, curative power of medicine, so there is a blending of the two, the supernatural and the natural. This divine communion and trust resting down upon the medicine is the so called "blessing on the means;" and I doubt not that the sick and dying believer in Christ is many a time, especially in diseases of mental and nervous nature, by this double power restored. Such a case is a supernaturalism, but not a *miracle*. The bold claim of a positive objective MIRACLE must be sustained by unequivocal proof. The deep reality of the disease, the instantaneous sequence of the cure, the completeness and permanence of the restoration, and the trustworthiness of the witnesses, must be perfectly clear. Nor are these cases of such frequency or regularity as to be calculated upon as to take place in any hospital you may select.

But we are triumphantly told that Garfield's case presents "the crucial test," "grander than that of Elijah." Not quite. The discussing parties had entered into no compact. Mr. Wakeman and his co-thinkers would never have accepted Garfield's recovery as any proof of the power of prayer, and Christians never admitted his dying as any disproof. With both sides, therefore, it was no test case.

And then, what Mr. Wakefield calls "the prayer of fifty millions" never existed. One third of the nation, at least, in deferential silence, was quite willing he should die. Two thirds of the whole never prayed, even in form. A small minority did devoutly pray; but none of that choice few possessed the divine commission, the prophetic impulse, or the charismatic power of Elijah, and none, so far as I know, ever claimed it. It was simply the earnest *wish* of a large body of our people, shaped into earnest, uninspired prayer by only the devoutest hearts. What is thereby proved? What nobody ever denied, that the united prayer of our Christian body is not sure of obtaining an external, physical miracle from God. To assert such a surety would be to claim Church control over

the physical forces of events of the world. We would be glad to be informed what Protestant authority of our day ever uttered such a claim? But all this touches not the spiritual sequences within the spirit of man, on which alone Christianity is emphatic.

Two or three points made supplementary to the argument we may, in conclusion, notice.

To the argument in behalf of a Supernatural drawn from the universality of the belief in the supernatural, Mr. Wakeman answers somewhat contemptuously. He parallels such belief, even the belief in God, with the belief in "fairies, witches," etc. But what are even those superstitions, we ask, but the unenlightened forms of the same natural belief of the Supernatural? When men's ideas are local and fragmentary, their supernaturals are so. But even then they often monotheistically believe in a *supreme* deity, though they possess not the full conception of an Infinite Being. But when expanding thought grasps firmly the realities of infinite space and limitless power, and sees the astronomic world to be a unit, the idea of an omnipresent, omnipotent Unit over the whole bases itself firmly in the human soul. To the claim that the Supernatural is a "want" of the soul, he first denies that "the general want of a thing proves its existence." My answer is, that for every constitutional primary "want" of the human soul there is the constituted supply, whether each individual obtains possession of it or not. He next affirms that the "want" is produced by the belief, and will die with it. The reverse I submit to be the fact. The belief is prompted by the instinctive "want," and established by the intuitive reason, and will live as long as the instinct does. To the appalling aspect of these his denials of God, personality and immortality, he offers the consolation of knowing "the truth." Well, the criminal under death sentence, waiting for a reprieve, has a satisfaction in at last knowing the worst of his case; but that relieves not the anguish of knowing that his doom is death. Nor, for us, does the fixed certainty of our doom diminish our horror of its endless darkness. To all that horror these sad denials surrender us. To the deep questionings of the soul, "When shall day dawn on the night of the tomb," what is the answer? Quoth the Raven, "NEVERMORE!"

Art. II.—THE EARLIEST CREED OF MANKIND.

The sacred books of Judaism and of Christianity describe the first human beings as having stood in direct personal fellowship with the personal Creator of the world, as having received instruction and commandments from him, as having at length, in consequence of disobedience, been dispossessed of Eden and subjected to a new, providential, and gracious administration devised for their salvation. They teach that the descendants of the first human pair recognized, by offerings and sacrifices, the being and claims of the Supreme God, and that for a long time—certainly till after the Flood—a line of pious patriarchs maintained in the wicked world the profession and testimony of monotheistic believers.

The Koran is pervaded by the same idea. To Mohammed, no less than to Moses and Paul, the theism of revelation was the primitive faith of mankind; polytheism and its attendant idolatry were of later origin, and traceable to spiritual blindness and unbelief. In all three of the monotheistic religions of the world, therefore, men are conceived of as commencing their history with a supernatural knowledge of the one true and living God.

In the Christian world the first noteworthy treatise expressing dissent from this view was from the pen of the English deist, David Hume. In his "Natural History of Religion," (published in 1755,) he lays down this as his first and fundamental proposition: "Polytheism was the primary Religion of Mankind."

His first argument in support of this thesis is an appeal to the evidence of post-Christian history. He puts it thus:

> It is a matter of fact, incontestable, that about 1,700 years ago all mankind were polytheists. The doubtful and skeptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that not entirely too pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold, then, the clear testimony of history. The farther we mount into antiquity the more do we find mankind plunged into polytheism. No marks, no symptoms of any more perfect religion. The most ancient records of the human race still present us with that system as the popular and established creed. The North, the South, the East, the West, give their unanimous testimony to the same fact. What can be opposed to so full an evidence?

The force of this passage consists almost exclusively in its cool positiveness of dogmatic assertion. Plainly, the condition of the majority of mankind 1,700 years ago affords no just criterion by which to judge of the condition of the race thousands of years before that. Indeed, to any believer in historic evolution of any sort, it would seem antecedently certain that the condition of men several thousand years after the commencement of their existence must be very different indeed from their primitive condition. But, furthermore, he grants that 1,700 years ago the prevalence of polytheism was, after all, not universal; there were "one or two nations" of theists, and even philosophers in other nations, who doubted the truth of polytheism. It was absurd, therefore, to talk of "the *unanimous* testimony" of North and South, East and West.

The second point urged by Hume is the improbability of the supposition that "a barbarous, necessitous animal, such as man is, on the first origin of society," a being "pressed by such numerous wants and passions," should have had either the disposition, or the capacity, or the leisure, so to study "the order and frame of the universe" as immediately to be led "into the pure principles of theism." He grants that a careful and philosophic consideration of the unity and order of the natural world is sufficient to conduct one to an assured belief in the being of one Supreme and Almighty Creator, but he says: "I can never think that this consideration could have an influence on mankind when they formed their first rude notions of religion." Assuming that the first men must necessarily have been "an ignorant multitude," he says:

> It seems certain that, according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature.

The force of this argument it is difficult to see. It all rests upon two assumptions: first, the assumption that the first men were the lowest barbarians—to use his own words, "barbarous, necessitous animals;" and, secondly, the assumption that there was, apart from the philosophic study of nature, no other way in which they could have obtained a belief in the existence of the Creator. As no religionist of any age has ever admitted these assumptions, and as Hume adduces no particle of proof

for either of them, this part of his argument is surely without force.

His next and last point is the impossibility of the loss of the monotheistic faith if it had once been reached by the earliest men. He says:

> If men were at first led into the belief of one superior Being by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could never possibly leave [have left] that belief in order to embrace polytheism; but the same principles of reason which at first produced and diffused over mankind so magnificent an opinion, must be [have been] able, with greater facility, to preserve it. The first invention and proof of any doctrine is much more difficult than the supporting and retaining of it.

Here our author appears to even poorer advantage than in either of his former arguments. In the first place, as before, he ignores the possibility of supposing a knowledge of God by means of a divine self-manifestation—thus covertly misrepresenting or evading the only point in debate. In the second place, the assertion, that if the first men had attained to a pure theism, they never could have left it and become polytheists, should be compared with his own later assertions in section viii, of the same treatise, where he describes what he, himself, calls the "Flux and Reflux of Polytheism and Theism." This section opens thus:

> It is remarkable that the principles of religion have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink again from theism into idolatry.

The author then states his well-known theory of the origin of polytheism as the first form of religion, and his theory of the rise of monotheism out of polytheism. But when a people have thus reached a belief in a God possessed of "the attributes of unity and affinity, simplicity and spirituality," there comes—so he declares—a natural relapse into polytheism. The explanation of this is given in these words:

> Such refined ideas [as those of pure monotheism] being somewhat disproportioned to vulgar comprehension, remain not long in their original purity, but require to be supported by the notion of inferior mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose between mankind and their supreme deity. These demi-gods, or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objects of devotion. . . . But as these idolatrous religions fall every day into grosser and more vulgar corruptions, they at last destroy themselves, and by the vile

representations which they form of their duties make the tide turn again toward theism.

Thus monotheism and polytheism are, to Hume, two opposites, between which the human mind forever oscillates. This being so, it is plain that this oscillation is grounded in reason, or it is not. If it is grounded in reason, then primitive men may have reasoned their way into monotheism as their first religious faith, and still have relapsed into polytheism as the natural and rational reaction. On the other hand, if the oscillation is not grounded in reason, then, as by his own account all later religious states of mankind have been unreasonable, the *first* may have been altogether different from what Hume would have considered rational; that is, may have been a state of pure monotheism.

Such was Hume's attempted demonstration of the primitiveness of polytheism, and the whole of it.

Five years later, in 1760, De Brosses, one of Voltaire's correspondents, published his crude but noteworthy book on "The Worship of Fetiches; or, Parallel of the Ancient Religion of Egypt with the present Religion of Nigritia." This was the writer who first gave currency to the word "Fetichism," and who first postulated it as the invariable antecedent of polytheism. De Brosses, however, was a professed believer in primeval divine revelation, and he made the Hebrews an exception to his general claim that all ancient nations began with fetichism, rose thence to polytheism, and tended thence toward monotheism. In the early part of the present century, however, Auguste Comte, ignoring any primeval revelation, elevated De Brosses's generalization into an absolute law of historic development. He gave the greater acceptability and influence to it by representing this law of theological progress as only part of a yet broader social law, according to which humanity, having traversed this "theological stage" in the manner indicated, passes next through a "metaphysical" one, and finally attains the "scientific" stage of atheistic positivism.

In Germany, in 1795, Hume's opinion found an able representative in G. L. Bauer, of Altdorf, and ten years later we find Meiners, in his "Universal History of Religion," repeating and enforcing the notion of the absolute primitiveness of fetichism. The rationalistic and pantheistic tendencies of

German speculation about this time, were, of course, favorable to any new theory which discredited the biblical one, and thus it came to pass that before the middle of the present century the De Brosses theory, in its completer Comtean form, became almost universally adopted. Speaking of its prevalence, Max Müller says:

> All of us have been brought up on it. I, myself, certainly held it for a long time, and never doubted it till I became more and more startled by the fact that, while in the earliest accessible documents of religious thought we look in vain for any very clear traces of fetichism, they become more and more frequent every-where in the latter stages of religious development, and are certainly more visible in the later corruptions of the Indian religion, beginning with the Atharvana, than in the earliest hymns of the "Rig Veda." *

For many years our works on primeval history have been saturated with this idea. Even professedly Christian writers upon the history of religions, and upon Comparative Theology, have largely fallen in with the prevailing notion. As one has well said, "The very theory has become a kind of scientific fetich, though like most fetiches it seems to owe its existence to ignorance and superstition."

For some time past, however, this long dominant dogma of naturalism has been losing credit with all careful students of the world's religions, and, indeed, with the more thorough professional ethnologists. In his recent work, "The Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion," † Max Müller, himself for a long time, as we have seen, a believer in the theory, publicly challenges its correctness. In Lecture Second, after rapidly sketching the rise and remarkable prevalence of the theory, he exposes, with much acuteness and with his usual wealth of illustrative facts, the indiscriminateness with which the term fetichism has been currently used, and the worthlessness of evidence upon which Comte and others have relied. He sets forth, respectfully, but strongly, the inadequacy of their psychological exploration of the origin of fetichism, and shows that even the West African fetich-worshipers hold at the same time other views properly polytheistic, or, in some cases, even monotheistic. Summing up his own conclusions, he says:

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* "Origin and Growth of Religions," Lond. and N. Y., 1879, p. 58.

† Reviewed by C. P. Tiele, in "Theol. Tijschrift," for May, 1879.

The results at which we have arrived, after examining the numerous works on fetichism from the days of De Brosses to our own time, may be summed up under four heads:

First. The meaning of the word fetich has remained undefined from its first introduction, and has by most writers been so much extended that it may include almost every symbolical or imitative representation of religious objects.

Second. Among people who have a history we find that every thing which falls under the category of fetich points to historical and psychological antecedents. We are, therefore, not justified in supposing that it has been otherwise among people whose religious development happens to be unknown or inaccessible to us.

Third. There is no religion which has kept itself entirely free from fetichism.

Fourth. There is no religion which consists entirely of fetichism.*

So able an *exposé* of the short-comings of the fetichistic philosophy of the origin of religion, coming from the pen of a writer so widely and deservedly popular, cannot fail to produce in the Anglo-Saxon world of general readers and second-hand writers a profound and wholesome impression.

Perhaps the most striking defect of this work of Müller's was his failure anywhere to recognize the fact that, so far as this dogma of primitive fetichism is concerned, he was really dealing with an issue which in advanced circles was already dead. Ten or fifteen years earlier his polemic would have done many times the good it can now. During this period a decided change has taken place. There remained a decade or two ago a further step, and but one further step, for the advocates of the naturalistic view of the origin of religion to take. Hume had made polytheism the primitive faith; Comte thought to go back of this, and to postulate a still more rudimentary form as antedating polytheism. It remained to go back of fetichism and predicate of the first men *absolute atheism.* This, various recent authors have done, prominent among whom, in England, is Sir John Lubbock. In chapter iv of his work, miscalled "The Origin of Civilization, and the Primitive Condition of Man," † he classifies "the first great stages of religious thought" as follows:

First. *Atheism;* "understanding by this term not a denial of

* "Origin and Growth of Religion," p. 115.

† The first edition was published in 1870.

the existence of a deity, but an absence of any definite ideas on the subject."

Second. *Fetichism.* In the state of primeval atheism men were "not without a belief in invisible beings." They especially believed in human shadows, ghosts, and the people seen in dreams, etc., though these spirits were not conceived of as immortal, or as possessing any supernatural powers. They were feared only because they were supposed to have power and disposition to inflict disease or otherwise injure men yet in the flesh. Now, inasmuch as it was believed that, by means of the fetich, these evil spirits could be controlled and coerced to the will of the worshiper, fetichism, viewed in its relation to religious development, is pronounced by Lubbock "a decided step in advance." Viewed in itself, "it is mere witchcraft."

Third. *Totemism*, or Nature-worship. This our author nowhere clearly distinguishes from fetichism. In this stage of religious progress—

> The savage does not abandon his belief in fetichism, from which, indeed, no race of men has yet entirely freed itself, but he superinduces on it a belief in beings of a higher and less material nature. In this stage every thing may be worshiped — trees, stones, rivers, mountains, the heavenly bodies, plants, and animals.

Fourth. *Shamanism.* "As Totemism overlies Fetichism, so does Shamanism overlie Totemism." Here the gods are conceived of as far more "powerful than men," as "of a different nature," as residing far away, and as "accessible only to the Shamans," who are "occasionally honored by the presence of the deities, or are allowed to visit the heavenly regions." This in its turn is pronounced "a considerable advance" over the preceding stage of religious thought.

Fifth. *Idolatry*, or Anthropomorphism. Here "the gods take still more completely the nature of men, being, however, more powerful. They are still amenable to persuasion; they are a part of nature, and not creators. They are represented by images or idols."

Sixth. To the sixth stage no name is given; but it is described as one in which "the deity is regarded as the author, not merely a part, of nature. He becomes for the first time a really supernatural being."

Seventh. In this last and highest stage, which he also leaves

unchristened, morality becomes "for the first time associated with religion." *

We will not stop to criticise in detail this extremely confused and ill-named classification, or the assumptions on which it rests. Its most characteristic feature is its postulation of universal primitive atheism as antedating every form of religious development in our race. So far as he rests this dogma, either upon the affirmed absence of all religious beliefs and usages among the lowest savages of to-day, or upon the principle that the religious conceptions of a people are always in exact proportion to its degree of civilization, his refutation quickly began. The next year after the publication of his work, in a learned treatise on "Primitive Culture," E. B. Tylor challenged several of Lubbock's authorities for the statement that non-religious tribes have been found, while in his new work on "The Human Species," 1879, the learned and able Professor of Anthropology in the Paris Museum of Natural History, Quatrefages, went yet further, not only maintaining, with Tylor, that no atheistic tribe of savages has yet been discovered, but also expressly denying the proposition that elevation of religious conceptions invariably corresponds to the elevation of a people in the scale of general civilization or knowledge of the arts. The fact that these objections to the hypothesis of primitive atheism came, not from theologians, but from scientific men—from fellow-students in the fields of anthropology and ethnology—gave them, with many, all the greater weight. The careful reader, however, cannot fail to see that the only difference between Lubbock and some of his critics is merely one of name and not of thing—that the alleged primitive state which he calls atheistic exactly corresponds to what Tylor and Darwin would describe as the earliest form of animistic religion, and to what Herbert Spencer would call the first rudimentary beginnings of ghost and ancestor worship. Nor can we fail to see that the consistent Darwinian evolutionist must place the beginnings of human history so near the plane of the brute-life as to make it almost certain that its first stage was truly non-theistic, if not, indeed, altogether non-religious.

Precisely at this point notice should be taken of the elaborate work of Otto Caspari, of Heidelberg, entitled "*Die Urgeschichte*

* Chaps. iv–vi.

der Menschheit, mit Rücksicht auf die natürliche Entwicklung des frühesten Geisteslebens," ("The Primitive History of Mankind, with Respect to the Natural Evolution of the Earliest Spiritual Life.") This two-volumed treatise was issued at Leipsic in 1872, and reached a second edition in 1877. A very large portion of it is devoted to the exposition of the author's view of the origin and natural evolution of religion in the early history of the race. This view is characterized by an originality and elaborated with an ingenuity which render the book as fascinating to the student as the most absorbing romance. The author is a pure and professed evolutionist, but instead of attempting to solve his problem with Lyell and Broca from the data of Paleontology, or with Darwin and Häckel from the data of Zoology, or with Huxley and Bastian from the data of Biology, or with Müller and Noiré from the data of Philology, or with Prichard and Peschel from the data of Ethnology, or with Tylor and Lubbock from the data of Culture-History, or with Waitz and Topinard from the data of General Anthropology, he approaches it and grapples with it as a problem for that higher and broader science to which all of the above are tributary—the science to which its German originators have given the name, *Völker-psychologie*, (Ethnic or Anthropic Psychology.) He cannot consider the problem solved until, beginning with the psychological facts of brute-life, we are able to represent to ourselves the successive steps and stages by which the originally animal mind slowly evolved all the spiritual and religious conceptions, emotions, habits, and ideals of the historic and actual human race. His own attempt to do this is not free from arbitrary assumptions or inconsistencies, but, as a whole, it is a marvel of subtile analysis and constructive ability. In contrast with it the expositions of Hume and Lubbock appear as clumsy and grotesque as the early theories of geology, described in Goldsmith's "Book of Nature," now look to the modern student.

One of the oldest of the antisupernaturalist explanations of the origin of religion is that which ascribes it to the ignorant and superstitious fears of earliest men.

"Primus in orbe deos fecit timor,"

wrote Petronius, and Lucretius's fuller exposition of the same notion is familiar. No such explanation satisfies Caspari. He

cannot conceive how fear could ever become that compound of reverence and love which is of the essence of religion. Fear simply prompts the brute to shun, as far as may be, the object feared. Equally unsatisfactory is the notion that the heavenly bodies and the sublimer phenomena of nature inspired the awe and curious questionings out of which religion could have grown. The primitive man, like the anthropoid brute, took no notice of the remote and lofty. Nothing had interest for him save that which was perceived to be vitally related to him in the struggle for existence. The range of his conceptions and of his sympathies was limited to the objects which were his allies or his enemies in this perpetual battle. Religion, therefore, is not to be traced to any inworking of nature or of natural objects upon the human mind. It had a deeper and yet more obvious genesis in natural human relationships. The first and root-form of all piety was filial piety. The first object of truly religious regard was *the parent.* This reverential and affectionate regard of the consciously ignorant, weak, and dependent child for the indefinitely wise, strong, and helpful father or mother is essentially religious. At an extremely early date it must have become extended from the parent to the all-defending and all-regulating tribal chieftain, and to the aged and experienced counselors of the rude primeval communities. The natural tendency of uncivilized men to gesture-language must have produced habitual forms of rendering homage—the germ of which we may observe in the homage paid by the bees to their queen—and thus parents, chieftains, and sages were the first objects of religious reverence and homage among men. As yet men had no conceptions of nature as a whole, no intellectual interest in stars or trees or animals, no mental provocation to worship any thing else than "*the ethically exalted*," as it appeared in the narrow circle of the family and tribal life. There was no thought of an unseen world, no idea of souls, no proper conception even of death. The dead man was supposed to be simply asleep, or in a long swoon. Being self-evidently helpless for the present, like a sick member of the family, he called out natural pity and care. Food and drink were placed in readiness against his re-awakening. If he had to be left behind, he was put in a cave to protect him against wild beasts, and his weapons were left for his use.

On the basis of this *naïve* conception of things the rise of animal worship first becomes conceivable. The beast which has devoured a man, living or dead, is now as much man as beast. The man has not ceased to be, he has simply blended his life in that of the beast, and become a "half-beast." The ferocity of the new compound is easily mistaken for an angry wish on the part of the late man to take vengeance on his relatives or associates for not having more effectually protected him from the devouring animal. But if the man-beast is human enough to remember and avenge such real or supposed neglects on the part of his late friends, he must be human enough to recognize and appreciate any well-meant attempts to appease his anger and propitiate his favor. Hence a natural basis, not for universal animal worship, but for the worship of the more common carnivora, and these Caspari endeavors to show were the first that attained such distinction.

Here, also, is found the origin of Cannibalism. A man has killed his foe. If he leaves him merely dead, he will some time come to life again as bad as ever. If haply a wild beast first come and devour him, he will then become a ferocious and malevolent "man-beast"—a worse enemy than ever. There is no way of making the victory final and secure, except by eating him up one's self. Then the life and valor of the slain becomes the life and valor to the slayer. Even the eating of others than foes becomes in this way intelligible. As the Fan Negroes are said to eat—"with a certain tenderness"—the corpses of their wives and children, so the primitive man, seeking the safest possible place for the body of his dead friend, may have thought it a far friendlier act to eat him up than to leave him to take his chances at the hand of worms under-ground, or beasts of prey above it. Between the two motives, the desire to appropriate the vital forces of the foe and the wish to do the best possible thing for the unwakable friend, our author thinks that anthropophagy became in the first age of the world almost universal. The very piety of the surviving for the dead contributed to the dissemination of the revolting custom.

Our limits will not permit an equally full account of the remaining steps by which religion has become what it has been and is in the world. Suffice to say that possible millenniums from the beginning of human history toward the end of the

"Stone Age," there occurred the greatest revolution in human thought and belief and life which the race has yet witnessed. This was brought about by the rise and adoption of the belief that trees and men and beasts—in fine, all natural objects—are possessed of invisible, impalpable, vital principles—souls. That which evoked and supported this strange, new notion was a discovery which, estimated by the breadth and profoundness of its influence, must be placed at the head of all others: the discovery, namely, of the art of kindling fire. This mysterious and novel power of evoking what seemed a bright and living being from the realm of the invisible, by means of the "fire-drill," half bewildered even the priestly caste, in whose hands the awful secret lay. Their attempts to use it led to Shamanism and a sincere magic. By means of the observed vital heat of living things, and the coldness of the dead, the new element was quickly identified with the inner essence of life itself, and the new art the more commended to universal attention by means of its beneficent applications in the hands of the Flamens or Fire-priests to the purposes of heating. The same identification of heat and life soon associated phallus and fire-drill, and introduced the strange and apparently monstrous aberration of Phallic worship. Under these new ideas it was only natural that sun and star and lightning flash should come to have a new significance for man, and make their impress on religion. Animal worship was profoundly modified in ways ingeniously set forth. The simple oblations of the earlier period give place to sacrifice to fire, and to the heavenly bodies. So strong is the desire to become transformed into white, flaming spirits, and to be joined to the supernal fellowship of such, that men bring themselves as offerings, and seek transfiguration in the holy altar flames. Hence human sacrifices; hence also incremation of the dead. In time, the idea of the soul takes on greater and greater definiteness; so also the idea of the immaterial supersensual gods. The long-continued stimulation of the imagination renders myth-constructions possible. Some of the great priesthoods of history invent hieroglyphic and alphabetic writing, and in time there naturally follow sacred books, cosmogonies, codes of religious laws, etc., etc. The magic wand of the first fire-bringer has at last created a spiritual and unseen counterpart to the world which is seen.

In this enchanted world we live to-day, the lowest of us showing our faith by superstitious fetichism, the highest of us by attempts at a purely spiritual worship. That highest Christian conception, "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all," is simply the culmination of a mode of thinking which started ages ago with the spark which some savage prehistoric flint-chipper struck out of the flinty stone.

The brevity of this sketch of Caspari's theory renders it impossible to do full justice to the skill and plausibility with which he has elaborated it. Still less have we time for that detailed review which would be needed were we to undertake a refutation of the scheme in part or whole.

In striking opposition to the theory of Caspari stands that of *Jules Baissac*, elaborated in his "*Origines de la Religion.*" * He too begins with primitive animality, and proposes to trace the rise and natural evolution of religion from that far-off starting-point of the human race. But, instead of magnifying the initial influence of a pure domestic life in Caspari's truly German method, Baissac—in a manner characteristically French, shall we say?—starts with a deification of mere maternity, conceived of as self-originating and self-sufficing. This form of religion prevailed during the remote period anterior to the time when it was discovered that males had any participation in the procreation of the species. The religious symbols of that far-off age were les élévations et tumescences terrestres, naturelles ou artificielles, et les cavités sonterraines; les tumescences comme image du sein maternel en état de pregnation et les profondeurs et cavités comme ventre sacré de la divine mère. De là le culte des ballons ou montagnes à croupe arrondie; de là le symbolisme des tumuli, des pyramides, des grottes, des puits, des labyrinthes, des dolmens. In this period all motherhood is divine, and all life and change in nature mentally represented as a spontaneous and exclusively female conceiving and bringing forth.

In the second period, which is still anterior to the idea of marriage, and to the establishment of the idea of personal property or individual rights, the function of the male principle has been discovered; and now Nature, the divine mother, is conceived of as analogous to a woman of the period, a mother

* Paris, 2 tomes, 1877.

fecundated only by male energy, but by male energy from any quarter. To use Baissac's own terms, she is a prostituée divine ayant son symbole dans la Terre ouverte à tous les germes.*

In the third period the two principles are brought into a relation of equality, and now the divine becomes hermaphrodite.

In the fourth the male principle is given priority, the religious symbols of maternity give place to the phallic symbols, the institutions of marriage and property arise, the power of atmospheric and celestial divinities begins to supersede that of earth-spirits. The fifth stage is marked by the entire predominance of these celestial divinities and the definite rejection of the ancient chthonian and subterranean powers. In the sixth comes the final separation of the Heaven and the Earth, the idea of creation and the idea of an almighty and transcendent Creator of all things.

The manner in which the author elaborates this savory interpretation of the history and symbolism of religion, through two octavo volumes of 300 pages each, is as ingenious as it is disgusting.

The best refutation of whatever is wrong in all these new evolutional conceptions of primordial religion will be found, not in a blind and indiscriminate polemic against them *en masse*, but in showing how every departure from the traditional conception involves the careful thinker in perplexing if not insoluble problems, and how easily all the real facts on which these proposed departures are based can be arrayed in support of the traditional conception. To this task we turn.

First, then, according to Genesis, the earliest representatives of the human race begun their existence in Paradise unclad, unhoused, and possessed of none of the outward and visible signs of what is called civilization. Had Mr. Lubbock been permitted at the time to visit the spot, he would have seen—so far as Moses suggests—no printing-press, no power-loom, perhaps not even a "fire-drill" or flint "arrow-head." He would have seen no god, no Miltonic guard of angels, no Eden gates, *no temple nor altar*. He would only have noticed, in the luxuriant tropical landscape, a wealth of graceful animal forms, rising in manifold gradations, and culminating in two fair human figures. He would doubtless have gone his

* Page 131.

way and reported at the next meeting of the Anthropological Society the discovery of a new Otaheite, whose naked and artless inhabitants were evidently at the bottom of the scale as respects "culture," and in the sub-fetichistic, "atheistic stage" as respects religion. So doing, he would have committed no greater blunder than many of his favorite reporters have made in describing such people as the Andaman Islanders.*

According to the old conception, no less than according to the new, the arts were only gradually developed. Men were destitute of the art of metal-working and of all to which that was essential until the days of Tubal Cain. Musical instruments there were none, until invented by Jubal. Every thing in Sacred Scripture indicates the kind of social and industrial progress for which, in connection with the beginnings of human society, one would naturally look.

So far, then, the believer in Sacred History has no occasion whatever to disagree with the believer in Natural History. Häckel and Peschel and Caspari hold, with Moses, to the monogenesis of the race, and even place their imaginary "Lemuria" just under the northern portion of the Indian Ocean, hard by one of the traditional seats of Eden. Their account of man's migrations from that center, and of his primeval destitution of the arts, conflict with no fact recorded in Holy Scripture. Neither party can tell precisely how long the period antecedent to the rise of the first great historic civilizations of Asia, Egypt, and Greece lasted, and neither can tell how long ago it terminated, so that even in their confessed ignorances both are in accord.

But, secondly, the believer in Sacred History, Hebrew or Ethnic, cannot accept the eagerly advocated notion that the intellectual condition of the earliest men was not higher than that of the lowest savages of to-day. Ignorant of many things those earliest generations must have been, but it is equally certain that they must have been above the line which separates stationary or retrograding peoples from progressive ones. They were men capable of investigating the powers and laws of nature, of originating arts absolutely new in the history of the

* For the complete vindication of this statement, see Sir Henry Sumner Maine, "Early Law and Custom," London, 1883. pp. 229-231; Quatrefages, "The Human Species," N. Y., 1879, chap. xxxv; and especially Roskoff, "*Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*," Leipsic, 1880.

world, and of making successive inventions which revolutionized the social state.

With this representation we should expect the Darwinian on sober second thought to agree. For it is a well-known fact that our lowest savages are dying out, while the men who peopled the world in accordance with the law of the survival of the fittest, at a period in the earth's history when, in important respects, according to Darwin, the environment was less favorable to the human struggle for existence than now—must have been superior to these degenerating and vanishing tribes. And as all evolutionists, in enumerating the qualities which win in the struggle for existence, lay great stress upon superior intellectual endowments, it is only a natural inference that the native intelligence of the earliest men was at least superior to that of the lowest modern savage. Turning to the writers in question we find our antecedent expectations confirmed. Thus Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his "Principles of Sociology," expresses himself as follows:

> There are sundry reasons for suspecting that existing men of the lowest types, forming social groups of the simplest kinds, do not exemplify men as they originally were. Probably most of them, if not all of them, had ancestors in higher states, and among their beliefs remain some which were evolved during those higher states. . . . There is inadequate warrant for the notion that the lowest savagery has always been as low as it is now. . . . That supplanting of race by race, and thrusting into corners such inferior races as are not exterminated which is now going on so actively, and which has been going on from the earliest recorded times, must have been ever going on. And the implication is that remnants of inferior races, taking refuge in inclement, barren, and otherwise unfit regions, have retrograded.*

In like manner Darwin himself conceives of the first men as capable of rising in thought above the knowledge furnished by the senses, *as able to represent to themselves the unseen and spiritual.* And he expressly calls their mental faculties "high," saying: "The same high mental faculties which first led men to believe in unseen spiritual agencies, then in fetichism, polytheism, and ultimately in monotheism, would infallibly lead him, so long as his reasoning powers remained poorly developed, to various strange superstitions and customs." † Thus Darwin

* "Principles of Sociology," pp. 106–109.

† "Descent of Man, vol. i, p. 66.

justly considers the character of the very aberrations of the human intellect in its infantile stage a striking proof of the loftiness of its powers.

Lubbock ascribes to the earliest men a like ability to conceive of the supersensual, and to govern themselves largely by ideals. Though sometimes speaking of the primitive generations as in a state of "utter barbarism," or as having been "no more advanced than the lowest savages of to-day," this seems to occur only by inadvertence, for in the later editions of his already quoted work on "The Origin of Civilization," (page 483,) he expressly admits and asserts that he does not regard cannibals as representatives of the first men.* On the same page he says: "It may be as well to state emphatically that all brutal customs are not, in my opinion, primeval. Human sacrifices, for instance, were, I think, certainly not so."

Caspari also affirms that the social state of the North American Indians and of the Australians is not primitive, but a result of degeneration. He says: "We know a succession of such tribes of which, in fact, only *ausgeartete verkommene Banden und staatliche Splitter* remain in existence, who, wild and savage, wander about in the primitive forests miserably to perish." †

Tylor takes the same general ground, maintaining that the best representatives of primitive men are not the lowest but "the higher" of the uncivilized races. Thus he says:

> In a study of the native myths of the world it is hardly practicable to start from the conceptions of the very lowest human tribes and to work upward from thence to fictions of higher growth; partly because our information is meager as to the beliefs of these shy and seldom quite intelligible folk, and partly because the legends they possess have not reached that artistic and systematic shape which they attain to among races next higher in the scale. It, therefore, answers better to take as a foundation the mythology of the North American Indians, the South Sea Islanders,

* Let us hope that it is by a like inadvertence merely that Professor Sayce speaks of "the savage tribes of the modern world, and *the still more savage* tribes among whom the languages of the earth took their start."—*Introduction to the Science of Language*, vol. ii, p. 31. Compare p. 269, where speaking of the mythopœic man, whom he considers a considerable advance on the primitive savage, the professor says: "He had not yet learned to distinguish between the lifeless and the living;" "he had not yet realized that might existed which his senses could not perceive."

† Vol. i, p. 113.

and other high savage tribes *who best represent in modern times the early mythological period of human history.**

In chapter ii of the same work he presents the evidence that many of the very lowest tribes of the modern world have become what they are by degeneration.

But, thirdly, if the best representatives of the first men must be sought, not among the lowest, but rather among the higher, of the uncivilized peoples, then surely we are justified in rejecting the notion of all those writers who, since the time of De Brosses and Comte, have maintained that primitive men personified and vitalized and fetichised all natural objects about them.

On this point the author of the "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy" is less clear-sighted than his master. Boldly and ably as he criticises Comte in some other particulars, in this Mr. Fiske surrenders to him wholly. He says: "We may safely assert, with Comte, that the earliest attitude assumed by the mind in interpreting nature was a fetichistic attitude." † Herbert Spencer, however, recognizing the fact that the lower mammals, birds, and even insects, are able to distinguish animate from inanimate objects, and that to deny this capacity to the first men would be to make them less and lower than animals, commits himself unreservedly to the view in harmony with that of the biblical record. Quoting the stock examples of savages who, on first seeing a watch or a compass, imagined that it was alive, he shows the naturalness of the mistake, and very properly says:

> We must exclude these mistakes made in classing things which advanced arts have made to simulate living things; since such things mislead the primitive man in ways unlike those in which he can be misled by the natural objects about him. Limiting ourselves to his conceptions of these natural objects, we cannot but conclude that his classification of them into animate and inanimate is substantially correct. Concluding this, we are obliged to diverge at the outset from certain interpretations currently given of his superstitions. The assumption, tacit or avowed, that the primitive man tends to ascribe life to things which are not living is clearly an untenable assumption. Consciousness of the difference between the two, growing ever more definite as intelligence evolves, must be in him more definite than in all lower creatures. To suppose that without cause he begins to confound them, is to suppose the process of evolution inverted. ‡

* "Primitive Culture," vol. i, p. 321.

† Vol. i, p. 178, *et passim.*

‡ "Principles of Sociology," pp. 143, 144.

This writer, therefore, whom Darwin in one passage calls "our great philosopher," explicitly rejects the dogma of the primitiveness and universality of animism and fetichism among the earliest men. According to him animistic and fetichistic beliefs were not "primary beliefs," they were errors into which "the primitive man was betrayed during his early attempts to understand the surrounding world." "The primitive man no more tends to confound animate with inanimate than inferior creatures do." (P. 146.)

Caspari, too, as we have seen, denies to fetichism a primitive character. Ascribing its rise to the new ideas which the discovery of the art of fire-kindling produced, he makes the worship of "the morally exalted," (*des sittlich Erhabenen,*) represented by the personal father, the tribal chieftain, and the deceased ancestor far older, possibly thousands of years older, than any worship of fetiches. With Lubbock there is no moral element in religion until it reaches its last and highest stage. With Caspari, on the contrary, religion is essentially moral in its first emergence, and has from the first moment of its existence an actual and relatively worthy personal object. This is a prodigious scientific advance from the positions of Hume, Comte, Lubbock, and all their followers, and by postulating a high moral nature and moral life at the very beginnings of human history, it renders the biblical conception of those beginnings, not only conceivable, but even antecedently probable.

Fourthly, the Bible and the sacred traditions of nearly all peoples represent monogamy as the first form of marriage, ascribing all deviations from it to the ungoverned selfish passions of men. This view, Lubbock and the writers whom he has followed, M'Lennan and Morgan, emphatically reject. These theorists claim that among the first men the late Oneida Community system of "complex marriage," or, as Lubbock calls it, "communal marriage," universally obtained. The appropriateness of the term *marriage* is very far from clear. The first communities were mere herds, in which all the women were "wives" to all the men. In M'Lennan's opinion "the next stage was that form of polyandry in which brothers had their wives in common; afterward came that of the *levirate*, that is, the system under which, when an elder brother died, his second brother married the widow, and so on with the others

in succession. Thence he considered that some tribes branched off into endogamy, others into exogamy; that is to say, some forbade marriage out of, others within, the tribe. If either of these two systems was older than the other, he considers that exogamy must have been the more ancient. Exogamy was based on infanticide, and led to the practice of marriage by capture. Lubbock, on the contrary, believes that the communal marriage, which he assumes to have been the primitive form, "was gradually superseded by individual marriage founded on capture, and that this led, firstly, to exogamy, and then to female infanticide, thus reversing Mr. M'Lennan's order of sequence. Endogamy and regulated polyandry, though frequent," he says, "I regard as exceptional, and as not entering into the normal progress of development." * Still different is the theory of Bachofen, set forth in his work entitled "*Das Mutterrecht.*" Assuming sexual promiscuity as the primordial state, he considers that under this system the women—instead of being rendered more and more debauched and corrupted by the practice, as we might suppose—became, on the contrary, in process of time so refined, that after a season they felt shocked and scandalized by the beastly state of things, revolted against it, and established a system of marriage with female supremacy, the husband being subject to the wife, property and descent being required to follow the female line, and women enjoying the principal share of political power.

Gradually, however, the more spiritual ideas associated with fatherhood prevailed over the more material ideas associated with motherhood. The father came to be considered the real author of life to the offspring, the mother a mere nurse, property and descent were traced in the male line, sun-worship superseded moon worship, men absorbed all political power—in a word, as primitive "Hetairismus" was followed by the "Mother-law" system, so this now gave way to the modern social state.

The chief evolutionist authorities disagreeing so widely on this point, it is surely proper to look further. So doing, we find a number of at least equally respectable, scientific, and speculative representatives of the evolutional school, who expressly question, if they do not openly reject, the dogma of

* "Origin of Civilization," pp. 94, 95.

universal sexual promiscuity as the primeval social state. Thus Herbert Spencer argues through many pages of his "Principles of Sociology" against M'Lennan, claiming that monogamy must be conceived of as going back to the beginning. However unsettled social and sexual relations then were, "promiscuity," he affirms, "was checked by the establishment of individual connections prompted by men's likings, and maintained against other men by force." (P. 665.) Again he says: "The impulses which lead primitive men to monopolize other objects of value must lead them to monopolize women." (P. 664.) And again: "Monogamy dates back as far as any other marital relation." (P. 698.) Darwin takes substantially the same view, positively discrediting the alleged sexual promiscuity of the earliest communities.*

In like manner another of the latest of English writers on this subject, James A. Farrer, in his book entitled "Primitive Manners and Customs,"† emphatically rejects the notion that a brutal and forcible bride-capturing was ever universal, and denies that the customs relied upon by M'Lennan and others to prove its prevalence are to be viewed as a survival of such a custom. As to the absolutely first form of marriage he does not express an opinion, but the theory of primitive monogamy would better agree with his general representation than any other. The same may be said of Caspari, who, though he does not expressly postulate the priority of monogamy, yet ascribes to filial piety a rôle in the first origination of religion which seems to necessitate such a postulate.‡ So Mr. John Fiske's suggestion, that the transition from the anthropoid animals to truly human beings was probably effected by the prolongation of infancy and of parental care incident to the slower evolution of a highly complex organism, and, by the family life thus necessitated and brought about, is more harmonious with the doctrine of primitive monogamy than with any other. It would not be surprising, therefore, if this class of considerations, which we meet again in Noiré's theory of the origin of language, should gradually lead to such a reconstruction of Darwinian sociology as will postulate monogamy as the one and only form of sexual relation by virtue of which man could have

* "Descent of Man," vol. ii, pp. 362–367. † London, 1879.

‡ See vol. i, pp. 322, 358, 367.

arisen out of the lower and preceding animal orders. Mr. Spencer calls Mr. Fiske's suggestion "an important" one, and he explains it in a note appended to a significant declaration respecting the biological and sociological value of monogamy. (P. 630.) Elsewhere, after stating that "Irregular relations of the sexes are at variance with the welfare of the society, of the young and of the adults," and after ascribing the gradual dying out of the Andamanese to their promiscuity of sexual relation,* he says: "We may infer that the progeny of such unions (as had a degree of exclusiveness and durability) were more likely to be reared and more likely to be vigorous." (P. 669.) Again, a page or two later, he uses this language: "As under ordinary conditions the rearing of more numerous and stronger offspring must have been favored by more regular sexual relations, there must on the average have been a tendency for those societies most characterized by promiscuity to disappear before those less characterized by it." (P. 671.) But Spencer himself must grant that in the earliest ages, upon the whole, the race multiplied and spread from generation to generation, so that we must at least conclude from his own declaration that the approximately monogamous societies and unions were more numerous than the approximately promiscuous ones.

Fifthly, the Bible represents the earliest men as capable of entertaining the conception of a supreme Divine Being, the Maker of the heavens and earth, the Creator and rightful Lord of men. It represents them as capable of realizing the moral obligation of obedience to the Creator, and as possessed of freedom to obey or to refuse. It gives us to understand that as a matter of fact a few, then as now, were faithful to their light and to their convictions of duty, while the greater part lived in conscious violation of the promptings of their own consciences. As a natural consequence immoralities multiplied; these demoralized and brutalized those who practiced them. Then demoralized and brutalized parents were followed by children less well instructed and less well endowed than they themselves had been, and so despite exceptional men and exceptional

* Mr. E. H. Man's recent paper on the Andaman Islanders ("The Journal of the Anthropological Institute," vol. xii, i. 69, and ii, 13) denies the alleged sexual promiscuity, and illustrates the worthlessness of much of the evidence on which popular ethnographers rely

families who were more faithful to conscience, the general demoralization went on. The song of Lamech (Gen. iv, 23, 24) is the song of a true savage, though of one who has known the law of right and duty. One can hardly read it without imagining it first sung in a kind of domestic war-dance in the hut of its polygamous author. He glories in his homicides, and evidently belongs to those who with savage lust and brutality "took them wives of all which they chose." He was a representative of his Cainite kindred. By the mass of these, and those who intermarried with them, the Father and Lord of all creatures was ignored and gradually misconceived and, at last, superseded by creations of man's own disordered mind and heart, until the pure primitive religion of the righteous patriarchs became a false worship as irrational and immoral as the mass of those who gave themselves to its loathsome and cruel practices. With some populations this abnormal and immoral evolution proceeded to thoroughly unnatural and self-destructive results, such as religious prostitution, sodomy, human sacrifices, cannibalism, etc. On the other hand, then as now, fidelity to truth and goodness led its possessor to larger knowledge and to higher spiritual experiences. Then, as ever, the principle held good, "To him that hath shall be given." Hence alongside and within and above the historic evolution of a large portion of the race from evil to evil, there was another evolution of a smaller but more vital portion from good to good. If Satan's kingdom steadily unfolded, so did also the kingdom of God. And while the one was in the direction of spiritual and physical degeneration and death, the other was in the direction of life and ultimate spiritual ascendency. Both of these partial or special evolutions were within and part of the universal evolution of the race under its pre-established nature and conditions, one of which fundamental conditions is its immanency in the Divine. Such is the picture presented us by all the monotheistic religions of the world, and it is substantially confirmed by most of the ancient traditions of the human race.

Now in all this there is nothing inconsistent with any well-established facts or principles of science. Some authorities which Lubbock himself quotes prove, not only that uncivilized tribes are capable of entertaining the theistic conception of the

world, but also that not a few of them when first found actually possessed remarkably high and pure conceptions of the Supreme Spirit and of man's relation to him. Thus he cites Livingstone as saying that "The uncontaminated African believes that the Great Spirit lives above the stars." In trying to prove the absence of prayer among certain savages, he admits witnesses who show that the Esquimos, the North American Indians, and the Caribs believed in the existence of a Supreme Spirit, the "Master of Life." He even quotes the following objection to prayer made by Tomochichi, the chief of the Yamacraws, to General Oglethorpe, to wit: "That the asking of any particular blessing looked to him like directing God; and if so, that it must be a very wicked thing. That for his part he thought every thing that happened in the world was as it should be; that God of himself would do for every one what was consistent with the good of the whole, and that our duty to him was to be content with whatever happened in general, and thankful for all the good that happened in particular." What civilized religionist, what purest monotheist, ever apprehended or expressed this theological problem more clearly than this Indian chief? Lubbock quotes another author as saying that the Caribs considered the Great Spirit as endowed with so great goodness that he does not take revenge even on his enemies.*

So Mr. Tylor allows not only that most barbarians are able to conceive of a Creator, but also that they actually believe in one. He says:

"Races of North and South America, of Africa, of Polynesia, recognizing a number of great deities, are usually and reasonably considered polytheists, yet their acknowledgment of a Supreme Creator would entitle them at the same time to the name of monotheists," if belief in a Supreme Deity, held to be the creator of the world and chief of the spiritual hierarchy, were the sufficient criterion of monotheism. "High above the doctrine of souls, of divine manes, of local nature-spirits, of the great deities of class and element, there are to be discerned in savage theology, shadowings quaint or majestic of the conception of a Supreme Deity." †

He illustrates the prevalence of this conception by facts related of barbarous peoples in almost every quarter of the globe. Speaking of the remarkable clearness of this idea and belief

* "Origin of Civilization," pp. 374, 375.

† "Primitive Culture," vol. ii, p. 332.

among the New Zealanders, the Hawaiians, the Tongans, Samoans and other representatives of the Polynesian race, he says:

> Students of the science of religion who hold polytheism to be but the misdevelopment of a primal idea of divine unity, which in spite of corruption continues to pervade it, might well choose this South Sea Island divinity as their aptest illustration from the savage world.

He quotes Moerenhout as saying:

> Taaroa is their supreme or, rather, only God; for all the others, as in other known polytheisms, seem scarcely more than sensible figures and images of the infinite attributes united in his divine person.

He adds the following sublime native description of this supreme God, (p. 345:)

> He was; Taaroa was his name; he abode in the void. No earth, no sky, no men. Taaroa calls, but naught answers; and alone existing he became the universe.

Though an outspoken opponent of the theory that polytheism arose from moral and spiritual degeneration, his own facts are so strong that, for the explanation of some of them, he is constrained to resort to it. Speaking of the "conceptions of the Supreme Deity in the savage and barbaric world," he says, "The degeneration theory may claim such beliefs as mutilated and perverted remnants of higher religions, in some instances, no doubt, with justice."

That a religion originally good and pure may degenerate and become corrupt is conceded even by Lubbock. At the close of his sketch of "the lowest intellectual stages through which religion has passed," he uses this significant language:

> I have stopped short sooner perhaps than I should otherwise have done, because the worship of personified principles, such as Fear, Love, Hope, etc., could not have been treated apart from that of the *Phallus*, or *Lingam*, with which it was so intimately associated in Greece, India, Mexico, and elsewhere; and which, though at first modest and pure—as all religions are in their origin—led to such abominable practices, that it is one of the most painful chapters in human history.*

Reading this the disciple of history simply asks: If men could so corrupt the originally modest and pure worship of Aphrodite, why not also the originally pure worship of Jehovah?

* "Origin of Civilization," p. 350.

Summing up, then, we see: 1. That, in rejecting the historical conception of the primeval religious belief of mankind, Hume took up a position which none of his own successors consider as at all tenable.

2. The further these successors have carried their revolt against history, the more have they become involved in contradiction with each other.

3. The more consistently and radically the dogma of primitive savagery has been carried out, the more inevitably has it landed its advocates in the doctrine of primitive bestiality.

4. In their eagerness to destroy the possibility or credibility of primeval monotheism, these more consistent and radical theorists have inadvertently gone so far as to render a self-consistent evolutional biology or sociology impossible.

5. In consequence hereof the more clear-sighted of the representatives of Darwinism are just now deftly re-approaching the long-scouted historic conception—by representing the first men as superior to the modern savage in intellectual endowment, by calling their powers high, by considering their judgments of natural objects substantially correct, by admitting their knowledge of the true and normal form of the family, by conceding to them a truly human appreciation of ethical excellences and obligations, by allowing to them a capacity to conceive of an almighty Supreme Spirit, the Author and rightful Governor of the world, and by recognizing that nearly all religions present clear traces of corruption. So far as principles are concerned these representations surrender their whole case. With these data Adamic revelation becomes quite as possible, and quite as credible, as Abrahamic, or Mosaic, or Christian Revelation.

This unclad Adam of the garden was no more incapacitated for the knowledge of his Father than was that naked second Adam for whose advent Mary provided the swaddling clothes. If the former seems too undeveloped to be an organ of divine revelation, the latter, the highest of all these organs, the absolute Revelator, began quite as low. If nomad Arabs of to-day can see in storm and stars sublime manifestations of one almighty personal power, why could not the nomadic Abel as well? If the Gospel messenger of to-day can cause the rudest Fijian to know God and to experience a sense of divine for-

giveness and favor, why may not God's earliest preachers of righteousness have produced a like effect on sincere souls even before the discovery of the art of metal-working? Only let once the anthropological and sociological postulates demanded even by Herbert Spencer be granted, and the ancient historic conception of primitive monotheism becomes both possible and eminently reasonable. As an escape from the conflicting and mutually destructive theories of the evolutional school in its different departments, it presents, on merely speculative grounds, a positive attractiveness. Its full array of evidences, however, is simply co-extensive and identical with the evidences for the reality of Historic Revelation as a whole. Every thing which goes to show that God has intelligibly revealed himself to men at all, bears more or less directly upon the credibility of a revelation "in the beginning."

Art. III.—OUR PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

An Index to Periodical Literature. By William Frederick Poole, LL.D., with the assistance of William I. Fletcher. Royal 8vo. Third Edition. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1882.

In no department of our modern literature do we find a larger or more vigorous and healthy growth than in that of the periodical. To measure its full magnitude we must recognize the fundamental difference between the serial and the finished volume. In a work which reappears at regular intervals, whether it be by the day or the year, the purpose is all the same—to speak again, and still again, and to keep on speaking, with a view to the new demands that come with each oscillation of the pendulum. But with the formal book the purpose is very different. The writer proposes to begin, and continue, and have done with, his undertaking, and then let it go out on its mission to the world. He may improve his work and prepare new editions, but it always contains an element of finality as a store-house of his thoughts. The periodical is the mouth-piece of confession, party, class, and tendency. It takes note of the passing currents, and expects immediate results from its work. It is the lance which the knight proposes to use in rapid gallop, not the heavy arms which must stand him

in good stead for an all-day encounter. The accumulation of this periodical matter is simply immense. The beginning is to be found in martial and thoughtful Venice, where, in 1531, the first modern periodical appeared as "La Gazetta," a name taken from the little local coin, which was the price of the fugitive sheet. The idea spread rapidly into other European countries, and now, after the lapse of three centuries and a half, we have a world of periodical literature, whose influence in shaping and quickening thought is beyond all computation.

The undertaking of Dr. Poole contemplated the classification of only the firmer and broader serials, the magazine proper, and not at all the mere newspaper. The growth of his idea touches upon the romance. While a student in Harvard, in 1848, and handling the books of the university library in his spare hours, he prepared his "Index to Subjects treated in Reviews and other Periodicals," a good pamphlet of one hundred and fifty-four pages. It awakened a taste, but did far more in revealing a need. Later, in 1853, his thin *brochure* grew into the "Index to Periodical Literature," an octavo of over five hundred pages. The edition was limited, and was soon out of print. As early as 1864 the writer had no little difficulty in purchasing a copy, which he did, finally, when spending a day in the Boston Public Library, of the author himself, who was the librarian. For twenty years the book has been entirely out of the market. Now comes the new edition, the latest Index, an immense royal octavo of one thousand four hundred and sixty-eight pages, in attractive print and double columns. Its place in literature is, and must remain, alone. The infant has at last become a man. The Preface, which could with great propriety have been called the Introduction, recounts the story of the bibliographer's intense mania, of librarians in the Old and New World coming to his relief, and of his happy solution of the difficulties of his system of classification, and of the fulfillment of his dream in the present magnificent work. Every American may well congratulate himself upon the achievement. The periodical world is no longer a hopeless labyrinth, but an easy road in the broad noonday. One can easily find what has been written, in calm or passion, on any topic and in any magazine, by the mere turning of the leaves.

We can best measure the value of Dr. Poole's labors by taking a broad view of this field, which he has been the first to enter as both student and analyst. The rapid growth of the European periodical, from its humble origin beside a Venetian canal in the former half of the sixteenth century, to its present immense proportions, is a fair index of the activity of thought created by the Reformation. Our serial literature sprang into being simultaneously with Protestantism, the mother of both books and modern republics. Venice was at this very time in the throes of the religious revolution. The works of Luther and his coadjutors were not only circulated, but even printed, along the Grand Canal. Some little skill was needful to escape papal interdiction. For example, the "Loci Theologici" of Melanchthon—the Greek term into which he translated his name, after the usage of scholars, from his German name of Schwarzerd, or Black Earth—was translated into Italian, and published under the almost undistinguishable, but accurately Italianized, name of "I Principii della Theologia di Ippofilo de Terra Nigra." The war between the German Empire and Italy broke out in 1526, and in 1527 the imperial army sacked Rome itself, and for a long time occupied Naples.

With this army there was a large number of Protestants. They carried the reform south of the Alps, and the contagion spread into the Italian peoples.* We have positive proof that Melanchthon corresponded with the Venetian reformers in 1529, and that Modena was a Lutheran city.† In England we find the same singular coincidence between the beginning of periodical literature and the bitter conflict between Romanism and Protestantism. The fitting out of the Spanish Armada was regarded as an attack at once upon British liberty and the Protestant cause. At the very time when the Armada was tossing in the English Channel, in 1588, and the hopes of Rome were bright with the prospect of humiliated British reformers, the first periodical in the British islands saw the light. This was eighteen years after Pius V. excommunicated Elizabeth, one year after the execution of Mary Stuart, and just at the hour when papal anger was supreme at the firm

* Sarpi: Dans l'Italie même plusieurs personnes joûterent la nouvelle Réforme, Hist. du Concile de Trente, traduit par Caerager, vol. i, p. 85.

† Citta Lutherana. Quirini, in Præf. to Poli Epistt. Tom. iii, p. 84.

Protestantism of Elizabeth and her ministry. The first German periodical was issued in Nuremberg. There is a number of it in the British Museum. Its title is "Newe Zeitung aus Hispanien und Italien." It is in black letter, and bears date of 1534. The description of this rare treasure is thus furnished by the catalogue:

A gazette of excessive rarity, which appears to have been printed at Nuremberg. It contains the first news of the discovery of Peru, and has remained unknown to all the bibliographers we have been able to consult. In it is announced that the governor of Panumya, (Panama,) in the Indies, has written to his Majesty (the Emperor Charles V.) that a ship had arrived from Peru with a letter from the Regent, Francisco Piscario, (Pizarro,) stating that he had disembarked and seized the country; that, with two hundred Spaniards, infantry and cavalry, he had embarked; that he had arrived at the lands of a great lord named Cassiko, who had refused peace, and attacked him; that the Spaniards had been victorious, and had seized five thousand castillions, pieces of gold, and twenty thousand marks of silver; and that they had drawn two millions in gold from the said Cassiko.

This is by nine months the earliest document known authenticating the conquest of Peru. The next publication we have was also in German, and printed in Cologne, by J. Bureich, entitled "Certain tidings of what has taken place in the month of September last past of this current year, 1596, in Spain, Portugal, and France." In 1590 a semi-annual publication was commenced in Germany. The following is the title of one of the numbers: "A True Description of all principal and noteworthy Histories which have taken place in Upper and Lower Germany, also in France, Italy, England, Spain, Hungary, Croatia, Poland, Sweden, Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, Turkey, etc., between the last past Frankfort Lent-Fair and the present Autumn Fair of this year, 1595, gathered and drawn up from day to day, partly from personal knowledge, partly from credible writings, by Jacobus Francus." The true name of the author was Conrad Lauterbach; he was born in Thuringia in 1534, and died in Frankfort in 1597.

The American periodical was born of the strife of the colonist with the rude forces of his new life and the ruder despotism of Whitehall. What had he to say, at his distance, from the happenings of the Old World? But it mattered little to him

what the Old World was doing and thinking. He had set up housekeeping for himself. The thought of independence really dawned on the colonial mind as early as the close of the seventeenth century. Our first American newspaper appeared in Boston in 1690. Its life was short, only one number appearing. It contained such an attack on the home government, on the ground of oppression, that the authorities cut its throat immediately, as "it came out contrary to law, and contained reflections of a very high nature." Only one copy of this remarkable production is supposed to be in existence. It is in the State Paper Office in London, and is a small sheet of four quarto pages, one of them being blank. On Monday, April 24, 1704, the "Boston News-Letter" appeared, on a half sheet of paper doubled into two leaves, having two columns on a page, and the entire paper one foot long and eight inches broad. Its imprint was, "Boston. Printed by B. Green, sold by Nicholas Boone at his shop near the Old Meeting House." From the opening address in it, it would be safe to infer that it was the property of John Campbell. It runs thus:

This "News-Letter" is to be considered weekly, and all persons who have any houses, lands, tenements, farms, ships, vessels, goods, wares, or merchandises, etc., to be sold or let; or servants run away, [in Boston, mind,] or goods stole or lost, may have the same advertised at a reasonable rate, from twelve pence to five shillings, and not to exceed: who may agree with John Campbell, Postmaster of Boston. All persons in town or country may have said "News-Letter" every week, yearly, upon reasonable terms, agreeing with John Campbell, Postmaster, for the same.

We must suppose that Mr. Campbell was successful in his enterprise, for, after a while, we find him enlarging and improving his paper, and invoking the good public to lend their generous aid. In his second appeal he said:

At the persuasion of several gentlemen, merchants and others, both in this and the neighboring provinces, who are sensible of the want of this public letter of intelligence for both foreign and domestic occurrences, the undertaker has once more attempted to promote the same, in hopes that all persons who love a public good will one way or other, will put to their helping hand to promote and support it, that the same may not only be carried on a fourth year, but also continued for the future. And all persons in town or country, who have a mind to encourage the same may

have the said letter of intelligence every week by the year upon reasonable terms, by agreeing with John Campbell, Postmaster of Boston.

But, lest that might not be enough, the publisher adds:

'Tis taken for granted that all such who had this letter of intelligence last year, and have not forbid the same, will be still willing to take it at the price which others give. If any are of a contrary mind let them signify it, and we shall forbear sending it to them. The undertaker has also been advised to carry on the occurrences where they were left off, and it is hoped that fourteen days will retrieve the same.

The "News-Letter" was a success, and only went down amid the convulsions of 1776. The journal that exerted the most marked influence during the Revolutionary War was the "Gazette," of Boston. It was established in April, 1755, and was the main organ of the patriots. It was published by Edes & Gill, and, at first, was issued in the form of a crown half sheet, in two pages folio; but about 1760 it was enlarged and printed on a demy sheet. Its office of publication became the habitual resort of the most distinguished political writers on the American side, among them James Otis, John Hancock, Joseph Warren, Thomas Cushing, Josiah Quincy, Jun., and the two Adamses, John and Samuel. This paper was a pest to the government. Every measure was examined and criticised in its columns by these able politicians with freedom and severity, and with a prodigious effect on the popular mind. It was in this journal that John Adams wrote, under the signature of "Novanglus," his celebrated series of papers in defense of the colonial cause, the first of which appeared in January, 1775. They were continued every week until April 19 of the same year, when the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington and Concord rendered further argument needless. Much as we must thank our grandsires for their restless swords, let us not forget that it was their pens that first drew their swords from the scabbard.

While patriotic impulses had much to do with the growth of American periodical literature, we must not forget that the theological and religious mind was active in the same direction. So far as we can determine, the great revival at the middle of the eighteenth century produced the first religious magazine published in this country. An odd hour in an obscure book-

stall brought into our possession a copy of a portion of this first American religious magazine, "The Christian History." It consists of weekly duodecimo numbers, of four leaves each, and bears the following title-page: "The Christian History, containing Accounts of the Revival and Propagation of Religion in Great Britain, America, etc., for the Year 1744. Boston, N. E. Printed by S. Kneeland and T. Green, for T. Prince, Jun., 1745."

This is the second and concluding volume. The first we have never been so fortunate as to see, except such extracts as are published in Gillies's "Historical Collections."* The serial closes with the following notice, which we introduce as a specimen of the business-like method with which even a religious publishing enterprise was conducted in those cruder days:

> Thus, according to the design of this paper, and from the best and most authentic materials we could obtain, we have given the reader a specimen of that wondrous work of God which has been in the midst of these years revived in many parts of Great Britain and America: and as the present paper concludes the year, and therewith the "Christian History," and there are some remarkable narratives yet unprinted, and others daily expected; it is proposed to publish them in entire pieces of about three sheets once a quarter, at twelve pence new tenor; and those who would encourage their publication are desired to send their names to Kneeland & Green, in Queen Street. The title-page and index to this volume will be speedily sent to the subscribers, when it is expected they will send in their dues.

After the declaration of peace the increase in American journalism was beyond all precedent. The freedom of the press having been guaranteed by the Constitution, newspapers multiplied, and continued to wield a supremacy over the public mind that has never yet decreased. Sometimes it is alarming; but, alarming or not, as the case may be, the fact is too well known to question for a moment. By the year 1810 the number of journals was 359, of which 27 were dailies, and the total annual issue was 22,321,000 copies. By 1850 the number of newspapers amounted to 2,800, with an annual circulation of 426,409,978 copies, or an average of nearly 22 copies to each person in our population, and of twelve journals to every 100,000 inhabitants. The number of daily newspapers, in

* Edited by H. Bonar, and published in Kelso, 1845.

1850, was 254, with an average circulation of 3,200 copies each. The number of newspapers and periodicals now published in the United States and Territories is as follows: dailies, 999; tri-weeklies, 49; semi-weeklies, 115; weeklies, 8,392; bi-weeklies, 46; semi-monthlies, 172; monthlies, 1,028; bi-monthlies, 12; quarterlies, 59—making a total of 10,872.*

We now come to the consideration of the utilization of our periodical literature for further literary purposes. For nothing good in literature ought to be considered a finality. Sometimes the magazine has been started somewhat flippantly, and you have not much respect for the editors, but the magazine itself may become a power. Take "Knight's Quarterly Magazine" as an illustration of the rollicking mood in which a periodical may be brought into life. A few young men, bright and sparkling Cantabs all of them—Praed, Macaulay, and Derwent and Henry Nelson Coleridge—resolved on starting a serial. They put out their proposition with that delicious bravery which marks the young man's trustfulness in the public before he gets to know it well:

Some of us have no occupation.
Some of us have no money.
Some of us are desperately in love.
Some of us are desperately in debt.
Many of us are very clever, and wish to convince the public of the fact.
Some of us have never written a line.
Some of us have written a great many, and wish to write more.
For all these reasons we intend to write a book.

The public had not much reason to expect mature matter after such a frank deliverance of motives, and yet, while this magazine has never figured extensively in the annals of periodical literature, no one can calculate the extent to which the editors and contributors gained that familiarity with the public, and with their own literary ability, which made them the writers into which they matured. Here lies one of the principal advantages of the periodical. The young aspirant for literary achievement has never attempted a book. It is too great a thought as yet. He is cramped, mayhap, for bread. At any rate, the burden of giving his inspirations to the public is full upon him. He is willing to do any thing by which to gain

* Rowell, "American Newspaper Directory," for 1883, p. 6.

the eye and ear of the million. So he writes an article for a magazine. He is admitted into the literary fraternity. Then come more confidence, more fresh thoughts, and finally the volume and volumes. We have just overhauled some numbers of the old short-lived "United States Literary Gazette," and there we find, away back in the twenties, some of our own Bryant's earliest and best poems, signed simply "B." Who can tell how much encouragement he derived from these first appearings of his poetic creations? The entire periodical was certainly worth all it cost, if for no other service than furnishing that one youth a stepping-stone to his now secure place in the pantheon of American minstrels. There is hardly any American poet, and many of the Victorian poets belong to the same category, who has not gained immensely from the advantages which were offered in the weekly and the monthly. It is not at all unlikely that most of the rare qualities which Macaulay developed as a historian found their germs in the care with which he found it necessary to prepare those fascinating articles in the "Edinburgh Review." Our own denominational literature abounds in illustrations of the same service. One has only to look into the back numbers of this Review to find abundant evidence of the single article as foreshadowing the later author of the formal volume.

The utility of the already existing treasures of periodical literature can be seen in the fact that many of the topics treated are of too special and minute a character to be cast into a volume. The whole magazine is replete with examples of this unique service to the general department of letters. As a specimen of the value of the one article which could never have been amplified into a volume, we may mention that choice bit of bibliographical information which Dr. M'Clintock furnished for this Review, in the year 1867, on the Abbé Migne's Roman Catholic Publishing House, a building occupying a good part of a block, under whose one roof the work of editing and printing the entire list of Greek and Latin Fathers is conducted. Poole's Index contains, on almost every page, monographs which, under any supposition, could not have seen the light had not the periodical been the vehicle for their presentation to the public. Where could we go for a satisfactory description of the Elgin Marbles, but to a single number of the "Quarterly Review;"

for an account of Sea Customs, but to "All the Year Round;" for a racy and full relation of the Scottish monks, but to a number each of the "North British" and the "Dublin;" for a thorough account of the Huguenots of Staten Island, by our genial friend, G. P. Disosway, but to the "Continental Monthly;" and for numerous descriptions of the early religious life along the Pacific coast, but to the now defunct "Overland Monthly"?

It may be urged that we find many of the more important magazine productions reproduced in volumes. True, but we must remember that the public of the periodical is different from that of the volume. Norman M'Leod wrote the most of his books in the monthly installments of "Good Words," of which he was creator and editor, and they afterward came out as bound volumes. Macaulay's Essays only solidified into a volume after appearing in the "Edinburgh," and even then under his protest. Trevelyan tells us that the author could never see why his Essays, and much less his Lays, should arrive at the dignity of a book. But there has been a different class of readers in each case. "Good Words" was sold at the news-stands, went every-where as a fugitive, stayed awhile on the parlor-table, and was finally thrown aside. But his "Old Lieutenant," "Parish Papers," "Highland Parish," "Character Sketches," "Starling," and "Eastward," as volumes, have gone into the home and the Sunday-school and the public library, and have gained a permanent place in the literature of all Anglic countries. Who that might want to read Macaulay's Essays would think now of depending on the "Edinburgh Review" for them? He found much to correct, and some harsh personalities to tone down, and finally came the Essays in the form of a volume. Only a small share, however, of even the best articles in periodicals are cast into the permanent form of a book. The most of them come before the public eye as monographs, and neither author or publisher thinks of later crystallization in a volume.

But the principal element of the utility of our periodical literature is to be found in the fact that, without it, we should be in the dark on many important departments of needful information. Suppose one is desirous of studying the aside-subject of the Plymouth Brethren. Where will he find his

sources? Marsden, in his "Dictionary of Christian Churches and Sects," does not dignify them with even a mention. There is, we think, no book (except M'Clintock & Strong's) which treats the subject even remotely. He is mainly dependent on the periodicals. By turning to Poole, he finds ten different magazine articles, from which he can derive data enough for a tolerably clear understanding of this diminutive, but still not to be despised, religious phenomenon. Who will direct to a single work that describes in full that rare and weird German mystic, Jacob Boehme? Vaughan, in his "Hours with the Mystics," gives us some choice information. The few books of the man which were rudely translated into English were out of the London market a century ago. But there are four Review articles, and a most valuable one on Boehme's death-bed, which tell us what we wish to know. There is but one good work on Tractarianism, that by Mozley, yet no one can read it without being convinced of how much he does not know of this singular theological development of our century. But we find that the missing links are supplied by the Review articles, nearly fifty of which have appeared, and leave but little to be desired. Sir Thomas More figures as both humanist and reformer, but he is a strangely overlooked character. Merle d'Aubigné can give us eight volumes on Calvin, but only a few fragments on More, the friend of Erasmus. But our periodical literature furnishes twenty-eight articles on the man, in all departments of his activity. We have but one good life of Olympia Morata, by Bonnet, but the reviews give eight excellent articles on her character and her place in the age to which she belonged.

The service which the periodical has performed as a censor of literature has been incalculable. Authors can no more be trusted to conduct their enterprise without the benefit of the public judgment than any other class of public servants. The republic of letters has often lapsed into a despotism of scribblers. Unless there be a watchful master, the same thing may occur at any time. The political review, albeit it may call itself purely literary, has its partisan point to carry, and so all things must bend to it. The "Edinburgh," in the days of Jeffrey, would tolerate nothing but Whiggery. No wonder Carlyle hated it, and no wonder it hated Carlyle, though a

truce was now and then patched up, on the basis of only German criticism from his jagged pen. To our certain knowledge the editor of a British review wrote to one of its critics to prepare a review on a certain book. The book bore on the stand-point of the serial. The answer came back, in substance: "What kind of a review shall I write? Shall I praise or abuse?" He of the tripod promptly replied: "Abuse." In due time the abuse came out in stately form.

William Black, in his "Shandon Bells," throws a world of light on the inner machinery of the typical London editing of a periodical, and how things must be made to match. Whatever suffers, the stand-point, like Sidney Smith's equator, must be respected. Still, this is only an offset to the general utility of the magazine as a public censor. There is justice—an average justice—even in the editor's room. Between the Tory and the Whig review, there is to be found, after all, the golden mean. As to the criticism on books, there is no telling what would become of authorship were it not for the writer's eye on his masters, the editors. In every line he writes he knows that he must look out for the lash. Like a certain English author of whom we wot, he may leave London for the continent for six months, that he may not see a single savage critique on his latest work. But who can tell how much of a thinking he keeps up meanwhile, and how slily he prowls around the reading-desks of the circulating libraries when he gets back again, to catch some words that the world has been saying about him while he has been lounging under the lindens at Schwalbach, or looking out of his window in Chamouni? We have yet to hear of the most defiant author who was totally deaf to the scratch of the critic's pen. One has only to read Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe" to see how this man of supreme equipoise kept informed upon, and was sensitive to, the very latest judgments of his critics. Who was more supercilious or intolerant than he when his impossible "Theory of Colors" was laughed at by the French scientists? Byron braved and defied his critics, and yet in the lines, and between them, of his "English Bards and Scotch Reviewers," one can easily see how deeply the "Edinburgh" lance has struck into the fiery spirit. One has only to read his Life by Moore, and Jeaffreson's "Real Lord Byron," to see

how observant he was, even amid his unrestrained life at the Diodati villa, in Venice, and in Ravenna, of the writing and talking of the English critics concerning even his most proper cantos of "Childe Harold," not to mention his exceptionable poems. Did not his starting of the short lived "Liberal" have for its aim a self-defense? Who knows whither we should be hurled, with Shelley, Byron, Swinburne, and men of similar mettle to bear us, but for the timely bridles ready for use in the editorial offices? We cannot doubt that even Byron acknowledged and submitted to the restraints.

With all possible margin for injustice, we are compelled to hold that there is not a department of literature that has not been held in check by the sense of a prompt criticism. As to thoroughness of work, in going back to the first fountains, in all the fields of authorship involving dependence on facts, the knowledge of accountability to the critic has been a constant reminder of duty both to the public and one's self. Even in historical fiction the judgment of the critical periodical has been of prime value. There is good ground for believing that Walter Scott was impelled to minute fidelity to historic truth in his "Talisman," "Betrothed," "Count Robert of Paris," and other oriental treatments, as well as in his romances bearing on Scotch and English life, by an acute eye on the keen critics who were ready at any moment to find out a flaw in the wand of the Northern Wizard, and equally ready to tell the public of their discovery. George Eliot was as painstaking in studying the sources for her "Romola" as if she were writing a Gradgrind history of Savonarola, while her "Daniel Deronda" shows that her studies on Judaism, in Frankfort-on-the-Main and other continental centers, were as thorough as if her task were exact history. She had received a training as a book critic herself on the staff of the "Westminster," and knew that the company to which she had belonged would tolerate no careless stroke of the pen. She knew that the critics, like death, love a "shining mark." It is easy to say that she and Sir Walter, and all their guild, were a conscientious folk, and would have told the truth, critics or no critics. Still, with all the margin for conscience, we must yet hold that in every case the knowledge that there is such a thing as criticism, and that no author is safe after he has done slovenly work, or, Homer-

like, has "nodded," has been a constant motive to the faithful and full use of all possibly available material. The old charge that critics are failures in literature does not disturb our position in the least. We have not to do with what men have been, but with what they are. The existing critic of the new book holds an important office. He is to judge and reveal and help to place the book where it belongs. Like Sidney Smith, he may not have read his new book, but that is the author's fault. He should have written a book that the critic could not help reading.

A sense of sadness will come over one, in spite of himself, as he reflects on the large number of dead periodicals, whose graves are so frequent along the paths of literature. The many departed ones, whose names are known only to the curious, have each a story of adventure, enterprise, and final failure. The Index of Dr. Poole contains many names which we search in vain for among the living. We have also before us that curious directory to the American periodical cemetery prepared by Henry Stevens, of London. As it has never been on the market, having been only privately printed, we give the title entire: "American Books with Tails to 'Em. A Private Pocket List of the incomplete and unfinished American Periodicals, Transactions, Memoirs, Judicial Reports, Laws, Journals, Legislative Documents, and other continuations and works in progress supplied to the British Museum and other Libraries." We turn over these pages, every one of which abounds in dead periodicals, with new thoughts on the vanity of literature. Many a periodical has lived only a year. Some have weathered the storm three or four years, and then, like the Arab's tent, were to be found no more. The want of money, of party, of subscribers, and what not, has come in to stop the editing and the contributing and the printing. The poor incomplete thing has passed out of existence, and carried with it many bright hopes. Sometimes the death has been followed by a new galvanism, as in the case of the first "Putnam's Magazine," and this in turn has been followed by a selling-out, an absorption, or even death. One can find the parcels of these departed periodicals in the junkshops of the land, all the way from Ann Street, New York, to the dusty stalls of San Francisco. But the most have gone the way of all dead literature, into what

Macaulay used to call the "lining of the trunkmaker's boxes," or, still more, into the pulp that fills the papermaker's vats. We will not say, however, that even the departed periodical has been a total loss. Even the lost Pleiad was once a point of beauty. No one would be so rash as to suppose that "Salmagundi," although short-lived, was without its power in developing Irving and Halleck, and of still greater power in pointing out, to later publishers and editors, the quicksands that bring certain shipwreck. There is not a periodical now existing, in Europe or this country, that is not built up on the graves of the dead. Wisdom has come from experiment. This very Quarterly is not the product of the year that gave it apparent birth, or even of the "Methodist Magazine," that ran from 1818 to 1828. Its real origin must be found in that earlier "Methodist Magazine," published in Philadelphia by John Dickins, which died in 1798, after the issue of the second volume, and in that still earlier "Arminian Magazine," with Asbury and Coke as sponsors, which came to its death with the close of the second volume, in 1790. The popular magazines of our country, such as "Harper's Monthly," the "Century," and the "Atlantic Monthly," are the ripe fruit of failures. Publishers have learned wherein the failure of their predecessors lay, while editors have learned good lessons from the earlier occupants of editorial *sancta*. Hence we say, of the flourishing periodicals of to-day, that the living live on the no longer living.

Art. IV.—LETTERS AND MEMORIALS OF JANE WELSH CARLYLE.

Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle. Prepared for publication by Thomas Carlyle. Edited by James Anthony Froude. Two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Of late years the press has teemed with anecdotes, personal reminiscences, and memorial sketches relative to the life and work of Thomas Carlyle. Yet, unique as is the character of this cynical Scotchman, grand as is his work, that as historian and prose-poet at once putting him in the foremost rank of English writers, it may fairly be questioned whether, in Froude's "Life of Carlyle," the most extensive as well as the most

authentic to be had, and to which, together with the "Reminiscences," we are to look for the history of Mrs. Carlyle's early life, Mr. Carlyle or his wife be the more interesting figure; for, as Lady William Russell put it: "Mr. Carlyle a great man? Yes; but Mrs. Carlyle, let me inform you, is no less great as a woman."

Mr. Froude was unsparingly censured for portraying the real Mr. Carlyle so admirably as he has done in his "History of the First Forty Years" of his life, a biography after Carlyle's own method, and as happily executed as if by the hand of that prince of biographers himself, the preacher of truth being unable to paint us a truer picture of himself. Now, again, the critics are lamenting Froude's obtuseness and indiscretion in giving us Mrs. Carlyle's letters just as annotated by her husband, confessedly a suitable person, recommending as a chivalrous deed the expunction of all passages relating to the petty details of home-life; maintaining, strange to say, that "unconscious autobiography, though interesting, is seldom fair and adequate." True, we were all startled by the novelty of the procedure, and somewhat shocked to find Carlyle so much of a bear, and his wife so menial a slave; for, had we known such to be the case, we should little have expected to find it chronicled here. It is equally probable that we might not have realized how completely Carlyle was wrapped up in what he conceived to be his mission, and how toilsome, so almost beyond expression, was the execution of it; how deep, pathetic a feeling he had for man and beast; nor have divined the exquisite delicacy and refinement of that *spirituelle* being that, for so many years, shed a halo of almost supernal brightness over his rocky pathway. And, to use the figure of the aforementioned critic, we are only too glad to believe that, had this ransacked house possessed the direst secrets to reveal, every door and shutter would have been flung wide open, "from kitchen to parlor." Had Mr. Froude acted on these suggestions of his censors, especially with regard to the latter book, the chief merit of his work would have been lost, and the letters, dull and insipid, like wine without sparkle or flavor; not the letters of a woman, least of all of this woman.

Woman, as Mrs. Carlyle well knew, has a knack for letter-writing, though it is not so certain that she understood the

philosophy of it. "'My dear,' said Geraldine, 'how is it that women who don't write books write always so much nicer letters than those who do?' I told her it was, I supposed, because they did not write in the valley of the shadow of their future biographer, but wrote what they had to say frankly and naturally." But authors are few, even among men, and it can hardly be claimed for the ladies that they are more frank and natural than men, or that there is such a vast difference, in this respect, between authoresses and their less fortunate sisters. The almost universal superiority of a woman's letter over that of a man is, I suspect, largely attributable to a difference in the cast of mind—the imaginative faculty predominating in woman as the reflective in man, a plan fruitful of so far-reaching and beneficent results as to be nothing less than providential, as has been capitally shown by Mr. Buckle. This gives woman a wonderful start over her prosy brother; for "the imagination is the strongest virtue to keep a book alive," and liveliness is what we look for in a letter.

The fact remains, anyhow; and Mrs. Carlyle seems to have had a clearer idea of the purpose of letter-writing and, certainly, a greater facility for realizing that ideal, than most women. "Decidedly I was meant to have been a subaltern of the daily press, not a 'penny-lady,' (almoner,) but a penny-a-liner; for it is not only a faculty with me, but a necessity of my nature, to make a great deal out of nothing." Or, if you please, what she surely meant, to invest every-day topics with such beauty and dignity as their frequent recurrence and a cultivated sensibility demand and justify. If this seem to you of small moment, only remember that, as Lowell says, "The true poet is he that detects the divine in the casual." So imbued was Mrs. Carlyle with this poetic sensibility that, with Wordsworth, she might well have sung:

> "To me the meanest flower that blows can give
> Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

How true this is of Mrs. Carlyle one has but to read these letters to know. The record of the simplest occurrences, under her treatment, interests, nay, charms, us. Whether she be relating an adventure with a lost child, a visit to a decrepit old woman, or a scene with a servant; or humorously detailing her

exploits against dogs, cocks, etc., for a deliverance from all which disturbers of the peace she would insert a special prayer in the litany, the result is the same, a story as beautiful and engaging as any fairy tale, woven out of details seemingly the most prosaic.

Readers of the "First Forty Years" must remember Carlyle's thundering anathemas against the whole canine race. Mrs. Carlyle, it seems, had something of the same antipathy for the howl of a dog, acquired, no doubt, through association with her husband. A noisy cur had, as they thought, been silenced. But no. She writes Carlyle:

The other night the candles were lit, and I had set myself with my feet on the fender to enjoy the happiness of being let alone, and to bid myself "consider." "Bow-wow-wow" roared the dog, "and dashed the cup of fame from my brow!" "Bow-wow-wow" again and again, till the whole universe seemed turned into one great dog-kennel! I hid my face in my hands and groaned inwardly, "O destiny accursed! what use of scrubbing? All this availeth me nothing, so long as the dog sitteth at the washerman's gate!" I could have burst into tears, but I did not! I ran for ink and paper, and wrote:

"Dear Gambardella: You once offered to shoot some cocks for me; that service I was enabled to dispense with: but now I accept your devotion. Come, if you value my sanity, and—" But he could not take aim without scaling the high wall, in doing which he would certainly be seized by the police; so I threw away that first sibylline leaf, and wrote another—to the washerman! Once more I offered him "any price for that horrible dog—to hang it," offered "to settle a yearly income on it if it would hold its accursed tongue." I implored, threatened, imprecated, and ended by proposing that, in case he could not come to an immediate final resolution, he should in the interim "make the dog dead drunk with a bottle of whisky, which I sent for the purpose!" Helen was sent off with the note and bottle of whisky; and I sat all concentrated, awaiting her return, as if the fate of nations had depended on my diplomacy; and so it did, to a certain extent! Would not the inspirations of the "first man in Europe" be modified, for the next six months at least, by the fact who should come off victorious—I or the dog! Ah, it is curious to think how the first men in Europe, and first women, too, are acted upon by the inferior animals!

We can best interest those with whom we can, in some sort, sympathize: Shakespeare is a general favorite because of his myriad mindedness: on his stage every class is represented,

from king to cobbler. Jane Welsh Carlyle is myriad souled, with enough intelligence to make it beautifully apparent on all occasions. An aristocrat herself, she takes no little pleasure in communing with plebeians; the best of scholars, she is at home in the company of the illiterate; a mover in the highest social circles, she counts it not a condescension to speak a word of cheer or do a deed of kindness to the lowest of her fallen brothers and sisters. From this universal love of others came the universal esteem in which she was held, the German servant declaring to Mrs. Carlyle that "a many, many peoples love you very dear." So bewitching was her influence over others, one would think she had recourse to a fairy's wand. From first sight one swore eternal friendship, and ever afterward rendered her unqualified adoration, the commons clamoring to become her servants, and countesses, kneeling beside the sofa, embracing her feet and kissing her hands to express their admiration. On one of her journeys Mrs. Carlyle inadvertently left her parasol in the coach, which misfortune she related to the landlady on entering the way-side inn. A gentleman present, a total stranger to Mrs. Carlyle, hearing this, bolted off, overtook the coach, and recovering the parasol, hastened back with it—all, he said, "for the pleasure of presenting it to Mrs. Carlyle."

As contrasted with Mr. Carlyle's writings how different the spirit. Every-where throughout Carlyle's works we meet with jeremiads on the ills of this "vile-spotted" world, he (in the "Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson") more than once declaring that Emerson's is the only "human" voice that reaches his ear. Woe is the world! Numberless were the voices that reached Mrs. Carlyle, each articulating something human, too. Carlyle's attitude is that of a spoiled babe, who would rectify the world by chronic censoriousness; Mrs. Carlyle's, that of a true mother, who dares all and hopes all. The one is a pessimist, the other an optimist, as clearly set forth in the two following sonnets, the former by Carlyle, the latter by his wife:

CUI BONO?

What is Hope? a smiling rainbow
Children follow through the wet;
'Tis not here, still yonder, yonder!
Never urchin found it yet.

What is Life? a thawing ice-boat
On a sea with sunny shore.
Gay we sail—it melts beneath us!
We are sunk, and seen no more.

What is man? a foolish baby;
Vainly strives and fights and frets;
Demanding all—deserving nothing!
One small grave is what he gets.

One feels like answering Carlyle as Rae, "an industrious simpleton, nursing his baby on the street," did "a conceited, quizzing man," who accosted him: "Rae, I's wae for you." "Damn ye, be wae for yersel'!" But here is Mrs. Carlyle's

ANSWER.

Nay, this is hope: a gentle dove
That nestles in the gentle breast,
Bringing glad tidings from above
Of joys to come and heavenly rest.

And this is Life: ethereal fire
Striving aloft through smothering clay;
Mounting, flaming, higher, higher!
Till lost in immortality.

And man—O! hate not nor despise
The fairest, lordliest work of God!
Think not he made the good and wise
Only to sleep beneath the sod.

On the other hand, about the time Mr. Carlyle seemed so bewitched with the first Lady Ashburton, when, to use Mrs. Carlyle's own terse phraseology, "there was fine weather outside, but indoors blowing a devil of a gale," and she felt the need of stirring around to get the "green mold" that had been collecting on her brushed off by human contact, the notes did become plaintive, and, perhaps, never again assumed their wonted sprightliness; and, toward the close of life, Mrs. Carlyle wrote in a diary, which no one saw till after her death—for, let it be remembered, all her heart-failings were kept to herself: "I married for ambition. Mr. Carlyle has exceeded all my wildest hopes ever imagined of him, and—I am miserable." But to the most sanguine of us moments of despondency will come, and a momentary outburst no more characterizes one's feelings and thoughts than does the height of the waters at flood-tide determine the depth of a stream. Paradoxical as

it may seem, Mrs. Carlyle was at one and the same time the saddest and cheerfulest of creatures: within her own soul sad; to outsiders hopeful and cheering. She did not, like Carlyle, make up her theory of the world from her own experience. Hers was no depreciative view of life; though we fancy we see traces of Carlyle's teachings. They are traces merely: to her mind, man, if he but strove aright, was all-powerful and all-adorable; trials are necessarily incident to his progress, and hence should be cheerfully borne. Ease she did not have, either of body or of mind; but, as with Schiller, the fiery consciousness of her own activity stood her instead. Here is no *nirvana*, but rather a battle-ground, whereon, if we contend manfully, progress is inevitable and reward assured. Deep and abiding must have been the faith in human nature, the world's advancement, and in God's providence, of a being that saw no creature, however forlorn or besmirched and low-sunken, but that she extended a helping hand, whispering, "Up, brother, sister; you can, you must: for there is a higher place if you will only take it," so lifting them out of the mire and brightening their dark lives, that she seems an emanation of the divine Light.

We have noticed the different spirit that characterizes the productions of the two Carlyles. Between the styles there is hardly so marked a difference, or, perhaps, we should rather say that, while these are unlike, the resultant sensation on the reader is quite the same, that of rapturous delight. In Carlyle the imaginative faculty was developed to a greater extent than in most men: so vividly does he picture events that one feels that one loses nothing by not witnessing the spectacle, if one but read Carlyle's word-picture. This powerful effect Carlyle attains by a skillful marshaling of striking words in striking combinations. Mrs. Carlyle effects the same result by a hardly less clever ordering of ordinary words; so that, if she do not hold the mind with such intensity of interest as does Mr. Carlyle, she does not, on the other hand, awaken that puzzling, nay, almost repellent, feeling that, at first, seizes a reader of Carlyle. Notable as is the benign spirit every-where manifest, no less noteworthy is the simple, graceful, forcible directness of its diction, to which no little of the book's charm is due.

The womanly genius is stamped upon every sentence; every-

where there is exhibited a sprightliness and an audaciousness found alone in the speech of woman. In his "Among my Books," commenting upon Carlyle's style, Lowell says, "that the figures of some authors remind him of dolls stuffed with bran, but that Carlyle's, if punctured, yields blood; and, with equal propriety, this might be said of Mrs. Carlyle. Her characters seem embodiments of flesh and blood, they live and move, and we fancy ourselves moving with them—a thing more difficult in letter-writing, since they are presumed to especially interest those only to whom they may be addressed. The following displays the ingenuity and boldness of the woman no less than the vivacity of the writer. Mrs. Carlyle was having some repairs made on the house, in consideration of which the proprietor had promised "to indemnify them with the undisturbed possession of the house for five years!" In her account of the transaction to her husband, who always absented himself in times of renovation, Mrs. Carlyle wrote:

A piece of paper equivalent to a lease of the house for five years, "with the reciprocity all on one side," binding him and leaving us free. "Such a thing," old Sterling said, "as no woman but myself would have had the impudence to ask, nor any lawyer in his senses the folly to grant." This was one of those remarkable instances of fascination that I exercise over gentlemen of "a certain age;" before I had spoken six words to him it was plain to the meanest capacity that he had fallen over head and ears in love with me; and if he put off time in writing me the promise, it was plainly because he could not bear the idea of my going away again! No wonder: probably no such beatific vision as that of a real live woman, and a silk bonnet and a muslin gown, ever irradiated that dingy, dusty law-chamber of his, and sat there on a three-feet high stool, since he had had a pen behind his ear, and, certainly, never before had either man or woman, in that place, addressed him as a human being, not as a lawyer, or he would not have looked at me so struck dumb with admiration when I did so. For respectability's sake I said, in taking leave, "that my husband was out of town, or he would have come himself." "Better as it is," said the old gentleman; "do you think I would have written to your husband's dictation as I have done to yours?" Plainly he had lodged an angel unawares.

Intensely engaging throughout for its frankness, piquancy, bold originality, for the gleams of light shed upon two of the rarest characters in all history, "The Letters and Memorials" ranks high as a literary production, the letters being pronounced

by the "Boston Post," perhaps not injudiciously, "the finest of the nineteenth century." Beyond a doubt, it is a worthy companion of "The Correspondence of Carlyle and Emerson," and needs only to be read to win for itself a permanent place among the classics of English literature.

The life of the author is a romance. Of a worthy pair, themselves the descendants of John Knox and Sir William Wallace, in the little village of Haddington, Scotland, on July 4, 1801, was born Jane Baillie Welsh, a child from the very first endowed with an ambition that knew no bounds, an intellect whose quick and subtle apprehensions were the wonder of her companions as they were the delight of her parents and elderly acquaintances. "Mamma, O mamma, don't exposie me," once exclaimed three-year-old Jane, her mother having occasion to arrange some of her undergarments. Beautifully expressive, this, of a modesty and a precociousness quite foreign to the ordinary child. Yet Miss Welsh was no genius. Unusually endowed she doubtless was: of these endowments she made unusual use. Surely she is the offspring of that family of which it had been said that "there were in it many blackguards, but not one blockhead." At five the young student must begin Latin; but her parents are unwilling. Not to be outwitted, wary Jane, by some means, learns the first declension, and, under the cover, at night, is heard lisping, "*Penna*, a pen; *pennae*, of a pen," etc., and handsomely wins her point. This is no sudden outburst of a flickering flame, but rather the steady, ever-brightening light of an unquenchable fire. Dissatisfied with the few studies allotted the young miss of her period, Jane begged to be allowed to study like a boy. Her application was intense, Jane tying weights to her ankles to prevent oversleep, her rising hour being four! An early curiosity to know Latin led to the acquisition of a thorough knowledge of the classics. When, a few years after her first triumph, she is admonished that girls in Virgil do not play with dolls, it is determined that the doll's end shall comport with her mistress's dignity: the funeral pyre is built, the doll, with all her finery, laid thereon. For dolly Jane is spokesman; the last words of Dido the First (which Miss Welsh said she had as pat as A, B, C) are said, the torch is lighted, and Dido the Second ends her career, not without a few tears on

Jane's part. Miss Welsh seems to have imbibed much of the spirit of these authors: her every act was judged by the Roman standard, so that when, on her way to school, she is attacked by an old gobbler, she determines to stand her ground; for, she reasoned, Cæsar would have done so! Miss Welsh was then seven years old. "Thus," she said, "my inner world, at that time, was three fourths old Roman and one fourth old fairy."

Beautiful in person Miss Welsh must have been, judging from the following description by an intimate friend:

> As a girl she was extremely pretty, a graceful and beautifully formed figure, upright and supple, a delicate complexion of creamy white, with a pale rose-tint in the cheeks; lovely eyes, full of fire and softness, with great depths of meaning.

The girl of quick parts and tireless energy grew to the clear-sighted, keen-witted, scholarly young lady. Miss Welsh's insight was as penetrating as instantaneous; her wit, at times, scathing; in all the branches of the best schools, thorough; always she seemed

> "Bright as angel new-dropped from heaven."

So supremely fascinating a creature, that, as was said, no gentleman could be in her presence for five minutes without making her an offer of marriage. Although Miss Jewsbury has said that, "If flirting were a capital crime, Miss Welsh would have been in danger of hanging many times over," her conduct, all must admit, was unexceptionably high-toned. Edward Irving was her tutor while Miss Welsh was yet a girl. The zealous teacher paid his young charge a devotion that, as she herself afterward put it, was "passionately" returned. Meanwhile Irving went to a neighboring town and half formed a betrothal with a Miss Martin. Presently, finding that one lady has his hand and another his heart, Irving says as much to Miss Martin, and begs a release. But in Scotland constancy is a duty enforced in matters marital as well as in business affairs, and the Martins prefer holding him to his engagement. Irving hesitates, but is urged to keep faith by Miss Welsh, who, on learning of his entanglement, at once forbade him to address her on other than sisterly terms. Poor Irving, who had rendered his pupil great service by turning her mind from matters

exclusively literary to the Source of all light, loses his prize, reluctantly marries Miss Martin, returns to London, there to enter on his brilliant but tragic career. This was one of the sorest of Miss Welsh's many trials: the heart's choice had been sacrificed to another, and never did it forget the old or find a new.

The sad soul finds some relief in the pressure of life's duties. Miss Welsh was too brave to yield to this disappointment, too intent on future success to admit of any cessation of her unremitting toil. Into her elegant home was introduced a young man whose rugged exterior and ignorance of conventionalities hid not from her the genuine worth that lay beneath. The womanly intuition saw in this unprepossessing youth the future distinguished author, Thomas Carlyle, thenceforward the director of her studies. Irving having moved away, and being busily engaged in his religious work, Carlyle, in some sort, took his place. Books were interchanged, and criticisms of these, and, naturally enough, friendly notes. Like another teacher, then safely ensconced in his pupil's love, Carlyle professed a deeper attachment. At once he is admonished to discontinue the strain, for Miss Welsh then expected to marry Irving. But the friendly notes go on; in these and their author Miss Welsh took a keen interest. Next to Irving, Carlyle's best friend, Miss Welsh was the first to bestow appreciative notice on this odd character. Carlyle's manner, far from repelling, amused Miss Welsh—nay, drew her to him. A worshiper of intellect herself, we are not surprised that she was attracted by this phenomenal manifestation of it. Seemingly protected by the humbleness of her suitor's birth and position, our young lady was yet in danger of Cupid's dart. Her respect for Carlyle's great learning and sterling character grew to admiration; her admiration to love. A declaration of affectionate regard is mistaken by enraptured Carlyle for a promise of marriage. The mistake is quickly corrected. "My friend," wrote Miss Welsh, "I love you. I repeat it, though I find the expression a rash one. But were you my brother I would love you all the same. But your wife, never! Never, though you were as rich as Crœsus, as honored and renowned as you yet shall be." Knowing woman as he did, Carlyle heard not in this the everlasting nay. The heart's chords had been touched deeply, as a bequeathal, about this time, of all her property to Carlyle

sufficiently evidenced. Proudly conscious of the impression already made, even then too full of "desperate hope" to be cast down at the rejection of a proposal for whose acceptance he had no right to hope, he sought to quicken and intensify this impression. What a courtship! Carlyle again proposes: his blythe mistress now laughs, now mocks, now repents and becomes the most tractable of creatures. Irving had married, Carlyle had succeeded in his first literary ventures, Miss Welsh was longing for literary companionship; so extraordinary a fellow, thought she, must make rapid strides toward the goal of fame, on the attainment of which Miss Welsh promised to marry Carlyle. For, though he had published "Wilhelm Meister" and the "Life of Schiller," and his work had been approvingly noticed by Goethe himself, Carlyle was at this time almost penniless, with no regular profession, no social standing. Though craving neither fortune nor grandeur, Miss Welsh had, she said, certain wants that she was unwilling should be unmet, since the idea of a sacrifice should not enter into a voluntary union; also, she had a certain station in society, which she felt it a duty not to compromise. Mr. Carlyle, she knew, was capable of attaining both these *desiderata;* meantime she hoped to come to love him more; for, with characteristic frankness, she confessed a lack of that love which she deemed proper toward a husband. The scales seem partly to fall from Carlyle's eyes: not his circumstances alone, but himself also, need betterment. Disclaiming a willingness to bring her from affluence and respectability to his poverty and obscurity, professing to find in her companionship his greatest stay and comfort, he proposes for them "to go forth their several ways." Miss Welsh's answer goes a long way toward explaining the character of the womanhood, the quality of her love: "How could I part from the *only* living soul that understands me? I would marry you to-morrow, rather; our parting would need to be brought about by death or some dispensation of Providence. Were you to will it, to part would no longer be bitter; the bitterness would be in thinking you unworthy." But, verily, we cannot see that she does get her own consent. Carlyle's character she revered, his wisdom she well-nigh adored; if not up to her ideal, confessedly she liked him above all others—always excepting him in whom she seemed to find a

second self, Edward Irving. She seems to get the assent of the head, not the consent of the heart, though one could never have discovered this from her conduct then or afterward. The marriage is determined upon. Carlyle has a dozen different propositions, as ludicrous as they are disregardful of his wife's comfort. Suddenly awaking to the fact, as he thought, that literature is the wine of life, the book-worm would become a farmer! One laughs outright. But the end is not yet: Miss Welsh has a bleak place, Craigenputtock, to work which, it strikes Carlyle, is better than renting, and of this desire he informed Miss Welsh. "I tell you it will not do," wrote she. "You must play Cincinnatus elsewhere. For my part, I could not live there a month with an angel!" 'Tis well we cannot peer into the future: she did live there six wearisome years with an angelic being, albeit one of the fallen! Now 'tis an Edinburgh cottage, where the great man can slam the door in the face of intruding visitors. Now 'tis at Scotsbrig, under his father's roof, already crowded, though of this Carlyle seems unaware. Although he had just asked her to share the rude hospitality of his own home, where surely her inconvenience would have been no less than his needless irritation in the home of her mother, Carlyle discourteously answers in the negative a proposal that they live with Miss Welsh's mother in Edinburgh, where finally the two settled alone.

Beautiful was Miss Welsh's behavior under these provoking circumstances. She writes Carlyle thus:

> This time twelvemonth nothing would content you but to live in the country, and, though a country life never before attracted my desires, it nevertheless became my choice the moment it seemed to be yours. In truth I discovered a hundred beauties and properties that hitherto had escaped my notice, and it came at last to this, that every imagination of the thought of my heart was love in a cottage continually. *Eh bien!* and what then? A change comes over the spirit of your dream. While the birds are yet humming, the roses blooming, and the small birds rejoicing, and every thing is in summer glory about our ideal cottage, I am called to live, *in prospectu*, in the smoke and bustle and icy coldness of Edinburgh. Now this I call a trial of patience and obedience. And, say, could I have complied more readily had I been your wedded wife ten times over? Without once looking behind, without even bidding adieu to my flowers, I took my way out of our paradise to raise another in the howling wilderness. A very miracle of love.

Each, uneasy, facetiously tries to stay the other. "I am resolved in spirit," wrote Miss Welsh, "and joyful—joyful in the face of the dreaded ceremony, of starvation, and of every other horrid fate. O, my dearest friend, be always so good to me, and I shall make the best and happiest wife. When I read in your looks and words that you love me, then I care not one straw for the universe besides. But when you speak of me as a circumstance of your lot, fly from me to smoke tobacco, then, indeed, is my heart troubled about many things." Ominous words these—we had almost said prophetic. Mrs. Carlyle is said to have had some temper herself. She continues:

I am going really to be a very meek-tempered wife. Indeed, I am begun to be meek-tempered already. My aunt says she could live with me forever without quarreling, so reasonable and equable am I in my humor. Do you perceive, my good sir, the fault will be entirely your own if we do not get on most harmoniously together?

After drawing stay from all the philosophers, German and English, Carlyle adds:

You are very kind to impute my ill-natured speeches (for which heaven forgive me) to their true cause, a disordered nervous system. Believe me, Jane, it is not I, but the devil speaking out of me, that could utter one harsh word to a heart that so little deserves it. O! I were blind and wretched if I could make thee unhappy. But it will not and shall not be; for I am not naturally a villain, and at bottom I do love you well.

Several times, in his annotations of his dead wife's letters, Mr. Carlyle exclaims, "O, sinner that I was!" with how much propriety will be seen as we proceed.

"The last speech and marrying words of that unfortunate young lady, Jane Baillie Welsh," as our heroine playfully put it, wherein she instructs Carlyle as to gloves, ceremony, etc., promising him that he may smoke two cigars on their homeward journey, is forwarded to her spouse, the dreaded ceremony over with, October 17, 1826. On the evening of the same day they reach Comley Bank, Edinburgh, for a year or two their home.

Various references have been made to Mrs. Carlyle's unhappiness, which was intense beyond expression. Only an angel could have been happy; and even an angel could not have

striven more zealously to make others so, or more delicately have hidden the heart's own bitter disappointment. The tender hot-house plant withers when treated as the hardy shrub of the field. She that had hitherto had nothing to do except to cultivate the mind, found herself too busy with domestic duties to engage in any intellectual work, even had he, of whom it had been said that "a glacier on a mountain would have been as human a companionship," wished her fellowship. As to what we call love, by which most men and women lay great store, of this Mr. Carlyle seemed incapable—really this was too insignificant for the philosophic mind. Do these statements seem wild? Take a peep at their second home, Craigenputtock, the weirdest of places, sixteen miles from town, in the midst of a peat bog, no visitor putting in for months at a time, one's ears being regaled, meanwhile, by the nibbling of sheep a quarter of a mile off, easily heard, so ghost-like was its silence. Here, where, as Mrs. Carlyle informs us, her two immediate predecessors went mad and the third took to drink, she was the veriest slave. Cook, milk, scour, all of these by turns; not infrequent turns either, it being difficult to obtain an efficient servant, the Carlyles never having one from poverty. This had not been so galling had Mr. Carlyle manifested any appreciation of his wife's efforts to please him. But no: Mr. Carlyle was too much engrossed in his own work, rambling among the clouds, to notice her who, without the compensation even of a grateful word or an approving smile, not to speak of a helping hand, from her master, was uncomplainingly slaving it beside him, Mrs. Carlyle seeing her husband but a few moments a day, these glimpses being stolen, she tells us, while her lord was shaving! Now do we appreciate the following, written in a diary never seen by any one save herself: "To a swallow building under our eaves," dated the "Desert:"

> Thou hast past fair places in thy flight,
> A world lay all beneath thee where to light.
> And strange thy taste.
> Of all the varied scenes that met thine eye—
> Of all the spots for building 'neath the sky—
> To choose this waste.

Nor was this loneliness one of place only, or of this place. In London, their home for the latter and greater part of life,

when Carlyle had become famous and had leisure enough to take a vacation of a month or two's duration every summer, to make repeated visits of a day or two's length to Lady Ashburton's, while his wife was suffering untold agonies of body and mind, Mrs. Carlyle saw her husband half an hour a day! Mrs. Carlyle thought, and very reasonably too, that she that had laid down name, wealth, rank, and had worn out herself in trying to shield her husband from vexation and to forward his interests—in a word, she that had given him her life—merited at least a few moments of his time and consideration. This discontent, aggravated by the supercilious treatment received at the hands of her with whom Carlyle seemed so fascinated, she made known to her husband. Without reference to Carlyle's relations to Lady Ashburton, this seems to me human nature, and I cannot ask of Mrs. Carlyle what is possible only to angels.

Yet things moved on as smoothly as if their life were one long-drawn-out honeymoon. To those who saw it, Mrs. Carlyle's home seemed a paradise, this, too, whether in London or the "Devil's Den" of Craigenputtock—equally in the years when their living was scant as when, in after times, their income was comfortably sufficient. This scrupulous housewifery was attained not without a few adventures and much toil on Mrs. Carlyle's part. She was somewhat startled by the grossness of her ignorance concerning household matters.

> Being an only child, and brought up to great prospects, I was sublimely ignorant of every branch of useful knowledge, though a capital Latin scholar and very fair mathematician! It behooved me, in these astonishing circumstances, to learn to sew! Husbands, I was shocked to find, wore their stockings into holes, and *I* was expected to look to all that; also, it behooved me to learn to cook.

At first the delicate organism shrank from the uncongenial tasks. Pathetic is the account of her first attempt at bread-making, in which she relates that, having sat up till three o'clock in the morning over a loaf of bread, a sense of forlornness and degradation stole over her. Suddenly she bethinks herself of Benvenuto Cellini's sitting up all night, watching his Perseus in the fire.

> After all, in the sight of the higher powers, what is the mighty difference between a loaf of bread and a statue of Perseus, so that

each be the thing one's hand has found to do? The man's determined will, his energy, his patience, were the really admirable things of which his statue of Perseus was the mere chance expression. If he had been a woman living at Craigenputtock, with a dyspeptic husband, sixteen miles from a baker, and he a bad one, these same qualities would have come out more fitly in a loaf of bread.

Heroic woman! that could follow out this principle, as difficult of application as simple of comprehension and Christ-like in influence, so eloquently stated by Mr. Carlyle: "Man! symbol of eternity imprisoned into time! it is not thy works, which are all mortal, infinitely little, and the greatest no greater than the least, but only the spirit thou workest in, which can have worth or continuance."

"Crown me with all the laurels that ever decorated man's brow: were it other than the bitterest of mockeries if she that had struggled with me were not there to share them?" wrote he that, for three years, could not find time to go out and buy his poor invalid wife a brougham! Yet, as far as his actions fell short of his professions, Mr. Carlyle was "not naturally a villain, and at bottom loved his wife real well"—so far as he knew how. There are circumstances that extenuate, none that excuse, Carlyle's boorish treatment of his wife. Gifted with a vivid imagination and, at the same time, afflicted with dyspepsia, Carlyle saw only the evil side of things, and that through magnifying glasses. This fact, no doubt, accounts for his acerbity. But we cannot but think of Schiller, to say nothing of Mrs. Carlyle, who, though harassed quite as much as Mr. Carlyle, not, it may be, by his "diabolical apparatus," was the calmest of men. Again, at Carlyle's home, his mother and sisters did most of the housework, and he, unmindful of their different bringing up, unwisely expected of his wife what he had seen done by his mother. The fact is, that of the two theories of womanhood—the poetic and the materialistic—the one championing refinement to the sacrifice of usefulness, the other, utility to the sacrifice of beauty and culture, finding in woman a child-bearer and domestic, Carlyle adopted the latter—a theory held in common with not a few of his contemporaries. Naturally enough, Carlyle did not encourage his wife to enter the field of literature, her place being, as he thought, in the cook-room or at the broom-handle; not, indeed, for lack of

talent or capacity, but as better comporting with woman's sphere. Alike by instinct and by breeding, Carlyle was unfitted to rightly determine woman's province or appreciate her nature, least of all his woman's.

But what sublime indifference to his wife's sufferings, what ingratitude for her laborious services! But Mr. Carlyle did have a heart, and it beat lovingly toward his mother and her family, no more filial or fraternal conduct than his being on record. Leigh Hunt, a frequent visitor and an intimate friend of his, thus warmly testifies to Mr. Carlyle's humanity:

> I believe that what Mr. Carlyle loves better than his fault-finding, with all its eloquence, is the sight of any human face that looks suffering and loving and sincere; and I believe, further, that if the fellow-creature were suffering only, and neither loving nor sincere, but had come to a pass of agony in this life which put him at the mercy of some good man for some last help and consolation toward his grave, even at the risk of loss to repute, and a sure amount of pain and vexation, that man, if the groan reached him in its forlornness, would be Thomas Carlyle.

Actions do speak louder than words. Carlyle was deeply imbued with the idea that he had a mission to right this disjointed world by instructing its poor fools, and, swallowed up as he was in his mission, he was lost to humanity; and we can but smile at the egotism of this typical one of the Britons, "not a bull of them all but believes he can bear Europa on his back," and wonder at the short-sightedness of a man that saw so much wrong in the universe, but nothing in his own ill-managed kingdom, the home.

Humdrum as was Mrs. Carlyle's way of living, she managed to extract therefrom many pleasures, not the least of which (the highest, resulting from a consciousness of duty performed, has already been noticed) was to have her friends call. The depth and the universality of their love has been incidentally shown. No visitor, however transient his stay, went off without being impressed with Mrs. Carlyle. She was the entertainer; and many amusing stories does she tell of her receptions: how, for instance, the Jeffreys once visiting them very unexpectedly at Craigenputtock, and the larder being rather empty, she sprang upon a horse, rode sixteen miles to town, made her purchases, hurried back home, and, having gotten dinner with her own hands, presided at the table as gracefully

as ever did a queen. She does not seem to have especially liked us Americans; in fact, none save Emerson, of whose visit to Craigenputtock she said that it was the only one made for such a purpose since the time of Noah's ark. While living at Chelsea, Mrs. Carlyle, on returning home from visiting one evening, was told by the servant that some one was awaiting Mr. Carlyle in the library. She writes:

On proceeding thither, a tall, lean, red-herring-looking man arose from Carlyle's desk, at which he was writing, and, running his eyes over me, from head to foot, said, "O, you are Mrs. Carlyle, are you?" An inclination of the head, intended to be hauteur itself, was all the answer he got. "Do you keep your health pretty well, Mrs. Carlyle?" said the wretch, nothing daunted, that being always your regular Yankee's second word.

Then, pouring upon her a broadside of impertinent questions, receiving in return churlish answers, "that spattered off the rhinoceros hide of him as if they had been sugar-plums," and being informed that Mr. Carlyle might not return for some time, he leaves his note and departs; whereupon Mrs. Carlyle soliloquizes: "If Mr. Carlyle's increasing reputation bore no other fruits than congratulatory Yankees and the like I should vote for its proceeding to diminish with all possible dispatch." Mr. Carlyle was not very accessible, Mrs. Carlyle telling us of his turning off two of his boon companions of early life, when she came to the rescue and saved him from doing what he would afterward have regretted. The following, occurring in a letter to her husband, shows in what awe Mr. Carlyle was held by people generally:

"There is just one thing," said Madame —— de —— to Rev. John Barlow, "I wish you to do for me—to take me to see Mr. Carlyle." "Tell me to ask the Archbishop of Canterbury to dance a polka with you," said Barlow, aghast, "and I would dare it, though I have not the honor of his acquaintance; but take any body to Mr. Carlyle, impossible!"

Though she has left us but few memorials of her literary talent, Mrs. Carlyle was truly a woman of intellect, and, pre-eminent as was her character by reason of its many rare virtues, the intellectual is scarcely second to the moral endowment. A hard student she always was, even during the Craigenputtock *régime* finding time to read "Don Quixote" and other classics

in the original. At thirteen she wrote a drama said to have been of more than usual merit, though committed to the flames soon after its production. After the busier period of life had passed Mrs. Carlyle began a novel, which, owing to a complete failure of health, she was unable to finish. "None of the writing women," thought Charles Dickens, a contemporary of George Eliot, "come near to her at all." Carlyle, while he would not admit her to literary partnership, never failed to avail himself of her criticisms, which were acute and far-reaching, as we may judge from her prophetic foreshadowing of Carlyle's talent. In his own inimitable way Carlyle estimated his wife's literary ability: "Not all the Sands and Eliots and babbling coterie of celebrated scribbling women that ever strutted over the world in my time could, it seems to me, if boiled down and distilled to essence, make one such woman." The "Letters and Memorials," itself of the highest literary merit, has yet its chief value as a token of what might have been accomplished. Certainly Mrs. Carlyle accomplished much under most adverse circumstances; and it is not improbable that, under more favorable conditions, "like the eagle renewing her mighty youth and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam, she would have purged and unscaled her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance."

When we come to speak of character, we, as Merivale in writing of Cæsar, exclaim, (we hope with better reason,) "One can but be silent in the presence of the perfect." Energetic when energy and forethought were at discount, patient amid unparalleled vexations, serene and trustful by the side of a joyless Jeremiah and doubting Thomas; withal so intelligent, so forgetful of self, so thoughtful of others, with Mr. Carlyle we may well ask, "Did ever one come more direct from the empyrean?"

Art. V.—THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DISCIPLINE.

The proper administration of the Discipline is a matter of grave importance to the welfare of the Methodist Episcopal Church. As yet, it has not received the attention which its importance demands. There is, perhaps, no part of our ecclesiastical machinery so little understood, and so inefficiently worked, as the part which relates to the administration of the discipline. Not that the machinery itself is greatly defective. It is not. No other ecclesiastical body has a better. The fault is not in our judicial system, but in its administration. It is this that is frequently inefficient and open to criticism; and that, too, when it is possible for it to be most efficient in its workings and trustworthy in its results.

We are suffering both from laxness of administration and from clumsiness in its attempt. The difficulty attending and the labor involved in the investigation of alleged crimes charged against offenders are so great, that the administrator sometimes shrinks from them, and evades the unpleasant task, if possible. The result is, offenders remain in the Church, elements of weakness to it, and stumbling-blocks in the way of its progress. Or, if it is attempted, the methods of investigation are frequently such that they fail to elicit the truth. The consequence is, the guilty escape, or, perhaps, what is rarer, the innocent suffer. Because of this, ecclesiastical courts are looked upon with suspicion, and the trials conducted in them assumed to be inefficient in their methods, and unreliable in their findings—a result greatly to be deplored.

We lack uniformity of administration, also. One pastor or presiding elder tries to enforce the discipline and preserve the purity of the Church; another evades or ignores it. Different localities and different administrators have different modes of administration. With some, it is lax; with others, what is called liberal; with still others, critical and exact. All these—the laxness, the clumsiness, and the lack of uniformity —are hinderances in the way of the true work of the Church. Any Church that does not keep itself pure, that does not sho wintelligence and wisdom in the administration of its laws, and that does not have power enough, as a system, to impress

uniformity in its administration, cannot long command the respect, secure the confidence, or exert much influence for good over mankind. The avenues through which the Church reaches and controls men are the avenues of its wisdom, efficiency, and purity; and if the world does not see in it these elements—if it does not possess them, it has lost its influence for good and its power over men.

To call attention to these evils, and the possibility of remedying them, and at the same time stimulate the Church to effort in that direction, is the object of this paper. In it I propose to discuss the whole question of administration, under the five following general divisions of the subject:

I. To call attention to the principles of authority underlying the government of the Church, by and through which it is possessed of power to exclude unworthy persons from its body.

II. To show the limits and kind of jurisdiction which the Methodist Episcopal Church gives to its administrators, and the several duties it imposes upon them.

III. To define the qualifications and the spirit which should characterize the true administrator, in conducting all investigations coming under his jurisdiction.

IV. To define the manner in which a Church court should be conducted, and to discuss the application of the principles and rules of evidence prevailing in civil courts to ecclesiastical courts.

V. To show that our ecclesiastical courts may become the most reliable of all courts, the surest in eliciting truth and rendering verdicts which will command the approval of honorable and thinking men.

In accordance with this plan I proceed,

I To call attention to the principles of authority underlying the government of the Church, by and through which it is possessed of power to exclude unworthy persons from its body.

The authority which the Church has over the individuals composing it, rests upon the broadest possible foundations, both of reason and the will of God. They are the same as those upon which the state rests, and are twofold in their origin and character. One of the greatest philosophers and jurists of

modern times has said, concerning the principles underlying civil government: "One thing is always essential to civil societies: that each member of a society should relinquish in favor of the social body a portion of his rights, and there should be a power capable of governing all individuals, of giving them laws, and of coercing those who refuse to obey." Aristotle, long centuries ago, said, "A truly human life is in society; individuals are only accidental parts of the social whole." * Hence, the individual being less than society—on the principle that a single part is less than the sum of all the parts—if he infringes against the rules which govern the whole, and which are ordained for its interests, society must deal with the offender. Therefore, he says, "The moral mean in social life is between doing wrong and suffering wrong, which is justice." All governments are founded upon these principles; all states stand on these foundations. They are simple, but they are universal, and no social body can exist without them. The Church, on its human side, is a civil society, a state, and, as such, it must have government and administration. If it is to command the respect of mankind, and conserve the ends for which it exists, it must be possessed of these powers. Viewing the Church from this stand-point, another high authority has said of it: "The quality of the true visible Church is purity, and a union under no other than moral motives. The relation of its members to each other rests upon the principles of freedom. The Church is, therefore, a free state, neither a hierarchy nor democracy." †

This definition of the Church is almost an exact definition of ecclesiastical Methodism. "Such a society is none other than a company of men having the form and seeking the power of godliness." They are "banded together" for this purpose. It is a voluntary union for moral ends—a free state. This implies government, discipline, laws, and their execution. Being a voluntary and free state, existing for the purposes named, it cannot "coerce" in the sense of inflicting physical penalty, but it can by inflicting moral penalty. It can compel compliance with its laws or exclusion from its body, and the privileges belonging to that body, for the attainment and

* Wolff, "Law of Nations."

† Kant, "Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason."

preservation of the ends for which it exists, namely, its "essential quality," *purity*.

But there is another and a higher class of principles than those already named underlying the government of the Church. These are principles of divine character and authority. The Church is more than a free state existing for moral ends; it is *God's visible kingdom among men*. It has an authority, therefore, higher than that given it by the individuals who voluntarily enter into it and compose its body. God is its king and lawgiver. His authority is supreme; and he to whom he delegates it, possesses it—holds it by supreme right, arising out of divine enactment. That God has committed authority to the Church to govern, cannot be denied; and this authority, though exercised by the Church, is *God's authority*. Whether we consider this right to govern as lodged in the whole body of Christians, and delegated by them to those whom they set apart to rule—as we most steadfastly believe, and as Methodism teaches—or as committed to the few, and transmitted from them by the "laying on of hands" to others, in either case the authority is in the Church, and is God's authority.

The Holy Scriptures teach us that the state has this element of divine authority lodged in it. The thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans fully establishes this fact. Such declarations and exhortations as the following are unequivocal and explicit upon this point: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. . . . For he [the civil ruler] is *the minister of God* to thee for good . . . he beareth not the sword in vain: *for he is the minister of God*, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For, for this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing."

If this be the relation of the civil government and the civil ruler to the divine government and the divine Ruler, how much more the Church, which is God's kingdom among men, uncircumscribed by political boundary, by nationality, race, or age! A kingdom, as described by the prophet Daniel (set up)

to be "an everlasting kingdom," one which is to break in pieces and subdue all others, and fill the whole world, making the civil powers but limited fragments of its own power, which, while separated from them, yet permeates and controls them. The most important of all institutions, the most universal and perpetual—the "New Jerusalem descending from God out of heaven," into which the glory of the nations is to be gathered, and into which kings are to bring their treasures —the power that is to subdue the world, overcome evil, develop holy character, train souls for heaven, and into which nothing shall enter "that *defileth*," and which is finally to be presented to God "a glorious Church without spot or wrinkle," *must* be under the dominion of a divine government, and *have lodged* in it an authority more than human, even the authority of God.

The Holy Scriptures nowhere formally state and define this authority in so many words, but they do most explicitly recognize and speak of it. St. Paul, in his first letter to Timothy, third chapter, speaking of the qualifications of a bishop, says, he must be "one who ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity. For if a man know not how to rule his own house, how can he take care of [rule] the Church of God?" Again, in the fifth chapter, he says, "Let the elders that *rule well* be counted worthy of double honor." "Against an elder receive not an accusation but before two or three witnesses." "Them that sin, *rebuke* before all, that others may fear." "Lay hands suddenly upon no man, neither be *partaker of other men's sins*." "I charge thee before God, and the elect angels, that thou observe these things, without preferring one above another, doing nothing by partiality." All this teaches us that *elders ruled;* that Timothy, as an ἐπισκοπος, by virtue of his office, if not his order, had still *higher authority* than they, and the apostle, by virtue of his apostleship, still *higher authority* than Timothy; and that this authority extended to the *arrest, arraignment, trial,* and *expulsion* from the Church of unworthy members and ministers. We are taught thereby that the early Church was under government, God having made them who were in authority "overseers to feed the flock," and not only to feed them, but to *arraign, discipline,* and *expel* the unworthy by a

divine authority committed to them, and for the proper exercise of which they were not only responsible to the Church, but to God himself.

In the First Epistle to the Corinthians, fifth and sixth chapters, there is given a case in point. There was one, it seems, allowed to remain in the Church who was known to be guilty of gross immorality. The apostle severely rebukes the Church therefor, and says: "But now I have written unto you not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; *with such a one no not to eat.* For what have I to do to judge them also that are without? do not ye judge them that are within? But them that are without God judgeth. *Therefore put away from among yourselves that wicked person.*" And then, as if anticipating an objection to this action upon the ground of a lack of competent authority in the Church to exclude, he says: "Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world? and if the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters? Know ye not that we shall judge angels? how much more things that pertain to this life."

In the Gospel by St. Matthew, eighteenth chapter, our Saviour, in a most marked and positive manner, recognizes and speaks of this authority as follows: "Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church: *but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a* HEATHEN MAN AND A PUBLICAN."

Nothing can be stronger than this. The absolute and utter separation and exclusion from all the religious privileges of the Jewish Church of a heathen, or publican, was most thorough and complete. And such is to be the attitude and action of the Church toward the persistent and defiant offender. The verse following the quotation already given asserts, in the strongest manner, the authority of the Church, and, while no Protestant will claim it as teaching what the Roman Church claims, yet it does imply that excommunication from the

Church is a fearful thing—a penalty which to the incorrigible must appear like the foreshadowings of that darkness which will accompany the wrath of the judgment thunders. "Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

The Church, then, is still, as of old, a Theocracy. The Lord Jesus Christ is its head and ruler, the word of God its law. Its authority to administer discipline is by divine enactment. Those into whose hands this authority is committed must exercise it according to the direction of the Supreme Head of the Church, and the laws he has given. They have no choice; they must be faithful to their trust, or stand guilty before their Judge. The Methodist Episcopal Church, as a part of the body of Christ, recognizes these principles, and assumes the authority they imply. It says of its fundamental rules and requirements: "These are the General Rules of our societies; all of which we are taught of God to observe, even in his written word, which is the only rule, and the sufficient rule, both of our faith and practice. And all these we know his Spirit writes on truly awakened hearts. If there be any among us who observes them not, who habitually breaks any of them, let it be known unto them who watch over that soul as they who must give an account. We will admonish him of the error of his ways. We will bear with him for a season. But if then he repent not, *he hath no more place among us.* We have delivered our own souls."

Having called attention to these great basal principles and sources of authority in the Church, we are led naturally to ask, What provisions has the Methodist Episcopal Church made for the exercise of this authority? This leads to my second general division of the subject:

II. To show the limits and kind of jurisdiction which the Methodist Episcopal Church gives to its administrators, and the several duties which it imposes upon them.

The Methodist Episcopal Church indicates quite clearly the manner in which discipline shall be administered, and designates the persons it selects and authorizes to perform its functions in this respect, defining and limiting their several duties; and it recognizes this authority as existing in the

whole body of the Church, and not exclusively in its ministers or officers, except as delegated to them from the Church as a whole.

Part third of our Book of Discipline, chapters first, second, and third, containing paragraphs from 200 to 253, inclusive, covers the whole ground of administration. Space will not admit of extended quotations. Any one so desiring can sift the matter in detail by reading these chapters and paragraphs.

The Methodist Episcopal Church has, for laymen and bishops, *two* well-defined courts, and *one* not well-defined, making three in all. The two well-defined are courts of *trial* and courts of *appeal*. The third and *ill-defined* court is that provision which is made in our Book of Discipline whereby (1) A preacher in charge, when differing in judgment from a majority of a committee, may refer a case to a Quarterly Conference, which may order a new trial, (¶ 235.) (2) Where the president of an Annual Conference may correct *errors of law* made by a Presiding Elder in an appeal case before a Quarterly Conference, and an Annual Conference itself correct errors of administration not connected with judicial proceedings, providing such suitable remedies as may be needed, (§§ 2 and 3, ¶ 215;) and (3) Where "the General Conference," in reviewing "the decisions of questions of law contained in the records and documents transmitted to it from the Judicial Conferences, in case of serious error therein, shall take such action as justice may require," (¶ 247.) It has for traveling preachers, other than bishops, three courts, besides the indefinite court already named. These are: court of investigation, court of trial, and court of appeal. The court of investigation, however, can hardly be called a court in the proper sense, though possessed, in a limited degree, of judicial functions; it being instituted to meet exigencies which may arise in the interim of an Annual Conference, a body which has no real judicial power save when in session.

The oversight of all administration is lodged in three classes of persons, who, in their official capacity, are designated to perform the duties assigned to each. These are, first, the Bishops, or General Superintendents; second, the Presiding Elders, or District Superintendents; third, Preachers in charge of Circuits or Stations. The jurisdiction and duties of a Bishop

are defined in ¶¶ 201 to 216, 242 to 244, and 248. These are: to convene and preside in a Judicial Conference called to try an accused Bishop; to preside in an Annual Conference at the trial of a traveling preacher, when tried before the whole body of the Conference; or to appoint a chairman to preside when tried before a select number; to appoint counsel for the Church and for the accused; to convene a Judicial Conference, and preside therein, in cases of appeal from the decisions of an Annual Conference; and to decide all questions of law presented in an appeal from the decisions of a Presiding Elder, made in an appeal case before a Quarterly Conference.

The jurisdiction and duties of a Presiding Elder are defined in the following paragraphs, and relate to four classes of cases. First, the appeal of a private member or local preacher to a Quarterly Conference, (¶¶ 219 and 251.) Second, proceedings against a preacher on trial, (¶ 218.) Third, proceedings against a traveling preacher, or other Presiding Elder, in the interim of an Annual Conference, (¶ 209, §§ 1 to 5, ¶¶ 211 to 215.) Fourth, proceedings against an accused Bishop, (¶¶ 201 to 203.)

The jurisdiction and duties of a preacher in charge are defined in ¶¶ 219 to 226, ¶ 227, §§ 1 and 2, ¶¶ 228 to 233, and ¶¶ 235 to 237. These paragraphs refer to proceedings for immorality, imprudent and unchristian conduct, insolvency, disagreement in business, non payment of debts, sowing dissension, neglect of the means of grace, and improper words and tempers. Their jurisdiction extends over local preachers, and official and private members.

The first class of offenses named consists of improper tempers, words, and actions, insolvency, non-payment of debts, sowing dissensions, neglect of the means of grace, disagreement in business, teaching heresy, buying, selling, or using intoxicating liquors as a beverage, or becoming in any way a participant in the traffic in intoxicating drinks, dancing, card-playing, horse-racing, attending theaters, circuses, dancing-parties—in a word, all such amusements as "cannot be taken in the name of the Lord Jesus." The second class consists of such offenses as are "expressly forbidden in the word of God, and sufficient to exclude a person from the kingdom of grace and glory."

The Church, while it makes it the duty of a Preacher in charge, a Presiding Elder, and a Bishop to see that the pro-

visions of the Discipline named in all these paragraphs and sections are carried out by each in the jurisdiction given him, does not give either of them any right to exclude from the Church until the persons charged, after trial by their peers, have been found guilty of the crimes alleged against them. The administrator, in no case, is the judge of the innocence or guilt of an accused person. He cannot even charge a committee which tries a case as a judge charges a jury in a civil court. The committee are the judges of both the *law* and the *evidence*, and the Church does not permit interference with their prerogatives. All an administrator can do is to see that a case is properly arranged and conducted, and rule upon motions for the admission or exclusion of proffered evidence. The only departure from this is where a preacher in charge "may differ in judgment from a majority of the committee concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused, he may refer the case to the ensuing Quarterly Conference, which shall have authority to order a new trial." A prerogative of doubtful expediency, and not at all in harmony with the general jurisprudence of Methodism. The Church decides upon the guilt or innocence of all who are arraigned for offenses committed against its laws and order. The verdict is pronounced by the peers of the accused in every case except that of an arraigned Bishop, and here also, if we look upon the episcopacy as an *office* and not an *order*—a view which most Methodists hold. The right of *peremptory* challenge is only given to accused Bishops, and to traveling preachers in cases of appeal to a Judicial Conference; but this extends only to a limited number. The court cannot be reduced below the minimum required by the law of the Church. The right to challenge for *cause* is given to private members, local preachers, and traveling preachers, in all preliminary investigations, but not in appellate courts. Such courts—being either the Quarterly Conference, the Annual Conference, or the Judicial Conference—are created by the organic law of the Church, and cannot be changed in their composition, like committees called together for an especial purpose. The Church grants the right of appeal to all, where errors and defects in judicial proceedings may be duly considered, and rectified if wrong, or affirmed if right. And beyond these appellate courts of the Church,

definitely named, there are the indefinite courts already alluded to, where errors of administration and serious errors in law may be remedied by "such action as justice may require."

It is seen by these provisions that the Church guards most sacredly the rights of all within its fold; while, at the same time, by the minute provisions made for proceedings against those guilty of the multiform and various offenses named, it also equally seeks to guard the integrity and purity of the Church.

There can be no doubt as to the duty of an administrator in relation to offenses so explicitly named. It matters not what his personal feelings may be, nor how much he may shrink from the performance of what must ever be a most disagreeable task; obligation binds him, responsibility rests upon him, and the gravity of his position as "an overseer of the Church of God" makes it impossible that he should evade his duty without incurring serious guilt. There are, however, some questions arising in connection with the discharge of these stern duties which are worthy of consideration. For instance: How far should an administrator insist upon regular investigation by Church courts of alleged immoralities or other offenses? Constant, or even frequent, litigation is very pernicious in its results; it distracts and demoralizes. We know something of its evil effects upon the character of those who indulge in it in our civil courts. Would not the effects be worse upon litigants in our Church courts? How, then, is an administrator to proceed in the discharge of his duty, so as to subserve the moral ends for which the Church exists? How is he to preserve its peace, secure moral benefit to the offender, uphold the righteousness and dignity of Church authority, saving it from any charge of laxness or connivance with offenders, and at the same time avoid the troubles which naturally grow out of litigation? It is evident that Church trials ought to be avoided, if they can be, without betrayal of trust or neglect of duty. If all men were honest, or even wise when honest, it would be different. There is likely to be misrepresentation. Sides will be taken, perhaps from prejudice, or sentiment, or interest, and not from reason, justice, the love of the Church, or the love of God. There will, in all probability, be evil passion engendered, and no one can predict what

may be the final outcome of evil. On the other hand, to even *seem* to wink at wrong, or to show the least indifference in reference to evident immorality, would be productive of still greater evil. There must not be room for even the *shadow* of a suspicion in this direction. Where, then, shall the line be drawn so as to avoid both of these evils? To carry out in their fullest measure the mandates of the Church, and at the same time avoid, as far as possible, the evils which arise out of wrong *when it arrays itself against the forces which seek to suppress it?*

I answer: Let the provisions of our Book of Discipline, in reference to the minor offenses, be faithfully and fully, yet prudently, carried out; and it is probable that, in a large majority of these cases, reformation can be secured, and the Church saved both the scandal and the trouble which grow out of litigation. In cases of the sterner immoralities, there should be no vacillating. Every rumor should have immediate attention, and such informal inquiry be made as will ascertain the grounds upon which it rests. If it appears, after such inquiry, that the rumor is false, let the result be known, and usually the case will be ended. If, on the other hand, there is a probability, or even a possibility, of guilt, or if it is not *absolutely clear* that the rumor is groundless, then let the administrator proceed to investigate the case according to the rules and provisions of the Church made and provided for such cases. No member of the Church, certainly no *minister*, can afford any other course. To shrink from investigation is tacit confession of guilt; and though the accused may escape expulsion from the Church by evading trial, yet he will not be exonerated in the eyes of his fellow-men, nor of the Church, nor will the administrator be guiltless of a betrayal of the sacred trusts committed to his keeping. The interests of the Church, the administrator, and the accused all demand that there be *immediate, thorough, and fearless investigation of every such case.* The solution of the difficult problem just named will find further answer in the consideration of my next general division, which is:

III. To define the qualifications and spirit which should characterize the true administrator in conducting all investigations coming under his jurisdiction.

The proper inquiry having been made, and the preliminary steps of arraignment all having been correctly, carefully, and prudently taken, the personal qualifications and spirit of the administrator will have much to do with results and their effects. The position in which he is placed is one of the most critical positions possible. He is intrusted with interests of the most delicate and important character, and surrounded with difficulties of the most subtle and sensitive kind. He is in the position of both a judge and a brother, and consequently occupies a near and delicate relation both to the accuser and the accused. The Church has intrusted him with the care of its honor, integrity, and purity. He pities the accused, and sympathizes with the innocent and blameless ones, who by the ties of kinship and friendship are so intimately associated with him, that their welfare and happiness is bound up in the verdict which may be given in the case. The welfare, too, on the other side, of perhaps deeply injured and wronged ones, and those near and dear to them, the welfare of the Church, and perhaps the eternal salvation of souls, is involved in the issue. With these opposite interests clamoring and appealing to his judgment and his heart; with self-interested, and sometimes wicked, persons seeking to influence him by raising false issues, in order to distract attention from the real issue; surrounded with smiles and frowns, praise and blame, flattery and censure, promises and threats, often alternating and seeking to move him, he certainly needs to be thoroughly panoplied for the ordeal.

Plato* classifies virtue as follows: The virtue of the *reason*, which is prudence, or wisdom; the virtue of the *heart*, which is valor; and lastly the virtue to which he says "belong the due regulation and adjustment of the other powers of the soul, and which, therefore, constitutes the bond uniting the three, which is *justice*." "In justice all the elements of moral culture meet together and center." Again he says: "God is angry when any one censures a man like himself, or praises a man of an opposite character; and the Godlike man is the *good man*." The administrator of the discipline *ought* to be possessed of all these virtues. *Wisdom* and *prudence* are indispensable to him. He will need *valor* of the highest order, daring, under any and all circumstances, to do right. And above all, he *must be* just.

* "Republic."

He ought, and he will, if he has the right spirit, typify in his character Plato's "Godlike man," and be possessed of what Charles Sumner calls "the true grandeur of humanity" when he says: "The true grandeur of humanity is in *moral elevation*, sustained and enlightened by reason, and that passionless, Godlike justice which controls his relations with all others." No tincture of littleness or narrowness should show itself in his character. He must not be a partisan, nor allow prejudice to control him. Sympathy must be under the dominion of reason, and impartiality mark every movement. The old saying, "the judge is on the prisoner's side," must not be the rule which regulates him; he is to be on no side, or rather, on *all* sides. Standing as the representative of God's authority in the Church, he ought to cultivate and represent that dignity, impartiality, justness, tenderness, transparency, wisdom, courage, and love which inhere in and adorn the character of our Lord Jesus Christ. He ought to be possessed of all the platonic virtues, and more, of the Christian virtues also. If it were possible, he ought to be as wise as Solomon, as just as James, as prudent as Paul, as brave as Peter, as tender as John, and as *immovable from right* as the "Rock of Ages," and, like the symbolic representations of justice, *blind* to *every thing* but truth, right, and the eye of God. Such a character, who can find? Such perfections, alas! are only ideal, and never can be fully realized in fact. Yet notwithstanding this, every administrator should strive, as nearly as possible, to reach this ideal. He can be possessed of the spirit, and be guided by the intent thereof, even when he falls greatly short of its realization. Knowing "no man after the flesh," let him preside as reflecting in his administration God's qualities, and above all, "*that passionless Godlike justice*" which is the band that ties in one the bundle of all the virtues.

I now come to the most important part of this discussion—indeed, all-important, if the results aimed at by the Church in its administration of the discipline are rightly reached, or even reached at all, namely:

IV. To define the manner in which a Church court should be conducted, and to discuss the application of the principles and rules of evidence prevailing in civil courts to ecclesiastical courts.

How is an administrator to elicit the truth in reference to the guilt or innocence of an accused party, and thus secure justice in administration? This is a vital question. He may be just and upright; his intentions may be the purest and best; he may have many of the qualifications, and be possessed fully of the spirit, already described, and yet so conduct an investigation or trial as to defeat the ends of justice, rather than attain them. It is very important that all the preliminary steps shall have been carefully and correctly taken. The requirements of our Book of Discipline should be fully complied with, even to the minutest details, in this respect. The charges and specifications under them ought to be carefully and correctly drawn. Each charge should be specific; each specification definite, and under its appropriate charge; the committee secured; due notification given the accused of time and place of trial; ample time given him to secure counsel and prepare his defense; sufficient time allowed to both complainant and defendant, to take depositions, secure witnesses, and do any other thing which may be necessary to the thorough investigation of the complaints.

When every thing is thus ready, and the investigation begins, *the administrator must see that the case is conducted according to the forms of law and that the tests of relevancy and truthfulness are applied to all the testimony offered;* applying strictly the principles and rules of evidence prevailing in civil courts *to the case in hand.* I know that this is not the view taken by the Church generally. Perhaps a majority—certainly a large number—of its administrators hold that these principles and rules should not be strictly adhered to, *but* that all rulings on the admission of offered evidence should be what is called *liberal*—whatever that term may mean, (as indefinite here, doubtless, as it is when applied to theology;) that there should be a "broad margin" given, as to the character of witnesses, kind and relation of evidence, character of questions, etc. In support of this view, it is said, it is impossible to apply the rules of evidence to cases before ecclesiastical courts, or conduct them as civil courts are conducted, because the Church has no power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and administers no oaths. Not, therefore, using the forms, nor possessing the powers, of a civil

court, greater latitude must be given, and the facts gained by gleaning them from and sifting them out of whatever may be proffered or produced, whether true or false, relevant or irrelevant, to the issue relating or not relating to the case in hand. The *sorting process* implied in this position is the point of its weakness. He who would be able to separate the true from the false, under such circumstances, would be possessed of an insight almost amounting to *omniscience.* And yet such views are somewhat general, and our Church practice largely corresponds to them; and because of this, our Church courts are so frequently charged with "whitewashing" offenders, and are reckoned by many untrustworthy, failing to command, as they should, the respect of the intelligent and thinking public. This "wide margin" theory is a delusion. The fallacy of the position will be seen upon a moment's reflection. In granting it the question naturally arises, How wide? Do away with all limitations? ignore all tests? admit every thing that is offered as evidence? allow every question which may be asked? *No one will be absurd enough to claim this.* Well, then, where shall the line be drawn? It must be drawn somewhere; where shall it be? Is it not better to leave it where the experience of men who have made the methods of eliciting truth a special study have placed it? Is it probable that any one can do better than this? Is there not an unwarranted assumption of wisdom in setting one's self up as wiser than the aggregate wisdom of the many, gained by hundreds of years of experimenting in reference to the same thing? Ought any *one* man be permitted to assume such prerogative, much less be assisted in taking it upon himself? It is an assumption unwarranted in any view of the case. There will be points enough arise, as we shall see farther on, where an administrator will be forced to apply principles of evidence in his discretion, without assuming to set aside or ignore those well-established rules, which are every-where reckoned the *safeguards of virtue and the tests of truth.* The reasons given for a departure from the practice of civil courts are, when properly considered, reasons why, if there should be any difference, the rules of evidence should be more strictly applied in ecclesiastical than in civil courts. Because the Church cannot compel the attendance of witnesses, nor secure their testimony except

they choose to give it, nor administer oaths, it is therefore under the greater obligation to be careful as to the character of those who do testify, and to protect them and all concerned from attacks which, from the nature of a Church court, they may not be able to repel. Any other course can only be of advantage to the unscrupulous. They, and not the honest and truthful, would take advantage of this liberality in administration, and put in irrelevant and false testimony under it; while the just, being unable to secure the attendance of witnesses, perhaps, and being precluded by *conscience* from meeting it on its own plane, *would be at the mercy of the vile.* Our Church courts would thus become agencies to hurt the good, instead of agencies to protect the Church and punish evil-doers. No just person could ever be benefited by such administration. All legitimate evidence—all that is necessary for the ascertainment of *truth* and *fact*—can be brought forward without the least departure from the rules of evidence contained in the common law and equity. Nay, more, an adherence to them is necessary to the ascertainment of truth and the protection of all parties from the dangers of false testimony; they are equally just to all, and the surest means known of detecting and preventing such testimony.

It is the duty of every administrator to become familiar with the methods of civil courts. He ought to make himself master of the rules of evidence, especially the principles upon which they are based. As truth is more certainly attained by the use of logical methods than in disregard of them; as they are absolutely necessary to the success of argument and the detection of fallacy; so the methods of our civil and criminal courts are necessary to the attainment of justice before ecclesiastical tribunals. The rules of evidence contained in the common law are the result of centuries of investigation and experiment as to the best methods of eliciting truth. They are the product of experience, and the conclusions of the ablest and most learned jurists of the world. The ground of their necessity lies in the *infirmity of the human mind*—its inability to avoid confusion amid a multitude of issues. The best disciplined minds among men, those trained to the closest thought, have ascertained that in the pursuit of truth it is *absolutely* necessary to hold the mind to *singleness of issue*, and exclude

from it all irrelevant and extraneous matter. There is but a single issue in any trial before a Church court; namely, the guilt or innocence of the accused in reference to the offenses charged against him. An unscrupulous counsel will seek to shift the issue, and by so doing confuse the court and jury, by calling their attention away from the real issue to some person not on trial, and some issue not involved in the case. An administrator must prevent this, holding all parties strictly to the case in hand, excluding every thing irrelevant.

In a sister Church, it is said, there actually occurred the following case, highly illustrative of the importance of the point just named. A pastor preferred charges against a member of his church for the crime of theft, of which he was clearly guilty. A neighboring pastor was called in to preside at the trial. The defense, instead of trying to show innocence, assailed the character of the pastor who brought the charges, accusing him of all kinds of misdemeanors, and bringing forward disreputable persons to prove them. He protested, claiming that he was not on trial; that the question before them was not what he might or might not be guilty of, but whether the accused was guilty or innocent of the crime charged against him. He insisted that, if he had committed the offenses claimed, that charges should be preferred against him in a proper way, where and when he could meet and answer them; that now the question was not his *guilt or innocence*, but that of the *other man*. The president of the court ruled that ecclesiastical courts should be conducted with great liberality of procedure! that in them accused and accuser came face to face; both were before the Church, and *on trial*. The result was, that one clearly guilty escaped, and the good name of an innocent party was clouded, through the ignorance of an administrator, ignoring, as he did, the plainest principles of evidence and the dictates of common sense. The notion that a Church court ought to be conducted upon the *broad* and *liberal* idea so generally prevailing is a *delusion of the worst kind*, and, in nine cases out of ten, will not only needlessly and indefinitely prolong investigation, but *defeat the ends of justice*.

But it may be said, Trials conducted in this way give better satisfaction to the general public, who, knowing nothing about the principles of evidence, will be dissatisfied if the case is held

strictly to them. I reply, If the object of a Church court is to *please the people* more than to *elicit the truth*, the point is well taken. But is that the object? Is that what Church trials are for? Is there no higher motive than this? Does not the objection rest upon a moral plane so low that it is unworthy of a moment's thought? Is it not better to please *God* than *men?* What would be thought of a civil court which should in all its proceedings have its hand upon the popular pulse, and act accordingly? Its work is to administer *justice*, regardless of the popular favor or disfavor. And shall the Church of the living God be less removed from such influences? Nay, verily! When in the discharge of the high and holy duties of the administration of the Discipline it panders to popular clamor, it will have ceased to *deserve* the confidence of mankind, and will soon reach the point of its deservings.

The administration of Discipline should not, however, be confined to a quibbling adherence to mere technicalities; this is an extreme to be avoided as well as the opposite. It is a well-established principle of our ecclesiastical jurisprudence, that no technical informality nor hair-splitting quibbling shall be permitted to interfere with the ascertainment of truth, or stand in the way of justice. Geikie,* speaking of the disgusting adherence of the Jewish rabbis to the minute technicalities of the "traditions of the elders" at the time of our Saviour, says: "A system which admitted no change, in which the least originality of thought was heresy, which required the mechanical labor of a life-time to master its details, and which occupied its teachers with the most trifling casuistry, could have but one result, to degenerate to a great extent into puerilities and outward forms." The same thing is true of a rigid adherence to minute technicalities anywhere and in any thing. Lading the memory with fine points of detail usually enfeebles the understanding, rendering its decisions more or less untrustworthy. A Church court laden and bound fast with a great mass of technicalities would be as puerile as a court of rabbis. Avoid technicalities, but in doing so do not ignore those rules which are not merely technical, but are *God's sign-boards of reason*, which point the way to the truth, and whose directions we *must follow* if we ever arrive at it.

* "Life of Christ."

In the progress of a trial there will frequently points arise where the administrator must be guided by the nature of the case, and his judgment as to the course he should take. The application of principles of evidence at such times is discretionary, and must be determined by all the circumstances of the case. It is at points of this kind he needs the greatest wisdom, and should proceed with the greatest deliberation and care. There can be no definite rules given to guide him at such points. His own good judgment, personal insight, common sense, and intuition of right, aided by the enlightenment which God gives to the sincere seeker for it, must be his guides. A distinguished authority* has said, "The absolute criterion of the correctness of our conviction of duty is a feeling of truth and certainty." This accords with the theory that conscience is the "eye of the reason" † by which we recognize the intuition of right and wrong; the ought and ought not; and, when enlightened by the judgment, not only recognizes that there is a *right* and a *wrong*, but *what* is right and *what* is wrong. Without indorsing or denying this "philosophy," it is safe to say such study of a case as recommended would so enlighten the "*feeling* of truth and certainty," that what it dictated would perhaps be right, at least as nearly right as it is possible to ascertain under such circumstances and in such cases.

But, aside from the exceptions named, an unswerving adherence to the well-established rules of evidence will be still more clearly seen by calling attention, a little more fully than hitherto, to the following three important points: (1) The competency and character of witnesses. (2) The grounds upon which certain questions are allowed or prohibited in the direct and cross examination of witnesses. (3) The quality and relativeness of testimony. The common law recognizes several things as rendering witnesses incompetent. Defect of understanding, defect of a sense of moral obligation, and defect from infamy of character, all render them incompetent to give testimony in courts of justice. Defect of understanding may arise from insanity, idiocy, or immaturity—intoxication being defined as a species of insanity. Defect of a sense of moral obligation arises from a lack of religious belief, and of a conviction of

* Fichte. † Calderwood.

moral accountability to God. Defect from infamy of character may be either infamy in the eye of the law or infamy in fact. Infamy in the eye of the law arises from a conviction by a court of justice for the commission of certain crimes. A conviction for forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, bribing a witness to absent himself, or for conspiracy to accuse another person of a capital crime, all render witnesses incompetent. Infamy of character is usually set down against the credibility of a witness. In Church courts it ought to render them incompetent, because of the reasons already given, and also because of the *superior dignity and purity of the Church.* There is a difference between the common law and the statutes of some of the States as to the competency of certain testimony. The common law, as a rule, does not allow one charged with crime to testify in his own behalf, while the statutes of several States, at least, make him competent so to testify. Ought the Church to follow the common or the statute law? Possibly, for prudential reasons, it may be best to follow the practice of the courts in the localities where we reside; at the same time, the best minds who have given the subject the thought it deserves are fully convinced of the superior wisdom of the common law in this respect. Neither the cause of truth or justice has been served by the other practice. The plea of guilty or not guilty covers the whole ground, and no testimony from an accused person will add any thing to this plea. The common law practice, in my judgment, ought to be the practice of our Church courts, with the added exclusion of witnesses who are infamous in fact, though they may not be so in law. The Church is the earthly representation of God's eternal kingdom; its government, therefore, ought to be a reflex of the divine government, and its dignity and purity in all things duly considered and protected. Hence no person of acknowledged bad moral character should be competent to bear witness in its courts. No self-convicted debauchee, no person convicted of the commission of grave crime, no one expelled from its folds for falsehood or other gross immorality, should ever be permitted to testify before its tribunals. Expulsion from the Church debars from Church privileges. If the expulsion has been for falsehood or other gross immorality, the expelled person stands in the same relation to the Church that one

convicted of perjury or other grave crime stands to the civil court, and, by the law of analogy, is incompetent to testify in the courts of the Church.

Questions asked witnesses by counsel or committee are frequently necessary to get out the real points of testimony upon which the prosecution or defense rely. The direct and cross examination of witnesses, therefore, is an inalienable right; but the rule prohibiting a leading question in direct examination is based upon grounds of equal reason with those of examination itself. Such questions are equivalent to putting words into the mouth of a witness, and justly chargeable with attempt to manufacture testimony for the occasion. For this reason they are prohibited. But to offer suggestions, in order to assist the memory of a witness, is not only allowable, but highly proper, because often necessary to enable the witness to call up that which, though important, would otherwise, because of the treachery of the memory, be passed over and lost. In cross examination leading questions are admissible, because they may be necessary to bring out some point which the witness is trying to conceal, or to show the animus of the witness toward the opposite party. All questions asked upon cross-examination must bear the tests of being responsive to the examination in chief, and relevant to the issue. Were it otherwise, endless issues might be raised, unlimited time consumed, private right invaded, and the dignity of a solemn court turned into a burlesque of justice. For the same reasons no new matter can be introduced upon cross-examination. If there is something the opposite side desire the witness to state, which has not been stated in the direct testimony, let the party make the witness his own, or bring the evidence out through some other witness. No witness can be called upon to answer a question which would criminate himself in such a manner as to expose him to legal penalty, and an administrator ought to protect him against all attempts to induce him to do so; if he is a competent witness, he has a right to such protection; if incompetent, he ought to be ruled out. When a witness, through regard for the accused, or out of respect for the welfare and purity of the Church, voluntarily comes forward and gives testimony, the Church owes him protection. And while his testimony ought to be subject to all the rules of testing known in civil courts,

nothing beyond this, upon the plea that there should be greater breadth and liberality in ecclesiastical courts than in civil, should be permitted.

The impeachment of a witness is also an inalienable right, because necessary sometimes to self-protection; but it should never be permitted save in one, or both, of the two ways recognized in the common law. That is, by showing the general reputation of the witness for truth and veracity to be bad; or by showing that the witness has made statements outside of the court different from, or contradictory of, those made in it. The foundation for impeachment in the latter of these two ways must be laid in the cross-examination of the witness, by calling his attention to the time, place, attending circumstances, and person to whom such contradictory statement was made. The reason for this is, that while one may be supposed to be always able to defend his general reputation, he may not be able to defend his reputation in a special case unless he has his attention called to all the particulars connected with it. For this reason, if there has been no such foundation laid, the law does not permit any attempt to impeach in that way, or questions upon outside matters which are not contradictory of the direct testimony, or irrelevant to the issue. A member of our Church ought to be liable to impeachment, as well as one who is not. There is no good reason why all witnesses should not equally be subject to the same testings. The cause of truth and justice demands it.

As to the quality and relativeness of testimony, a part has already been anticipated. The rules relative to hearsay, relevant and irrelevant; parole and written; matters of public interest; husband and wife; co-conspirators; dying declarations; declaration of agents, *res gesta;* burden of proof; substance of the issue; presumptive and direct evidence, are as applicable to ecclesiastical as to civil courts, and ought to be adhered to by the administrator of the Discipline as strictly as by a judge in a civil or criminal court. That he may do so, the Rules of Evidence, by some recognized authority, ought to be in the course of study prescribed for our preachers; and none should be graduated without mastering them any more than they should be without mastering our "Standards of Theology" and "Church Economy."

I come now to the closing division of this subject, the foundations for which have been laid in the preceding divisions:

V. To show that our ecclesiastical courts may become the most reliable of all courts, the surest in eliciting truth and rendering verdicts which will command the approval of honorable and thinking men.

The reliability of the decrees of any court depends upon the extent into which the following elements of certainty have entered into its investigations.: (1) Legality of form and order in the indictment, or complaint. (2) Legality of procedure in the investigation of the complaint. (3) Singleness of *issue* in the contest between the parties to the suit. (4) Reliability and truthfulness of testimony, because of the good character of witnesses. (5) That the verdict is the verdict, not of *one*, but of *several* persons. (6) That a full, *written* record of the testimony be kept, so that it can be examined carefully, point by point, by the jury or committee at their leisure. (7) General intelligence and special legal training of the court and jury. (8) Incorruptible integrity, accompanied by the solemnities and sanctions of a personal religious faith and sense of responsibility to God on the part of both court and jury. These elements, in some degree, at least, would enter into a Church court if conducted in the manner already described.

Let the complaint be explicit and definite, containing no side issues or unimportant matter. Let each charge, and the specifications under it, definitely state the offenses, when and where committed. Many a cause has failed, both in civil and in Church courts, because of serious defect in the complaint. Many Church trials have proved unsatisfactory, or entirely failed, because of clumsiness in drawing the charges, and in loading down the case with trifling issues.

One defect in the verdicts of our civil courts, especially the verdicts of juries, rendering them more or less unreliable, is the utter inability of the human mind to retain in memory all the points in a large mass of conflicting testimony—a defect which the courts now quite generally are seeking to remedy by the employment of stenographers. The writer just quoted puts the case in the following clear and strong language: "To carry all the evidence of a long trial in the mind is a thing few men can do with the training of a life-time. In a cause which

has a large mass of conflicting testimony it is an impossible thing, even for the most able and experienced judges, to give sound decisions on mere matters of fact without having the exact record of the witnesses' words, copies of the papers, and, above all, *time* to read and think."

As if anticipating this defect of civil courts, as well as the possibilities of an appeal, our Church requires an exact copy of all the proceedings and testimony in the case to be taken down in *writing*, so that a committee can carefully examine it at their leisure, and ascertain exactly what the testimony is upon any point which may be in doubt; thus refreshing the memory, enlightening the judgment, and rendering its decisions trustworthy.

As to intelligence, a Church committee of five laymen, selected, as they should be, and usually are, for their intelligence and sound judgment, will in this respect greatly outrank the best juries in our civil courts; while a committee of ministers, either in a preliminary investigation before a Presiding Elder's court, a select number at an Annual Conference, or as a Judicial Conference, constitute a jury whose general intelligence is unequaled save by a bench of trained lawyers when acting as judges in an Appellate or Supreme Court. It is safe to assert that there is no class of men of superior general intelligence, or with better trained and disciplined minds anywhere, than these. The breadth and variety of their general culture, the critical training that comes from theological and philosophical study, the habit of observing nice distinctions and scanning close points, render them eminently qualified to sift, weigh, and apply evidence. If, in addition to this, we add the mastery of the fundamental principles of law and evidence, then, if such a court is not thoroughly prepared for the intelligent performance of its work, it would be hard to find one in the world that is.

But there is a still more important element than intellectual qualification, which enters into the trustworthiness of the verdicts of courts and juries. That element is integrity, backed by a religious conviction of responsibility to God for the justness of the verdict. This, above every thing else, renders such decisions worthy of confidence. When men act from profound convictions of duty, with the fear of God and the solemnities

of the judgment before their eyes; *they do only what they believe to be right*, and when that conviction is supported by intelligence and the other safeguards named, its decisions amount to as nearly a certainty as is possible in this fallible world. Every court of the Methodist Episcopal Church is supposed to be composed of such men: men of integrity and of profound convictions of duty and responsibility; men who have the vows of God upon them, and act as in his sight; who in their daily lives are in constant association with things good and pure; many of them engaged in the most holy of all callings—the Christian ministry. If there are pure, honest, God-fearing, good, and true men, these men ought to be, and, with rare exceptions, are. There can be only two grounds of danger that the verdicts of such men may not be just and right, and these have respect to their virtues and not their vices. The first of these arises from the *unsuspectingness* which belongs to unfamiliarity with crime. The difficulty which such persons have of conceiving how men can be as vile as they sometimes are, arises from the fact, that "to the pure all things are pure." "Charity thinketh no evil;" and because it does not, such persons will be slow to believe evil. They must see it before they can or will condemn it. We may, therefore, be sure that there will not be, with them, a readiness to convict without the strongest evidence of guilt. The second ground of danger arises from the spirit of sympathy with the sorrowing and troubled, which, belonging to Christ, is the spirit of Christians. But these are only seeming dangers. They are fully balanced by intelligence and sincerity, and by that sense of responsibility and of accountability to God which will not permit, however painful, sympathy to override justice or crime when clearly seen to go unpunished. Indeed, these elements of supposed weakness are really elements of strength, rendering the decisions, when made, all the more reliable; because they show us that sympathy prevents injustice being done to the accused, while the sense of responsibility prevents sympathy from overriding justice.

Take, then, in conclusion, these great facts and points which I have been discussing in this article and put them together.

1. The fact that there is both natural and divine authority in the Church to exclude the unworthy, and that he whom

the Church selects to exercise this authority is acting, when exercising it, under the double sanction of both human and divine authorization; and is, therefore, not only the *Church's agent*, but *God's minister* to do this very thing, surrounded with a dignity and clothed with a power the highest earth can know.

2. The fact that the Church by its law points out the limits of the jurisdiction it delegates to him, and the powers it confers upon him, defining his duty in each several case clearly and explicitly.

3. The point that he should, as far as possible, be possessed of the spirit of wisdom, prudence, valor, and justice, already pointed out, having, as a crown over all human endowments, "the wisdom that cometh from above."

4. The point that the case to be tried, after being carefully prepared and exact in all its points, be inquired into according to the principles of investigation already discussed, and by such committees as our Book of Discipline designates, and *nothing can compare with such administration in dignity, wisdom, purity, and certainty of righteous result.* It ought to, and would, command the respect, approval, and admiration of the world.

There can no good reason be given why such results may not be reached in our administration, and the Methodist Episcopal Church become "a terror to evil-doers," as well as a "praise to them that do well." A government which permits its laws to be violated with impunity, becomes contemptible in the eyes of its own citizens, and loses the respect of the governments of the world. If the Methodist Episcopal Church is to retain the respect of its own members, and command the respect of other Churches, it must show that it has value as a system, and the power and the will to preserve its own purity by administering discipline, intelligently, kindly, and yet with a firm hand upon the violators of its laws within its own pale, and around its own altars.

Art. VI.—THE PROBLEM OF OUR AFRICAN POPULATION.

In our July number we discussed some "remarkable problems" of the population of the United States as presented by M. Simonin, in the "Bulletin" of the Geographical Society of Paris; facts which he pronounces "the most noteworthy, in geographical, economic, and moral phenomena" ever brought out by the statistics of nations. The results of this discussion were, summarily, the following: (1) That the "center of population" moves westward at the rate of fifty miles per decade (2) That, while the center has thus advanced at the rate of about five miles a year, the vanguard and flanks of the movement—in a line 1,200 miles long, as the bird flies, from the Lakes to the Gulf—advanced at the mean rate of seventeen miles a year, until the gold discoveries on the Pacific coast broke up the comparative regularity of the movement and dispersed it over the whole west of the continent. It had been, as Sir Charles Lyell said, "a continuous, a grand and solemn march" of humanity over the New World; felling the forests, planting the prairies, and founding the institutions of civilization. (3) That our population doubles in periods of from twenty-five to twenty-eight years. (4) That in about seventy years, that is to say, within the life-time of some thousands of our children, it will equal the whole present population of Europe, on a territory more than equal to that of Europe—a fact which must have most important effects on the commercial, social, political, and military relations of the two great sections, that is to say, on the whole civilized world. It will be equivalent to what would be the case were a single European State, say Germany, to have sway over all Europe, its "flag waving from the North Cape to Malta, from Lisbon to Moscow, over a population homogeneous in all vital respects, all freemen, and all speaking the same language. The fact of such a result is, in itself, startling; the fact of its *proximity* renders it doubly startling." In about eighty years the population of the United States will be more than seventy millions greater than the present population of Europe, according to M. Simonin's formula, and some of our children will see that time.

(5) The movement of the "center of population" will be completed, according to M. Simonin, and "all the surface of the immense country be filled with inhabitants," in about three hundred years—at most three hundred and twenty—a period which, though apparently distant to us fast Americans, seems near to him; it is as to-morrow in the history of nations. (6) Before this consummation, and as early as the year 2050, our population will be 800,000,000. "This," remarks M. Simonin, "is more than *double* all the population of Europe, including Russia; it is the figure which was given, at the beginning of this century, for the population of the *whole earth*." (7) But the result he reaches at the completion of the center movement—within three hundred and twenty years—is still more startling, not to say absolutely incredible; namely, that our population will then amount to 1,600,000,000; that is to say, a hundred millions more than the whole present population of the planet!—a hundred and sixty-six millions more, according to the latest and best German estimate of the population of the globe. The requisite period is not farther from us in the future than the conquest of Mexico, by Cortez, is in the past. It is but about fifty-seven years more than have elapsed since the arrival of the "Mayflower" at Plymouth. (8) But, what is more relevant to our present purpose, M. Simonin, in common with other European thinkers, points to two other very interesting and very grave facts in our national statistics, namely, that though the Negro population has no aid from immigration, yet its rate of increase is greater than that of the whites, which has such immense accessions from abroad; and, secondly, the startling fact that, in about eighty-one years, it will be larger than our whole population at the last census.

Such is a rapid summary of the calculations presented in our former article; they are assuredly of surpassing interest, and justify the attention given them by M. Simonin's European *confreres*, and the questions they have propounded to him respecting the probability of a future reflex emigration from the New to the Old World; the possibility of new fields for emigration, especially in the great *terra incognita* of Africa; and, finally, the fate of the world itself with a prospect of such a repleted population.

When we proposed to return to the subject, it was not with

the hope of saying anything much more satisfactory than we have already said on its problems, but of emphasizing some of its practical corollaries. For personal reasons we must, at present, resist the temptation to do so; but we must be allowed briefly to refer again to the future of our African population, a problem which is so proximate, so startling, and, as some writers think, so menacing. As to the problem of the general population of the globe, as affected by the immense American growth, we may leave that to the Malthusians and their opponents; it is so distant, and subject to so many contingencies—which have thus far historically affected it—wars, famines, pestilences, etc.—that few of us would contemplate it with much solicitude. It is a relief to us, also, to learn from the statisticians that, if our own population should be as dense, per square mile, as that of some of the agricultural districts of India, we are able, alone, to accommodate about three times the present population of the globe.

Our colored population is now found to be a great element of the working force of the nation, and is constantly becoming a better one; it deserves well of the republic for worthy conduct generally, and especially in critical times of our history. We have given it, theoretically, at least, liberty and political equality; but it has not social equality, for the latter does not depend entirely on political equality, though it may be profoundly affected by it. Our African population is still a social *caste*, and seems destined to continue such. The mark of that caste is on its very brows, as we have admitted in our former article; and, though only "skin deep," yet it is believed, by many of our own thinkers, at least, to be irremediable. Professor Gilliam, in treating elaborately the subject, (in the "Popular Science Monthly," February, 1883,) pronounces Amalgamation impossible, inconceivable. Professor Freeman, (the English historian,) who has studied it in his travels among us, points to the problem as one of the gravest perils of our future. The Parisian geographers look upon it as a "surprising" and formidable question. Are these well-deserving fellow-citizens to be forever a social *caste* among us? They are to be, as we have seen, within the life-time of some of our children, numerically equal to our whole present population—fifty millions and more; Professor Gilliam shows that, in 1980, they will be

one hundred and ninety-two millions. Can a republic go on prosperously with such a socially proscribed nation within the nation, and all these proscribed millions actual freemen, and politically equal to the race that socially disowns them? Can this Hindu pariah barbarism be successfully incorporated into our free institution, and Christian civilization? We unhesitatingly say No! Neither republicanism nor Christianity can admit such a supposition; and every fundamental law of national life is against it. And all good men should thank God that it is so.

Professor Gilliam insists that colonization is our *only* hope. We are not disposed to discourage this hope, though, in the presence of the formidable facts of the case, it seems altogether dubious. Geographers rank Africa as one of the great quarters of the earth; and it is fast becoming the chief field of modern exploration and commercial experiment. European enterprise is now attempting to penetrate it, at almost every point of the north, the west, the south, and the southeast, and to reach its very heart through the north-east by Egypt and Nubia. Livingstone, Stanley, De Brazza, and their coadjutors, have concentrated the attention of the world upon it; and the Congo would seem about to become one of the great thoroughfares of the globe. The "Dark Continent" is full of resources, of gold, iron, coal, ivory, precious woods, and gums, and the day for its corporation into the commercial system of the civilized world seems to have at last come. It may also be pronounced the greatest of all our remaining fields for philanthropic and religious zeal.

European thinkers now point to Africa as the next great field of colonization, after America; its proximity to Europe gives it special advantage in this respect, and it will not be surprising if the surplus population of the latter should be found, before many years, flowing toward it. The unhealthiness of parts of it would seem not to be an insurmountable obstacle. Geographers and geologists describe it as an inverted plate, with a low, malarious margin, or sea-board; and an inner, circular ridge of mountains inclosing most of the country as high and comparatively healthy plateaus, with inestimable resources. Several of the governments of Europe are now actively interested in its exploration and development. Is not

America to share, commercially, at least, this new interest for Africa? We, who have millions of people the best adapted to its climate—to be its sailors, pioneers, merchants, and missionaries—are we to be but idle spectators of the general movement for it? Are our growing millions of its children, rising daily in intellectual and moral improvement, to take no part in its redemption? With the immense prospective growth of our colored population will doubtless come considerable development of its business talent and wealth; in spite of its social disadvantages, can its fatherland fail then to attract its enterprise in commerce, in religion, and civilization generally?

It is not, therefore, improbable that the coming colored American hosts may look thitherward with an interest such as few of us now dream of; and if European emigration is hereafter to tend toward it, is it chimerical to suppose that the Americo-African race, with its scores of millions, will neglect the inviting field—its ancestral home?

We may well remind ourselves, in this connection, of the marvelous times in which we live, and their probable effect on the future. Events move now, not in arithmetical, but in geometrical, progression. Within our own still uncompleted century the world has advanced, in the scientific and practical arts, more than it ever advanced before in any recorded two thousand years. Our century has given it the steam-boat, the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone, the photograph, the spectroscope, anæsthetics, practical electricity, and how many other beneficent wonders! The above summary statistics of the New World are alone marvels portentous of revolutionary changes of the entire planet. Not he that hopes, but he that desponds over the prospects of the world, is now likely to be the false logician. As our Africo-American millions go on increasing, the world will also be hurrying on to new, and, perhaps, unthought-of, intersectional relations. Commercial steam navies will cover the seas; cheaper and more rapid communications will exist; and the transition from one to another portion of our little globe will become incredibly facilitated. May we not, then, with sufficient sobriety, expect that the African movement, now setting in, will affect the Africo-American problem? Europeans come now, by annual hundreds of thousands, to America to escape social and other disadvantages

of their native lands; and Africa is pointed to as their next great field of refuge. Can it be possible, we again ask, that our own African people, suffering the social disadvantages we have mentioned, will not share the general and ever-growing colonizing spirit, and claim their precedent right to the blessings of their fatherland?

Still, we look in this direction only for relief to the problem, not for its solution. Emigration to Africa, or anywhere else, must be voluntary with our colored population; no compulsion can now be thought of as either right or possible. Can we expect a voluntary expatriation of such millions? There is another line of thought, on which we may find further relief to the problem. While the movement of our Middle and Northern population is toward the West and North-west, that of the South tends to the West and South-west. Of course the black population must share the latter general movement; but it is said that there is already discernible a peculiarly strong tendency of the blacks in that direction. They appear to be unconsciously wending their way thitherward. Southern observers say so, at least. Even in the North, where there has been, since the civil war, a great diminution of prejudice against the race, and where hosts of philanthropic citizens stand ready to help it upward, it increases in but few places, and is gradually disappearing in many. Some of us expected it would overflow the North after emancipation; but, excepting a few western localities whither it has gone under a sort of sporadic and temporary impulse, its tendency has been south-westward. It is leaving Virginia, the old "breeding field" of the race; and all through the old Southern States, while it still multiplies there, it is reported that this tendency is bearing it along toward the Mexican frontier. Thither, too, tends inevitably the destiny of the nation. Beyond that frontier, and throughout Central and Southern America, exist millions of mixed populations, amalgamated Spaniards, Africans, and Indians. Our prejudices against amalgamation, wrongly affirmed, as we think, by Professor Gilliam, to be invincible are comparatively unknown among the masses, at least, of those vast and fertile regions. Is our African problem to find its solution there? Is nature, or rather Providence, opening thitherward the national destiny for our salvation and pro-

longed beneficent mission? We know how conjectural must be any such calculations, and how self-complacently criticism can brush them aside; but the history of humanity has much in it that our philosophy would never have dreamed of; there is a beneficent programme in things, whether we are willing theistically to account for it or not. Expecting death under the Reign of Terror, the atheistic philosoper, Condorcet, wrote an essay to prove the progressive "perfectibility" of the world —that by a natural law, an inherent system, the human race will go on to ever better conditions. The Christian thinker may still more confidently entertain this hope, especially in connection with so grand a destiny as that to which our country seems appointed. Few of us can doubt that our strongest future geographical tendency must be southward, perhaps indefinitely southward; and that our recent railroad and other business enterprises in that direction, particularly in Mexico, are opening the way for it. Meanwhile, what does this tendency of our black population thitherward mean? These people will there find not only a congenial climate, and most favorable conditions for their accustomed agricultural life, but they will find the native population, we may say, in a sense, the whole population, a mass of amalgamated races, including their own. Reaching the great new field, either by a special tendency of their own or the general tendency of our people, can they fail to intermingle with its mixed races? A similar amalgamation can begin only with the lower classes of population in any country; all the population of this vast, new field may be said to be of those classes. Mixing, as they naturally do in such circumstances, the distinctive and repulsive types, as of aboriginal or African, are more or less obliterated, or mingled in a new type of the working or common people, from whom, under free institutions like ours, rise at last the better classes of population; specific causes of prejudice against intermarriage, like that against the African, may thus die out. May we not, then, look with hope to the great Southern fields of the continent, which are to be the theater of our future national progress, for the solution of this Negro problem?

This view of the subject makes us, of course, "amalgamationists," though in a somewhat qualified sense; and we hesitate not a moment to accept that charge, notwithstanding

the emphatic language of Professor Gilliam, and similar very respectable writers, against amalgamation. We would not be unreasonable here, much less fanatical; but from broad views of humanity, as well as Christianity, we must insist on a treatment of the subject less liable to foster the antipathies of race than that which has prevailed among us. Though our religion is wisely not dogmatic on such subjects, unquestionably it repels at its very heart most of these prejudices. In most of foreign Christendom they are comparatively unknown; even in polished Paris, the American traveler finds them far less prevalent than in Boston or New York.

But it is on scientific grounds that we chiefly assert, contrary to prevalent opinion, that "amalgamation," and nothing but amalgamation, in some way or other, must be the final solution of the problem. This is certainly its only historical solution. No similar problem has been solved in any other way. England, France, Spain, modern Greece, have all homogeneous populations compounded of various races; the illustration is, we admit, but partial, for they are not exactly parallel cases; but in tropical and South America the amalgamation has been sufficiently parallel; and, whether parallel or not, is there any other historical or scientific solution to be offered us? If not, should it not be the aim of all thinkers, and of all good men among us, to diminish rather than fortify the prevalent prejudice against it?

It is often said that degeneration attends the intermarriage of blacks and whites, and there are wise men who would conscientiously oppose it on this ground. The opinion is a fallacy, founded nevertheless in an element of truth. It is contrary to the well-known laws and results of interbreeding. The mulatto may, indeed, be less physically vigorous than the pure African, but intellectually he is superior, and this implies an essentially superior type, with whatever incidental defects. He is in transition, and has, doubtless, some peculiar liabilities; but let the transition go on, and the superior blood is certain, soon or later, to work out superior results. His anomalous position amid our unchristian prejudices, depresses him in all respects; give him fair play and, like not a few of his class of late years, he, or at least his children, will soon reveal his superiority. The quadroon has been noted for beauty; and beauty belongs

to superior race. It is seldom found among savages. If we pass by the local anomaly of the Asiatic Georgians, (intrinsically, however, an intimate example of the Aryan race, and probably affected by peculiar local conditions,) beauty is a characteristic of advanced humanity; it distinguished the Greeks in the ancient world, as symbolized by their poets, in the person of Helen; the French in the modern world, symbolized in Madame Recamier; the Americans in recent times, if we may accept the concurrent opinion of foreign travelers among us. The blood of the white race in the quadroon doubtless contributes to the peculiar physique in which is founded her peculiar beauty; but, nevertheless, the Negro element is the distinctive fact of that beauty. We have certainly abused the Negro enough; let us be candid with him, at least within the limits of science, if we will not within those of religion and humanity. Let us not deny to him the benefits of its acknowledged laws. If we suppose ourselves incomparably his superior, and consider his race one of the lowest, yet what were our own British forefathers in the days of Cæsar's invasion, and what would we probably be to-day, had they, in their mud huts, their clothes of wild beasts' skins, and their universal brutality, been denied the benefit of the natural laws of improvement? Heredity is one of those laws which affects the intellectual and social as well as the physical condition of races. It has taken centuries for the British race to rise from its primitive inferiority; but it has risen to the supreme place among nations. Doubtless the Negro race, among us, has inherent natural disabilities, and no possible means can at once bring it up to the standard of advanced races; its immediate improvements must become hereditary; with fair play every successive generation will possess not only better advantages, but better hereditary capabilities for further advancement. And we doubt not that, under the auspices of our better times, its continuous development will be far more rapid than was that of our own British ancestry. Be that as it may, let us give it fair play here, in our glorious arena of the New World—here, where races, nationalities, complexions, and physiognomies should pass out of consideration, and humanity alone be recognized—humanity in its universal brotherhood, and its imprescriptable rights.

It would seem, indeed, that the popular, if not the scientific, mind of our times has been too much inclined to place the Negro in the very lowest degree of humanity, quite forgetting the Terra del Fuegian, the Patagonian, the New Zealander, and other still lower forms of the species. The African is considered as, in some peculiar sense, autochthonous, indigenous to the "Dark Continent,"—if not sprung from the very slime of its soil, yet from some of its brute occupants, probably from its monkeys, and it is apparently assumed that any mingling of foreign blood with his can only brutalize humanity, not humanize his supposed brutality. Ethnologists know, however, that if we except one or two local examples of peculiar degradation in Africa, there are other much inferior races of our poor humanity. They know, also, that in Africa itself the laws of interbreeding have been working out their usual salutary results on a scale of much greater magnitude than has been generally suspected; and demonstrating that the Negro is as capable as any other people of this natural process of improvement. The Semitic race, to which we owe so much, has long been extending its sway over, not only the northern coast, but the northern interior of the continent, reaching far southward, over the somewhat numerous communities of the great desert, and into the Soudan, and is tending fast toward the equator; not only reducing the native tribes under its control, but teaching them to read the Arabic; erecting mosques among them, superseding the native polytheism by the strict Mohammedan monotheism, marked though it may be by some traces of the old native superstitions. The Semitic race, while maintaining its characteristics throughout this vast region, mingles, nevertheless, its blood with the native blood; the daughters of Africa fill the households, the harems, of the superior race, and thus a new race, a Semitic-African race, is being raised up over a large portion of the continent. A similar amelioration is also going on over most of the eastern coast. Ethnologists have long known that the superior Negroes of south-eastern Africa, who have won the friendship and admiration of Livingstone, Colenso, etc., are the offspring of an amalgamation of the natives with a foreign race. The original Kaffirs were a people from the north-east, quite distinct from the Negroes; they have mingled with the latter and

raised up a new race admired by all travelers for their superior stature, their fine proportions, "supple," and even "elegant," says a French authority—their lighter color, yellow brown, their elevated and rounded foreheads, etc. Their idiom and their influence reach far beyond Kaffraria. Amalgamation has, certainly, not failed to show here the usual advantages of interbreeding.

Again, there extends over nearly the whole northern interior, from Nubia to the Atlantic, a remarkable example of the comparative elevation of the native race by amalgamation with a mysterious foreign people from the North-east, known as the Pouls, the "Reds," "forming," says a French ethnologist, "the dominant caste in all the states which were founded ages since in the valley of the Senegal, in that of the Niger, and in the basin of Lake Tchad." They founded the empire of Tekrour, reaching beyond Timbuctoo. They have assimilated the native population, have raised up an improved race of pale or red color, "with a shade of rhubarb;" their children are taught to read in schools; their faith is monotheistic; their features are "fine;" their lips are "thin;" they have "nothing of the Negro woolly hair," but their locks hang in long tresses on their shoulders;" their "noses are aquiline;" their figures "tall and straight." They are "very intelligent," combine in their industries, and work well in iron and tissues. They "show a decided taste for instruction;" they "cannot be held in slavery," etc. In fine, Africa itself presents, we repeat, on a broad scale, examples of the salutary effects of amalgamation, incontestable demonstrations that the Negro is susceptible, like all the rest of the human race, of the elevating effects of interbreeding.

That good and, in some respects, truly great man, the late Bishop Gilbert Haven, studied thoroughly the African race among us. He himself was of the best type of American character—or, at least, of what all genuine Americans should be—with a soul large, not only as his nation, but as his race. At heart Gilbert Haven was an amalgamationist. He knew the Negro well, for he traveled and labored in the South with heroic devotion. He did not believe the race could be forever a *caste* among us, and what prevention of a caste could he see but the blending of it with our other races? He came, not

only to esteem the African, as having some peculiar and admirable race-traits; but, at last, he came heartily to love him as a brother man, destined to good and great things, and worthy of such a destiny. He saw in the race the best social affinities, singular docility, rare facility for acquiring at least the elementary intelligence and habits of civilization, such as could prepare it for high and speedy hereditary development, great religiousness, subordination to government, so rare in undeveloped peoples, brave patriotism, soldierly capabilities, and the best human sympathies. His episcopal dignity could not prevent his fervent fraternization with the humblest black men, nor even a certain frank, not to say gallant, acknowledgment of the beauty and graceful capabilities of many of their women. After studying them, all over the South, he could never criticise Moses's choice of an Ethiopian wife; and he believed it quite possible that, some day or other, an American leader of the people might not hesitate to introduce one into the presidential mansion. We may smile at all this; but the future may have some new revelations for us little suspected at present. The "heresies" of great men in one age have often become the highest orthodoxy and sublimest convictions of another. What will be, what *must* be, the relative position of this race when, a few years hence, it shall be as numerous as our whole present population—when, in about a hundred years hence, it shall be, according to Prof. Gilliam's figures, nearly four times as great as all our present national hosts? What must be the elevation of many of its families in that time? Already it has given us some really able men, who have adorned our public life; with its advancement they will multiply to tens of thousands. There will be among them successful merchants, scholars, statesmen. Can we socially proscribe them then? What will their millions not be able to do with our politics? They can then control, at discretion, our greatest parties; they can rule the nation. They are already in our Legislatures, and worthily there. To the most sober calculation the time may not be distant when, in the balancing of parties, we shall have a nominee from among them for the Vice-Presidency of the republic. Many patriotic citizens, zealous for their elevation, would hail such a fact to-morrow; but the Vice-President may readily enough become President, as our history shows; and if

he is worthy of the one position, he ought to be of the other. And if an able colored statesman, a man of polished education and manners, should enter, by the call of the nation, the White House, with his educated wife and children, what would become of our Negro social proscription under such a political recognition? Where would our race antipathy take refuge? It must be thrown to the winds. We would find ourselves in a practical, a national, solecism, where we must stand before the world confounded, if not ridiculous. Evidently the two things cannot co-exist; and, evidently, the first of them is next to inevitable in our political future. Gilbert Haven will as inevitably be recognized, not merely as an apostolic bishop, whose humanitarianism was worthy of the highest ethics of his religion, but as a heroic prophet in our national Israel.

Speculate on the subject as we please, the essential facts of the question confront us in a manner entirely uncompromising. These people are enfranchised citizens; they are to become the millions we have above estimated—these are two clear enough facts. It is another certain fact that their social proscription cannot possibly co-exist with their future numerical and political importance. What, then, are we to do in the case? The solution of the problem must absolutely be either such as we have indicated, or these coming millions must be reduced to such subjection as existed under the old, oriental, barbaric despotisms, where alone history has recorded any long subjection and control of large socially proscribed "castes," unless in legalized slavery and ownership. Does any man think we can reduce these millions again to slavery? Or, on the other hand, can our republican and Christian civilization sink to the condition of the old, oriental despotism and barbarism? If any man could wish the latter, as our only salvation, in respect to this problem, yet there can be no such miserable hope for him; for no nation could, in one century, sink from our altitude to such a depth, and in about one century, as we have seen, our Negro population is to be several times as great as our whole present population. There can be no time, therefore, for this barbarous alternative. On the other hand, let us the rather believe, that the providential extension southward of our population and civilization, not to say our governmental autonomy—for this is not necessary in the argument—together with a grand moral

self-conquest of our prejudices, shall dispel alike our race antipathies and the perils of the problem.

So much for hypotheses on the question; we wish they could be something better than hypotheses, but we offer them only for what they are worth, and if any other pen should afford us a more satisfactory, a more hopeful, solution of the problem, we would gratefully give our dubious theorizings to the winds.

We have said that the subject presents occasions for "prophesyings," and even "preachments." There have been enough of the former, in our treatment of it, thus far; we have no disposition to indulge in the latter, but may be allowed to add a few practical remarks in conclusion.

What should be our conduct, as citizens, before this formidable problem?

First. All political grievances of our colored people should be extinguished. The constitutional amendments have made them citizens and given them political equality with the whites, and the national Constitution is, as Judge Black affirmed, tacitly, an integral part of the organic law of the individual States; nothing in the latter can legally contradict the former, and any thing that does so, as regards the colored man, should be effectually negatived. It is not here a relevant question whether the constitutional amendments were wisely made, or could not have been more wisely made. Good citizens, good friends of the enfranchised African, may differ on that point. Personally we believe they were wisely made, and that nothing short of them could have been wisely done at the time. Reservations, which some thinkers suggest as having been expedient, and more appropriate to future opportunities, might never again find such opportunities, and might have remained eternal and insurmountable subjects of political agitation and peril. We rejoice, therefore, in the *fait accompli* of the enfranchisement of the American colored man. It is a legitimate evolution in the history of our civilization; and what now devolves upon us is the duty of maintaining it in its fullest integrity. All local laws that, in spirit, contravene it should, we repeat, be swept away. They should be no more tolerated against the black man than against the Teuton or the Celt. There are remnants of such laws; some of them, if they do not directly oppose liberty of marriage, impose at least dis-

advantages on the descent of property in marriages between blacks and whites. There are even disparagements of African citizens retained in the regulations of the national army, against which they have strongly protested in a late public convention. Evidently the best policy toward a people so prospectively important is to leave them the least possible grievance to complain of, the least possible motive for race combination, or for separate political organization in self-defense. It is especially important that the Southern States should follow this liberal policy. Already the blacks have large majorities in some of them. Professor Gilliam's statistical tables show that, before long, these majorities will be absolutely overwhelming. Superior intelligence and social power may enable the whites to guide political events there for some few years, but the advancing education of the blacks will afford them able leaders of their own color, and then race grievances will be sure to come into play in party movements. "The best solvent of political problems is liberty," says a great writer. Take away public grievances if you would prevent public disturbances. Our government started with perfect religious liberty. The result has been that, while every cabinet of Europe is more or less embarrassed by ecclesiastical problems, ours has probably never had any such problem before it for ten minutes. European radicals come among us in hosts, and, for a time, declaim their opinions, hold conventions, and have, in some cases, organized their socialistic communities. In Europe they would have been oppressed, perhaps suppressed; here they have had full liberty to experiment their whims, and the experiment has usually converted them (the most of them, at least, if not the demagogical leaders) into sober, practical citizens, seeking to make their individual fortunes, and to maintain the individual rights of property. No new political party could seriously disturb the American public mind, or even long exist, without a more or less sound and intelligible *raison d'etre*. But there could hardly be a more valid reason for public agitation and peril than race grievances imposed upon a large class of citizens having equal constitutional rights. Let the colored citizen, then, have fair play in the politics of the country; let him have no grievances to complain of, and we believe he will be as patriotic as any other race under its flag. Let him have as

perfect eligibility to public office, under good civil-service rules, as any other citizen; his promotion in this respect will tend to elevate the status of his race, and that elevation can only be a public advantage. In other words, color—whether white or red, black or yellow—should be incognizable before the laws of the republic.

Second. We should put away, as far as possible, our social, as distinguished from political, disparagements of the colored citizen. Free as we may personally be from such social prejudice, we would not impair the influence of what we wish to say on this subject by inconsiderately attacking the contrary sentiments of the reader. As Sir Roger de Coverly used to say on all doubtful or delicate questions, "There is much to be said on both sides of the subject." *De gustibus non est disputandum;* and the prejudices of men are as imprescriptible as their natural rights. No positive law in the Church or the State can be relied on as effectively corrective of the social antipathies against the Negro. But there is stronger law than positive legislation; there is the "higher law," the moral law, of public conscience, which can be arrayed in voluntary opposition to local or personal wrong opinion. It is this law that we would invoke in the present case. It was invoked against the old slave-trade, and swept it from the seas by taking on, at last, the power of legislation; it was, later, invoked against slavery itself, and swept it from the British Colonies and from the United States. Can it not now sweep away most, if not all, our race antipathies, and clear the national field for the free development of this depressed, this much-wronged, people? In the more intimate relations of life some of these antipathies may yet long linger among us, but should not our political ethics, should not our religion, should not our patriotism, (especially in presence of the problem we have been discussing,) inspire the whole nation with a determination to ameliorate, as far as possible, the social proscription which we yet impose upon this race, and on this race alone? There will always be social discriminations in any society. The "political equality" of men, declared by the American fathers, does not imply the extinction of such discriminations, though the doctrine continually tends toward that result. They depend upon social conditions—education, wealth, tastes, manners, or even whims;

but there is a point beyond which neither our politics nor our religion should allow them to go. It should be considered an offense against our self-respect and the public conscience to allow them to go further against the colored man than against the Hindu, the Japanese, or any other distinctly marked race, for the American colored man has higher claims upon us than any of these races. The Hindu or Japanese is physically as distinctly, if not more distinctly, marked by nature than the American African—if not by color, yet by other traits. As the latter rises in his circumstances he rises with peculiar rapidity in his tastes, dress, and manners. He is the natural Frenchman of the New World in the etiquette of manners and apparel. We admit the well-dressed, well-mannered Japanese, Hindu, or Sandwich Islander to our hotels, railroads, or omnibuses, and even to dinner tables; why, in the name of all good sense or good taste, should we hesitate to extend equal courtesy to the equally presentable American colored man? Especially in the South should we expect to see these illogical prejudices extinguished, for why should the Southerner, whose infant sports were with colored children, who was carried in the arms of a colored nurse, and even nourished at her breast, why should he disdain to travel in the same railroad car, or lodge in the same hotel, with his old colored playmate, now his fellow-citizen, and as well dressed and as well behaved as his other fellow-citizens? Clearly enough these antipathies are but whimsical prejudices, and should, especially in our new circumstances, be thrown to the winds.

We are more urgent for this social self-emancipation now that the Supreme Court at Washington has decided against the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The decision still leaves the Act in full force in the Territories and the national capital; and this is much, and will tend to fashion public opinion; but in the individual States the African citizen is left without legal protection against disparaging treatment in hotels, theaters, public conveyances, etc. The individual States themselves should now provide that protection; still better, public opinion should provide it. Public opinion should demand no special favors for him, but it surely should demand for him perfect impartiality; it should claim for him equal treatment with the Japanese, Chinese, Hindu, or any other

marked race of equal personal conditions. We believe that, soon or later, it will do so.

Thirdly, the religion of the land should especially get rid of its prejudices against this much-wronged people. The "color line" should be obliterated throughout the American Church. But let us not be misunderstood here. As we have already affirmed, no mere legislative act of Church or State can obliterate such invidious lines; but public sentiment can. Public sentiment must indeed itself be first rectified. But we believe public opinion is capable, in these Christian States, of any beneficent advancement. It broke the chains of the Negro slave; it changed the national Constitution to make him a citizen equal to the best of us; it rallied hosts of our best men and women to go, with the ardor of missionaries, to the South to educate him and his children; and it has inspired some of our capitalists to found, by the donations of millions, grand, permanent provisions for the education of his race. Let us have confidence in American public sentiment; there is nothing to-day, in the whole Christian world, more generous or more powerful, in spite of its many errors or whimsicalities. It needs but to be specifically and resolutely directed by right leaders to obliterate the "color line" from our Churches. But, it will doubtless be asked, Would you flood our white congregations with untutored, uncleansed, unmannered blacks? Not at all. We would have the illogical, fastidious, unchristian, discrimination of the Negro from all other races, in this respect, abandoned as unworthy of our religion, our polities, our humanity, and we would have it peremptorily assumed and asserted that there is no such danger as is apprehended or pretended from such an emancipation of the Church—its own emancipation, let us say it, rather than that of the African —from an inhuman, an inherently anti-Christian, prejudice. Things are a law unto themselves in all such cases. The Negro does not wish to intrude into your churches; he prefers his own, and does it too strongly for his own good or for our good. We can safely treat him, in this respect, as we treat all other men whether Celt, Japanese, Chinese, or our poor white Anglo-Saxon brother. Let us have no invidious sentinel at the church door or the pew door against him, none more than against any other race or class under our national flag.

The poor white man goes, with his humbly-dressed family, to the sanctuaries of his own class; he prefers to go there, and no fastidious church in the land fears his undue intrusion into its garnished aisles; there is no "line" of discrimination against him there, except the undefined, the tacit one, which social convenience or his own good sense and good taste may suggest. Why not give the colored citizen equal right, especially in the temples of our common God? If, like his poor white, or Japanese, or Chinese brother, he should rise, in individual cases, in culture and social condition—in manners, dress, intelligence, etc.—to a rank essentially equal with your own, and should then seek for his family a well-paid pew in your sanctuary, why forbid him? In every land under heaven, except this Christian republic, he has not only the right to do so, but is welcomed as a "man and a brother." In St. Paul's, in Westminster Abbey, of London, in Notre Dame, of Paris, in St. Peter's, of Rome, no prince nor coxcomb would decline to sit beside him. We alone, in all the Christian world, have the ungracious, we were about to say the ridiculous, fastidiousness to order him away from us, or take ourselves away from him. There is no church of the land in which a well-dressed and a well-mannered Japanese or Hindu would not be admitted, and be even an object of generous interest however conspicuous his seat there. Why, then, repel an African fellow-citizen of equal social condition? We repeat that the prejudice, which has ordained among us the "color line," is an egregious social fallacy, against which every really high-minded citizen should protest as belittling to our national good sense, our religion, and our republicanism. We believe, further, that nearly all our apprehensions of social inconveniences from the obliteration of that "line," especially in the Church, are utterly fallacious. We believe that in "Old Trinity," in "Grace Church," or any other notable church of New York, the habitual appearance of a well to-do, cultivated African family in their own pew would soon come to be considered an honor to the congregation. It would be a noteworthy example of Catholic Christianity as acknowledged in all the high places of Christendom beyond our own land. It would be a triumph over prejudice to which the Christian heart of the community would, soon or later, respond with admiration. It would be such a recognition of

our common humanity as could not fail itself to be recognized with honor by all thoughtful men.

One topic more we might allude to here as of immeasurable importance, in respect to the African-American, namely, his education; but we have reached the proposed limit of this article, and what need of enlarging on a subject of such obvious significance, one upon which there has been so much public interest, to which so many heroic men and women are devoting their lives, and to which individual philanthropists have consecrated millions!

Let us say, in conclusion, that notwithstanding the grave difficulties of the problem we have been considering, and the merely hypothetical solutions of it we have suggested, yet the treatment of the colored man, which we have urged, seems to us to be about the sum of our responsibility for, and practicable management of, the question. Let us do this our duty, and leave the rest to that beneficent Providence which has hitherto guided our national destiny. Great things are undeniably before us all, whites and blacks, in the providential programme of this grand New World; humanity is here probably to take on new developments such as have never been dreamed of in our political and social speculations. It may not be for us to forecast these coming destinies by our theories, but we can forecast them by our practice. Let us emancipate ourselves from prejudices; let us rise above traditional fallacies; let us seek to embody in our legislation, and in all our social conventionalism, the universal principles of humanity, religion, and liberty, and the God of our fathers will take care of our country and our children.

Art. VII.—PROBATION AFTER DEATH.

[First Article.]

Probation is the moral trial of intelligent and free beings, under divinely-appointed conditions, in preparation for reward or punishment in the world to come. As used by Bishop Butler, who first brought the term into prominence, it means "that our future interest is now depending, and depending upon ourselves; that we have scope and opportunities here for that good

and bad behavior which God will reward and punish hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other." * Over against our natural depravity, which of itself would necessitate a failure, is placed the ever-availing grace of the atonement, whereby success is possible to every man. The central point of the test is not, however, an unfailing, perfect obedience to law, as with Adam before the Fall, but a new one, adapted to fallen beings, of the acceptance or rejection of the gracious remedy in the cross of Christ, through which alone can the power of sin be escaped and holiness won. The providential advantages of individuals greatly vary with different ages and other circumstances, and it may be safely assumed that the Judge of all the earth, who surely will do right, knows well how to measure responsibility in every case. But if any be destitute of intelligence, or if any, because of some necessitating agency outside of himself, be not free to choose his course, he stands as a non-probationer, for whom any proper trial is not conceivable.

The general faith of the Christian Church is that human probation closes with the present earthly life, and that in the final judgment at the end of the world every person will receive his eternal and unalterable award according to his character, the righteous being crowned with everlasting blessedness, and the wicked consigned to everlasting conscious punishment. From this common faith there are three classes of dissent, holding,

1. The ultimate recovery to holiness of all wicked men and fallen angels, and the cessation of evil throughout the universe, involving the continuance of probation until it is accomplished.

2. The continuance of probation to the impenitent during the period between death and the judgment-day, at which time the final award will be made.

3. A second probation after death for those who in this life have had no knowledge of Christ and his Gospel, such as the heathen and children dying in infancy.

In the examination of the question of probation after death, while our ultimate appeal must be to Holy Scripture, and especially to the words of Christ himself, the query arises whether our Lord in any way contradicted the opinions on the subject of the eternal punishment of the wicked prevalent in his day,

* "Analogy," part i, chap. iv, 1.

and also whether the doctrine held by his early followers was in accord with that which he taught. For it would be a very important, but difficult, task for the denier of endless punishment to explain why, if the Jews were wrong, he did not correct them, and also, if the early Christians had fallen into error, how it came to pass, and how it became so unanimous and unquestioned. Let us, then, notice first:

I. The sentiment held at and about the time of Christ.

1. Among Jewish writers.

The Book of Judith, (xvi, 17,) written about a hundred years before Christ: "Woe to the nations that rise up against my kindred. The Lord Almighty will take vengeance of them in the day of judgment, putting fire and worms in their flesh; and they shall feel them and weep forever."

The Book of Enoch, (ciii, 4, 5:) "Woe to you, sinners, when ye die in your sins, and they who are like you say of you, Blessed are these sinners. . . . Has it not been shown to them that, when to the receptacle their souls shall be made to descend, their evil deeds shall become their greatest torment? Into darkness, into the snare, and into the flame which shall burn to the great judgment, shall their spirits enter, and the great judgment shall be for every generation, even forever."

The Fourth Book of Esdras, (vii, 36:) "A lake of torment shall appear, and over against it a place of rest: and the oven of gehenna shall be shown, and over against it a paradise of delight. . . . If one be of those who have despised and not kept the way of the Most High, or who despised his law and who hated those who fear him, their souls shall not enter the habitations, [garners;] but shall wander about thenceforth in torments, ever grieving and sad."

The Apocalypse of Baruch, (lxxxv, 98:) "Prepare ye your souls, that, when ye have ended your voyage and disembarked, ye may rest, and not be condemned, for the Most High will bring all these things. There will be no more place of repentance, nor bound to times, nor length to hours, nor change of way, nor place for petition, nor sending of entreaties, nor obtaining knowledge, nor giving of charity, nor entreaties of parents, nor orison of prophets, nor help of the righteous, but there will be sentence to the destruction of the way of fire, and the path which leadeth to the hot coals."

Josephus, ("Ant.," xviii, 1, 3:) "The Pharisees believe that souls have an immortal vigor in them, and that beneath the earth there will be rewards or punishments, according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; and the latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison, *εἱργμὸν ἀϊδιον*; but that the former shall have power, the other have permission, to revive and live again," and that the souls "of the wicked are to be *ἀϊδίῳ τιμωρίᾳ κολάζεσθαι*, punished with eternal vengeance." * .

Dr. Farrar objects to Josephus generally as an untrustworthy witness,† and to these passages in particular, because "his words are unscriptural." ‡ Yet the latter citation contains the very words which he complains were not used by our Saviour if he intended to teach endless punishment, admitting at the same time that "Josephus and some Christian writers, when they want to speak of endless retribution, do use such words." § The real reason may be that *ἀϊδίος* would better express to strangers, unfamiliar with the Hebrew mode of thought, the idea intended by *αἰώνιος*.

Dr. Pusey, Regius Professor of Hebrew at Oxford, is authority for the statement that the expression of belief was uniform and unmistakable, with the one exception of the Sadducees, who did not believe in a future life, "but whoever did believe in it, believed in the eternity of the weal and woe which God would allot to the righteous or the wicked." The theory that punishment in gehenna is limited, he shows, originated with Rabbi Akiba, eighty-six years after our Lord's ascension, and had reference, not to all mankind, but to the Jew alone. ‖

2. Among early Christian Fathers.

Ignatius of Antioch, A.D. 107: "One so defiled [by corrupting the faith of God] will go into the unquenchable fire, and in like way he who heareth him."

Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, A.D. 155, when threatened with the stake, replied, "You threaten me with fire that burns for one hour and then cools, not knowing the judgment to come nor the perpetual torment of eternal fire to the ungodly."

* "Bell. Jud.," ii 8, 14.
† "Mercy and Judgment," p. 193.
‡ "Mercy and Judgment," p. 196.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 385. See p. 131.
‖ "What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?" p. 78, 87.

Justin Martyr, A.D. 141, in his Defense of the Christians to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, said: "Briefly, what we look for, and have learned from Christ, and what we teach, is as follows: Plato said to the same effect, that Rhadamanthus and Minos would punish the wicked when they came to them. We say the same thing will take place, but that the judge will be Christ, and that their souls will be united to the same bodies, and will undergo an eternal punishment, and not as he (Plato) said, for a period of a thousand years only."

Irenæus, pupil of Polycarp, and Bishop of Lyons, A. D. 180, writing against the Gnostic heresies, says: "The Church, though scattered through the whole world to the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples the faith . . . in one Christ Jesus . . . and his appearing from heaven in the glory of the Father . . . to raise up all flesh of all mankind that . . . he may execute righteous judgment over all, sending into eternal fire the spiritual powers of wickedness and the angels who transgressed and apostatized, and the godless and unrighteous and lawless and blasphemous among men." He adds, "The Church, having received this preaching and this faith . . . zealously preserves it as one household, . . . and unanimously preaches and teaches the same." In a Latin form, he says, "the Saviour of those who are saved, and the Judge of those who are judged, and sending, *in ignem æternum*, into eternal fire the perverters of the truth and the despisers of his Father and his advent."

Tertullian (A. D. 200) says Christ "will come again with glory to take the saints into the enjoyment, *vitæ æternæ*, of eternal life and to judge the wicked, *igni perpetuo*, with eternal fire."

Clemens Alexandrinus (A. D. 215) says: "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid. It is clear, then, that those who are not at enmity with the truth, and do not hate the word, will not hate their own salvation, but will escape the punishment of eternity." He elsewhere speaks of the sinner's "securing exemption from eternal death by a little pain." Clemens has been claimed as a Restorationist, but it is probably through wrongly interpreting him as speaking of the purification of sinners by fire, when he meant that imperfect Christians must pass through the fire in order to complete

fitness for heaven, as, indeed, not a few of the fathers believed, even including Augustine, who distinguished between "that eternal fire which shall to eternity torment the ungodly" and "that also which shall amend those who shall be saved by fire, for it is said, 'Yet himself shall be saved, but so as by fire.'"

These citations, purposely not extended later than the time of Origen, who will be mentioned on another page, show a remarkable unanimity of sentiment both in the fathers and in the whole Church.

3. Testimony of the Martyrs.

That unanimity is still more apparent in the sayings of martyrs before their judges, under torture, and in death. They show the faith of all classes—the shepherd and the flock, the teacher and the taught, noble, plebeian, and slave, men and boys, matrons, widows, and girls. With one consent, they see in opposition to fidelity to Christ here only "eternal destruction," "everlasting burning," "eternal punishment," "perpetual torment," and "eternal fire" in the world to come. This universal faith in the people shows the instruction given and received by the Church every-where, which is utterly inexplicable if our Lord and his apostles taught, as is alleged, a contrary doctrine. And if they did, we have a right to look for it in clear, decisive utterances, and not in obscure passages or uncertain inferences which may only mock us at the last. If Christ taught it, it should be found in some distinct statement, with an "I say unto you" as authoritative as any of those in the Sermon on the Mount with which he contradicted the false teaching of his time.

II. Scriptures adduced as teaching probation after death.

We mention only those most strongly relied on. The first is Matt. xii, 31, 32: "All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come."

On these words Dr. Farrar says: "Our Lord states with immense plainness, and with no reservation, the possible ultimate remission of every sin and blasphemy *except one*. What that

one is no human being has ever been able to decide."* "It is doubtful whether it is meant that even *this* sin can never be repented of, either here or in the world to come."† Dr. Dorner is more modest: "Whereas other sins find forgiveness without restriction to this life, there is involved a testimony that other sins, aside from the sin against the Holy Ghost, may yet be forgiven in the next world."‡

The appalling truth in the statement of our Lord is that there is one sin for which there is no forgiveness *even in this life*, and this is made emphatic by the further statement that it cannot be forgiven in the future world. So that, as Professor Wright truly remarks, "Probation may practically close before death."§ It is most blessedly true that all other sins are forgivable, but always in accordance with God's conditions of forgiveness, and those conditions, as we know from other Scriptures, are limited to this life. Dr. Farrar's "ultimate" is an adroit gloss of his own without foundation in the passage; and Dorner's "without restriction to this life" assumes that if pardon is limited to this life it must be expressly stated, and so begs the whole question. The parallel passage in Mark iii, 29, reads, "hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation," or, as in the more correct text of the Revision, "guilty, *αἰωνίου ἁμαρτήματος*, of eternal sin," a sin so bound up with the sinner's existence that from it there is no escape. If possible to be "repented of" by one abandoned by the Holy Spirit, that repentance must be forever unavailing. Dorner admits the necessity of the punishment for those guilty of this sin, but adds, "That does not necessarily exclude deliverance through punishment and its just execution."‖ It is enough to say here that this would be salvation through perdition, and not through grace, and, besides, would blot out an "eternal sin."

Matt. v, 25, 26: "Agree with thine adversary quickly. . . . Thou shalt by no means come out thence till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing." The case is that of a debtor who can neither pay nor settle with his creditor, almost parallel with the debtor in chap. xviii, 23–34, who owed his lord fifteen

* "Eternal Hope," p. 112.
† "Mercy and Judgment," p. 464.
‡ "Future State," p. 103.
§ "Relation of Death to Probation," p. 29.
‖ "Future State," p. 119.

millions of dollars, and was "delivered to the tormentors till he should pay all that was due." The inference drawn is that punishment for sin is limited in duration. The reply is, (1) The punishment in this case is, indeed, in the sentence pronounced, limited *in its terms*, which therein differs from God's sentence upon the sinner; and yet, inasmuch as the debtor is bankrupt, and can never pay the debt, it is endless *in fact*. For this very reason our Saviour exhorts him to make an arrangement with his creditor before reaching the court, that is, in its spiritual application, he admonishes the neglectful to "quickly" make use of the hour of probation to secure the mercy of God, lest he summarily fall into the hands of inflexible justice. (2) Punishment does not pay the debt of sin. It is not the coin current in the court of heaven with which to purchase salvation. (3) Dorner's remark, that "penal sufferings may be requisite to deliverance," overlooks the absolute condition of payment in full, and forgets that no amount of torturing can enable him to pay who has nothing to pay with.

The passage most depended on to prove probation after death, especially by German theologians, is 1 Pet. iii, 18–20: "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit: by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing." *

As we shall see, opinions on this passage greatly vary. Of those who hold the preaching to have been on the earth, some think it was through Noah to the men of his time; others that it was through the apostles, the disobedient antediluvians being taken as a type of all wicked men. Of those who understand the preaching to have been in hades, some interpret it as announcing terrible condemnation to the ungodly; others, including the Roman and Greek Churches, as triumphantly proclaiming salvation and release to the Old Testament saints; others think that Christ, as conqueror of Satan and the demons, raised the dead to life and declared the true doctrine of the Messiah; and others still, that he published the Gospel of salvation to the spirits of the righteous, and damnation to those

* For a full exposition, see Whedon's "Commentary."

of the wicked. These theories are connected with the doctrine of the Descent into Hell, or, rather, they are accretions to the simple statement of David in Psa. xvi, 10, and St. Peter's citation of it in Acts ii, 27, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, (*hades,*) neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption." Eph. iv, 8–10; Rom. x, 7, and this passage of Peter, have, we think, no reference to that event. But it will be seen that some of the opinions given above are clearly outside the passage in hand, and that none of them involves the offer of salvation to those who died impenitent. Alford gives a list of expositors who admit the descent into hades, but suppose it "to have had another purpose" than preaching the Gospel to the dead, and then very strangely sums up by asserting that "with the great body of commentators, ancient and modern," he holds that Christ did "preach salvation in fact to the disembodied spirits of those who refused to obey the voice of God when the judgment of the Flood was hanging over them." Dr. Newman Smyth falls into the same discrepancy as to "the great consensus of interpreters;" but Dorner, with the same view of the passage, more accurately accepts it "as a result of the more recent exegetical research." * The authority of the great commentators of past ages is thus invoked to sustain a theory which they neither taught nor held, while, on Alford's own testimony, they may be rightfully cited in opposition to the doctrine of future probation.

By many theologians, especially in England and Germany, this passage is held to teach that our Lord preached the Gospel in hades to the disembodied spirits of the disobedient antediluvians of Noah's time who were there confined. This would seem to be sufficiently definite, but the inquirer presently finds the unity of opinion so full of diversity that, like Noah's dove, he has no place for the sole of his foot. It makes a difference whether our Lord's human spirit was in hades simply as other human spirits are, and whether his humiliation continued until he rose from the dead, and whether his preaching there was after his resurrection, and whether his resurrection and glorification began immediately after his death. Nor is it all one whether his acts in hades were in the exercise of his priestly, kingly, or prophetical office. If, indeed, our Lord did truly preach the

* "The Future State," pp. 147, 148.

Gospel there, as Alford, Fronmüller, Wordsworth, Ellicott, Farrar, Dorner, Smyth, Pope, and Townsend assert, these differences should weigh little, if any thing, against the settled fact; they cannot be summarily brushed aside when the question is in debate whether he preached the Gospel there at all. This only increases the hazard of those who would build their faith and rest their souls upon this foundation, so frail at best.

But, granting that our Lord did so preach, we are absolutely limited to the simple fact that he offered salvation to a particular class of antediluvians. Nothing is proved, except that by a well-known law the specification of those to whom he preached excludes all other sinners in hades at the time. There is no evidence that any who heard him accepted his offers. Dr. Newman Smyth admits that "nothing is said or implied concerning the effect of Christ's preaching among the dead." * For aught that appears they scoffed at him as they did of old at Noah. It is absolutely certain that none of them crossed the great, impassable gulf and entered Paradise among the blest. It may be that the obduracy acquired on earth, in spite of Noah's preaching, had become so intense, that repentance was beyond their power or desire. If, then, there be a future probation, this test case furnishes naught but hopelessness. The only lesson is that another chance in the future world would have no different result from the chance in this world. And the fact of no known benefit resulting throws a doubt upon the interpretation given.

Nor, again, is there in this passage the least evidence that the preaching in hades was repeated or continued. Not a few, including Wordsworth, Pope, and Townsend, strongly insist that it was not. On the other hand, the widest latitude is eagerly given to inferences of its repetition and continuance, and these inferences are announced as the proven doctrine of God. Thus, Alford argues from our ignorance that "as we cannot say to what other cases this preaching may have applied, so it would be presumption in us to limit its occurrence or its efficacy." In our view, the presumption is in the opposite direction, for we are not informed that there are any "other cases." Dorner says: "The ceasing of this preaching which Christ began, with his preaching at that time, is neither recorded nor

* "The Orthodox Theology of To-day," p. 184.

reasonably to be supposed,"* thus mistaking the shoulders upon which the burden of proof falls, and forgetting that it is very far from agreed that Christ preached in hades at all.

The most that the passage can be claimed as teaching is that after Christ's death his human spirit went to hades and preached the Gospel to the disobedient antediluvians of Noah's time. But κηρύσσω signifies, *to make proclamation as a herald, to proclaim, to announce, to declare, to tell, to preach.* In the sixty times that the word occurs in the New Testament, what is declared or preached is to be gathered from the context; but it never, in itself, means *to preach the Gospel.* For that the word is εὐαγγελίζω. What, then, did our Lord proclaim? The word translated "preached" does not tell us, the context gives no light, and no mortal knows. The passage, then, does not affirm that Christ preached the Gospel.

Did St. Peter understand these antediluvians in hades to be in a state of probation? The apostle shall answer for himself. In his second epistle, (chap. ii, 4–9,) denouncing a class of sinners of his day for whom he sees only eternal destruction, he makes an argument of which the conclusion reached is this: "The Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptation, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished;" or, as the Revised Version more correctly reads, "to keep [that is, in custody] the unrighteous under punishment unto the day of judgment." His proof of this proposition, for such it really is, consists of three historic precedents in the divine administration, namely, first, in the case of the apostate angels cast down to Tartarus, committed as prisoners to caverns of darkness, and kept in custody unto the final judgment; second, the antediluvians who had for a hundred and twenty years Noah's preaching of repentance and righteousness, and then, when the long-suffering of God became exhausted, were swept from the face of the earth and shut up in the "prison" of hades; and, third, the cities of the plain turned to ashes, overthrown, made an example to the ungodly of all coming time, and (Jude 7) "suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." St. Peter sets forth these three classes as illustrative specimens of those who are kept in prison under guard, enduring punishment, like Dives, and bound over to the judg-

* "Future State," p. 153.

ment-day. The antediluvians are, in his view, equally with the fallen angels and the Sodomites, a standing proof of the assured perdition awaiting the ungodly.

He considers their probation closed forever with death. He could not have cited their case for his purpose had he thought them in a new probation and receiving from Christ the glad tidings of salvation. Nor can we conceive the compassionate Christ as inflicting upon souls beyond remedy the horrid mockery of an offer of mercy which he knew it was impossible for them to accept. And even if he did offer them mercy, it does not follow that he will offer it to us in the next world if we reject him here.

The crucial word in the passage is the participle ζωοποιηθεὶς, rendered *quickened*. Very singularly, this seems to be generally overlooked in the effort to properly dispose of the two datives, which really derive their force from the participles. The verb means simply *to make alive*. Such is its use in the classics and the Septuagint. It occurs in eleven other places in the New Testament. In seven, John v, 21, twice; Rom. iv, 17; viii, 11; 1 Cor. xv, 22, 36, 45, it refers to the resurrection of the dead; in three, John vi, 63; 2 Cor. iii, 6; Gal. iii, 21, to giving spiritual life; and once, 1 Tim. vi, 13, to God, as the giver of life. In every instance it signifies *to make alive*, that is, *to give life where it has never been, or to restore life where it has once been and has ceased to be.* Its use should be the same here. But when we apply it to Christ's human spirit, which did not die and was already alive, we encounter new definitions specially invented for this particular place. For instance, Steiger and Bloomfield understand a preservation of life; Wordsworth, an increase of life; Alford, the beginning of "a spiritual resurrection life;" Dorner, "a higher state of life, of a pneumatic character;" while Smyth speaks of "the beginning of the new life made after the spirit." Possibly the reader may think this not very intelligible; if so, he is doubtless in goodly fellowship with plain St. Peter himself. All these definitions must be rejected as outside the established meaning of ζωοποιέω, and because, again, none of them is necessary to a correct understanding of the passage. Christ's human spirit did not die; it therefore was not *made alive*, and no change in its sphere or mode of continued being falls

within the meaning of the word. What the case requires is either that something not before existing was *brought into being* and connected with him, or that something belonging to him which had ceased to live was *restored to life.* The former is nowhere intimated; the latter was accomplished in his resurrection from the dead. It clearly follows that πνεῦμα does not mean Christ's human spirit; it must indicate, therefore, either his divine nature or the Holy Spirit. Taking "flesh" in the sense of man's nature, as in John i, 14; Rom. i, 3; 1 Pet. i, 24, and other well-known passages, we have, *put to death indeed as to his human nature, but made alive by his divine nature.* This explains how his sufferings avail to "bring us to God," and exactly parallels the saying of St. Paul, "Was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification." Rom. iv, 25.

As to the preaching, it is a little remarkable that St. Peter himself, in speaking elsewhere (2 Pet. ii, 5) of these same antediluvians, mentions Noah as "a preacher (κήρυκα, *a herald*) of righteousness," using the noun from which comes the κηρύσσω here employed, and thus seems to furnish a clew to its manner. Noah was the herald of Christ, the Jehovah of the Old Testament as well as Lord of the New, and under the inspiration of his Spirit he proclaimed for a hundred and twenty years his law to the men around him, who remained unbelieving and disobedient until the Flood came. Thus the preaching was truly Christ's to the antediluvians at the time of their disobedience. (The "sometime," once, aforetime, is from Peter's point of view, not Noah's.) A parallel is Eph. ii, 17, where St. Paul says of Christ who, in his earthly life, did not visit Ephesus: "And came [by his Spirit] and preached [through the apostles] peace to you which were afar off, and to them that were nigh." So Christ "went" by the Holy Spirit "and preached" through Noah to men whom St. Peter identifies as "spirits in prison" at the time of his writing, not in probation, but in confinement awaiting the judgment.

Frequently joined with the passage just considered, as supposed to have the same reference, is 1 Pet. iv, 6: "For this cause was the Gospel preached also to them that are dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit." The Revised Version reads,

"preached even to the dead." But the connection is not so clear. In the former we have "spirits in prison," and in the latter, the "dead:" in the former, heralding; in the latter, preaching the Gospel, and with no mention of the antediluvians. Why this complete change of expression if the apostle is speaking of the same persons? And, again, what possible encouragement for Christians to brave endurance of persecution even unto death, would there be in the knowledge that our Lord preached the Gospel to antediluvians in hades, which we have shown did not occur? The theory supposed by advocates of probation after death to be here taught is, that the Gospel is preached to all the dead in the other world. But there are several grave difficulties. If "dead" means the dead universally, it includes the sainted dead who need no pardon among those to whom pardon is offered; and this proves too much. Again, *ενηγγελίσθη* is aorist, and shows that the Gospel was preached and *the preaching ceased*, as, indeed, it does to every man at death. Moreover, the plain meaning is that the Gospel was preached to men when living who are now dead, and who will not by death be exempted from judgment for their persecutions.

III. Probation limited to earthly life.

While the Scriptures do not warrant the expectation of a probation after death, they do, on the other hand, most unequivocally and positively connect certain results in the future world with the course pursued and the character attained in the present life, thus excluding the idea of probation beyond it. Our citations shall be chiefly of the words of our Lord himself.

Very explicit is Matt. x, 32, 33: "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven. But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven;" or, as we read in Luke xii, 8, "before the angels of God." Like, but more decisive, if possible, is Mark viii, 38: "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels." The confession, denial, and shame "before men," and, more definitely, "in this . . . generation," belong to this world, and

are the condition of confession, denial, and shame before God at the second advent, with no hint of a different result from any thing occurring in the long interval. The story of the rich young ruler in Matt. xix, 16–22, who asked the Saviour, "What good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?" shows his belief that his condition in the next world would turn upon his conduct here; and our Lord's reply distinctly puts "treasure in heaven" as compensation for the surrender of treasure on earth, thus showing his own understanding on the point. In Rev. ii, 10, the "crown of life" is the promise made to fidelity "unto death;" and for the present purpose it is immaterial whether the words mean during life, or to death by martyrdom. In either case it is the end of earth, and inseparably connected with it is the unfading crown. St. Paul, in 1 Cor. vi, 9, 10, after a general statement, excluding "the unrighteous" from the kingdom, becomes specific, and adds: "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God." This is not a list of lovely characters. Their vices belong, with scarcely an exception, wholly to this world, and when the sons of God enter the kingdom to which they are graciously entitled as heirs, these sinners will be left out. If a sense of justice assent to this because of the greatness of their sins, and it be thought that sins of less magnitude will receive more lenient treatment, let us remember our Lord's words to the Jews, (John viii, 21:) "Ye shall die in your sins: whither I go ye cannot come," and the reason given in verse 24 for the stern statement, namely, "If ye believe not that I am he." Omission and neglect are small things as men measure, but, small as they are, whoever dies in them is shut off from going where Christ is.

Probation sometimes closes suddenly. The lesson related in Luke xii, 42–46, pronounces a blessing on the faithful servant who is ready for his master's coming, but to the careless, selfish, procrastinating, and riotous servant the master's return is unexpected, sudden, and unprepared for; and we are told that his Lord "will cut him in sunder, and will appoint him his portion with the unbelievers." Nay, probation sometimes closes before life ends. Such we have found to be the result of his

sin who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, who, though he may remain years on earth, has already by his voluntary act forever put away from him all hope of mercy, and freely become guilty of "eternal sin." Such was the effect of the sin of the Hebrew apostates, (Heb. vi, 6,) who, in renouncing Christ, declared him to be an impostor and his sacrifice for sin worthless, that, either from their self-induced obduracy or from the withdrawal of the proffers and aid of grace, it was "impossible . . . to renew them again unto repentance."

The narrative of the rich man and Lazarus, in Luke xvi, 19-31, is full of instruction. If it be thought a parable, we may say that, whatever it be intended to teach, the several features of the picture drawn must have a foundation in the facts of the world of departed spirits, so that our Lord has really given us a glimpse of the condition of souls between death and the judgment. We are not concerned to fix its locality, or, rather, perhaps, its localities, for they seem to be two—Paradise, the abode of the blessed, where the souls of Jesus, the penitent thief, and Lazarus went, and to which St. Paul was "caught up;" and the abode of wretchedness, to which the name of hades peculiarly clings, where the rich man was. They are "afar off" from each other, with a "great gulf fixed" between them, declared by our Lord to be impassable in either direction. Father Abraham preaches no Gospel of salvation; the rich man pleads for no pardon, nor is there token of repentance. The one prayer for himself is that Lazarus may be sent with some alleviation of his anguish, "for," said he, "I am tormented in this flame"—not, of necessity, material flame, but something which is to the soul as material flame is to the body. Even this prayer is denied, and for two reasons: first, he chose and had his portion here, and is now receiving only what he had prepared himself for in his life-time; and, second, it is one of the inflexible laws of that realm of the dead that "they which would pass from hence to you cannot;" so that Lazarus could not fulfill the desired office; and we may add that, for the same reason, the disembodied human spirit of Christ, which went into that world as the natural consequence of death, as do other human spirits, and was subject to its laws, could not cross the impassable gulf to preach the Gospel to the antediluvians there confined.

These references, which might be greatly extended, not only fail to intimate hope for the continuance of probation beyond death, but they so directly connect the future with the present that it should not be thought an open question.

Dr. Dorner argues that "the time of grace does not by a universal law expire with death," from the case of the son of the widow of Nain.* Luke vii, 11–15. Dr. Smyth, referring to the same case, takes up the strain, speaking of "prolongation upon earth of probation after death had ensued, which could not be if at death the final judgment takes place;" † and, in a foot-note to Dorner, he asks, with a seriousness born apparently of the deepest perplexity, "In the case of Lazarus, after which death, the first or the second, was the judgment appointed for him?" The new reconstructed theology plainly has need of friendly caution, for it cannot stand the strain of many such problems. Surely, Dr. Dorner, "the greatest living theologian," must know that probation is claimed to expire when earthly life ends, and not at some supposed end which is really only an interruption of it. But when Dr. Smyth, the Presbyterian, going beyond his chief, speaks of "the final judgment at death," he does it with full knowledge that the orthodoxy which his "new departure" seeks to modify, holds no such doctrine.

It should be noted that the very passages quoted for half a century to prove Universalism are now employed by advocates of probation after death, from Dr. Smyth to Dr. Farrar, who denies again and again that he is a Universalist, but does his utmost to prove hope for every man, if not after the last judgment, at least in the intermediate state. All good men would rejoice over the repentance of the last sinner and the perfect victory of goodness over evil, and yet not a few who have hoped for it have confessed that the Scriptures do not so teach. Olshausen admits that "no passage of the New Testament affords a clear and positive testimony for the consummation of this longing." Neander sees "only some slight intimation." Thomas Starr King says: "There is no argument for the final triumph of goodness in the four gospels, nor any dogmatic textual assertion of that doctrine." And Theodore Parker, who may be accepted as a competent witness on this point, said in his last discourse: "I think there is not in the Old

* "The Future State," p. 102. † "Orthodox Theology," p. 185.

Testament or the New a single word which tells this blessed truth, that penitence hereafter will do any good." The ground for hope must be sought elsewhere.

But there is some interesting testimony as to the tendencies of this doctrine of probation hereafter. Neander saw them when he said, "We acknowledge the guidance of divine wisdom that, in the records of revelation destined for such varied steps of religious development, no more light has been communicated on this subject." Prof. Herman Messner uses nearly the same highly suggestive words. Origen is more emphatic. In some of his works, the *De Principiis* in particular, written when he was a young man, and not intended for publication, in a philosophical, speculative, and tentative way, he propounds the theory of ultimate universal restoration through a series of transmigrations and probations. On the authority of Jerome it is stated that "in an epistle which he wrote to Fabian, Bishop of Rome, he expressed regret for having written such things, and threw the blame upon Ambrose, who made public what he had written privately." * In his popular writings he taught the common doctrine. In his reply to Celsus he acknowledged that Christ taught eternal punishment, and with the effect of inducing men to strive against those sins which lead to it. He, however, calls the fear of it a beneficial deception brought about by God himself, yet thought its rejection dangerous. "For," said he, "many wise men, or such as thought themselves wise, after having apprehended the real truth respecting the divine punishments and rejected the delusion, have given themselves up to a vicious life. It would have been much better for them to have continued in the delusion, and to believe in the eternity of the punishments of hell." † The dangerous tendency has in no wise diminished with the passage of the centuries.

IV. The decisions of the day of judgment based upon the deeds of this life.

Dr. Farrar arraigns as a "popular accretion" to the teaching of Scripture the notion that, "at death, there is passed upon every impenitent sinner an irreversible doom to endless torments." ‡ None should know better than that eminent scholar

* "What is of Faith?" pp. 129–200.

† Hagenbach, § 18. ‡ "Eternal Hope," preface, p. xiv.

and brilliant preacher that the common view places the passage of that doom at the day of judgment, and not at death. We must not confound God's act of judicial sentence with his daily discrimination of human character, nor yet with man's act in deciding his own condition and destiny. There is, undoubtedly, in God's mind an opinion, a discrimination, a judgment, a classifying of men in this life, so that, as Fletcher expresses it, we are every moment pleasing or displeasing to him according to the whole of our inward tempers and our outward behavior. Our present acceptance or condemnation turns upon our voluntary position with respect to him and his truth. "He that believeth not is condemned already," not by a judicial act of God, but by the terms of the law of grace. He may change this state if he chooses to believe; if he chooses not, it abides with him when he passes away from life and can choose no longer. Thenceforward, with conscious knowledge of himself, even as God will know him, and with full certainty of the issue, he will await the public trial of the last day, when definite sentence will be passed upon every man according to the self-determined course of the present life.

The Scriptures are very plain upon the point. St. Paul gives as the reason for his incessant striving for present acceptance with his Lord the fact, that "we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." 2 Cor. v, 10. He evidently does not anticipate a chance in the intermediate state of recovery from failure through negligence here. In Rom. ii, 5, 6, he teaches that at "the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God, [he] will render to every man according to his deeds," and the specifications following describe conduct belonging to this life. In that day (verse 16) "God shall judge the secrets of men," the things covered up and hidden, which earth has in plenty, but are hardly supposable in the transparency of the world of spirits. The same apostle, in Heb. ix, 27, connects death with the judgment in these words: "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment," with no intimation of a day of grace in the interval. The connection of the two events is placed beyond criticism by the parallel in verse 28 of Christ's death for sin and his second advent

to gather its fruits in the eternal salvation of those expecting his coming. In Heb. x, 26, 27, for them that "sin willfully," as apostates do, and as saints in Paradise cannot, "there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation" as their only possible fate.

St. Peter, in a passage (chap. ii, 9,) already discussed, shows that the unrighteous of this world are strictly guarded in prison under punishment unto the day of judgment, when (verse 3) eternal destruction will surely be inflicted. And St. John, in Rev. xxi, 7, 8, while assuring the victorious struggler of a blessed heirship, says of the opposite class, "But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death." Some of the sins pointed out can be committed only on the earth, and they who commit them are, with the moral coward and the simple neglecter of Christ, to be "judged every man according to their works." Rev. xx, 13.

And what says our Lord? Referring to the judgment-day, (Matt. vii, 22, 23,) he affirms that many in that day will claim to have prophesied, expelled demons, and performed miracles in his name, all of which are deeds in time, "and then," he says, "will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity." In Matt. xi, 20–24, he declares that "it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment than for" Chorazin and Bethsaida, and "for the land of Sodom" than for Capernaum; and in chap. x, 15, "for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah than for that city," which rejects his disciples and their message. No place is left for the hypothesis of the repentance of these people in hades, and in the judgment they will stand relatively as they did then. In Mark viii, 38, he that is "ashamed" of Christ and his teachings "in this adulterous and sinful generation," which is very definite as to time, will have Christ "ashamed" of him at his second coming. And in the solemn delineation of the proceedings of the judgment-day in Matt. xxv, 31–45, the reasons assigned for the decisive awards pronounced relate without exception to deeds of this world, performed by those on the right hand of the Judge, and not performed by those on his left.

Such are some of the sayings of our Lord and his apostles

that connect conduct in this life with the final judgment. They make no reservation. They give no hint of some possible change of character in the intermediate state that may reverse the result in the day of trial; but, on the other hand, they distinctly teach that the stamp which character bears at death is ineffaceable. The fixed permanency thenceforth is in the nature of things, and is always in accordance with the choice freely made under the light and influences of a probationary state and in full view of its obligations. Surely it becomes those who advocate the doctrine of future probation to explain the entire absence in these stern and positive declarations of the New Testament of a mitigating word, or even of the least intimation of some chance for repentance after death. And still more is it incumbent on them to explain why Christ, who seized so many opportunities to contradict and correct erroneous sentiments of his time, not only did not contradict the prevalent view on this subject, but always spoke in accordance with it. The truth is nigh at hand. He did not correct it because it was true. He came to a race of sinners to offer himself to them as God's provided remedy for sin and the giver of life to their souls, and demanding acceptance. Not to believe on him when offered is to reject him, and upon such rejecters "the wrath of God abideth." Probation, then, summarily closed would not be injustice, and its further continuance is purely of the compassion and long-suffering that will not willingly let a soul perish. Through lengthened years he seeks them with the Gospel, with his Spirit, with providences, with multiplied warnings and entreaties, until he is weary of rejection, and death closes the scene with pity for the infatuation that spurns the beseechings of infinite love.

Neither the blessedness of the Christian nor the wretchedness of the sinner will be perfected until the resurrection; but it does not follow that the intermediate world is one of moral change except by growth. In Dr. Dorner's view, "believers are not yet sinless at the moment of death;" * and as "only the pure in heart, or holy, shall see God," † they must become freed from moral imperfection in the future world before they can enjoy the glorious vision. Dr. Smyth, faithful in his following, cannot see "how the mere accident of death can fit an

* "Future State," p. 100. † *Ibid.*, p. 93.

untrained and unchastened Christian for the pure vision of the supernal glory."* No more can Dr. Farrar, or Dr. Pusey, or the Romish Church, who argue that infirmities, moral defects, evil habits, sins, and neglects will, by training, by discipline, by punishment, by purifying fire, become finally purged away, and the soul prepared for the blessed vision of God. All alike assume that the moral processes of this life shall be in the next world much as they are in this, only, perhaps, "much more abundant." Holy we must be before we can see God; but neither death's cold stream nor purgatorial burning has power to make us so. The believer has learned a better way. The infirmities and defects, physical and mental, inherent in our nature must, indeed, be carried to the end, but the "blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin" in this life. It may be true that many devout Christians do not attain this gift of grace until near death; but it is likewise true that no child of God passes that boundary without a previous full preparation by the Holy Spirit dwelling in him to meet his Redeemer and Judge. All hopes of becoming fit for heaven after death must prove fallacious. Spotless holiness must be won before that hour; but the blessedness of the saved, far exceeding aught on earth, will increase until its consummation at the resurrection. This, however, involves no change of destiny.

In our examination of the teachings of Scripture we have not forgotten the multiplied admonitions against the "ignorant tyranny of isolated texts," to use the words of Dr. Farrar, or the necessity of inquiry for the broad outlines, the unity, and the drift of revealed truth. There is no divinely prepared table of contents outlining for us beforehand the Book of God, and no one has informed us how to discover those outlines, to find that unity, or to learn that drift, except in the careful study of its words. Beginning thus, and moving forward step by step, we find the Scriptures, from "God" in the first verse to "the grace of the Lord Jesus" in the last, to be an urgent message of salvation sent by Infinite Love to a sinful, guilty, ruined race. In its letter and in its spirit, in its single words and its broad outlines, in its separate expressions and its whole drift, it demands acceptance to-day, and makes no provision or suggestion for to-morrow. Our Lord's preaching, both in the

* "Orthodox Theology," p. 126.

plainest of words and in the most significant of parables, and the preaching and writings of his apostles as well, always treat the subject as if this life were the only time in which men can prepare for the next. They warn, they exhort, they plead, they urge to immediate action while the power of acting remains, as if the final issue were to turn upon the next step; and they never intimate even a suspicion of an opportunity in the future world to recover from the present neglect, while they do most strongly base condition there upon character here. These facts are strangely mysterious and absolutely unaccountable, if human probation extends into the future life; they are perfectly plain, and precisely what we might expect in a revelation of a way of salvation, if the day of grace is limited to the present world.

Art. VIII.—DR. ELIPHALET CLARK.

Eliphalet Clark, M.D., was born in the town of Strong, Maine, May 12, 1801. His father, Mr. Richard Clark, of Puritan descent, was among the pioneer settlers of the Sandy River Valley, one of the most beautiful of the many picturesque sections of the State. Mr. Clark was a farmer, and on his farm reared, amid the rigors of a New England climate, a large family.

Our early pioneer ministry at a very early day penetrated the settlements of Sandy River, and gathered among its sturdy settlers some of their richest harvests. Very near the Clarks lived the Soules. Both families became Methodists; the one gave Joshua Soule to the ministry, and the other Eliphalet Clark to the laity, of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Young Clark was converted in his father's house at family worship when he was eighteen years of age. The change was thorough, and accompanied by a clear witness of his acceptance with God. This sound conversion not only gave bent to all his subsequent actions, but was the key which ever unlocked to him the secret wards of the divine kingdom.

In one of his first letters to his parents, 1826, soon after leaving home, Eliphalet thus showed his appreciation of their influence: "But for no particular of your concern in my welfare do I feel more grateful than for the religious restraints imposed when my mind was easily impressed, and for the religious instructions by which I was frequently caused to reflect, when a child, on the uncertainty of life, and the necessity of a change of heart to be prepared for another and more important state of existence."

Of his brother Dennis, whom he called his "twin spirit," and who died, while a young man, in New Orleans, he wrote: "Is Dennis indeed *dead?*

True, his dead body, his earthly part, his well-wrought frame, may now be decaying in a far-distant city among strangers; no one to visit the grave and say, Here lies my son, my brother, and drop a tear of affection, and plant a rose on the sacred spot; yet, is *Dennis* dead? A voice from Him who is the resurrection and the life, declares *he shall never die.* All that made Dennis so lovely, all that so closely bound our hearts in one, lives in heaven."

Eliphalet, after receiving an academical education at Farmington, Me., read medicine with Dr. J. L. Blake, of Phillips, and also with Dr. Thomas Little, one of the most eminent surgeons of the State. Between the pupil and the venerated teacher, Dr. Blake, who still survives, there ever subsisted the warmest affection. In 1824 he received the degree of Doctor of Medicine from the medical school of Bowdoin College.

His first settlement as a physician was in the town of Wilton. While here he was married, October 8, 1827, to Miss Nancy Caldwell, only daughter of Mr. William Caldwell, of Hebron, Me., and the sister of the Rev. Zenas Caldwell, of the Maine Conference, and of Professor M. Caldwell, afterward of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa. Miss Caldwell was reared by her eminently godly mother under a *régime* which accepted the theory that it is safer for young Christians always to lean toward the "stricter virtues." She became the life-long companion of her husband. She fully appreciated his genius and character, and, in a very important sense, merged her life in his. Her rare tact, affability, and patience, but, above all, her deep, intelligent, and steady piety, made her to him all that a man called of God to a laborious and useful service could require. From first to last no one more certainly perceived or more readily acknowledged her worth than her husband. As early as 1832 he expressed it to his parents: "My good Nancy is a host herself, none better, and, may be, none so good. 'Ah,' say you, 'Eliphalet can brag at any time.' Well, laugh at my folly; still, let me say, no man's wife is better than mine, none a better nurse, more sympathetic and devoted, the very angel of kindness. Well, laugh, or say umph. I know what I say."

The account of the marriage, written to a brother, may be a little amusing, but would there were more such wedding days! "Tuesday morning talked and sang and prayed all day. In the evening we were married for the first time in our lives; felt anxious about the sequel, of course. We were married in three or four minutes; then had a prayer-meeting, very interesting. . . . Friday reached home; set up a few things, talked some, and dedicated our home, our goods, our souls and bodies, our ALL, to God; were some happy."

Soon after locating at Wilton he had a severe sickness, from the ill effects of which he never fully recovered. During convalescence he wrote: "O may I, with increasing strength, be increasingly happy, holy, and useful! . . . You may know the service of God is still my delight."

In 1830 Dr. Clark removed to the city of Portland. He had but little money and no influential friends to introduce him. The following account, in a letter at the time to Professor Caldwell, speaks for itself:

"See one or two sick folks every *week*. Expenses about one dollar a day; income, twenty-five cents. That's making money. However, I expect every day to obtain great celebrity, and, of course, much business, and then I shall be rich. Don't you wish your prospects were as good as mine?"

Again, in 1831, in the same vein: "Hi-ho-hum! Most tired boarding out. O dear! Nancy some home-sick. Not much business, no money. O what can the matter be! Tam-to-diddle, diddle, diddle-de! Wish you could just look through my windows and see the blue houses and the blue horses and the blue sky. 'Home, home, sweet home, there's no place like home,' etc., (singing.) Any body comes here to get rich must learn to live on nothing, and make money out of the north angle of two ideas. Hurrah! (smiting his fists and scratching his head) hurrah! I never lay down in the ditch yet, and I'll give it one pull before I let it go. Hurrah for Jackson! He's mad with Calhoun, and I may get an office by this means. If South Carolina repudiates much more I shall be off in a giff, as Jack Downing would say."

It is not surprising such courage was rewarded. He almost immediately built up a large and lucrative practice both as physician and surgeon. He did this without compromising his religion or his Methodism. He became an active official member of the Chestnut-street Methodist Church. At that day the Methodists were rather looked down upon in the cultured communities of New England, and more than once it was broadly hinted to the struggling young doctor that, if he would succeed, he must leave them and join some more popular sect. His reply was substantially, "Success or no success, I am a Methodist; and I cannot give up principle for profit or fame." And stick to his Church he did, with the best results both for himself and the Church. He lived to be more respected for his adherence to his denomination, and the respect which he gained as a man aided not a little the cause of which he was an acknowledged representative.

Dr. Clark, while catholic in his views and feelings, counting always among his esteemed friends many members of the various Christian communions, was a Methodist from *conviction*. Yet he became quite early a reader outside of his professional studies. Ere he had attained his prime he was fully imbued with the distinctive Wesleyan doctrines, and always held them with the utmost firmness. His persuasion of the supreme importance of these doctrines made him feel that his Church had a right to be and to grow. His judgment was, that it was especially needed in New England to answer a want of many minds which could accept neither the ultra-orthodoxy of Calvinism, nor the latitudinarianism of so-called liberal Christianity. And yet his mind, like his home, was most hospitable. Enthusiastic in his love of truth, of a speculative turn, he was ready to learn from every source, and any religious opinion which presented itself with good credentials would be respectfully entertained for the time and duly considered.

Not many years after his location in Portland his attention was called

to the works of Swedenborg. The dreamer drew strongly upon his vivid imagination, with that peculiar spell by which he has charmed many minds both in Europe and America; but there were some stubborn facts which stood in the way. What, no justification by faith! No vicarious atonement! Now he knew that God for Christ's sake had forgiven his sins. This was enough. Only a day or two before his death, he said: "When I was a young man Swedenborgianism was presented to me, and it had some attractions; but it required me to give up the doctrine of justification by faith, and this I never could do. Then the doctrine of the Godhead—Father—Logos—Paraclete—three, THREE, not one person, became fixed in my mind. This is the wonderful system so adapted to man's need."

Thus a sound religious experience saved him from what he regarded afterward as a very specious and dangerous error. As with this, so with the doubts and denials which more or less prevailed in the highly speculative New England religious atmosphere. "To me," he said again, "the answer to salvation is my own consciousness. You know I have always been fond of theology and speculation, and have indulged my taste. So it was a wonderful mercy that the Holy Spirit came to me, sweeping away all doubt, and forever settling my mind. Now, these," alluding to the nearness of death, "are no times for doubt and uncertainty; salvation is a great practical question."

Thus with him was attested the principle that *faith*, in its evangelical sense, is the foundation of religion. He realized this faith given of God, distinguished alike from historical belief, and the conclusions of reason, and possessing internal certainty, to be indeed the verifying faculty of the soul. It revealed Christ to him as a personal Redeemer, and consequently the Son of God, who liveth and abideth forever.

An additional and very urgent reason for the existence of Wesleyanism with Dr. Clark was the prominence it gave to the definite experience of Christian perfection. He espoused the doctrine when quite a young man, and held it fast with maturer and ripened faculties. In his later years he was seldom heard to refer to it, much less to his own personal attainments; but it was well understood by those who knew him best what his opinion was, and where, if occasion required an expression, he was accustomed to stand.

As early as 1839 he wrote: "My own enjoyment in communing with God has been increased. . . . I have some hope that I feel the blood of Christ cleanses from all sin. . . . Here I rest, relying only on Christ for all I need. How peace comes to my heart and love to all men! . . . The class which I have led for some years is generally prosperous. Four of my members and two others who have attended pretty regularly have professed the blessing of perfect love. Their lives show what their lips profess. The work of holiness has been gradual in most of these cases. A strong conviction of impurity, of want of full conformity to the holy law of God, a hungering and thirsting for righteousness, has characterized them all. The blessing has been accompanied with the witness

of the Spirit in each case. In some several days have elapsed before the witness came, but when it was given it was clear as light, hushing every murmur of the soul, and giving peace that passeth understanding."

As might be expected Dr. Clark was in intelligent and hearty sympathy with the Church, not only in its doctrines, but in its polity and work. While his health admitted he had the charge of a large and prosperous class, and was a regular attendant upon the public and the social devotional services. He co-operated with his pastors in their efforts to promote revivals of religion, and to build up both the spiritual and material welfare of the congregation. At one time, being greatly exercised for a revival in the Chestnut-street charge, he prayed most earnestly for it. He thought he would exact large things, and ventured to ask God for the conversion of one hundred persons. The revival came, and one hundred persons were converted. He thanked God, but felt a little sorry he did not ask for a larger number. The pastors of the earlier days, and before his enforced retirement from the means of grace, will recall what a power he was in the spiritual life of the people.

In private, however, he was always accessible to the brethren, and especially to his pastors. "How are you?" "How was your meeting?" was the quick inquiry as the pastor entered his door. If all was well and prosperous, he rejoiced; if adverse, he was ready with a strong and cheery word. What the Rev. W. R. Clark, of Boston, once his pastor, writes, all his pastors will indorse:

"Dr. Clark possessed a kingly nature, all his ideals of life were of the royal type, and his lightest word was freighted with wisdom. Although compelled by delicate health, at or before the time when I was his pastor, to keep aloof from active participation in the religious work of the Church, yet the pronounced thoughts and feelings of his great heart were a perpetual benediction—a fountain clear and exhaustless. He was the soul of courtesy toward his pastors, generous, appreciative, deferential, and steady as the sun in the warmth of his friendship. Devout, practical, and progressive, he was a tower of strength. Eminent in his profession, and of commanding influence, he was such a support to his pastors as it rarely falls to their lot to find."

Dr. Clark was a "born leader." All with whom he was associated recognized his capacity for guidance and control. Although he never sought prominence, yet he was never afraid of responsibility. It is not too much to say that our Church owes largely what it is to-day in the city of Portland and vicinity to his foresight, enterprise, and liberality. He was the principal man in the erection of the present edifice of the Chestnut-street Church. In feeble health at the time, (1856,) both he and his wife were ready to acknowledge that his life was spared for this work. It was, when finished, an ornament to the denomination in the city. Bishop Morris, after inspecting it, pronounced it "the best house for all purposes in Methodism." To show his interest, he not only conferred constantly with the architect and builder, watching each stone and timber, but he studied carefully the construction of pipe organs, in order that no

mistake might be made, and they should have the best instrument possible for the money. This was not all; he either gave or secured the land on which the Pine-street and Congress-street churches were built; and among his last works was to see completed a tasteful house of worship at Woodford's, the village where he spent the closing years of his life. Dr. Clark's zeal for education in the Methodist Episcopal Church was, if possible, even greater than for church building. His conviction was that the Church which educates the people will be the Church of the people.

In harmony with these views he became the early and constant friend of Kent's Hill Seminary. As far back as 1831 he wrote to Professor Caldwell: "When every denomination, nearly, in the State has its seminary of learning, and all are urging forward their claims on public patronage, is this the time for us to give up our popular school? No. Let an agent be appointed. . . . Let the agent be a MAN of *one mind* who loves the interests of our youth." When, in 1848, this institution was deeply embarrassed and greatly needed increased accommodations, he suggested the organization of a Board of Education, distinct from the Board of Trustees, to which the care of educational funds could be committed. The Maine Wesleyan Board of Education was incorporated in 1850, and he was elected its first president, which office he held until within a year of his death. He promptly subscribed one thousand dollars to its funds; other subscriptions followed and confidence was restored, and the school entered upon a new career of prosperity.

In 1860 he rejoiced at the completion of the new and commodious building for the female college.

To Mr. James Noyes, the treasurer of the Board of Education, a few days before his death, he said: "This work in which you and I have been engaged these years I am still interested in. You know my views. Be faithful—be faithful." Thus the institution which had his first educational love had his latest care, and to it the bulk of his property was bequeathed. He was one of the first patrons and trustees of the General Biblical Institute of the Methodist Episcopal Church established in Concord, N. H., and afterward removed to Boston.

While Dr. Clark was in full accord with the polity of the Methodist Episcopal Church he was yet progressive in his views. He was an early, consistent, and persistent advocate of lay delegation. He talked and corresponded with most of the leading ministers and laymen of his State, and with many outside of the State, on the subject, and ceased not his efforts until the measure was adopted. His brethren of the Lay Electoral Conference of 1872 offered to elect him the first lay representative to the General Conference which was to meet at Brooklyn, N. Y., but he was obliged to decline on account of poor health. He believed that because Methodism was vital, that, like all true life, it must be 'constant to a constant change,' and when it ceased to be so, there was already proof that decay had set in. Though dying beyond fourscore years, he was never known to utter a word either of disparagement or despondency as to the government of the Church. His soul expanded

and his tongue glowed as he dilated upon its history and prospects. On his death-bed he said: "I joined the Church at eighteen—joined to stay. I have made many mistakes. My life has been full of failures and shortcomings. I love the Church; I have always felt my need of it, and that it helped me. Methodism is a great system; I never liked its doctrines or its polity better. If true to itself, there is no reason why it should not spread over this continent, including Mexico and South America. And within the next fifty years Christianity shall extend over Japan and China, and 'shall reign where'er the sun does his successive journeys run.'"

Dr. Clark had a rare capacity for friendships. A more sincere, loving man never lived. With all the grasp and strength of his intellect, his sensibilities were as tender and refined as any woman's. He loved his kindred and friends until his heart well nigh ached. Like good old Sir Thomas Browne, their sorrows he desired not only to share but to engross. To be filled with their company was his delight. His house was the seat of true hospitality. For very many years it was the home of the Bishops and other ministers, great and small, all brothers beloved in the Gospel. Around his genial hearth sat many a time Hedding, Waugh, Morris, Olin, Janes; and many are the pleasant stories he could tell of these distinguished servants of the Church. Hedding, for example, walking the floor one night discussing preachers and preaching, stretching himself to his full proportions and exclaiming, "Doctor, this preaching is a great business!" Sick preachers from every part of the State came to be treated, and they were both treated and entertained. "He is preaching," said one who knew whereof he spoke, "through more living preachers, whom he has cured or helped, than any other man in the State." Who that has ever been a recipient of his genial hospitality can forget his graceful, dignified, and hearty welcome. "One of the most princely men I ever saw," declared a delegate from the Baltimore Conference in attendance upon the General Conference at Boston in 1852. In his own home he was most himself—as habitual invalidism had debarred him from general society—and here, when those were about him whom he loved, he conversed, did not deliver monologues, but *conversed*, with a familiarity which put every one at ease, and elicited from all the utmost freedom of expression. At such times wise and high talk was so interspersed with playful and sparkling humor, with such delicate compliments for wife, friends, and guests, as to render the occasion ever memorable to those who had the honor and pleasure of his companionship. One of his most beautiful friendships was that with his brother-in-law, Professor Caldwell, of Dickinson. Beginning life together, both highly intellectual and thoroughly devoted to God, the Church, and learning, their correspondence is replete with thought and affection, and would make, if published, a valuable contribution to Methodist and scientific literature.

After all, humanly speaking, Dr. Clark was the *physician*. He had the highest ideal of his profession. "I feel," he remarked years ago to the writer, "that I am as really called of God to be a physician as you are

to be a preacher." His profession was a divine vocation, and consequently he pursued it with devout, scrupulous, and unflagging fidelity. As long as he was physically able to prescribe for and visit the sick, he could not retire from active practice. Having no other law of life than loyalty to the truth, he was in medicine a thorough and impartial inquirer. Quite early in his career peculiar circumstances called his attention to Homœopathy. After a full, practical, and conscientious examination he was convinced of the superiority of that system, and felt bound, even if it diminished his practice, to adopt it. He was one of the first native American physicians who adopted homœopathy, and was associated with the distinguished Dr. Gray, of New York, on the committee which drafted the plan of the American Institute of Homœopathy. In 1863 he was offered the chair of *materia medica* in the New York Homœopathic College, and asked to become Dean of the Faculty. Letters showing the highest estimate of his professional attainments and personal worth were written him urging his acceptance, but he was obliged, on account of feeble health, to decline. Thus, through his whole professional career, notwithstanding his grand physical proportions, sickness curtailed his opportunities. Not unfrequently he would be laid aside for months at a time, and for half his professional life was not able to attend patients at night or in inclement weather. He was restrained, not only in his practice, but in the use of his pen, which he might have wielded greatly to the advantage of the profession and the public.

With all his professional engagements and Church work, Dr. Clark was not fully content. He was also "a man of affairs," in politics, business, temperance, and good neighborhood; he had decided opinions, and in some directions was very active. He was solicited to accept nominations for governor of the State and mayor of the city of Portland, but he uniformly declined, deeming such positions incompatible with his professional duties. He projected and built the horse-railway of the city, and was the first president of the company. He was for a long while a director of the Boston and Portland Steam-Packet Company, and for some years before and at the time of his death its president. He did not believe in retiring from business, or in growing old and falling to the rear, but in standing to the last in the thickest of the fight of life. In matters of business, politics, theology, metaphysics, and literature, there could be discerned no failure in his mental powers. In the summer of 1882 the writer, when visiting him, found he had just finished Bowne's "Metaphysics," and he was as fascinated with it as any school-girl could be with the latest novel. Later on he wrote, touching the Smith-Andover controversy: "They (the Puritans) have already entered upon another transition period, which will land many of them on the ground of Universalism. If a future probation is worth having, to be of any value it must result in the ultimate salvation of all men. Their theology at this time is in a very precarious condition. The foundations are giving way."

The last six years of Dr. Clark's life were spent at Woodford, a rural retreat about two miles from the city. He had owned for some time a

little farm, where he beguiled many an hour, and relieved dull care, and where finally he indulged his taste for the country by building a capacious house, in which he could have plenty of room and sunshine. "Why, doctor," his friends would say, "building such a house, and in the country, at your time of life!" "Yes, it may prolong my life for some years, or none; but at any rate it will remain for some one else to enjoy when I have gone."

On the night of May 12, his eighty-second birthday, he was seized with the illness which, after extreme suffering, terminated his life, June 8, 1883. His death was such as befitted the life he had lived. He died more as a conqueror returns to the triumph. Through all his sickness his mind was clear, and his faith never faltered. Ever and anon, in the intervals of pain, Christian words of wisdom, beauty, and power fell from his lips. They were such as these: "I find now that Christianity is no failure. It is the truth. I am at the gate; the chariot is on the other side to bear me away." "God is my refuge, a very present help. I never had stronger consolation; have the strongest evidence of the truth of Christianity, the truth of the Bible—not a doubt or a fear. It is not matter of the reason, but of the heart, experimental. Yet, as usual with my experience, there is no rapture." "You know I have never been an emotional Christian, but I do feel, if I live long enough, I shall get very happy. O what waves of light have rolled over my soul as I have lain here."

To an old schoolmate and friend he said, "We were boys together. Now I say salvation is no empty word, no mere theory, but a fact—SALVATION! It does not come so much by reason as experience. 'Because I live, ye shall live also.' One such hour as this is worth a life's struggles. I have thought many times of young Tyng, especially his dying testimony: 'Stand up for Jesus!'—testifying for Jesus. Ye are my witnesses. If I had strength I should want to see a great many. My testimony is not to be doubted: saved, saved! So many years and I still cling to the cross." To another friend he said, "And now, to turn to Christ and his salvation; you have known something about it. I have such comfort as I never dreamed of. . . . I have tried to live faithfully, but I see my defects. Rest, such rest! I have not much joy, but it will come afterward. 'Rock of Ages;' sing that often, and think of me. This abiding consciousness, 'I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.' He will soon come and take me home." "I shall see you again," remarked the friend. "Yes, in heaven. You will meet me; let there be no failure."

Again, to the family gathered about him: "Such mortal weakness I never felt before. I know I am in God's hands, and he cares for me, and will not allow more suffering than is necessary for me. I am nearer heaven; I feel it." His eyes following his patient, faithful wife, "My dear, don't stay with me, it can do me no good. Joy inexpressible! I am so grateful for the attention I have received from all those dear friends. It is all of the Lord, because we are bound together in Christ's love." To a lady friend who called: "Once I thought my bark was coming into port. The head-lights were in sight, and I expected soon

to hear the bells ring, when I was driven out, to be tossed a little longer on the stormy sea. It will not be long. Give my love to your children." After recovering, during the last day that he survived, from a sinking spell, he remarked, "It is strange how I recovered from the last attack. I seem to have come from home, and to be in a strange place for awhile. I am going home. Glory be to his name! I rejoice in God my Saviour." At night, turning his face and looking up, he said, "You must let me go this time." Early the next morning as the day was dawning the windows were opened, he looked out, but said, "It is growing dark, I am almost home," and soon fell asleep in Christ. These expressions are only a few of the many which he uttered, and which chanced to be taken down. Through all these last days there was the same thoughtfulness for others, the same regard for all human relationships and temporal duties, the same exquisite appreciation of the beauties of nature, and consideration for the welfare of the Church and the State which had characterized him in the fullness of his active powers. Truly, Christianity is its own best witness, and it can never fail so long as it produces such holy and beautiful lives for its confirmation.

Art. IX.—SYNOPSIS OF THE QUARTERLIES AND OTHERS OF THE HIGHER PERIODICALS.

American Reviews.

American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal, October, 1883. (Chicago.)—1. Native Races of Colombia; by E. Barney. 1. Mexican Antiquities; by L. P. Gratacap. 3. On the Gentile System of the Omahas; by Rev. J. Owen Dorsey. 4. Primitive North-West; by C. W. Butterfield. 5. Babylonian and Assyrian Art; by W. S. C. Boscawen.

American Catholic Quarterly Review, October, 1883. (Philadelphia.)—1. The Law of Prayer; by Most Rev. James Gibbons, D.D. 2. William M. Thackeray; by Prof. A. J. Faust, Ph.D. 3. The Church in Spain; by Rev. Bernard O'Reilly. 4. Who Wrote the "Imitation of Christ?" by Rev. Aug. J. Thebaud, S.J. 5. Bancroft's History of the United States; by John Gilmary Shea, LL.D. 6. Martin Luther. 7. What has Ireland Gained by Agitation? by John Boyle O'Reilly. 8. The Origin of Civil Authority; by Rev. John Ming, S.J. 9. The Philosophy of Introspection; by A. de G.

Baptist Quarterly Review, October, November, December, 1883. (Cincinnati.)—1. The Worship of the Church; by A. J. Rowland, D.D. 2. Some Aspects of Early Protestant Theology; by Prof. Albert H. Newman. 3. Probation After Death; or, "The Spirits in Prison;" by Rev. C. F. Mussey, D.D. 4. The Six-Principle Baptists; by J. T. Smith, D.D. 5. The True Light of Asia; by John T. Perry.

Christian Quarterly Review. October, 1883. (Columbia, Mo.)—1. The Temporary and the Permanent in Christianity; by A. I. Hobbs. 2. Christ—the Ideal Teacher; by J. W. Monser. 3. Exegetical; by J Tomline Walsh. 4. One Chapter in Theodicy—the Origin of Evil; by B. U. Watkins. 5. The Church as the Body of Christ; Unsectarian and Non-Denominational; by B. F. Manire. 6. Inspiration; by H. W. Everest. 7. A Criticism of Hall's

"Problem of Human Life;" by Clark Braden. 8. The Lesson of Paul's Life; by E. K. Miller. 9. Scriptural Status of the Apostleship; by G. R. Hand. 10. Among our Exchanges.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT MONTHLY, November, 1883. (New York.)—1. The Lands of the Bible, Ancient and Modern; by Mr. Hormuzd Rassam. 2. Remarks on Mr. Rassam's Paper; by Howard Crosby, D.D. 3. Additional Remarks; by Prof. Francis Brown.

CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY REVIEW, October, 1881. (Lebanon, Tenn.)—1. The Bible and Revision; by H. M. Irwin. 2. Inspiration of the Scriptures; by J. D. Kirkpatrick. 3. Spurious Zeal; or, Church Discipline; by Rev. J. H. Milholland. 4. True Education: by Rev. A. L. Barr. 5. The New Theology; by Rev. W. H. Black. 6. The Problem of Religious Progress; by B. W. M'Donnold, D.D., LL.D. 7. Christian Institutions; by S. G. Burney, D.D. 8. The New Revision; by Prof. D. M. Harris. 9. Date of the Origin of the Human Race; by S. H. Buchanan, D.D. 10. To Our Readers, (Editorial.) 11. Notes; by Prof. R. V. Foster.

JOURNAL OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, October, 1883. (New York.)—1. Hospitality; by Andrew P. Peabody, D.D. 2. The Duty, Value, and Power of Positive Faith; by Samuel C. Bartlett, D.D. 3. The Authenticity of the Four Gospels; by Henry Wace, D.D. 4. The Modern Theory of Force *vs.* Materialism; by Rev. Joseph S. Van Dyke. 5. The Disbeliever Challenged; by Rev. Francis W. Ryder. 6. The Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch; by Very Rev. R. Payne-Smith, D.D. 7. The Ethics of Herbert Spencer; by A. Campbell Armstrong, Jun. 8. The Historical Chapters of Daniel Attested by Contemporary Records; by William Hayes Ward, D.D. 9. God's True Glory, and Man's Knowledge of It; by William H. Dallinger, LL.D.

JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL LITERATURE AND EXEGESIS, June and December, 1882. (Middletown, Conn.)—1. Notes on the Beirût Syriac Codex; by Prof. I. H. Hall, Ph.D. 2. On Job xix, 25–27; by Rev. J. I. Mombert, D.D. 3. An Examination of the Use of the Tenses in Conditional Sentences in Hebrew; by Rev. Henry Ferguson.

December.—1. The New Testament Witness to the Authorship of Old Testament Books; by Prof. Francis Brown. 2. Lost Hebrew Manuscripts; by Rev. B. Pick, Ph.D. 3. On בְּרֹא in Josh. xvii, 15, 18, and Ezek. xxi, 24; xxiii, 47; by Prof. Willis J. Beecher, D.D. 4. The Syriac Apocalypse; by Prof. Isaac H. Hall, Ph.D.

LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, October, 1883. (Gettysburg.)—1. Of Free Will; by Prof. H. Louis Baugher, D.D. 2. The Relation of the Lutheran Church in the United States to the Lime-Stone Districts; by Rev. Sylvanus Stall, A.M. 3. History of the Lutheran Congregation at Frederick, Md.; by B. M. Schmucker, D.D. 4. Luther and Loyola—Their Influence on Men; by Alfred A. Mitchell, Esq. 5. Tendencies; by Rev. Edward T. Horn, A.M. 6. Standing in One's Lot at the End; by M. Valentine, D.D. 7. The Call to the Ministry; by F. W. Conrad, D.D.

NEW ENGLANDER, November, 1883. (New Haven.)—1. A Chapter of Connecticut Reminiscences; by Rev. I. N. Tarbox, D.D. 2. The Relations of the Church to the Colored Race; by Rev. Lewis Grout. 3. Revival Experiences during the Great Awakening in 1741–44, in New London County; by Rev. Wm. B. Cary. 4. The Influence of Infant Baptism on the Children Themselves; by Rev. Burdett Hart. 5. The Christian Consciousness; by Rev. Philo R. Hurd. 6. A Study of Cognition; by Miss Laura A. Luse. 7. The Paulicians; by Rev. William Clark. 8. The Method of Political Economy: by D. M'G. Means. 9. Prof. Harris's "Philosophical Basis of Theism;" by Rev. G. B. Stevens.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, October, 1883. (New York.)—1. Gold and Silver as Standards of Value; by Senator N. P. Hill. 2. Some Aspects of Democracy in England; by A. V. Dicey. 3. Co-operative Distribution; by Rev. Dr. R. Heber Newton. 4. Early Man in America; by Prof. W. Boyd Dawkins. 5. Astronomical Collisions; by Prof. C. A. Young. 6. The St. Patrick Myth;

by Moncure D. Conway. 7. Board of Trade Morality; by Van Buren Denslow. 8. Histories of the French Revolution; by Frederic Harrison. 9. Social Forces in the United States; by Rev. Dr. E. E. Hale.

November.—1. Limited Suffrage in Rhode Island; by Senator H. B. Anthony. 2. The Government and the Telegraph: by Dr. Norvin Green. 3. John Brown of Osawatomie; by Rev. David N. Utter. 4. Solar Physics; by Prof. Balfour Stewart. 5. Modern Explosives; by Gen. John Newton. 6. Conversations with a Solitary. Part III; by W. H. Mallock. 7. Suggestions in Regard to the Public Service; by Green B. Raum. 8. Dr. Hammond's Estimate of Woman; by Lillie Devereux Blake, Nina Morais, Sara A. Underwood, Dr. Clemence S. Lozier.

December.—1. Government Control of the Telegraph; by Gardiner G. Hubbard. 2. Causes of Felicity; by Dr. B. W. Richardson. 3. Evils of the Sub-Treasury System; by Prof. J. L. Laughlin. 4. The Day of Judgment. Part I; by Gail Hamilton. 5. Overproduction; by Henry George. 6. National Defense; by Gen. W. B. Franklin. 7. Railroad and Public Time; by Prof. Leonard Waldo. 8. Morality and Religion; by F. A. Kidder, Prof. A. A. Hodge.

Old Testament Student, September, 1883. (Chicago.)—1. Traces of the Vernacular Tongue in the Gospels, III.; by Prof. Franz Delitzsch. 2. The Literary Character of Amos: by Talbot W. Chambers, D.D. 3. The Battle Address of Abijah; by Rev. James L. Bigger, M.A., B.D. 4. Isaiah and the New Criticism: by Rev. C. N. Patterson. 5. The Old Hebrew Theology; by Rev. Nathaniel West.

October.—1. Is the Book of Jonah Historical? by Editor. 2. Modern Biblical Criticism; by Rev. Wm. Norman Irish. 3. Al-Tashheth; by Rev. Wm. H. Cobb. 4. Notes on the Targum as a Commentary; by Rev. M. Jastrow, Ph.D.

November.—Is the Book of Jonah Historical? II; by the Editor. 2. The Assyrian Literature and the Old Testament; by Prof. S. Burnham. 3. The Cuneiform Account of the Deluge: by Dr. Paul Haupt. 4. Ruth and the New Criticism; by Rev. Newell Woolsey Wells.

December.—1. Some Features of Messianic Prophecy Illustrated by the Book of Joel, I; by Prof. Edward L. Curtis. 2. The Results of Modern Biblical Criticism; by Prof. D. G. Lyon, Ph.D. 3. Chronological; Prof. H. G. Mitchell, Ph.D. 4. The Relation of the Old Testament to the New; by Rev. Wm. Burnett.

Presbyterian Review, October, 1883. (New York.)—1. Milton and Tennyson; by Rev. Henry J. Van Dyke, Jun. 2. Hilary of Poitiers, and the Earliest Latin Hymns; by Rev. Samuel W. Duffield. 3. Studies in Eschatology; by Prof. Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D. 4. Presbyterian Worship; by Rev. R. M. Patterson, D.D. 5. The Psalter of Solomon; by Prof. Bernhard Pick, Ph.D.

Princeton Review, November, 1883. (New York.)—1. The Abnegation of Self-Government; by Hon. Thomas M. Cooley, LL.D. 2. Divorce Reform; by Leonard Woolsey Bacon. 3. Tourgeneff; by Bayard Tuckerman. 4. The "Foreign Competitive Pauper Labor" Argument for Protection: by Hon. David A. Wells. 5. Currency Problems; by Worthington C. Ford. 6. The Critical Study of the Scriptures; by Rev. Francis A. Henry.

Quarterly Review of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, October, 1883. (Macon, Ga.)—1. Revelation Sustained: by A. Means, D.D., LL.D. 2. Spontaneous Combustion. 3. A Free Ballot and a Fair Count; by Rev. J. M. Edwards. 4. Plurality of Inhabited Worlds; by Rev. E. A. Yates, D.D. 5. Facts Concerning the Resurrection; by Rev. O. A. Myers. 6. Lord Macaulay; by Rev. W. Jackson. 7. Worldliness and Other Worldliness; by Rev. W. Harrison. 8. Educational Problems in the South; by Prof. James C. Hinton, A.M. 9. The Problem of Life; Prof. J. M. Long, A.M.

Universalist Quarterly, October, 1883. (Boston.)—1. The Jew—From the Maccabees to Christ. Part I: by Rev. A. G. Laurie 2. New Orthodoxy; or, the Tendency of Sin to Permanence. Part I; by Rev. Stephen Crane. 3. The Resurrection of the Dead; or, An Exegesis of the 15th of First Corinthians;

by W. E. Manley, D.D. 4. Maya Literature; by Rev. J. P. M'Lean. 5. A Personal God: Omnipresent; by Rev. Thomas Abbott. 6. The Bible; by G. T. Flanders, D.D.

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, October, 1883. (Andover.)—1. Proposed Reconstruction of the Pentateuch; by Prof. Edwin C. Bissell, D.D. 2. Sociology and Christian Missions; by Rev. George Mooar, D.D. 3. Theism and Ethics; by Rev. Thomas Hill, D.D., LL.D. 4. Recent Theories of the Divine Foreknowledge; by Rev. Wm. Henry Cobb. 5. The Practical Bearings of our Belief Concerning the Relation of Death to Probation; by Rev. G. Frederick Wright. 6. The Brahma Samaj; by Rev. C. W. Park. 7. Ctesias of Cnidus; by Prof. H. A. Schomp.

Mr. Cobb's article on Divine Foreknowledge is clear, acute, and candid. It examines Dr. M'Cabe's theory of Nescience as well as those of Rothe and Dorner, and concludes that "the result of our Scripture examination is to negative decidedly" all three. But so obscure are the utterances, which he fully and freely quotes, of Dorner, that he concludes "that a clear statement of Dorner's real belief is a *desideratum*." He gives a summary of Scripture texts on the subject which the investigator of the subject may find a valuable aid. Mr. Cobb, we may add by the way, is author of the remarkable arithmetical demonstration of the unity of Isaiah, in the Bibliotheca Sacra, noticed in a former number of our Quarterly.

The author also presents and discusses the view maintained in our volume upon the Will; giving copious and pertinent extracts, aiming evidently to give an accurate exhibit of our doctrine. He does not rank it in the unscriptural category. "It would be hazardous for any one to assert that Whedon's theory of divine foreknowledge is, on the face of it, contrary to Holy Scripture." Indeed, he professes "we go as far as any one in maintaining the power of alternate choice." But he affirms, "The Bible was not written for the purpose of furnishing proof-texts to either party." If Calvinists rightly insist on the absoluteness of God's plan of "election," Arminians rightly insist on "man's absolute freedom in the process."

Mr. Cobb quotes from Dr. M'Cabe's book on "Nescience" a sentence extracted from a private letter of ours, saying, "I have never made any objections to your view." He is induced therefrom to conjecture that our maintenance of divine foreknowledge may be purely hypothetical, and that we occultly mean: *if* foreknowledge be held it can thus be defended. This conjecture arises from the fact that this sentence is isolated from its context. Dr. M'Cabe certainly never understood

from us that we *had* subjectively no objections to his view, but that we had "never *made* any," either in this Quarterly or in our volume. Our mind has ever been very much coincident with that of the Cambridge Platonist, Dr. Henry More, that we hold firmly to divine foreknowledge, but if that be incompatible with human pre-responsibility we must, philosophically speaking, maintain the latter and not the former. Accordingly, in our volume we simply allude to the doctrine of Nescience, and without making "any objections" to it, declare that it is an unnecessary hypothesis, since freedom and foreknowledge are maintainable as compatible with each other.

Mr. Cobb expresses the doubt whether Edwards really taught *necessity*. He says our book is "an admirable polemic against necessity; yet many will refuse to grant that Edwards is properly classed with the fatalists, although his terminology alone might warrant that inference. It is not necessary to discuss here the perennial question whether Edwards does or does not hold to the true liberty of the Will." Now we wish he had discussed the question whether Edwards taught the doctrine of necessity, in the sense of the non-existence of the power of contrary choice. We have seen many a flat denial, but we have never seen any attempt to *disprove* that he was a rigid, unflinching necessitarian. And when we are told that our book disproves necessity, and remember that the main statements with which we took issue in so disproving were taken from Edwards with a most rigid scrutiny of the meaning of his words, and then learn that Edwards taught no necessity at all, we might at first feel quite chopfallen at committing such a miss-fire. But then, on second cheery thought, we might claim to have performed therein one of the most unique exploits in all literary history. Looking through the world of thought we could find no author who so fully and explicity teaches what we wished to refute as Edwards. Hobbes is generally accepted as necessitarian and fatalistic; but Hobbes does not express that doctrine with any thing like the clearness and force that Edwards does. And if any defender of Edwards is pleased to try the contest of quotations we think that for one clear unequivocal expression of the doctrine in Hobbes we could find from three to ten in Edwards. On page 29 of our volume we call attention to the fact that Edwards ridicules

those who hold to a "liberty *ad utrumvis*," or "*power of choosing differently in given cases*," as not knowing what they are talking about. And this *power of choosing differently in given cases* is just *that power of contrary choice* which Mr. Cobb holds to be anti-necessitarian freedom, thereby subjecting himself to Edwards's sharp sarcasm. Repeatedly, at successive statements of Edwards, we call attention to the unflinchingness of the fatalism. Thus, at p. 157, we give the following words of Edwards:

> If the acts of the Will are excited by motives, those motives are the *causes* of those acts of the Will; which makes the acts necessary; as effect necessarily follows the efficiency of the cause.

Now if that does not explicitly affirm necessity, will our Edwardian friends please give us a formula which does? At p. 221 we condense into a brief summary the statements of Edwards, which make it almost as wise to say that Euclid did not teach geometry as to say that Edwards did not teach necessity. Some twenty years ago we said that Edwards was the most unflinching fatalist that ever held a pen, and to the best of our knowledge and belief it is still true.

Mr. Cobb maintains that "knowledge is an essential attribute of God, but not foreknowledge. The latter respects a future certainty, which can be made certain only by God's decree. We can conceive him as a perfect God without foreknowledge." That is, he can at once be both omniscient and nescient! And that is precisely Dr. M'Cabe's theory. "A future certainty can be made certain only by God's decree." Why, then, in regard to a free agent, may not God withhold decree, and allow him to act freely as he pleases, God meanwhile voluntarily unknowing the acts? And why can he not create a system of free agents, and withhold all decree fixing their acts, and, freely unknowing what they will do, adjust his own plans so as to overrule their actions to the best results? And then what can Dr. M'Cabe want more to satisfy his nescience theory? It is in fact Dr. Adam Clarke's theory of divine voluntary nescience of the future acts of agents left to the freedom of their own will.

The following is our treatment of the sole difficulty of God's foreknowledge of the free act, with Mr. Cobb's reply:

P. 274. "The real difficulty (which we distinctly profess to leave forever insoluble), as may soon more clearly appear, is to conceive *how God came by that foreknowledge.* But that is no greater difficulty than to conceive how God came by his omnipotence or self-existence. It will be a wise theologian who will tell us how God came by his attributes." Dr. Whedon seems here to miss the point of the problem. When we inquire, "How can God draw his knowledge from an object not yet in existence, a zero?" we are not asking after a method, but suggesting a contradiction. The *how* resembles that in Matt. xii, 34, "How can ye, being evil, speak good things?"

But, we reply, a future *fact* is as knowable a reality as a future thing, or even a present thing, and so is no mere *zero.* The conception of such fact may exist, must exist, in the omniscient mind. A future fact is no more a zero than a past fact. The former is a matter of anticipation, the latter of memory. Even when it is decreed to be in the future, it is no more than a conception until it is accomplished. Nay, it must in the order of nature exist as a conception before it can be decreed. If the conception can be decreed to be in the future, why not foreknown? There is, then, no such "contradiction" as this foreknowing of a zero. The true difficulty, as we stated, is how the knowledge of a future free fact can be possible in omniscience. Or, rather, since a nescient Omniscience is no Omniscience at all, *How* is a complete Omniscience possible? Which is all the same as to ask of God's other attributes, How is complete omnipresence or omnipotence possible? But specifically it is asking, How can God look through time as man can look through space? It is, then, the question, *Quomodo?* And we may say that our power to look through space is as inconceivable to a blind mole as God's looking through time is to us. Our own non-possession of intuitive omniscience striking through time is the reason why we can shape no conception of it.

Man sees through time on a line of causations and through means of calculations and deductions. (See our "Will," page 129.) God sees through time independently of all such aids and props, by the pure intuitive power of omniscience. Of course Mr. Cobb will scout all idea of ascribing such an attribute to God; and so would our blind mole aforesaid scout Mr. Cobb's pretensions to looking through space. Why may

not God possess a vision as much above ours as ours above the mole, and as inconceivable to us as ours to him? And this is the true idea of omniscience. We mean not the idea of the eternal *now*, nor the notion that time has no reality; but the grand idea that all time, and all eternity, and all the eternities of eternities, *present* their contents to his open view, and are realized by him with a direct and perfect knowing. "All things are naked and opened to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do." They are not present to him by the annihilation of time, but seen by him in full perception of the distances and evolutions of time; so that the Gnosis of God pervades alike the eternities of time and the immensities of space. And this clear comprehensive view relieves us of all trouble in ascribing to God a direct knowing of the acts of alternative agents. For this *knowing* perceives not merely externalities, but the intrinsic natures and relations of things, and events, and realizes truly the act put forth with power-otherwise.

Mr. Cobb brings up the question, Does omniscience precede the act of decree, or *vice versa?* We say (as in the first article of this Quarterly) that, omniscience, being a divine attribute, in the order of nature and thought precedes the divine act, and so the decree is enacted in the full light of an antecedent omniscience. God does not decree in ignorance. He does not *create* any part or phase of his own omniscience. He knows, and in the order of nature foreknows, his own free act, just as I may know my own future free act.

To this Mr. Cobb replies in the words of the following paragraph. To each successive step of the process we affix a numeral, which refers to our reply marked with the same numeral.

We transport ourselves in thought to the distant eternity when God existed alone, and, admitting that his essential attributes *logically* precede his acts, we will overleap those acts, and endeavor to conceive of the divine mind in its essential knowledge, when the present order of creation was only one of many possible systems, among which God was to choose, when therefore God knew them all as possible, no one of them as actual; just as an architect may have a distinct vision of a dozen conceivable houses.[1] But Dr. Whedon arrests us in this endeavor, and asserts that the divine omniscience must eternally conform to whatever is certain in the future. Granting that there is no *chronological* separation between the knowledge of possibilities and of realities, we still insist, with Whedon himself, that volition must

logically come after perception.[2] Is not God at liberty to create what he will?[3] Can we not even conceive of his essential attributes without postulating our own existence? Dr. Whedon will hardly maintain that we cannot, in view of a statement which he makes in the interest of human freedom, (pp. 279, 280:) "An atheist is fully able to conceive a world of free agents without any omnipotent personal First Cause." So, then, we can conceive of man without God, but not of God without man![4] And not only so; for if foreknowledge be an *essential* divine attribute, then God could not be God without the certain existence of the meanest reptile that crawls on the ground.[5] The existence of all things as they are at present was *first* infallibly certain, and *then* —God deliberately chose the present world out of all possible worlds![6] *That* choice, at least, could not reflect itself back into the previous knowledge, for then the choice would be logically first, which is contrary to the supposition. The divine creative act was according to a divine thought into which no choice had entered, but which shaped infallibly the pattern to be followed.[8] The advocates of this doctrine must beware lest, in freeing man from his chains, they wrap them around his Creator.[9] —Pp. 686, 687.

(1) But the traditional view is that "God from all eternity decrees whatsoever comes to pass." The omniscience and the decree are, therefore, co-eternal, and oblige us to find God eternally in the state of freely choosing for the best, just as he is eternally in the state of omniscience. There can, therefore, be no anterior period of God's ignorance of any free acts, even his own. And so eternally the act is in the order of thought subsequent to the attribute. Mr. Cobb's theory is compelled to suppose a pre-existent nescience, a mutilated omniscience, waiting for the construction of God's divine theory before it is able to know. But, in fact, these conceptions of God on a certain occasion making a comparison of worlds, and choosing the best one, do not presuppose an actual transaction once occurring, preceded by divine ignorance. They are simply devices to aid our own thought. (2) Yes; just as the divine decree must come after the full omniscience. (3) This argues that God's omniscience as including his own act destroys the liberty of his act. And yet our author tells us on the very next page: "His *knowledge* of all future motives, and accordingly *of all free choices* as certain to be realized, . . . gives the system of liberty." That is, God's knowledge of future free acts does not destroy their freedom; and so his knowledge of his own

free acts does not destroy their freedom. God is to be conceived as freely and eternally choosing the best possible system, and plenarily knowing and foreknowing within his own divine consciousness that he will do so. His omniscience and his purpose, as in nature antecedent and consequent, eternally fuse with each other, eternal knowledge and eternal act. In our chapter on "Freedom of Divine Will" we say: "Eternity bears to God the same relation as an hour bears to man; and it no more follows that God's volitions are bound by fixed law from his *will*-ing eternally right, than it follows that man's volitions are fixed by law because he wills right through sixty seconds." God's "unchange*ableness*" is his free unchang*ingness* with eternal full power to change; his immutability is his eternal free volition not to mutate. (4) It is perfectly easy to conceive God as eternally willing not to create man; just as Mr. Cobb holds, as we suppose, that it was perfectly competent for God to foreordain from all eternity that man should not exist. And just as we may conceive a man for an hour willing or not willing to make a clock. Does Mr. Cobb admit that the eternity of God's foreordination destroys the freedom of God? (5) No difficulty in conceiving God eternally willing the "reptile" not to exist, and eternally knew he would. (6) Whichever the enacted choice, that would be the foreknown choice. (7) Not "the choice," but the knowledge or idea of the choice, "would be logically first." (8) No. Not "shaped," but shapes to "the pattern followed." (9) And yet Mr. Cobb holds that God foreknows the free choices of men, as he says on this very page. He has declared, "We go as far as any Arminian in maintaining alternate choice." And yet he here stoutly maintains that the foreknowledge of the choice destroys the alternity. And this again seems like an indorsement of Dr. M'Cabe. On our view there is no difficulty in the matter. It is of the very property and power of perfect omniscience, that the alternative choice should be the one embraced within its knowledge, without destroying its alternity.

Mr. Cobb introduces a fine old Puritan writer, Charnock, with extracts clearly demonstrating that he held "the power of contrary choice." All that is lovely. But soon comes a terrible catastrophe. In other extracts this same Charnock avows the doctrine of predestination, which makes God's

decree annul, with all the might of his pledged omnipotence, this very power of contrary choice. What boots it, we pray you, to take off the shackles of necessitation from the will, and then clap on the fetters of predestination upon the Will? What worth is a power of choice which abuts against the decree of God? There can be no "alternate choice" if God's power has secured that none but one given choice can take place. God's decree forecloses, crushes out, and annihilates the "contrary power." It is an issue between the contrary choice and omnipotence. The reprobate sinner is hemmed in to his reprobate choice, and to his reprobate doom. God has decreed his sin, and damns him for committing the sin decreed. And this decree is very specially denied to take shape from the foreknowledge; the decree creates the foreknowledge, and the foreknowledge is shaped by the decree.

And in this same awful inconsistency Mr. Cobb fearfully involves himself. He traces (p. 687) the process of divine government by stages of which the fourth and fifth are as follows: "His [God's] act of will, according to which certain beings are endowed with freedom, and surrounded with objects appealing to choice; his knowledge of future motives, and accordingly of all free-choices as *certain* to be realized. This gives the system of liberty." Now, of the connection between the "motives" and the "choices" three things are predicated. First. It is so strong that the very scheme of divine government can safely rest upon it. Second. It is so strong that it can bear to have the decree of predestination fastened and based upon it. Third. There emerges this contradiction that the "knowledge of future motives" and "free-choice" is here made the basal condition of the decreed "system," and yet the decree is held by Mr. Cobb to be the precedent condition of the "knowledge." Now we beg leave to doubt that, holding to all those annihilators of the power of contrary volition, Mr. Cobb can accurately claim to "go as far as any Arminian in maintaining the power of alternate choice." The moment you introduce predestination you cancel all freedom.

In summarizing calmly his conclusions whether this "traditional" Calvinian theodicy should be amended, our friendly critics final objection to our "theory" is that it gives us "an unfree Creator forming a free creature." That is, God's endowing man

with ample scope of unviolated freedom sufficient to render him justly responsible renders him an "unfree creator." We wish Mr. Cobb had fully weighed our two chapters entitled "Freedom limits not Omnipotence," and "Freedom exalts Man and dishonors God?" where that objection is analyzed. We there show that the outfit of free agency furnished to man by God was no abdication or diminution of divine power, but simply a munificent divine self-limitation of action *in the use of that power.* Even in the imposition of physical laws upon the material mechanism of creation God imposes the most absolute laws upon his own action. He binds himself by the same adamantine laws with which he binds mechanical nature. If he will have a permanent course of nature he must hold himself "unfree" to violate that course of nature. He cannot both maintain and violate. If that is to be "unfree," God is as unfree as the clod of the valley, the rock in our Palisades, or the orrery of the solar system revolving in its orbits. Is it "unfree" in God to uniformly and forever avoid a capricious break-up of the system of nature as a boy knocks to pieces his Christmas block-house? The human mechanist *obeys his machine;* and so does the divine, and thereby both are far more free and illustrious. Even if God determines to have a system of necessitated human agents he must hold himself just as unfree to violate the law of necessity as he is "unfree" to violate the law of freedom in a system of responsible free agents. And in the realm of responsible beings: the greater the power and freedom conferred upon the agent, the higher does God himself rise above the grade of a mere master mechanist to a divine imperial Ruler. The higher, the richer, the endowment bestowed, the nobler is the dignity of the "divine sovereignty." For God to grant all the capacities necessary to a due responsibility is simply for him to most freely take upon himself the principles of eternal wisdom and righteousness. It is a voluntary unfreedom, a free unfreedom. On the other hand, the "traditional" Augustinian view makes God too covetous of his power to allow a freedom requisite for responsibility. God is made to talk largely of freedom, responsibility, and penalty, and damnation; but when it comes to the freedom, the pseudo-free action is scrimped, and necessitated, and predestinated, and determined, and made "certain," before-

hand, like the automatic figures of a chess-board, all to save God from being "unfree" and without attaining that result. It represents God like a tradesman who might win a million, but is too penurious to lay out the necessary investment. God's freedom, we maintain, consists in the largeness of his liberalities, in the nobleness of his divine self-limitations as a ruler, in the richness of the powers he bestows upon the subjects by him held responsible. And in the fullness of those powers for which he holds his subjects responsible is the true grandeur of his "divine sovereignty." We conclude that in honor of the divine Sovereign the "traditional" Augustinian theory needs summary abolition.

Finally this objection that our "theory" gives "an unfree Creator forming a free creature" evolves something like another contradiction. Mr. Cobb declares he "will go as far as any one," even as far as we, "in maintaining the power of alternate choice;" and yet it seems we go it so far as to hold "an unfree Creator." Which "horn," then, does Mr. Cobb accept? Our "alternate choice?" Then he has "an unfree God." Does he assert a free "Creator?" Then by his own account he must reject the "alternate choice." We have a shade of doubt whether our candid friend has as clear and firm belief in "alternate choice" as he himself.

English Reviews.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, October, 1883. (London.)—1. The London Quarterly Review: New Series. 2. Professor Palmer. 3. The Completed Church Books of Wesleyan Methodism. 4. Republican France and Religion. 5. The Official Year-Book of the Church of England. 6. Hopes and Fears for Madagascar. 7. The Luther Festival; by Dr. Philippi.

BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, October, 1883. (London.)—1. The Life and Times of St. Anselm: by John Gibb. 2. Some Indian Stories; by W. R. S. Ralston. 3. Life Insurance Finance. 4. Among the Mongols. 5. Cromwell in Ireland: by T. C. D. 6. The Four Hundredth Birthday of Luther; by George P. Fisher. 7. Mr. Roden Noel's Poems; by Daniel C. Angus. 8. The Dog in Homer; by A. M. Clarke. 9. The Second Part of "Faust": a Study; by M. Betham Edwards. 10. Mr. Ilbert's Bill; by Wm. Summers. 11. Political Review of the Quarter.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW, October, 1883. (London.)—1. Proposed Substitutes for Christianity; by Prof. J. Radford Thomson, M.A. 2. Canon Cook's Criticism of the Revised Version of the Three First Gospels; by Principal Brown. 3. Studies in Scottish Ecclesiastical Biography; by Rev. Charles G. M'Crie. 4. Was Aërius a Heretic? by Rev. Thomas Witherow. 5. The Nature of Physical Causes and their Induction; by Prof. R. L. Dabney, D.D., LL.D. 6. Christianity and Buddhism; by Prof. S. H. Kellogg, D.D.

German Reviews.

THEOLOGISCHE STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN. (Theological Essays and Reviews.) 1884. First number.—*Essays:* 1. HAUPT, The Life of Jesus; by B. Weiss. 2. FRANKE, The Sphere of the Johannean Gospel. *Thoughts and Remarks:* 1. KLOSTERMANN, Alteration of the Text of the Psalm of Hezekiah, in Isaiah xxxviii, 9–20. 2. TAG, An Exposition of Luke xviii, 7, and Galatians ii, 3–6. *Review:* SCHRADER, The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament; reviewed by RÖSCH.

KIRCHLICHE MONATSCHRIFT, (Church Monthly.) Vol. 2, No. 12.—1. H. SCHMIDT, Church Heresy and the Sects. 2. FRICK, Guide to the Teaching of Homiletics for the Theologians of the Francke Foundation in Halle. 3. MARTINS, The Soldier and the Sabbath: a Contribution to the Sabbath Observance Question. From East and West Prussia. Monthly Review. Programme for the Luther Celebration in Wittemberg.

The leading article in the first of the above periodicals is an exhaustive criticism on the "Life of Jesus," by Bernard Weiss. This now famous work has already been so much criticised and reviewed, on account of its equivocal character, that it may be pleasing to our readers to learn how an orthodox publication presents it to the German public. The work itself appeals to an extensive circle of readers among the cultured and intelligent classes, and also to the smaller circle of the specially scientific and theological.

"Weiss places himself in sharp contrast to the so-called 'modern theology' which does not believe in miracles in the strict sense of the term, by confessing to the existence of a Christ who is more than a mere man, even the highest and most unattainable. On the other hand, he separates himself from the usual Church circle, by resting his views on a historically critical treatment of the gospels, by a presentation of the life of Christ from the stand-point of his earthly and historical life. On account of this double position, Weiss expresses the fear that his book will find a favorable reception from neither of the theological tendencies. And unfavorable criticisms have not been wanting. Weiss frequently wrestles with inexactitudes and errors in treating of the miracles; but this is all pardoned by some in view of his exact treatment of many ecclesiastical truths, as the pre-existence of Christ, his immaculate birth, and his resurrection. The *external* success which Weiss has gained is largely owing to this direction. The *external* success, for the internal success is by no means assured. This can only be settled when the principles represented by him are accepted in broader circles; and how far this will be the case is yet doubt-

ful. Only the future can show whether a large circle of readers will be induced, through his book, to give up their principal stand-point, or whether they will simply accept his aid to reach their results, but in other matters refuse to follow in his ways and look to his aims."

This same number of the "Theological Essays" closes with a review of Schrader's work on the "Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament," which has just been issued in a new and enlarged edition, with a supplement by Prof. Paul Haupt, the famous young Assyriologist, now of the Johns Hopkins University of Baltimore. This new edition has been largely increased and greatly improved by the criticisms that the first edition received from several distinguished Orientalists, so that it has become, in Germany, the standard work on the matter of these now widely-known inscriptions. This new edition contains about two hundred pages more than the original, presenting in these added pages an Excursus containing the transcription, translation, and exegesis of the cuneiform description of the Flood, together with a glossary belonging to it.

In consequence of the increase of the Assyriological parallel Bible passages, the number of the compared quotations has largely increased. The body of the book contains, therefore, in the order of the chapters, all the passages that are illustrated in any measure by the cuneiform parallels. The Excursus has four chronological supplements referring to so many different reigns. To these are added two linguistic supplements, a glossary by Haupt, and one by Schrader himself. There are also numerous additions and corrections in the registers, showing how every day, almost, brings some new matter or discovery to this interesting handmaid of biblical exposition. In conclusion, the master map-maker of Germany—Kiepert—is present with a most complete map of Mesopotamia, from the Armenian mountains to the Persian Gulf, and also from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates. The cartoons of Nineveh are also greatly improved in comparison with those in the earlier edition.

As we examine the contents we find them divided into sections treating of the geography, history, religion, and language involved in an accurate study of the subject. In the geographical section the question as to the location of Paradise is treated in harmony with the views of Friedrich Delitzsch and Fritz

Hommel; that is, it is laid in the region of Babylon. This view, they claim, is sustained by one of the cuneiform inscriptions, and the reasons given are based on linguistic, geographical, and mythological research. Turning from the question of the site of Paradise to that of genealogy, we find a thorough revision. The period after the flood has now its parallels from an old Babylonian list of kings found among the cuneiform inscriptions; some new names are even introduced from the cuneiform lists. In the field of history the author begins with cuneiform parallels for the biblical account of the creation. At the flood Schrader makes a very interesting comparison between the agreements and the disagreements of the biblical story and that of the inscriptions. The result reached by Schrader is, that the biblical account of the Flood stands in closer harmony with the Chaldaic story than could have been expected. On the whole, the work is a very rare product of some of the first biblical scholars of the world, and goes marvelously far in supporting Bible history by these profane inscriptions.

French Reviews.

REVUE CHRÉTIENNE, (Christian Review.) August, 1883.—1. MOURON, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Evangelical Association. 2. In Africa, by X. 3. BRIDEL, Philosophical Chronicle. 4. ROERICH, Literary Notices. 5. Monthly Review by Pressensé.

September, 1883.—1. AGUILERA, The Future of Religion. 2. In Africa, by X. 3. Sabatier, Literary Chronicle. 4. NYEGAARD, English Chronicle. 5. Review of the Month by Pressensé.

October, 1883.—1. E. DE PRESSENSÉ, Conciliation in Theology. 2. In Africa, by X. 3. DRAUSSIN, Protestant Literature and Book-selling. 4. Monthly Review by Pressensé.

In the August number of the *Revue* we find an interesting and instructive article on the establishment and growth of the Evangelical Association of France. It is virtually an address delivered quite recently on the occasion of the semi-centennial celebration of the society. Fifty years ago, under the heavy pressure that still kept the Protestant Church in the background, and did not even permit it to hold as a Church any general meetings or synods, a few zealous Christians determined to adopt the custom of Switzerland, England, and the United States, and establish an organization with the view to

advance and consolidate the cause of Protestant Christianity. With much trial and discouragement to contend with they nevertheless at last succeeded in effecting a reunion of a few of the Protestant leaders of the day to consult in regard to the enterprise. Among these we find the revered names of Frederic and Victor Monod, and E. de Pressensé. They had scarcely made the first step in their organization before they were encouraged by the greetings of similar bodies from Switzerland, Ireland, and England, as well as the United States. This step put them in *rapport* with the Protestant Christians, and their words of encouragement induced them to study the methods of these sister Churches for the propagation of the Gospel. In due time they had a Bible society and colporteurs, and were fairly on the good and active path. But this activity stirred up opposition in certain quarters, and soon certain of their colporteurs were arrested, and the penal code was brought to bear on their assemblies and their agents. Magistrates would put injunctions on them that wise judges would remove as illegal and not in accordance with the spirit of the code, and so they floated through stormy seas with an occasional wreck of their frail bark high and dry on the sand.

Under such adverse winds it was thought at times that the society must yield up its existence, but in these hours of trial there were always a few determined ones whom no opposition could crush or threats intimidate. These kept the leaven alive until the storm had passed, when they again tried the high seas, sometimes to sail smoothly for awhile, and then again to be buffeted by other storms. And these vicissitudes tell the sum of the story of well nigh forty years. When the Second Empire fell, Protestantism bounded forth like a spring that had long been under pressure. Bells that had been under a forced silence now pealed forth their tones to call together Christian brothers animated by new hopes; schools that had long been closed now opened their doors, and the Protestant chapels again dared to sing aloud their fervent hymns. When Protestantism was again allowed to move abroad it seemed as if liberty were in the air and new hopes inspired the hearts of men. In Paris, the workmen came in crowds to listen to Gospel words, and in the provinces new stations were opened to proclaim the name of the living God.

This society immediately received the privilege to preach and circulate its publications every-where, and it has used these opportunities with great effect. Now the cry is for workmen for the harvest, and for means to carry on the various enterprises of the associations. The object of this semi-centennial meeting was to review the past and animate the present into renewed vigor in view of the growing demands of the future. What they most need just now is money to carry on their enterprises. And this is coming now from England and America.

The article in the October number, on the literature and the book-sellers of Protestantism, reveals some of the wants and difficulties with which the aggressive movements of French Protestants have to contend. They find themselves devoid of implements with which to forward their cause in the dearth of good religious books for the instruction of their higher institutions, as well as their schools and families.

To remedy this defect they at first resorted to the method of encouraging as far as possible a Protestant establishment in private hands, and this mode was warmly seconded by some of the first men of the Protestant ranks. It seemed, however, not to move with any degree of celerity, and the cry went forth for some process more rapid and practical and popular. And therefore, about five years ago, the religious press announced the formation of a Committee resolved to undertake the reprint of a series of works on history and theology, to which they fittingly gave the title of *Classics of French Protestantism.* The names of the members of this Committee were a guarantee for the character of the works that would be published.

The enterprise of this association was in the course of execution, and was to be inaugurated by the Ecclesiastical History of Theodore Bèze, which was the fruit of twenty-five years of exhaustive labor of one of the most learned men in the Protestant ranks, and not, of course, as a means of making money, for no sale of such a book in France would be possible to an extent to make it a profitable enterprise pecuniarily. While this work was in the course of execution there was suddenly formed, in the south of France, a society for the publication of cheap religious books, which announced as its first

issue a popular edition of this same work. The members of the above Committee represented in vain that such an impediment thrown across their path would prevent them from making a success of the endeavor to do good work and select desirable books; but their appeal was in vain, and so the matter stands at present without compromise.

Art. X.—FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES OF ITALY.

The Protestant Churches of Italy are just now embarrassed by a very peculiar circumstance, namely, the abolition of paper money and the introduction of gold. For many years the premium of the precious metal has been so high that the face value of a draft to the missions was much greater than the strict figures of the draft; but now a draft for five hundred dollars only draws that amount at the bankers, instead of drawing well nigh six hundred, and this deficit in the missionary treasury is becoming a very serious matter. Under it the Waldenses especially are appealing for more funds from their friends in this country. A recent tabulation of the Protestant Churches in Italy presents the following figures:

	1878.	1882.	Increase.
Waldensian Churches	2,530	3,421	991
Free Church	1,649	1,666	17
Wesleyan Methodists	1,276	1,451	175
American Methodists	437	707	270
Baptists of various shades	(?)	847	497 (?)

So that now the entire number of Church members of various evangelical denominations in Italy amounts to 8,092, and we surmise that there has been a large increase on this figure during the year 1883.

The Italian Protestant press has for some time been discussing the project of the association of all the evangelical denominations of the land into one Church body, or rather into one organic federation. The organ of the Free Church in Venice, "The Fra Paola Sarpi," exclaims: "The members of our parishes will rejoice on the day when their ministers will lead them hand in hand to the same living pastures and fresh waters." In the Waldensian organ, "L'Italia Evangelica," Teofile Gay proposes, with certain restrictions, the following mode of confederation: (1) Every denomination which enters the confederation will remain fully autonomous in all that regards its ecclesiastical and financial administration. (2) The confederated denominations will in future divide among themselves the fields of labor not yet occupied, and will in them only establish new stations. (3) The confederated Churches will mutually recognize the leaders and members of the other Churches in their

respective qualities as pastors, evangelists, and Church members in communion. (4) Each of the confederated Churches binds itself to accept no member that has belonged to one of the other confederated Churches without the previously expressed permission of the Church in question. (5) The confederated Churches unite in the exchange of preachers, in periodical assemblies, in a common organ, and in common synods composed of all the Churches of the confederation, meeting triennially or quadrennially. (6) This confederation will be controlled by a central committee, to consist of one or two from each of the denominations to be named by their representatives in the synod. This committee remains in activity in the interim of the sessions in the general synods. (7) This central committee will take measures to create a single and complete theological faculty, in which the clergy of all denominations will receive their preparation, and will do whatever else that may forward the aim of the confederation.

The author of this proposition hoped to see the preparations for this work of union so far advanced as to be able to have the constituent assembly of this confederation to meet on the occasion of the principal Luther festival of Protestant Italy in Rome or Florence. This project seems very attractive to most of the Italian Protestants, and they sincerely hope that its execution may be speedily effected. The greatest obstacle to its advancement will be probably found in the differences that exist between the Free Church supported mainly by Scotch funds, and the Churches of the Waldenses.

THE BELGIAN MISSION CHURCH.

We notice with extreme pleasure the zealous earnestness and loving activity of the Protestant Church of Belgium. In the midst of this land of ultramontane gloom the work of Protestant missions shines forth like a bright light. At a meeting of this body recently held in one of the industrial sections of Belgium, the fiery tongues of the promoters of the mission work seemed inspired with the energy of the brawny arms of their working masses. The Protestant pastors on this occasion scarcely found it necessary to appeal for assistance in the work. The improved condition of the financial situation has enabled most of the parishes to reduce their floating debt and to increase their subscription for the instruction of their children in the Protestant faith in the Sunday-schools, and to make an advance in their subscriptions for the mission work. The most interesting features of the occasion were the exercises connected with the withdrawal of Rev. Leonard Annel from the work that he has conducted with signal success for the last forty years among the Protestants of Belgium. He was for a long time pastor in Brussels, and at the same time general secretary for the evangelical Church in Belgium, which is emphatically a mission work amid the ignorance and superstition of the Catholic Church. An untiring activity, a rare fidelity, and an inimitable spirit of self-sacrifice have at last exhausted his powers, and bidden him cease from his labors and seek

for rest. By common consent he has been placed upon the retired list and roll of honor as missionary *emeritus.*

But the armor that he lays down has been taken up by a young and active worker, and the cause moves on apace. Here, also, the Scotch Church is doing a grand work with its missionary funds; and prominent members of its organization were present to express their thanks to the veteran Christian laborer who had used them with so much judgment and success. Wishes and prayers for the increased prosperity of the Belgium Mission Church came from many hearts in that land, and, it is believed, find a place even in the heart of its king. The glorious enterprises undertaken by Leopold II. in the wilds of Africa, under his lieutenant and mouth-piece, the indefatigable Stanley, have inspired the Belgian Protestants to prepare themselves for the work that is soon likely to be ready for their hands on the banks of the Congo.

THE OLD CATHOLICS IN BADEN.

The Old Catholics of Germany seem to hold their own in Baden with more tenacity than in any of the other States. They lately held a state convention for the purpose of a close inspection of the situation. Their bishop, Dr. Reinkens, was present with them, and preached with fervor before a large congregation. Thirty-two parishes of Baden were represented in this convention by one hundred and thirty delegates. Besides their presiding bishop there were also present their general vicar, an Anglican clergyman, and one of the evangelical Protestant faith. The State's attorney of Baden from its capital, Carlsruhe, was the presiding officer. A professor from Austria made an interesting report on the politico-ecclesiastical condition in that country, and two other professional delegates treated of the position and the character of its literature and of its press.

The national committee proposed to make a collection for episcopal support, and also for the assistance of poor parishes and the formation of new ones, on Whit-Sunday, of each year, which is a period of high festival with the German nation. Certain resolutions published in their official organ, "The Old Catholic Messenger," were indorsed, according to which the opposition of the Old Catholics, not only to the infallibility of the Pope, but to the entire Romish system, with all its abuses and misleading tenets, were asseverated. A lasting peace between the State and the Pope was declared impossible, and the speeches of the Ultramontanes in the imperial Parliament and in the respective State diets was declared to be the product of a supercilious policy of expediency. It is declared to be untrue that the Roman Catholic is independent of the Pope in the political field, and that every act of any government whereby the common use of Catholic churches was withdrawn from, or denied to, the Old Catholics must result in strengthening the Ultramontanes and weakening the civil power. Again, it was asserted that every one in Germany who awakens or stirs up confessional conflict, be he Catholic or Protestant,

is an enemy of the fatherland; and that only in the false belief that Romish policy is the Catholic religion could statesmen legislate for the care of the souls of the people with Rome.

At a banquet held on the closing evening, Professor Michelis offered to go for a few weeks to Bohemia, where recently several parishes had declared themselves ready to enter the ranks of the Old Catholics. Professor Watterich narrated the struggle of Luther against the Hildebrand papacy. A Protestant pastor favored the union between Old Catholics and Protestants, which suggestion and proposition was critically explained by Bishop Reinkens. It would seem, from the above proceedings, that the Old Catholics are not yet losing hope of a certain success in the future, but the conquests that they are now making are of a very equivocal character. We opine that the parishes of Bohemia that declare themselves ready to throw off the papal yoke, and join hands with the Old Catholics, do so more in a fit of anger at tyrannical priestly rule than from well-grounded conviction. The Old Catholics are now virtually between two fires, for the Protestant Church of Germany is greatly disappointed that they do not go far enough in their opposition to the papacy to be of any influence in the cause of Protestantism, and are thus deserting their cause, ecclesiastically and politically, while the Catholics are taking advantage of the situation, and are crowding them out of the Catholic churches, in which they have hitherto enjoyed common privileges.

Art. XI.—FOREIGN LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

In the line of French Theological Literature the book of the period is the "Ecclesiastical History of the Reformed Churches in the Kingdom of France," by Theodore De Bèze—a new edition, with additions by Baum and Cunitz, Professors in the University of Strasburg. This monumental edition of the book of the religious history of the sixteenth century is published under the patronage of the Society for the History of French Protestantism, and with the collaboration of a committee composed of Alfred André. Eugène Bersier, Jules Bonnet, Henri Bordier, Maurice Cottier, Count Jules Delaborde, Alfred Franklin, J. Gaiffe, C. Jameson, William Jackson, Fr. Lichtenberger, Henri Lutteroth, William Martin, G. de Montbrison, Rosseeuw-Saint-Hilaire, E. Sayons, Baron Fernand de Schickler. The plan of this publication was conceived five years ago. The very numerous notes, borrowed for the most part from a copy annotated by the late Professor Baum, of Strasburg, have been carefully gathered, revised, and enlarged by Professor Cunitz of Strasburg. Jules Bonnet has been delegated by the above-named committee to overlook the printing of these volumes. The work will be complete in three quarto volumes, forming together more than 3,000 pages. The printing of the second volume is almost completed. It will, doubtless,

become the standard in the public libraries, and in the libraries of the consistories, of scholars, of pastors, of bibliophiles.

Another monumental work in the same line, published by subscription, by Fischbacher, of Paris, is the "Dictionary of Ecclesiastical History," by PASTEUR BOST. We are aware of the considerable development which has taken place during the last fifty years in historical sciences, even in the domain purely ecclesiastical and religious. If the epoch of the Reformation first justly fixed the attention of our scholars and writers in beginning, by the *Chroniquer* of 1835 and 1836, to end in the great works of Reuss, of Herminjard, of Haag, of Douen, of Merle d'Aubigné, of de Félice, of Puaux, of Jules Bonnet, without forgetting the precious bulletin of French Protestantism, other periods have been equally elucidated; monographs and biographies have been multiplied, given by humble or by eminent investigators, whose names are legion. This collection of sketches and fragments prepared and made desirable a complete and analytical history of the Church, written by a historian worthy of the name. This man was found in the person of Professor Chastel, whose works and previous publications had engaged the attention of the learned world. This gentleman placed 3,500 pages of his manuscript at the disposition of Edmond de Pressensé, who writes thus about it: "My dear friend, what I have seen of your historical dictionary appears to me to demonstrate its utility and excellent arrangement, and its publication will present genuine advantages." Another critic, Pasteur Perrelet, speaks thus: "I have had the privilege of examining the manuscript of the work which Augustin Bost is about to give to the public after fifteen years of labor. This ecclesiastical and theological dictionary is a vast library contained in a thousand pages, a veritable fortune to all those who shall possess it, and they will be numerous."

The Luther revival has produced a tidal wave of so-called Luther literature. Several of these works are replies to recent Romish attacks on Luther's fair fame. A very notable publication in this line is an address by Dr. Martin Rade, at the Conference of Meissen, in reply to the oft-asked question, Does Luther need defense against Janssen, his most determined and prominent vilifier? The address culminates in these two striking answers: From the stand-point of the historian—No! From that of the theologian—Yes! The scientific method of Janssen, if such it can be called, has been condemned and executed, and needs no further contradiction; but that such a book should attract the attention in Protestant circles which it clearly has, must create serious apprehensions from the stand-point of the theologian. This ultramontane distortion of history has been effected by Janssen, with all the air of innocence, and this makes of the book "a stupendous invitation for the conversion of all intelligent Protestants." Against his falsehoods and seductive reasonings Dr. Rade prescribes the careful reading of all that Janssen has written, on the one hand, and then all the careful reading of Luther's writings.

"Zöckler's Manual of Theological Science," to which we have previously alluded in these pages, has just been enriched by another volume. This contains Old Testament theology, by Professor Schultz, in Breslau, an Introduction to the New Testament, and a Biblical History of the New Testament. Professor Grau has an article on New Testament theology, while Volck, of Dorpat, treats of canonical doctrine and biblical hermeneutics. The section under the charge of Volck is the most satisfactory and systematic as to the dialectics of the thoughts. The Old Testament theology, by Schultz, seems to be more acceptable to German critics. The work is very abstruse, and intelligent readers are requested to appreciate the difficulties that have attended these investigations.

Art. XII.—QUARTERLY BOOK-TABLE.

Biblical.

The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture. A Critical, Historical, and Dogmatic Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of the Old and New Testaments. By George T. Ladd, D.D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Yale College. Vol. i, 8vo, pp. 761. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883. 1.

By *Doctrine of Sacred Scripture* Dr. Ladd means the true doctrine or teaching in regard to the Scripture; and his book professedly aims to answer the question, "What *is* the Bible?" But, more definitely, it attempts to answer the question, What opinion shall we form of the Bible, in view of the present debate between the school of Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen, and the "traditional" maintainers of the high Biblicism of the Post-Reformation era? Dr. Ladd, as an eminent Yale professor, may be assumed to be a master of the scholarship of the question; and as for years a pastor claims to have some perception of the true needs of the popular mind. He takes ample space for a full discussion of all the phases of the great question. His two volumes embrace about fifteen hundred pages; fifteen of which are devoted to an analytical table of contents, shedding great lucidity through the massy volumes, fifteen pages to a list of quoted texts, and twenty-four to an index of topics. The work is a "liberal education" upon its topic, or, rather, generic range of topics. Even those who dissent, more or less, from the author's views will respect the clearness, candor, thoroughness, and critical ability of the learned author, and we doubt not it will make a decided impression upon the public mind.

Between Kuenen and his extreme opponents Dr. Ladd takes

professedly a medium ground. His position, generically stated, would be, not that "The Bible *is* the word of God," but that "The Bible *contains* the word of God." Within the visible canon there is "an inner Bible" revealing supernatural ethico-religious truth in its purity, but surrounded by an outer margin which is not infallible nor always accurate. The "inner Bible," "the word of God," speaks in self-evidencing clearness and power, from the Spirit of God to the spirit of man, especially to the regenerate spirit. It is God revealing himself, and revealing Christ and his kingdom, with all its glories, to men. If this inner Bible is inclosed in earthen vessels, if surrounded by a margin partly or wholly human, the true inquirer can readily distinguish the true word from the vehicle that holds it. Our faith in the word, therefore, need never tremble at the disclosure of mistakes of chronology, contradictions to history, discrepancies between its own narratives, human conceptions, and traditional legends. Through all these, indeed, more or less, the divine word is breathed, making even error and myth the vehicle of divine truth. Besides, several books of our Bible are of doubtful canonicity, and so of inferior authority. But the body of holy truth is ample and intact after all these deductions.

To ascertain what the Bible is, he asks, in his first six elaborate chapters, What does the Bible claim for itself? He commences Christo-centrically, and critically analyzes the words of Christ to find his opinions of the character of the Old Testament, and his promises for the inspiration of the New. Similarly he analyzes the claims set up by the Old Testament for itself, and by the New Testament for the Old and for itself. These claims he finds to be far more qualified and limited than our Protestant "traditionalism" has taught. The classical text regarding Inspiration (2 Tim. iii, 16) is thus rendered: "All Scripture, theopneustic, is also profitable for the ethical purposes of teaching, conviction, correction, discipline, in righteousness." The passage is said to allude to the Old Testament only, "and although it is not the intent of the writer to suggest the possibility of denying theopneusty to any Scripture whatever, neither is it his intent to imply such theopneusty of any such Scripture as is not morally profitable."

After having ascertained the claims made for the Canon, our author proceeds to answer the inquiry, How do the contents of the Canon sustain its claims? The body of responses arising from this inductive investigation is elaborate and immense.

Scripture is scrutinized in the various departments of History, Prophecy, Ethics, Authorship, and Composition of the Sacred Books, their Language and Style, and the History and Text of the Canon. This much in the first volume.

The freedom of dealing with the outer Bible which his inductions afford him is amply displayed in his treatment of his topics. The first chapter of Genesis, whether ante-Mosaic, Mosaic, or post-Exilic, is entirely unscientific. So far from attempting to reconcile it with geology, he simply traces in it how an ancient pious monotheistic thinker would imagine the successive steps of the creational process. The history of the Fall is allegory, nor have we clearly ascertained whether or not the author believes in a personal Adam, or how he would expound the Pauline parallelism between Adam and Christ in Rom. v, 12, 25. On the geological proofs of the antiquity of man he gives a confused dissertation, bringing out no clear conclusion. He makes no allusion to the ascertained lateness of the glacial break-up, and the consequent "pluvial period" hastening the geological events. We have sometimes suspected that Yale was infected by the malaria proceeding from a certain Marsh. Our author seems to entertain no predilection for Darwinism.

The prophets, he thinks, were more largely preachers than predicters. Their predictions were not always fulfilled, and he even gives a list of mistaken prophecies. Their fulfillments in Christ are generally secondary, and even the celebrated Isa. liii, originally fulfilled in other personages, and is applied to Christ only by accommodation. Yet there is an organic connection between the prophetic system and Christ. The old dispensation is truly a preparatory to the new, and this new is found to authenticate the second-hand lapping over of the residuum of a once-fulfilled prediction upon the person of Christ.

But the "higher criticism," specially attracts our attention by its heroic treatment of the Pentateuch or, including Joshua, Hexateuch. The "tradition" of the Jewish Church regarding its own literature is nullified and ignored at start. The Hexateuch is seen to be "a composite book," made of crudely juxtaposed scraps and laws of obviously different ages of history. Critical elimination of conglomerated parts discloses indeed a *Grundschrift*, a *ground-script* or *basal document* at the core, which, however, is none the more true for being basal. Dr. Ladd gives us the *ground-scripts* of several leading investigators for

each book of the Hexateuch. On these primitive skeletons Dr. Ladd remarks, in reference to his critics:

Fault will doubtless be found with the author for going even thus far in affirming the results of critical research. Some students would much prefer the statement that criticism has failed hitherto to reach any conclusions as to the composition of the Hexateuch; others would force the re-affirmation of the tradition of the synagogue; still others would desire the full and unquestioning assertion of all the details of the theories of Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen. But we stand upon the facts. Certain general conclusions wholly adverse to the traditional view are as well established as any critical results can be. It is simple statement of fact to say that in Germany—so far as we are aware—Keil remains the only advocate of a view at all resembling the traditional one. Even Delitzsch—so far as can be judged from his statements, which are always commendably cautious, but often obscure and wavering—could be claimed in support of most of our very moderate conclusions.

Assuming the validity of a division into Elohistic and Jehovistic documents, the great question with "the advanced criticism" is, "since the Jehovist is generally agreed to have written in the time, from 700 B. C. to 900 B. C., and the Deuteronomist not long previous to 621—did the Elohist write before 900, or after 600?"

Now be it understood that Dr. Ladd does not fully affirm these "advanced" views. He thinks it is a matter of degrees; modification and additions have taken place to an unknown extent; but the sweeping extremism of German "criticism" is untenable. First giving a calm statement of the "critical" theory, he next arrays a series of formidable objections and takes position in *via media*. The several points against the theory he makes are: (1) Its discordance with the facts of Ezra, and his period; (2) With the plain truth of an antiquity of the religion earlier than Prophetism and clearly originating in the Mosaic age; (3) With the high and commanding personality of Moses; (4) With the traits of antiquity in some of the so-called Mosaic laws; (5) With the traditional antiquity of hereditary feasts and other institutes, such as the Passover, Sanctification of the First-born, Offerings and Sacrifices, the Tabernacle, the Priesthood, all pointing to a certain primitive national origin, authenticating their history, and by their history authenticated.

The questions herein involved Dr. Ladd conceives to require for authoritative decision a life-long study by profound experts. Especially do the philological aspects of the discussion require further exploration by our Oriental scholars. The following paragraph shows this point in a strong light.

But what is the precise truth as to the grammar and etymology of the author of the Grundschrift? This question is still in dispute. The means for making the necessary comparisons are few; and all our conclusions may be largely vitiated

by our ignorance as to how we shall distinguish between writings which are in a body of late date, and early writings into which certain words and phrases of late form have been introduced at a late date. Delitzsch is doubtless right in denying the correctness of many of the earlier statements of Graf, Popper, and Kuenen. But his own positive affirmation—"The so-called Elohistic language is ancient throughout: . . . there is no trace of the peculiar exilic forms and syntax"—is at best very doubtful. The thorough examination of Ryssel led him to the following conclusions. The language of the Elohistic portions of the Pentateuch would assign them, so far as its Aramaizing is concerned, to the second period of the language, viz., that between Josiah and 536 B. C. It is conceded by Ryssel, however, that certain parts of Numbers, in themselves considered, should be referred to the time of the later books of the Old Testament. But many of the conclusions of this author have been most seriously shaken by the searching criticism and independent research of Giesebrecht. According to this critic a large proportion of the words and roots distinctive of the Elohist can be shown to be either Aramaic or Aramaizing.

Dr. Ladd concludes that, as yet, "there is no reason to depart from the most general conclusions" of Delitzsch, if we make all allowance for successive redactions. And he still believes that "the principal part of the Elohist," (to which the first chapter of Genesis belongs) "the superior laws and histories, belong to the earliest age of the language." It will be seen, therefore, that Dr. Ladd does not quite belong to the Kuenen or even Robertson Smith sections of "criticism."

The unanimity of German criticism is by no means conclusive to the English and American mind. We remember the period when Hegelism was so supreme that none was so bold as to give it denial, and how soon the period of its fall when "none so poor as to do it reverence." Let the English and American mind, taking all the materials that Germany can furnish, revise the logic and draw the independent conclusion. We have no fears of the result.

Biblical Study, its Principles, Methods and History, together with a Catalogue of Reference. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D.D., Davenport Professor of Hebrew and Cognate Languages in Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. 12mo, pp. 506. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883. Price, $2 50.

Dr. Briggs is a clear thinker and a fine writer. He has here collected a series of his fugitive articles on Biblical topics, forming a somewhat connected train of thought, and treating on questions lately discussed. He occupies nearly similar grounds with Professor Ladd. The doctrine that *inspired Scripture evidences itself directly to the soul* has a fine evangelical ring, but it means that our canon has an "inner" and outer Bible distinguishing themselves to our subjectivity. Those who cannot undertake Dr. Ladd may, perhaps, satisfy themselves with Dr. Briggs.

Bible Hermeneutics. A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments. By MILTON S. TERRY, S.T.D. 8vo, pp. 781. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. Price, $4.

Dr. Terry's new volume is one of the most elaborate and able works ever issued from our press. It is written in clear, manly English, and embodies a vast compass of erudition and thought. Of course we do not pledge ourselves to agree with him in all his positions. But we can only announce his work in our present number, with a hope of a fuller notice in a subsequent Quarterly.

Theological.

An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. By GILBERT, Bishop of Sarum. With an Appendix, containing the Augsburg Confession, Creed of Pope Pius IV., etc. Revised and Corrected; with copious Notes and additional References. By Rev. JAMES R. PAGE, A.M., of Queen's College, Cambridge, Minister of Carlisle Chapel, Lambeth. 8vo, pp. 585. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1842.

There are two books of fine old English theology well worthy the attention of the Methodist theological thinker: "Pearson on the Creed," from whom Watson culls many a fine extract, and "Burnet on the Thirty-nine Articles," which sheds much light upon our own standard document. The former is a true specimen of the free, fresh English of his age; the latter is less lucid and classic, yet abounds in vigorous and suggestive discussions. When, in the reign of James I., the debates aroused by Arminius in Holland had powerfully impressed the English mind, the best thinkers in England were awakened to find how completely they were fettered in their articles by the imported theology of Geneva. The still older Eastern, Greek, or Chrysostomian, theology had been supplanted by the later Western, or Augustinian, dogmas. They had not strength enough to reconstruct the Articles, and so the Chrysostomians, or Arminians, re-interpreted them. The various parties were so equally divided that a compromise spontaneously took place, by which, under the generic Calvinistic phrases, different specific meanings might be allowed. The clergy generally went back to the Greek theology, and this, in fact, drew them nearer to that of Trent, and the fashionable and court opinions became anti-Calvinistic. The result was, as somewhat overstated for terseness' sake, by Lord Chatham, that the English Church has "a popish Liturgy, a Calvinistic Creed, and an Arminian Clergy." The

Puritans adhered to high Calvinism, so that the curious antithesis, remarked by Selden in his "Table Talk," existed by which absolutists in creed became the liberalists in politics, and *vice versa*. But so severely did the Puritan absolutistic liberalism press upon the nation that the reaction brought in Charles II. with a national debauch. The Revolution of 1688 restored the public balance. And here it is, in the time of William and Mary, that Burnet comes in with his "Exposition" of the Churchly Articles. He writes with great good sense and piety; with an unpolished and often intricate vigor of style and thought; and with an irenical spirit quite well worth our study at the present day. The Calvinists and Lutherans and Arminians were all in a quarrelsome mood; and he brings them counsels of peace and love; yet not without a free fraternal discussion of doctrinal truth. In much of his treatment he gives the various views of leading minds and classes of minds, with but gentle interposition of his own opinions. Upon the Predestinarian article, especially, he congratulates himself upon having stated the argument on both sides so fairly that nobody could tell on which side he stood, although he really held the Eastern, or Arminian, theology. Dean Stanley wishes that some one would explain historically how John Wesley became a maintainer of the Eastern theology. We understand it to have been as to Predestination the theology of the whole Wesley family, derived from its High-Church antecedents.

The clergy were required, so Burnet says, to declare their belief *ex animo* in the entire truth of the Articles. Yet, to give a due freedom of opinion, they were allowed to read any opinion into the Articles which did not violate either the lexical meaning of the words or the grammatical syntax of the sentences. Thus there may be "an Article conceived in such general words that it can admit of different literal and grammatical senses, even when the senses are plainly contrary one to another; yet both may subscribe the Article with a good conscience, and without any equivocation." Thus, for instance, the Article concerning Christ's *descent into Hell* admits of three different, yet allowable, interpretations. The Ninth Article admits as many.

Instead of modifying the Articles by diverse interpretations, Wesley, in his day, expurgated the Articles themselves. One of our Roman Catholic exchanges lately impeached the integrity of Wesley for mutilating Articles he had sworn to maintain. But Wesley made no change which altered the doctrines as then

held by the Church authorities, and as by him promised to be taught. All he did was to diminish the amount of the assent required by those who belonged to his "Societies." And as American Methodism, in ceasing to be "Societies," and becoming a Church, adopted his diminished form, so, what he struck out from the Ninth Article is not to be required as Methodist doctrine; nay, it stands in the historical position of being, like the Nineteenth (predestinarian) Article, positively exscinded and supposably denied.

On the Ninth Article, which we have had late occasions to discuss, Burnet gives the various existing opinions, condemning some and legitimating others, but very usually balancing between. He fully maintains the doctrine of hereditary sinwardness derived from the Fall, condemning the Pelagians, who hold that every man is freshly born pure as Adam, and able to please God without the Spirit's aid. He repudiates the Manicheans, who explained depravity as the work of an evil anti-God. And, what is to our purpose, he finds the transmission of sinwardness from Adam to take place by the law of propagation. "God has settled it by a law of creation" that a soul should be adjusted to a fitting body. "And if with this [law] God made another general law, that when all things were duly prepared for the propagation of the species of mankind, a soul should always be ready to go into and animate those first threads and beginnings of life; those laws being laid down, Adam, by corrupting his own frame, corrupted the frame of his own posterity, by the general course of things and the great law of the creation. So that the suffering this to run through all the race is no more (only different in degrees and extent) than the suffering the folly or madness of a man to infect his posterity. In these things God acts as the Creator of the world by general rules, and these must not be altered because of the sins and disorders of men; but they are rather to have their course, that so sin may be its own punishment."

And then he raises the perennial question: Is this hereditary *sinwardness* truly sin? that is, is it responsible sin, "*hereditary guilt?*" "The defilement of the race being thus stated," he says, "a question remains whether this can be called a sin, and such as deserves *God's wrath and damnation?*" To this question at the present day, we understand some Arminians to say, Yes; but we understand a greater number, with Dr. Wilbur Fisk, to say *No;* and to that *No* categorical we give our humble ditto. Hereditary sinwardness, inborn tendency to

sin, is not itself sin, that is, "guilt," until we make it so by free, volitional action. And Burnet goes on thus: "An opposition of nature to the divine nature must certainly be hateful to God, as it is the *root* of much malignity and sin. Such a nature cannot be the object of his love, and of itself cannot be accepted of God." This is precisely our position as explained in our last Quarterly, and (although we had not then read Burnet on the Article) in remarkably similar phrase. We said that an inborn sinwardness was a nature "contrarious to the divine nature," and so the proper object of a real, though not judicial or punitive, displacency. It is this non-judicial, non-punitive character that, in the next sentence, Burnet misses and (contradictorily to himself, as we shall soon show) runs widely astray, followed by some of our theologians. Burnet adds: "Now, since there is no mean in God, between *love* and *wrath, acceptation* and *damnation*, if such persons are not in the first order [namely, of love and acceptation] they must be in the second." Now, according to Burnet's own repeated assertion of the requisiteness of freedom for responsibility, there is between God's "love and acceptation" of a freely-obedient being and his "wrath and damnation" of a freely-disobedient, at least one intermediate; namely, his displacency toward a necessitatedly evil being. And we may add a second, namely, God's divine complacency for a necessitatedly pure and benevolent angel. Of Burnet's affirmations of the requisiteness of freedom for responsibility and judicial condemnation the following is a specimen: "It is a principle that seems to arise out of the light of nature, that no man is accountable, rewardable, or punishable, but for that in which he acts freely, without force or compulsion; and, so far, all are agreed." But how does a "man" "act freely," without force or compulsion," in being born a sinward being? And how can God hold such being amenable to wrath and damnation for so being born?

This question, whether inborn sinwardness deserves God's "wrath and damnation," Burnet discusses, giving the opposite views and arguments, but very indecisively indicating his own. He gives the Augustinian interpretation of Rom. v, 12–21, and concludes: "This explication does certainly quadrate more to the words of the Article, as it is known that this was the tenet of those who prepared the Articles, it having been the generally received opinion from St. Austin's [St. Augustine's] days downward." And that means that the Article was, originally and historically, Calvinistic in its meaning. He then gives the methods

of the Arminians of his day to read a different sense into the words, methods so poor as to be hardly worth the giving. One method was to say that this passage of Paul stood alone, and we lack the confirmatory force of similar passages, and are, therefore, not so sure of the meaning of this. The other was to say that, in recognizing the "condemnation" of this passage, Paul simply assumed the truth of the prevalent opinion of the Jews of the day, in order to illustrate or enforce the doctrine of redemption through Christ. That is, it was a case of accommodation: proving a truth from popular concession; the conclusion being true, the argument was untrue. How terribly a Wesley was needed to sweep the clause with a besom!

That between the divine "love and acceptation" of justified man and the "wrath and damnation" of a freely sinning unholy being there is a "mean," namely, the divine unjudicial displacency toward an evil, unfree agent, we maintained in our last Quarterly. Two learned friends, the one in the North and the other in the South, have written us objections to the reality of this intermediate. As it happens, both these respected correspondents express a high valuation of our work on the Will, a work which, for some twenty years, has been recommended to be read in our Course of Study. Our two friends, nevertheless, seem totally unaware that whole chapters of that volume are expended in elucidating that *intermediate*. In our two chapters entitled "Distinction between Automatic Excellence and Moral Desert," and "Created Moral Desert Impossible," (pp. 375–396,) we have discussed this subject with a fullness and, as we think, with a demonstrative conclusiveness which admits of no valid reply, and which ought to have expelled the fatalistic monster of "hereditary guilt" from our theology.

It was a full decade since we had read these two chapters; but we see nothing, save some little stiffnesses, occasionally, of expression, in which we could now improve them. To save the trouble of our readers in referring to the volume, and ourself from rewriting, we here quote a few passages, at the same time asking our friends who are disposed to differ from our view to fully read both chapters.

We quote the following on

Non-meritorious Necessitated Holiness.

If God were to create a being of perceptions, emotions, and volitions, all perfectly excellent and well adjusted, yet all necessary and automatic in their action, so that every volition, like the pointers of a perfectly true clock, should point exactly right, such a being would be innocent and lovely, and in that sense of

lovely innocence it might be called *holy*. It could not be punishable. We shoud æsthetically admire it; we should sympathetically love it; we should wish it happy in a condition accordant to its nature. Yet we should none the less hold it incapable of moral responsibility, moral merit or demerit, moral good or evil desert, moral reward or penalty. Nor could it, even by Omnipotence itself, be invested with a morally meritorious holiness. All its *holiness* would be simply a lovely and excellent automatic innocence or purity. The sum of all this is, that *a necessitated holiness is no meritorious or morally deserving holiness.*—P. 383.

Non-responsible Automatic Badness.

Again, should God create an automatic fiend: a being whose perceptions were, indeed, true, but whose emotions were purely and with a perfect intensity, yet automatically, malignant; and whose volitions were, with all their strength, automatically bad; we should hate such a being and wish it out of our way. We might still admire its vicious perfection. Yet, when we had indulged our abhorrence of it, and come to remember coolly its automatism, we should see that, though bad, it was unblamably bad. Its volitions, being as necessitated, are as irresponsible as the springs of a gun-lock. Upon such a fiend, if the infliction of *pain* would set his volitions right, and make all his movements safe and beneficial, we should, for the common good, think expedient to inflict it, simply as an alterative; just as we would insert a key and turn it round to set any other machinery right—simply as an alterative. Such infliction of pain could not be a punishment, in the sense of justice, or execution for a responsible crime. It would simply be an expedient, like a medicine or a mechanical adjustment, in which there can be no moral element. We might, for the good of the world, wish such a being destroyed; not as a moral retribution to him, but for the common weal, and, if possible, painlessly. The sum of all which is, *a necessitated depravity is no responsible or justly punishable depravity.* As there is, therefore, what may be called a *holiness* without any meritoriousness or moral good desert, so there is what may be called a *depravity*, or a *sin*, without any responsibility or morally penal desert.—Pp. 383, 384.

Irresponsible Congenital Depravity of our Fallen Race.

The whole human race, viewed as fallen in Adam, and apart from redemption through Christ, is thus necessitatedly unholy. It is in disconformity with the ideal prescribed by the divine law. Judged by the standard of the moral law, it is evil; and, in the sense above defined, it is morally evil. But it is not *responsibly* evil. It cannot be retributively, and in the strict sense of the word, *punished*. Incapable it is, indeed, of the holiness, and so of the happiness, of heaven. It rests under the displacency of heaven as not being holy in the sense of conformed to his law, which is but the transcript of his own character and the expression of his own divine feelings.—P. 385.

One of our correspondents above mentioned assured us that Dr. Bledsoe would have condemned our notion of a *created unholiness* as an absurdity. We assured him that we were perfectly aware of it, and referred him to the following paragraphs:

Created Moral Desert, Hereditary Guilt, or Punishability, Impossible.

The maxim laid down by Mr. Bledsoe in his Theodicy, and used by him with great argumentative effect, that *there can be no created virtue or viciousness*, ought, according to the doctrine of our last chapter, to read, *there can be no created moral desert, good or evil*, and so corrected it would lose none of the argumentative efficiency with which his handling invests it. There can be a created conformity or disconformity to the divine law; but no created merit or demerit therein or therefor, or desert of reward or penalty.

The righteous law, let us say, has a twofold office, namely, the judicatory or

critical, and the retributive or *penal*. In its former character it is an ethical ideal by which is tested the active real; it is the rule by which the ethical character of its subjects is admeasured. That subject, if automatic, if created and having moral status anterior to free volitional action, is still tested by the law's ideal, is commeasured by the perfect rule; but there the office of the law stops. The instant it should proceed to use its retributive function and inflict penalty, it would be by its own rectitude condemned. But the moment free volitional moral action commences, the result is accountability; and retributive righteousness or unrighteousness inhere to his personality and being.

It might be said, then, that if the agent is not free, the law has nothing to do with him, inasmuch as he lacks the qualification of the subject of the law. And we might grant that the law scarcely is his judge; but only an instrument, as an ethical critique, to estimate the quality of the agent necessitated as good or bad without responsibility. Yet when the agent is placed, like Adam, at the historical commencement of a legal governmental system, the law is installed already over him, and it is its office to pronounce, even if it pronounce that it has no jurisdiction, and that he cannot come into court. In such case the agent is necessarily placed in some relation to the law, and the law pronouncing must, as we conceive, pronounce him ethically, but not retributively, holy.—Pp. 389, 390.

We take it that these paragraphs substantiate our statement that, in spite of Burnet, there is a "mean" between God's "love" for the regenerate and his "wrath and damnation" of the sinner, namely, his unjudicial displaceney toward an evil non-free agent. And that being the original case of Adam, we know precisely what is the divine "condemnation" pronounced in Scripture upon the race viewed as born sinward beings. The nature of that "condemnation" was expressed in our note on Rom. v, 18: "The condemnation would have produced the exclusion of the race from existence by the infliction of immediate death upon Adam." And we discussed the point more explicitly on Rom. xi, 32. It was a "condemnation" of the fallen race to non-existence as unfit for a probationary being without a special provision in its behalf. Like the marred vessel of the potter, though irresponsibly, it was unsuitable for the purposes of its creation. But it may be asked, however, Do you really suppose that was Paul's real meaning in Rom. v, 18? Paul, we reply, does not stop explicitly to define, or perhaps even to think out, the exact extent or limits of that "condemnation;" and so here the extent of its meaning must be limited by a just common sense and the clear nature of things, yet not transgressing the lexical boundary lines of the term. We do not pretend to know whether Paul personally realized the exact psychological import of his profound words or not; but we are absolutely sure that the mind of the omniscient Spirit that inspired Paul did. We do not suppose that Moses personally understood the true cosmogony now disclosed by science, but the Inspirer of the first chapter of Genesis did. Modern science could, doubtless, ask Moses questions about his cosmogony which

he could not answer. And so modern psychology and ethics might ask Paul questions about the bottomless import of his words to which he would decline to respond. But this we do know, the Spirit of Righteousness never inspired Paul to say that God damned the unborn soul for "hereditary guilt," and we do not believe that Paul ever said it.

The Conflict of Centuries. By C. W. MILLER, D.D. 12mo, pp. 308. Southern Methodist Publishing House, Nashville, Tenn. 1883.

Dr. Miller's book is a very interesting tractate for the hour. It is called forth by discussions that have been in progress in our Southern States and in the Dominion, as well as editorially in our Quarterly. It is a resurvey of the doctrines of Sin and Responsibility. It especially seeks an answer to the question: In what condition does Christ's redemption find our fallen race? What is our fallen condition before Christ interposes? Augustinianism answers that it is (according to the antithetic passage of Paul in Rom. v, 12) a state of genetic unconditional reprobation to an eternal hell. What is the answer of Arminianism? Dr. Miller traces the history of the "conflict" through the "centuries" rapidly, clearly, and quite conclusively.

The early or oriental Christian Church of the first three centuries emphasized the doctrine of human freedom as the basis of responsibility, and found human nature sinwardly disposed, but laid little stress on the derivation of that sinwardness from Adam. But when, about A. D. 415, Pelagius so emphasized the doctrine of freedom as to ignore the need of the Divine Spirit, Augustine came forth with his absolutism. He maintained that somehow the race so inherited the guilt of Adam as to be in a state of just eternal wrath and damnation from God. In that state redemption finds us, and elects from a sovereign good pleasure just such as it wills, with nothing in the creature moving thereto. Dr. Miller finds that it was Cassian that in this age furnished the true Arminian answer. The great abilities of Augustine secured the triumph of his theory, and it reigned, at least nominally, in the Western Church through the Middle Ages, and until the Reformation. And it largely rules still, and, to some extent, even among Arminian communions.

At the Reformation Augustinianism received an emphatic re-enforcement among the Protestant Churches. Luther and Calvin, more Augustinian than Augustine himself, led the way.

And, what is here specially important, it took full possession of the English Church. Dr. Miller quotes Hagenbach as saying: "The theological professors at Cambridge and Oxford were Calvinistic for fifty years from Elizabeth's accession. Bucer and Peter Martyr were called by Cranmer to the chair of divinity in Cambridge and Oxford during the reign of Edward. Cranmer, too, in 1552, invited Calvin, Bullinger, and Melanchthon to England to aid in drawing up a confession of faith for the Protestant Churches."—P. 93. Thus the Thirty-nine Articles were, unquestionably, a Calvinistic document. And what greatly aggravates the matter is, that the pestiferous technics of Augustinianism, such as "original sin" and "total depravity," became imbedded even in the Arminian vocabulary.

And this brings us to the age of JAMES ARMINIUS. Dr. Miller briefly gives his history, with extracts from his works, indicating his rejection of genetic unconditional reprobation of the race by the Fall. But, as Dr. Miller correctly says, it was Philip Limborch who was the truest systemizer of the Arminian theology. He gives us an admirable summary of Limborch's views, well worth our readers' study. How the doctrines of the Hollandic Arminians supplanted Augustinianism in England we have intimated in our notice of Burnet on another page. Our author furnishes a clear survey of Wesley's change in later life from the intensely Augustinian positions of his tractate on "Original Sin," and his deliberate purpose in striking genetic reprobation from our Articles.

In stating the views of Fletcher, however, there seems to us an important distinction which Dr. Miller overlooks. One position, as taken by Limborch, by our Wesleyan Articles, and by our own editorials, is this: Our state, previous to the interposition of the Redemption, was simply prospective non-existence (of a sinward but guiltless race) by the infliction of death on Adam. The other is, that our state was a just desert of an eternal hell. Now, which does Fletcher take? As we judge him from his words, so far as given by our author, he took the latter. He was that much Augustinian. The work of Christ, as he seems to state it, was a gracious rescue of the race from *a just desert of hell*, and the placing us upon a new probation. Fletcher, for instance, puts the question, "How could God damn, to all eternity, any of Adam's children for a sin which Christ expiated?" Christ's expiation, then, saves the race from a just eternal damnation for Adam's sin.

We have agreed wonderfully well with Dr. Miller, and we heartily recommend the perusal of his work to all our readers; but there is one point upon which he opens upon us a very vigorous, but quite superfluous, onslaught. He quotes a passage from our work on the Will, in which we state that a malignant non-free agent is "evil, morally evil," yet not responsible. This he earnestly pronounces a "self-destructive contradiction," etc. All this excitement arises from the fact that Dr. Miller adopts Dr. Bledsoe's formula (specified in one of our extracts given in our notice of Burnet) that there cannot be a created or necessitated holiness, unholiness, or moral character. On the contrary, as before stated, our formula is, that there can be created and necessitated holiness, unholiness, and moral character, but that such cannot be meritorious or responsible. Especially if, as we show in one of these extracts, the unfree agent is divinely placed under the cognizance of the moral law, then must his rightward or wrongward character and conduct be critically and morally adjudged. The very vessels of the sanctuary were pronounced "holy," though not responsibly so. Animals were held morally unclean, yet not retributively so. And when we speak of created unholiness, we have exemplified it in the case of Adam as a disconformity to a divinely applied law. If Dr. Miller thinks our above "automatic fiend" is not evil or hateful, any more than a pure automatic living angel, he is perfectly welcome to that view. We prefer to say that one is "good," and the other "evil;" and, when brought under authoritative scrutiny of the moral law, morally good or evil, but not responsibly or retributively so. If that be to him, as he says, "unthinkable," we imagine that very few of our readers will share his professed incapacity of thought.

Dr. Miller furnishes us an argument against infant regeneration which seems to us to be too unqualified.

First, he attacks the Calvinistic doctrine which affirms, as he interprets, that regeneration is partial, and not entire. It maintains that a degree of "concupiscence" remains in the regenerate, and that Dr. Miller earnestly denies. Now, if by "concupiscence" is meant our physiological and psychological sensitivities, by which we are susceptible to temptation and very liable to sin, so that the regenerate often do sin, the Calvinists are correct. No constituent part of our psychological or physical constitution is cast out or, in substance, changed in regeneration. It is the vitalizing influence, presence, and power of the Holy Spirit, obeyed and acted by our free agency, that constitutes our regeneration.

Nor does the still-remaining presence of the above-named susceptibilities and liabilities to sin in the least contradict the doctrine that our regeneration is of the whole man. The regenerative Spirit does pervade body, soul, and spirit. But here is a momentous distinction that, we think, Dr. Miller overlooks, namely, the distinction between the *extent* of the Spirit's presence and the intensity of its presence and power. This is the distinction sometimes philosophically found between *extension* and *intension*. We tolerate the phrase "total depravity," because that depravity truly does pervade the *total* man; not because its degree and intensity in the whole man is total, so total that he is as bad as the devil; bad as he can be; so bad that the most abandoned mature pirate is no more depraved than a modest young girl. *Totus vir depravatus*, not *totus vir depravatus totaliter*. And so the regenerate spirit is entire in its *extent* through the whole man, but measured in its intensity of influence and power; so that the free will is able to yield to temptation. According to the fullness of the presence and influence of the Spirit obeyed by the man is his degree of spiritual power; that is, the entirety of his sanctification. When that Spirit's power and the man's concurrence are so entire that the man is able to, and actually does, reject *all* sin, and so does remain in the undiminished fullness of the divine approbation, unquestionably he is entirely sanctified. The love of God is in his heart, and his path is the path of the just shining to the perfect day. And this is the simple account of the difference between regeneration and entire sanctification, at which so many minds are perplexed.

Now the fact that the word *regeneration* is usually applied only to the adult, arises from the other fact that the adult is the personality usually dealt with in urging regeneration. And we by no means insist that the *term* should be applied to infants. But that the infant, being by the vitalizing Spirit a child of God, is, as an infant, in the same state essentially as justifying faith has brought the adult, is to us perfectly clear. Here we think we accord with Dr. Miller. He even quotes approvingly our words: "The infant is in the kingdom of God with a character perhaps corresponding to regeneration in the adult."— *Will*, p. 347. But his specialty is, that he requires the *act* of regeneration to be preceded by a state of spiritual death. But we may consider that the gift of personal life and that of spiritual life by the Spirit may both be so bestowed upon the infant that generation and regeneration are simultaneous. Each is preceded by its non-living state.

Outlines of the Doctrine of the Resurrection, Biblical, Historical, and Scientific. By Rev. R. J. COOKE, M.A. With an Introduction by D. D. WHEDON, LL.D. 12mo, pp. 407. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

NOT a few thinkers at the present day identify death and resurrection with the successional waste and repair of our bodies by which our corporeal life is perpetuated. Particles in infinitesimal detail are displaced and replaced by their minute successors, until an entire change is made, and yet the organism is historically kept going, and is called *the same.* And hence it was lately said, in a theological journal, that there need not be a particle of the dying body in the body of the resurrection. But all that is confounding facts of very different nature. That great break-up of the body at death, specially appointed by divine authority, by which all corporeal continuity is destroyed, is no way analogous to that stream of molecular conduction by which corporeal continuity has been preserved. The two facts are, indeed, in momentous contrast. The one is the assimilative work of the present and active life-power, transmitting its vitalizing and organizing energies by physical contact from particle to particle; the latter is the catastrophe of the sudden withdrawal of the entire life-power, and abandonment of the organism to total disintegration and individualization of ultimate particles. Now, in order to a *continuity* which can constitute a resurrection of the *same body,* the life-power must go back to that aggregate of particles, and reorganize them into a new corporeity. It must go, like a divine voice, to the "graves;" it must waken the truly "dead;" it must quicken the "mortal bodies;" in short, it must effect a renewed continuity of the once living and dying body. This is altogether a different process from a construction from a new material—a creation. Every so-called "theory of the resurrection" which denies this molecular identity involves a misnomer; being truly a "theory" opposed to the "resurrection," and a denial of its reality. This book delineates not "a theory of the resurrection," but the resurrection itself.

Mr. Cooke, in the present volume, demonstrates this molecular identity to be the doctrine of the Word of God, of the Church of God, and even of Ethnic sacred tradition. He ranges through the Old Testament and the New, and finds it there. He appeals to the earliest post-apostolic fathers, to the catacombs, to the creeds, to the great doctors of the Middle Ages, to the symbols of the Reformation, and the Articles of Faith of the Evangelical Churches of Europe and America, and all pro-

nounce a unanimous verdict. And, then, since science is claimed as denying molecular identity, to science will he appeal. And, so far from opposition there, he finds that in fact he can draw from science the most striking confirmatory analogy and beautifying illustration. It is the first brilliant *brochure* of a young author, and, so far as we know, the completest treatise in our language on the subject. It is a "live" book; perhaps too exuberant with the florid life and free diffuseness of an habitual popular speaker. To some subordinate points we might dissent, as Mr. Cooke is withal an independent thinker; but his volume may, we think, aspire to a standard position on its subject.

Contrary Winds, and other Sermons. By WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, D.D., LL.D., Pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. Crown 8vo, pp. 372. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. Price, $1 75.

These twenty-four sermons, "printed now as they were preached at first to the writer's congregation," are an acceptable addition to the practical religious literature of the times. Without being profound they impress one as the product of a strong, cultivated mind. They are not speculative, but eminently practical, dealing with the problems of every-day life in treating which they make their appeal to Holy Scripture, to conscience, and to an enlightened common-sense. They are ethical rather than spiritual; not decidedly emotional, yet their thoughts are enlivened by a calm undercurrent of religious feeling. In style they are plain and direct, sufficiently rhetorical and illustrative, and invigorated by that inspiration which is the outcome of a high purpose. In doctrine they are in the main eminently scriptural, albeit, in the discourse on the "Seal and Earnest of the Spirit," the writer falls into the error of confounding the *direct* with the *indirect* witness of the Spirit. A little more Wesleyan and Pauline theology infused into that sermon would add much to its value.

The Living Christ: The Life and the Light of Men. By the Rev. W. P. HARRISON, D.D., Book Editor of the M. E. Church, South. 12mo., pp. 297. Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Methodist Publishing House. 1883. Price, $1.

Dr. Harrison, as is well known, is an eminent scholar, and wields an able pen. The present volume pictures Christ as the presiding patron of our world, ever present and ever benign. He is described as the Christ of yesterday through the Old Testament ages until the epoch of Calvary, and as the Christ of to-day from John the Baptist to our present hour. A tinge of attractive

mysticism pervades the whole. But the author by no means shuns the probing of deep theological problems. His view of the atonement is somewhat original. Christian thinkers will find a rich reward in the study of this thoughtful volume.

Philosophy, Metaphysics, and General Science.

World-Life; or, Comparative Geology. By ALEXANDER WINCHELL, LL.D., Professor of Geology and Paleontology in the University of Michigan. 12mo, pp. 642. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1883.

What is the best theory that the Science of our day can frame of the origin, structure, and destiny of the Material Universe as a Whole? This is the large question, very large, which Dr. Winchell aims to answer in this new volume. Worlds and universes have been built by theoretic thinkers, in chronological succession, during the past ages of active thought. They have been largely of an *a priori* character, yet gradually modified to truth by the advance of science. And now, at this day, so great a mass of scientific material has been piled up by the illustrious sons of Science, that our author takes his stand upon it as a high pedestal, and throws out his bold conjectures, in lines of logical probability, so grandly as to sketch the rational outlines of a Whole. He can tell us with a certainty, not wholly absolute, yet furnishing a reliable repose for our faith, what the substance, the growth, the history, the decline, the death—without a resurrection?—of the stupendous but not infinite Pan.

The volume is symmetrically divided into Four Parts; the Fourth being a history of cosmogonic thought from the days of the Greek philosophers to the age of Laplace. The three Scientific Parts treat of WORLD-STUFF, or the primal matter out of which the worlds are made; PLANETOLOGY, or the formation of planets according to the Nebular Theory, which the author very ably and perhaps conclusively explains and defends; GENERAL COSMOGONY, in which, after having in the previous part learned how a planet comes to form, we are enabled to take an inclusive survey of the entire congregation of worlds, filling a vast yet limited space in a limitless immensity.

It is, we may say, in a special sense, a *serious* subject. In spite of the deep interest we feel in *knowing*, yet, bare of all living beings, the material universe, with all the sublime vastness of its magnitudes, movements, and spaces, is a bleak machine.

Fires and blazes and heats enough it has; but they are not of the sort to warm the heart. And the fact that there hangs over the whole a destiny of final deadlock, that all its movements are but "funeral marches to the grave," sheds over the whole an aspect of disaster and doom, without the dignity and human interest of the tragic. It is simply a vast machine coming to a general hitch from which there is no known extrication. All its parts remain; but with so perfect a countercheck that not a particle can move. Not a pulse can beat, not a breath can heave. It still encumbers space, but as a worthless hulk! Büchner, the frank atheist, leaves it there through all the eternities of the future, and seems to jubilate over the prospect. Spencer suggests a hope of revival on his theory of pulsation and remission. Dr. Winchell, who claims to be the first announcer of this sad finality, even earlier than Spencer, has a resource in Theism; but does not tell us the process by which Theos restores the dominion of motion and inaugurates the new *αἰῶν*. Even our theology and our religion shudder over this catastrophe, and our spirits wonder what is to become of us ensconced in the solid bulk of this universal iceberg. And yet, somehow, our little Greek Testament seems to anticipate such remissions and pulsations when it talks of divine existence and even human penalty as enduring *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*. And, truly, what danger to the body of the resurrection from any material evolutions? Spirit-ruled, and able to rule its own corporeity, it stands unharmed amid "the crash of matter and the wreck of worlds." Perfect master of its own sensations it refuses to suffer any pain from heat or cold; perfect master of its own molecular organism it repels or evades all danger from collision. "The mind," says Milton, "in its own place and of itself can make a hell of heaven, a heaven of hell."

The World-Stuff, or substance out of which our system is made, is found by our author in various degrees of aggregation, as meteors, comets, and nebulæ, and the problem is first to show how these are modeled into planetary forms. This leads to a discussion of the primordial nature of the world-stuff, and the theory dawns into view that the some sixty so-called elements of matter are in simplest state a primitive *one*,—"a semi-spiritual ether." All material things are then but the foldings and combinations of this primordium. "As a vesture shalt thou fold them and they shall be folded." In the Second Part we have a full discussion and maintenance of the Nebular Theory and the

formation of planets and solar system on that hypothesis. He embraces that view under the conviction that it requires more credulity to reject than to accept it. Our planets and their sun are specimens of the entire plan of the universe.

The Comparative Geology of the Planets, like the parallel columns of a Polyglot, present but a varied repetition of the same story. Beginning with a "fire-mist," which (the apparent solecism is the author's) is "cold" and "dark," there are, successively, conflagation by condensation, a surface crust from surface cooling, a temperate inhabitable period, a refrigeration, and final frozen stereotype. Our moon has gone through this process; and our earth may look upon the dead lunar surface as a middle-aged gentleman gazes upon the pale, cold face of a dead baby and reads the image of his own destiny. And here Dr. Winchell, with a human and Christian interest, raises and discusses the question, whether the sister worlds of astronomy are inhabited? Shelley, the poet, once said, that astronomy amply refutes the notion of God's begetting a son from a Jewish maiden. The greatest of Chalmers's productions was his Astronomical Sermons, preached to reconcile the vastness of the universe with the incarnation and the atonement. Whewell, on the other hand, undertook to solve the theological problem by denying the population of any world but ours. But modern theology prefers to believe in a vast Republic of living worlds, divided into planetary provinces, with some common interest, under the Supreme Ruler. Dr. Winchell, while furnishing admirable statements of the vast variety of forms suited to a wide variety of existences on our earth, points out the non-necessity of requiring that all living, intelligent, or even responsible forms, must be conformed to the human model. He reminds us that it is simply an affair of attaching intelligence to a material form; and there is no limiting the variety of methods and forms with which that may be done. "Why might not psychic natures be enshrined in indestructible flint and platinum?" We read, a few months since, a Swedenborgian speculation that the form of a human soul was globular. And that curiously reminded us that, years ago, we had occasion to illustrate, colloquially, the difference between brute instinct and human reason, and were led to say that the former radiated from its center in a few far-reaching directions, while the latter emitted its radii equally in all directions. We thus made the human intellect a globe! How easily might there be a race of living, brilliant globes, like far-

seeing eye-balls, blazing with far-reaching intelligence, floating at their own sweet will in ether or even in pure space, unchilled by cold, unmelted by heat, and unknowing of dissolution. And then the nereids and mermaids of the mythologies tell us how easily watery Jupiter may be stocked with living beauty. And Dr. Winchell's reminder that there may be beings with more than five, six, or seven senses suggests that even the bleakest age of a planet or the moon may be truly invested with an unseen glory, and be the residence of unseen populations and "principalities and powers." Just so the white, dry, cold skeleton in the anatomical room was once clothed with beauty and occupied by intelligence. And what is this bleak machine universe but a blank skeleton? It is good for nothing, and it might just as well be so much space if it be not subservient to the existence and happiness of living beings. A living canary bird is of more value than a dead universe.

Dr. Winchell's last utterances, as here presented, on the commencement of the visible life-period on our globe, are very noteworthy. How long since the first incrustation of our globe commenced? Mivart ciphered that Darwin's Natural Selection, by his own statements, required twenty-five hundred millions of years since life first dawned on earth. Prof. Thomson disturbed our Evolution brethren profoundly by telling us it could be but fifty millions. Then it was announced as but fifteen; and then ten millions. Our author now ciphers it at *three millions!* Truly that crushes Natural Selection to nonentity. We may rest with La Conte's "paroxysmal evolution," but the paroxysms must be very spasmodic. Or if, with a late writer, we style it "saltatory evolution," evolution by jumps, it must be a very nimble jumper. On the whole we may perhaps fall back on Dawson's Creation in accordance with Evolutionary Laws. More important than even this limitation of earth's Zoic Period is the late closing of the Glacial Period, and consequent late creation of man. Four independent measurements, by American geologists, so agree as to form a medium estimate of six or seven thousand years. Does not Science begin to make her bow to Moses?

This volume is, thus far, Dr. Winchell's masterpiece. It assigns him a high rank among living scientists. Its clear exposition, in as popular style as the subject will admit, brings it within the reach of the great body of thoughtful readers. It furnishes us a magnificent survey of universal structural Cosmogony such as has not hitherto appeared.

Miscellaneous.

The Middle Kingdom. A Survey of the Geography, Government, Literature, Social Life, Arts, and History of the Chinese Empire and its Inhabitants. By S. WELLS WILLIAMS, LL.D., Professor of the Chinese Language and Literature at Yale College; author of Tonic and Syllabic Dictionaries of the Chinese Language. Revised Edition, with Illustrations, and a New Map of the Empire. In two Volumes. 8vo, pp. 836, 775. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

This magnificent work seems to bring China, large as life, into our office. It is too magnitudinous and too rich in its topics for a book notice, and we can now barely announce it, in expectation of a full review by an amply competent hand. It is thirty-five years since the first edition was published, and China has in that time so changed as to require, not a rewriting of the old, but a historical presentation of the new, China. It is done up—type, material, and engraving—in the best style of the Scribners.

Sketches and Anecdotes of American Methodists of the Days that Are no More. Designed for Boys and Girls. By DANIEL WISE, D.D., Author of "Heroic Methodists," "Story of a Wonderful Life," "Pleasant Pathways," etc. 16mo, pp. 352. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

Dr. Wise has here gone over some of the most striking events and leading characters of our American Methodist history. Barbara Heck, Shadford, Asbury, and others in the earlier period, and M'Clintock and Wilbur Fisk in the later.

The Raven. By EDGAR ALLEN POE. Illustrated by Gustave Doré. With a Comment by Edmund C. Stedman. Magnificent folio. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1884.

"That forever adds a T to the name of Poe," we said, when, one morning long ago, the New York Tribune brought a copy of "The Raven" to our quiet Massachusetts home. We were then but slightly familiar with his name, as that, as we supposed, of one of the literary *grubs* of the New York "Grub Street." We little knew what a weird pair of wings the said grub could put on, and with what flights he could soar.

Doré has added his shadowy conceptions to those of the poet, and Stedman has prefaced it with a "Comment," tracing the genesis of the poem, yet fully appreciating its marvelous individuality. But would it not have been well if he had uttered some words unfolding the solution of Poe's parable? Of the thousands who are entranced by its rhythms and wildering fancies do a respectable minority realize the hidden meaning? What is that Raven, and what the significance of its message?

It is, we answer, our modern oracular Agnosticism, coming from the realms of outer darkness, perched upon the semblance of science and philosophy, pronouncing its eternal negative on our hopes of immortality, and leaving the soul forever prostrate under the dark shadow of Pessimism.

The Soul-Winner. A Sketch and Incidents in the Life and Labors of Edmund J. Yard, For sixty-three years a Class-Leader and Hospital Visitor in Philadelphia. By his sister, Mrs. MARY D. JAMES, with an Introduction by D. P. KIDDER, D.D. 16mo, pp. 231. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

Mr. Yard was endowed by nature with a personal "magnetism," and by grace with a deep desire to draw therewith the souls of his friends to Christ. It was a blessed *charisma*. May the book spread far and wide and produce thousands of his like!

HARPER'S FRANKLIN SQUARE LIBRARY.—*David, King of Israel:* His Life and its Lessons. By the Rev. WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, D.D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. Quarto, pp. 97. *Harry Joscelyn.* A Novel. By Mrs. OLIPHANT., Author of "For Love and Life," "The Chronicles of Carlingford," "The Curate in Charge." "The Story of Valentine and his Brother," etc., pp. 87. *Pearla;* or, The World After an Island. A Novel. By M. BETHAM EDWARDS. Author of "Kitty," "Dr. Jacob," etc., pp. 45. *By the Gate of the Sea.* A Novel. By DAVID CHRISTIE MURRAY, Author of a "Life's Atonement," "A Model Father," "Joseph's Coat," etc. pp. 116. Price, 15 cents.

The Bill of the Vegetables and other Stories in Prose and Verse. By MARGARET EYTINGE. Illustrated. Quarto, pp. 246. New York: Harper & Brothers.

The Boy Travelers in the Far East. Part Fifth. Adventures of Two Youths in a Journey Through Africa. By THOMAS KNOX, Author of "The Young Nimrods in North America," "The Young Nimrods Around the World," "Adventures of Two Youths in Journeys to Japan and China—To Siam and Java—To Ceylon and India—To Egypt and the Holy Land," etc. Illustrated. Quarto, pp. 473. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1884.

Old Mexico and Her Lost Provinces. A Journey in Mexico, Southern California, and Arizona, by way of Cuba. By WILLIAM HENRY BISHOP. Author of "Detmold," "The House of a Merchant Prince," etc. With Illustrations. Quarto, pp. 509. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1883.

The Preacher and His Sermon. A Treatise on Homiletics. By Rev. JOHN W. ETTER, B.D., Quarto, pp. 581. Dayton, Ohio: United Brethren Publishing House. 1883.

A Complete Concordance to the Revised Version of the New Testament. Embracing the Marginal Readings of the English Revisers, as well as those of the American Committee. By JOHN ALEXANDER THOMS. Published under the Authorization of Oxford and Cambridge Universities. Quarto, pp. 532. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

The Parabolic Teaching of Christ. A Systematic and Critical Study of the Parables of our Lord. By ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. 8vo, pp. 515. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1883.

God and the Future Life. The Reasonableness of Christianity. By CHARLES NORDHOFF, Author of "Politics for Young Americans," "Cape Cod and All Along Shore," "The Communistic Societies of the United States," etc. 16mo, pp. 228. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1883.

Harper's Young People, 1883. 8vo, pp. 840. New York: Harper & Brothers.

The Pulpit Treasury. An Evangelical Monthly. 8vo, pp. 124. New York: E. B. Treat.

Mosaics of Grecian History. The Historical Narrative, with Numerous Illustrative Poetical and Prose Selections; A Popular Course of Reading in Grecian History and Literature. By MARCUS WILSON and ROBERT PIERPONT WILSON. 12mo, pp. 554. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1883.

Electra. A Belles-Lettres Monthly for Young People. Edited by ANNIE E. WILSON and ISABELLA M. LEYBURN. 8vo, pp. 336. Published by Isabella M. Leyburn, Louisville, Ky.

Gossip about America and Europe. By RAM CHANDRA BOSE, M.A., Author of "The Truth of the Christian Religion," etc. Published by the C. M. C. Press. 16mo, pp. 274. Lucknow. 1883.

Special Providence Illustrated. Quarter-Centennial Sermon, by Rev. J. O. PECK, D.D., in the Hanson Place Methodist Episcopal Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., October 21, 1883. Published by Request. Pamphlet, 12mo, pp. 38. New York: Willis M'Donald & Co. 1883.

An Autobiography. By ANTHONY TROLLOPE, Author of "The Warden," "Barchester Towers," "Doctor Thorne," "Framley Parsonage," "He Knew he was Right," "Phineas Finn," "The Prime Minister," etc. 12mo, pp. 329. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1883.

The Story of Young Margaret. By LENA GILBERT FELLOWS. 12mo, pp. 354. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

Stories of Patriotism and Devotion. For Young People. Translated from the French. By Mrs. BELLE TEVIS SPEED. 12mo, pp. 325. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1883.

Thicker Than Water. A Novel. By JAMES PAYN, Author of "A Confidential Agent," "Kit, a Memory," "For Cash Only," "A Beggar on Horseback," "By Proxy," "The Best of Husbands," etc. 12mo. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1883.

What Social Classes Owe to Each Other. By WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, Professor of Political and Social Science in Yale College. Small 12mo, pp. 169. New York. Harper & Brothers. 1883.

The Gospel According to Moses; or, the Import of Sacrifice in the Ancient Jewish Service By W. W. WASHBURNE, A.M., of the Detroit Conference. 12mo, pp. 90. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1883.

The Clerical Library: Pulpit Prayers. By Eminent Preachers. 12mo, pp. 287. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1884.

Outlines of Sermons to Children. With numerous Anecdotes. 12mo, pp. 300. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1884.

Small Things. By REESE ROCKWELL. Small 12mo, pp. 231. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

The Gospel According to John Explained. By WILLIAM MULLIGAN, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the University of Aberdeen, and WILLIAM F. MOULTON, D.D., Master of the Leys School, Cambridge. Small 12mo, pp. 443. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1883.

Lessons on the Life of Jesus. By Rev. WILLIAM SCRIMGEOUR BRIDGEGATE, Free Church, Glasgow. 12mo, pp. 232. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1883.

Prayer and its Answer. Illustrated in the first Twenty-Five Years of the Fulton-street Prayer-Meeting. By S. IRENÆUS PRIME, D.D., Author of "The Power of Prayer," "Five Years of Prayer," "Fifteen Years of Prayer." etc. 12mo, pp. 171. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1882.

Ripe Grapes; or, The Fruit of the Spirit. By Rev. W. H. POOLE, LL.D., Pastor of Simpson Methodist Episcopal Church, Detroit, Mich. Small 12mo, pp. 163. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1881.



J Fletcher

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METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1884.

ART. I.—"WESLEY'S DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR."

NEVER, since the "beloved disciple" fell asleep, has there trod this earth a saintlier man than Jean Guillaume De La Flechère. The aroma of his character and life has been breathed wherever Wesleyan Methodism has reared its standards in the earth. How true it is that, whenever God has a great work to perform, he has always his instruments ready to answer his call, and accomplish his purposes! This fact, which has its clearest illustration in all the grand eras and epochs of the history of the Church, is abundantly confirmed in the inauguration and mighty movement of the great eighteenth century revival. There was John Wesley, whom Buckle calls "The first of theological statesmen;" Charles Wesley, the sweetest singer of Israel for nearly three thousand years, whose hymns of love and praise will go ringing down the ages until they mingle with the millennial songs; George Whitefield, the mightiest preacher of the last three centuries; Thomas Coke, Methodism's first bishop and earliest missionary; Francis Asbury, the apostle of Methodism and evangelical Christianity in America; and John Fletcher, that saintly and seraphic man; and, without doubt, the greatest controversialist of his age. Each of these wonderful men had his own work assigned him; no one of them could do the work of the other; but all were essential in carrying out the great designs of providence and grace.

Especial attention has been called of late to the character, the life, and the work of the last named of this list of worthies by the publication of Mr. Tyerman's book on "Wesley's Designated Successor." Mr. Wesley, amid the pressure of multiplied engagements, and the heavier pressure of advancing years and growing infirmities, had prepared a brief biography of him; but it was very imperfect. Mr. Benson, in 1804, wrote a "Life of Fletcher," which for nearly fourscore years has been the accepted account of his life and work in all the families of Methodism. The author of this work has had exceptional advantages in its preparation for the press. In writing his volumes on "The Life and Times of Wesley" he had met with all the great facts in the early history of the Church, and had seen the all-important part which Mr. Fletcher had taken in this mighty religious reformation. Since then he has diligently followed up his pursuit of every thing which could be known of this distinguished man, until, in writing his book, he feels warranted in saying in his Preface, "I think I may say, without exposing myself to the charge of arrogance or conceit, that in this volume the reader will find all the facts of any importance that are known concerning Fletcher."

He was born in Nyon, Switzerland, on the 12th of September, 1729. His family was one of the most respectable in that grand old republic, being, in fact, a "branch of an earldom of Savoy." He says of the house in which he was born: "It has one of the finest prospects in the world. We have a shady wood near the lake, (Leman,) where I can ride in the cool all the day, and enjoy the singing of a multitude of birds." Of his early life but little is known. A few incidents only are preserved, which tell of hair-breadth escapes from perils and dangers, and show us his tenderness of conscience and his fear of God. His education, begun in Nyon, was carried forward in the University of Geneva, which was only fifteen miles from his ancestral home. After completing his course there, his father sent him to Lentzburg, where, besides pursuing other studies, he acquired the German language. On returning to his home he applied himself to the study of Hebrew and mathematics. Thus was God preparing him for the work which he had for him to do. The University of Geneva, as well as the University of Oxford, was to have its share in

training God's instruments for the revival which was to shake the world.

He dates his religious convictions from an early period in his life. So true is it that those whom God designs for a special work he begins to train early. He relates himself: "I think it was when I was seven years of age that I first began to feel the love of God shed abroad in my heart, and that I resolved to give myself up to him, and to the service of his Church, if ever I should be fit for it."

But, although his studies had been pursued with a design to enter into the holy orders of the ministry, yet upon the very threshold of this work he was startled, horrified, and "disgusted by the necessity he would be under to subscribe to the doctrine of predestination." His conscience in this respect was not so elastic as that of some of our modern ministers who, professing to be Arminians in their theology, gulp down the whole Calvinistic system without a qualm.

His attention was now turned, according to the wishes of his friends, although not of his parents, to the army. Having studied the works of Cohorn and Vauban, the great military engineers of his day, he went to Lisbon, and there raised a company of his own countrymen to fight in the strife between Portugal and Brazil. While waiting for the ship to sail, the maid who waited on him at the breakfast table "let the tea-kettle fall upon his leg, which so scalded him that he had to keep his bed." Wesley adds: "During that time the ship sailed for Brazil, but it was observed that the ship was heard of no more." Upon what seemingly small and trivial events God often turns the course and destinies of a whole life-time! That tea-kettle, and that scalded leg, changed the religious history of the world. A subsequent effort to enter the Dutch service also failed, and he abandoned, henceforth, all idea of military life.

We next find him in England, whither he had gone, with other young gentlemen, to acquire the English language. This was another link in the great chain of providences which was to bind him forever to the service of the Church—both militant and triumphant. His desire to become acquainted with the English tongue having been realized, he obtained a situation as tutor in the family of Thomas Hill, Esq., of Fern

Hall, in Shropshire. And here occurred the change which to him, and to all who experience it, is the beginning of a new life, the starting-point of a new career, the upspringing of a well of water which is unto life eternal. This was his clear, undoubted, scriptural conversion. God spoke to his inmost soul in a dream, in which the fiery terrors and dread alarms of that great day of judgment were vividly portrayed before his mind, and he was assured that he was not prepared to meet it. This awakened a wild tumult of doubt and fear, of conviction for sin and dread of its terrible consequences. Right in the midst of this an incident occurred which is of interest to every Methodist.

When Mr. Hill went up to London to attend the Parliament, he took his family and Mr. Fletcher with him. While they stopped at St. Albans he walked out into the town, and did not return until they were set out for London. A horse being left for him, he rode after, and overtook them in the evening. Mr. Hill asked him why he stayed behind. He said, "As I was walking, I met with a poor old woman, who talked so sweetly of Jesus Christ that I knew not how the time passed away." "I shall wonder," said Mrs. Hill, "if our tutor does not turn Methodist by and by." "Methodist, madame!" said he, "pray, what is that?" She replied, "Why, the Methodists are a people that do nothing but pray; they are praying all day and all night." "Are they?" said he; "then, by the help of God, I will find them out!" He did find them out, joined the society, and met in Mr. Richard Edwards's class.

As soon as the new, divine life was consciously enjoyed in his soul, he devoted himself earnestly to the service of his Master. Whole nights were spent each week in reading the Scriptures, and in other devotional exercises. Now, also, there returned upon him deep, earnest convictions, the pressure of a divine call to devote himself to the work of the ministry. And so, after consultation with Mr. Wesley, he was ordained to the holy work of the ministry, to which he had been set apart by his parents, which he had hesitated to enter upon before his conversion, but which now was the height of his sanctified ambition. Mr. Wesley had been longing for some one to help him in his large sacramental services. His request was now granted, and he writes, "How wonderful are the ways of God! When my bodily strength failed, and none in England were able and willing to assist me, he sent me help from the mountains of

Switzerland, and a helpmeet for me in every respect. Where could I have found such another?"

It seems, indeed, very strange that one so gifted and so devoted should be three years after his ordination without a church appointment. But so it was. He was evidently an unpopular minister among the ungodly and the worldly. When he preached at Atcham on "Ye adulterers and adulteresses," etc., Vaughan says, "The congregation stood amazed, and gazed upon him as if he had been a monster, but to me he appeared as a messenger sent from heaven." Soon the churches began to be closed against him; but by those who were evangelical in the Church, and by Mr. Wesley's societies, his services and sermons were highly appreciated. Nor were his ministrations ineffectual. Not only were believers comforted and built up, but instances of conversion of the most cheering character occurred. Hearing of the wonderful scenes which had been witnessed at Everton, under the preaching of Berridge, Mr. Fletcher desired to see them for himself. Arriving at the place, he introduced himself to Berridge as a "new convert who had taken the liberty to wait upon him for the benefit of his instruction and advice." Perceiving by his accent that he was a foreigner, he asked him what countryman he was. He replied, "A Swiss, from the Canton of Berne." "From Berne! then, probably, you can give me some account of a young countryman of yours, John Fletcher, who has lately preached a few times for the Messrs. Wesley, and of whose talents, learning, and piety they both speak in terms of high eulogy. Do you know him?" "Yes, sir, I know him intimately; and did those gentlemen know him as well, they would not speak so highly of him. He is more obliged to their partial friendship than to his own merits." "You surprise me," said Berridge. "I have the best reason for speaking of John Fletcher as I do. I am John Fletcher." "If you be John Fletcher," replied Berridge, "you must take my pulpit to-morrow."

It was in this place, not long afterward, that Mr. Fletcher witnessed one of those wonderful displays of the divine power and glory which were so frequent under the mighty ministrations of the early Methodists, both in the Arminian and Calvinistic branches. There were present on the occasion referred

to, besides Berridge and himself, Venn and Madan and the Countess of Huntingdon. And while they preached and prayed and sang for three days to congregations numbering thousands of people, men and women wept bitterly, and fell to the ground as dead. No wonder that, as the services closed, the whole assembly joined in singing one of Mr. Wesley's hymns, so familiar to our older Methodists:

> "Arm of the Lord, awake, awake!
> Thine own immortal strength put on!"

The circumstances connected with his appointment to Madeley are of so much interest that we must refer to them here. The living at Durham had been proffered to him. "It is a small parish," said Mr. Hill, his patron, "the duty is light, the income good, ($2,000, equal to $5,000 now,) and it is situated in a fine, healthy, sporting country." "Alas!" replied Fletcher, "alas! sir, Durham will not suit me: there is too much money, and too little labor." "Few clergymen make such objections," said Mr. Hill. "It is a pity to decline such a living, especially as I know not that I can find you another. What shall we do? Would you like Madeley?" "That, sir," said Fletcher, "would be the very place for me." Singularly enough, the two patrons of Durham and Madeley, uncle and nephew, "met at the Shrewsbury races, and there, on a *race-course*, of all places in the world, it was settled that the Madeley living should be offered to Fletcher."

Here were met the questions which have engaged the attention and demanded the consideration of Methodists for more than a century, namely: Should the ministry be wholly itinerant, or wholly settled; or can it be partly itinerant and partly settled, according to circumstances? Mr. Wesley was, doubtless, a born itinerant. It was from the fullness of his heart that he cried, "The world is my parish!" He was an "angel *flying* through the midst of heaven, having the everlasting Gospel to preach unto them that dwell on the earth;" and his wings could not long be folded, nor his voice long silent. On the other hand, Mr. Fletcher's whole nature demanded quietude, retirement, settledness. These tendencies of his nature must have been very strong to enable him to go against the urgent and oft-repeated counsels of Mr. Wesley to adopt an itinerant life. The sequel, however, will show that

Mr. Fletcher was right in the choice which he made. And we cannot help thinking that, if it had been possible to combine from the beginning the settled with the itinerant ministry, Methodism would have been stronger to-day than it is. The itinerancy is not suited to all men. There are many to whom it is revolting, or who shrink from it with dread. There are others who love its change—its variety of labors, and its ever fresh and new fields of toil. They are evangelists. God has called them to do this work, and they do it well, do it grandly. But others are just as truly pastors and teachers, and the nature which God has given them, and the character of the work which they are called to do, require time, maturity of plans of study, and work, and to all this the itinerancy is unfavorable. A very large number of the most excellent and cultured men have been lost to us simply because of their want of adaptation to the life and work of an itinerant. It is easy to say, "Let them go; we are better off without them than with them." But so long as they were *one* with us in doctrine and discipline, and in the fervor and fire of their ministrations; and since their learning and culture, in many instances, have been needed among us, no doubt, if we could have retained them and utilized them, they would have been even a greater benediction to us than they have been in the Churches where they have found a home. No cast-iron system will answer in any ecclesiastical arrangements—whether of a settled pastorate on the one hand, or of an itinerancy upon the other. There must be sufficient elasticity in the system to take in and make useful every grade of talent and every class of workmen. The problem which Methodism must solve in the not distant future is, can these two ideas of the permanent and the itinerant pastorate be combined in one system? Some hastily say, "It can never be done." We think it can be, and that the calm, deliberate wisdom of the Church will find an answer to the inquiry. Our early history seems to teach that both the Arminian and Calvinistic branches were combined in one Methodism, and a permanent and itinerant ministry may yet be combined in our Churches. Of course, it does not enter within the scope of this article to argue these questions. We merely refer to them as facts which meet us in the lives of Wesley and Fletcher. If Mr. Fletcher had become an

itinerant, as Mr. Wesley so earnestly desired that he should, we would never have known, in all probability, those mighty tomes which for more than a hundred years have stood as a great bulwark against Antinomianism, ultra-Calvinism, and Necessitarianism. Methodism, lacking such defenses, might have been, like Mr. Whitefield's converts, "a rope of sand," instead of being, as now, the most compact and cohesive body, so far as doctrinal belief is concerned, in the world. As a system of evangelism, Methodism has never been equaled in the history of this world. But as a system of culturing converts, and training up a body of strong, steadfast, intelligent workers, especially in our large cities, it has not been so efficient.

In the parish vestry of Madeley is, or was, a book with the following: "John Fletcher, clerk, was inducted to the Vicarage of Madeley, the 17th of October, 1760." "Madeley is a market-town in the county of Salop. It is beautifully situated in a winding glen, through which the river Severn flows. In 1800, fifteen years after Fletcher's death, it contained, according to parliamentary returns, 291 houses, and 4,758 inhabitants. The church is dedicated to St. Michael, and the parish includes Coalbrook Dale and Madeley Wood, noted for their coal-mines and iron-works." Here, in the midst of this community, largely composed of ignorant and brutal men, inexperienced in parish work as he was, with no one near him to sympathize with his Methodistic views, he began his earnest evangelistic and parochial labors. He was full of heart and of hope. His congregations grew amazingly, and he looked for immediate and wonderful results. But in this he was doomed to disappointment. Opposition speedily manifested itself against his plain and faithful preaching against drunkenness, shows, and bull-baiting. On one occasion he barely escaped violence at the hands of some of his enraged and drunken parishioners.

One Sunday evening, Mr. Fletcher, after performing the usual duty at Madeley, was about to set out for Madeley Wood, to preach and catechize as usual. But just then a notice was brought that a child was to be buried. His waiting till the child was brought prevented his going to the Wood; and herein the providence of God appeared. For, at this very time, many of the colliers were baiting a bull just by the meeting-house; and having

had plenty to drink, they had all agreed, as soon as he came, *to bait the parson.* Part of them were appointed to pull him off his horse, and the rest to set the dogs upon him.

Specimens of his sermons are given in this volume which are awakening and startling in a high degree. It is not to be wondered at that men who would not give up their cherished sins were enraged at his faithful portrayal of the results of their ungodliness. With him there was no toning down of the thunders of Sinai, and no vailing of its blazing lightnings. He not only believed in a whole Christ and a whole heaven, but he also believed in a whole hell. And what he believed he spoke. We have room for only one of these specimens. The text was Ezekiel ii, 7. After having portrayed their sins and guilt before them, he proceeds as follows:

And now, sinner, think seriously with yourself what defense you will make to all this. Will you fly into the face of God, and that of your conscience, so openly as to deny one of the charges of rebellion, yea, of aggravated rebellion, I have advanced against you? Have you not lifted up yourself against the Lord of heaven? Have you not sided with his sworn enemies—the world and the flesh? What part of your body, what faculty of your soul, have you not employed as an instrument of unrighteousness? When did you live one day before God with the dependence of a creature, the gratitude of a redeemed creature, the heavenly frame of a sanctified creature? Yea, when did you live one hour without violating God's known law, either in word, in thought, or action? . . . Thousands are, no doubt, already in hell whose guilt never equaled yours; and yet God has spared you to see almost the end of another year, and to hear now this plain representation of your case. And will you not yet consider? Shall nothing move you to shake off that amazing carelessness and stupid disregard of your salvation? Will you never begin to "work it out with fear and trembling?" Will you slumber in impenitency until eternal woes crush you into destruction? Is death, is judgment, is the bottomless pit so distant, that you dare put off from week to week the day of your conversion? You have read in God's word that there is mercy with him that he may be feared; but where did you read there is mercy with him for those who fear him not? . . . Sinner, despise me *here* if thou wilt; call me *here* an enthusiast, and laugh at the concern I feel for the perishing soul, but *hereafter* thou wilt do me justice, clear me before the Lord Jesus, and acknowledge that thy blood is upon thine own head, that thou art undone because thou wouldst be undone, because thou wouldst take neither warning nor reproof.

This, with kindred specimens, the author well calls "thunder and lightning preaching." So, indeed, it was. Yet it was the eternal truth of God, not changing to suit men's notions or fancies, or bringing itself down to the low level of men's passions and propensities. How different was it from much of the preaching heard at that time! and how different from much that is heard at the present!—these sermonettes of the present day, with their diluted Gospel, in which no thunder-bolts are launched against ungodliness, lest they should give offense; in which no ringing terrors of the law are proclaimed; in which no endless hell, as the legitimate result of sin, is announced; but in which the demand of worldlings, "lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God," of men and women who are dreaming of going to heaven, with a wine-glass in one hand and a pack of cards in the other, of frequenters of the theater and the dance, is regarded, and obsequiously obeyed, by men professing to be ministers of God's word.

Such preaching as that of Fletcher's will create opposition in certain quarters, but it will redeem and save men, it will meet the approval of heaven, and it will prevent ministers from going with blood-stained garments to the judgment-seat of Christ. By such preaching souls were saved in Madeley and other places then, and such preaching will save souls now. But his fidelity as a preacher was only equaled by his faithfulness as a pastor. He visited the people at their homes, in the forges and collieries, catechized the children, built a church in Madeley Wood, to which he gave largely from his own private funds; and "for many years he regularly preached at places eight, ten, or sixteen miles distant, returning home the same night, though he seldom reached it before one or two in the morning." Two or three times in the week he preached at a place six miles from Madeley at five in the morning. And if he heard the knocker in the middle of the coldest winter night, his window was instantly thrown up, and the uniform answer was, "I will attend you immediately." When some of his charge made it an excuse that they could not attend service on Sunday *mornings* because they did not awake early enough to get their families ready, he took a bell in his hand, and at five in the morning went round the more distant parts of his parish, calling the people to the house of God. And he did all this while

he was living upon the scantiest fare himself, giving, at times, the furniture of his house and table for the poor; and not only spending his salary for the relief of the needy, but also his own private fortune. Indeed, the wonder is, how *he lived* on the scanty fare which he allowed himself. Mr. Wesley wrote of him: "He did not allow himself such food as was necessary to sustain nature. He seldom took any regular meals unless he had company; otherwise, twice or thrice in twenty-four hours he ate some bread and cheese, or fruit. Sometimes he took a draught of milk, and then wrote on again. When one reproved him for not affording himself a sufficiency of necessary food, he replied: 'Not allow myself food! Why, our food seldom costs my housekeeper and me less than two shillings a week!'" In this Fletcher undoubtedly erred. No man has a right to neglect or starve his body. Fasting and abstinence are good and right; but no one should practice them seven days in the week. He accomplished, it is true, a great amount of work on this simple diet; but if it had been more generous and regular he might have lived longer, preached and written more, and, indeed, have become "Wesley's Successor."

We must now turn our attention to his relations with the Trevecca College. This was an institution which had been projected by the Countess of Huntingdon. It was located at Trevecca, in Wales. Mr. Fletcher had been, from the beginning, one of the Countess's chosen advisers, and had been fixed upon as the future president of the college. It was designed to educate young men for the work of the ministry. It was opened by Mr. Whitefield on the 24th of August, 1768. A list of the books furnished by Mr. Fletcher to the Countess will show how meager was the course of study in that institution: "Grammar, logic, rhetoric, ecclesiastical history, and a little natural philosophy and geography, with a great deal of practical divinity. Watts's 'Logic,' and his 'History of the Bible,' Mr. Wesley's 'Natural Philosophy,' Mason's 'Essay on Pronunciation,' Henry and Gill on the Bible, four volumes of Baxter's 'Practical Works,' Keach's 'Metaphors,' Taylor on the 'Types,' Gurnal's 'Christian Armor,' Edwards on 'Preaching,' Johnson's 'English Dictionary,' Mr. Wesley's 'Christian Library,' Usher's 'Body of Divinity,' Scapula's Greek and Littleton's Latin Dictionary, Bailey or Dyke's Dictionaries,

for those who learn English; two or three of Coles's Dictionaries, Schrevelius and Pasor's, for those who will learn Greek and Latin." This was indeed a limited stock to begin with, but, doubtless, was as extended as that which many of the clergy of that day possessed. What branches Mr. Fletcher taught, or how often he visited the school, we do not know. But one thing is certain, his influence upon the students was of the most salutary and hallowing character. It has been suggested by a very able divine, somewhat facetiously, that all our theological institutions now need is a "Professor of Religion." Trevecca College had this wonderful advantage. Mr. Benson's account of his visits to this college is well worth transcribing here:

He was received as an angel of God. It is not possible for me to describe the veneration in which we all held him. Like Elijah, in the school of the prophets, he was revered; he was loved; he was almost adored; not only by every student, but by every member of the family. And, indeed, he was worthy. The reader will pardon me if he thinks I exceed. My heart kindles while I write. Here it was that I saw, shall I say, an angel in human flesh? I should not far exceed the truth if I said so. But here I saw a descendant of fallen Adam, so fully raised above the ruins of the fall that, though by the body he was tied down to earth, his whole *conversation was in heaven.* His *life*, from day to day, was *hid with Christ in God.* Prayer, praise, love, and zeal, all ardent, elevated above what one would think attainable in this state of frailty, were the element in which he continually lived. As to others, his one employment was to call, entreat, and urge them to ascend with him to the glorious source of being and blessedness. He had leisure, comparatively, for nothing else. Languages, arts, sciences, grammar, logic, and even divinity itself, were all laid aside when he appeared in the school-room among the students. His full heart would not suffer him to be silent. He *must* speak; and they were readier to hearken to this servant and minister of Jesus Christ than to attend to Sallust, Virgil, Cicero, or any Latin or Greek historian, poet, or philosopher they had been engaged in reading. And they seldom hearkened long before they were in tears, and every heart catched fire from the flame that burned in his soul.

It is no wonder that, after such a presence among the students, and after listening to such burning words, when he invited those who were athirst for the fullness of the Spirit to follow him into his room, many went, where they would remain for hours, until they could kneel no longer. On such occasions

Mr. Fletcher himself would be so filled with the love of God as to cry out, "O my God, withhold thy hand, or the vessel will burst!"

And yet, this holy, this seraphic man, whose influence upon the students was so saintly and so salutary, was constrained, in a little while, to resign his presidency of the institution and to depart from its walls. The occasion for this is fully narrated in the volume before us.

On the 7th of August, 1770, Mr. Wesley held the Annual Conference of his preachers in London. Among other things suggested for the revival of the work of God was the following: "That the Methodists must be taught to seek and expect, not only *gradual*, but 'instantaneous sanctification.'" But this was not the only occasion of the trouble which removed Mr. Benson from Trevecca, and made the resignation of Mr. Fletcher desirable to himself, as well as, doubtless, to the Countess. This was found in the following questions and answers which called forth Mr. Fletcher's "Checks," and inaugurated a controversy which raged with the greatest bitterness on the part of the opponents of Arminianism for several years afterward:

We said, in 1744, "We have leaned too much toward Calvinism." Wherein? 1. With regard to *man's faithfulness*. Our Lord himself taught us to use the expression, and we ought never to be ashamed of it. We ought steadily to assert, on his authority, that if a man is not "faithful in the unrighteous mammon," God will not give him "the true riches." 2. With regard to *working for life*. This, also, our Lord has expressly commanded us, "Labor," ἐργάζεσθε, literally, "Work for the meat that endureth to everlasting life." And, in fact, every believer, till he comes to glory, works for as well as *from* life. 3. We have received it as a maxim, that "a man is to do nothing in order to justification." Nothing can be more false. Whoever desires to find favor with God "should cease from evil and learn to do well." Whoever repents should do "works meet for repentance." And if this is not in order to find favor, what does he do them for?

Review the whole affair.

1. Who of us is *now* accepted of God? He that now believes in Christ with a loving, obedient heart.

2. But who among those who never heard of Christ? He that "feareth God and worketh righteousness" according to the light he has.

3. Is this the same with "he that is *sincere?*" Nearly, if not quite.

4. Is not this *salvation by works?* Not by the *merit* of works, but by works as a *condition.*

5. What have we then been disputing about for these thirty years? I am afraid *about words.*

6. As to *merit* itself, of which we have been so dreadfully afraid. We are rewarded *according to our works,* yea, *because of our works.* How does this differ from *for the sake of our works?* And how differs this from *secundum merita operum*—"as our works deserve?" Can you split this hair? I doubt I cannot.

7. The grand objection to one of the preceding propositions, is drawn from a matter of fact. God does, in fact, justify those who, by their own confession, "neither feared God, nor wrought righteousness." Is this an exception to the general rule? It is a doubt whether God makes any exception at all. But how are we sure that the person in question never did fear God and work righteousness? His own saying so is not proof; for we know how all that are convinced of sin undervalue themselves in every respect.

8. Does not talking of a justified and sanctified *state* tend to mislead men, almost naturally leading them to trust in what was done in one moment? Whereas we are every hour and every moment pleasing or displeasing to God "according to our works"—according to the whole of our inward temper and outward behavior.*

Thus the broad line of distinction was drawn between Wesleyan Arminianism, and Calvinism and Antinomianism. Very soon the tocsin of war was sounded all along the line, and Mr. Fletcher for five years was engaged in unintermitting strife, until the last foe had abandoned the field, or confessed himself vanquished. There were no epithets which the opponents of the theses referred to thought to be too strong or too bitter to employ against Mr. Wesley and those who held with him. He was a "Pelagian," a "Pharisee," a "Papist," an "Antichrist." Mr. Benson, as we have seen, was dismissed by the Countess because he did not, could not, believe in "absolute predestination." Even a moderate (?) Calvinist had said to Mr. Fletcher that he was "in a damnable heresy, and never knew any thing of himself or of true grace, because he had taught that sinners perish for resisting and quenching the Spirit of grace." The Minutes were branded as "the very doctrines of Popery, yea, of Popery unmasked."

A deputation was appointed, with Shirley at its head, to attend Mr. Wesley's Conference, and, if possible, effect an

* "Minutes of the Methodist Conferences," vol. i, p. 97.

understanding. For this purpose a "declaration" was drawn up, which was amended by Mr. Wesley, and then signed by him and all the itinerant preachers present (except Thomas Ollivers). In this it was most positively affirmed that "we have no trust or confidence but in the alone merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ for justification, or salvation, either in life, death, or the day of judgment; and that our works have no part in meriting or purchasing our salvation from first to last, either in whole or in part."

This seemed eminently satisfactory to Shirley, who represented the Calvinists and the Countess. And here, perhaps, the strife might have ended. But Mr. Fletcher had already written his "First Check to Antinomianism," and it was in the printer's hands. Efforts were at once made to suppress it. But Mr. Wesley declined all offers in this direction, and it was published. It consisted of "Five Letters to the Hon. and Rev. Author of the Circular Letter" (Mr. Shirley.) It was at once answered by him. In this "First Check" Mr. Fletcher defends Mr. Wesley from the charge of heresy; while he clearly formulates the doctrines which were held and preached by him: depravity, redemption alone through the merits of Christ's death, holiness of heart and life, and the universality of the atonement. And in connection with this he clearly stated the necessity of the formulation of these doctrines, and the insistance upon *outward* as well as *inward* holiness.

The answer of the Hon. and Rev. Mr. Shirley having been published, it called forth "A Second Check." This contained, three letters, was revised, as the first, by Mr. Wesley, and therefore indorsed by him. It was a dark picture of the condition of the ministry and laity of the Churches, and grapples with ungloved hands the dangerous and damning Antinomianism of the day. But if he had written with severity against this error in his first two "Checks," his attack was even more severe and trenchant in his third. Mr. Wesley wrote of it to his brother Charles: "In this he draws the sword and throws away the scabbard." It was written in reply to a publication by his friend and neighbor, Richard Hill, Esq., consisting of five letters addressed to him. Mr. Hill's Antinomianism was of the most pronounced character. A single specimen from his letters clearly shows the character of his theology:

Either Christ has fulfilled the whole law, and borne the curse, or he has not. If he has not, no soul can ever be saved; if he has, then all debts and claims against his people, be they more or be they less, be they small or be they great, be they before or be they after conversion, are forever and forever canceled. All trespasses are forgiven them. They are justified from all things. They already have everlasting life. They are now (virtually) sat down in heavenly places with Christ their forerunner; and as soon shall Satan pluck his crown from his head as his purchase from his hand.

Mr. Fletcher grapples with this idea of the *eternal justification* of the elect in the most masterly manner, and shows that such teachings "make the preaching of the Gospel one of the most absurd, wicked, and barbarous things in the world. For what can be more absurd than to say, 'Repent ye, and believe the Gospel;' 'He that believeth not shall be damned,' if a certain number can *never repent or believe*, and a certain number can *never* be damned." And still further on he says: "But when a good man gives us to understand that there are no lengths God's people may not run, nor any depths they may not fall into, without losing the character of men after God's own heart, that many will praise God for the denial of Christ, that sin and corruption work for good, that a fall into adultery will drive us nearer to Christ, and make us sing louder to the praise of free grace," he represents the danger to the Church as great indeed.

Again, Richard Hill, Esq., appeared in the arena, and with great bitterness attacked Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher. Toplady, also, with an envenomed style, such as it is difficult to conceive possible for a man who wrote "Rock of Ages," violently assailed these leaders of the great religious movement of the eighteenth century. Rowland Hill, the eccentric brother of Richard, came to the aid of his brother, and endeavored to show the "glaring inconsistencies and palpable mistakes" of Mr. Fletcher. These attacks called forth the "Fourth Check to Antinomianism in thirteen letters to the Messrs. Hill." He fairly rains blows upon the system defended by them, employing a merciless irony, and holding up to ridicule the absurd reasonings of his opponents. A very brief specimen of this style of writing must suffice:

In this rich garment of *finished salvation* the greatest apostates shine brighter than angels, though they are "*in themselves*,

black" as the old murderer, and filthy as the brute that wallows in the mire. This "best robe," as it is called, is full trimmed with such phylacteries as these: "Once in grace, always in grace;" "Once justified, eternally justified;" "Once washed, always fair, undefiled, and without spot." And so great are the privileges of those that have it on, that they can range through all the bogs of sin, wade through the puddles of iniquity, and roll themselves in the thickest mire of wickedness, without contracting the least spot of guilt or speck of defilement.

It may occasion surprise to many that one so holy, so seraphic, even, as Mr. Fletcher, could write in this style. Such persons should not forget that the most scathing, withering irony and bitter invective ever uttered by human lips was uttered by God's mightiest prophet under the Old Testament dispensation, who was thought worthy to be translated to the heaven of heavens without tasting the pangs of death. Mr. Fletcher vindicates his use of this weapon in the following words: "If I make use of irony in my 'Checks' it is not from '*spleen*,' but *reason*. It appears to me that the subject requires it, and that *ridiculous error* is to be turned out of the temple of truth, not only with scriptural argument, which is *the sword of the Spirit*, but also with *mild irony*, which is a proper scourge for a glaring and obstinate mistake." The first part of Mr. Fletcher's "Fifth Check" was published in 1774, and was entitled "*Logica Genevensis* Continued," etc. In this Mr. Hill, Rev. Mr. Berridge, and others are noticed, and their publications severely reviewed. Meanwhile, between the publication of the fourth and fifth "Checks," he had published what may be regarded on the whole as his ablest work—"Appeal to Matter of Fact and Common Sense." This fifth and last "Check" seems to have cleared the field. His antagonists, one after another, were silenced, or sued for peace. As early as 1773 "Mr. Hill gave Fletcher full permission to make known the facts that the controversy had done him no good; that he desired to be humbled before God, and to ask forgiveness of Fletcher and Wesley for every thing that had 'savored of wrong' or of his own spirit in his writings; that he had stopped the sale of his publications; and that he regarded many of Wesley's people as the excellent of the earth." In 1776 Mr. Fletcher visited Berridge at Everton, whose "Christian World Unmasked" he had so utterly demolished. The instant

he entered the parsonage at Everton, Berridge rose up, ran to meet him, embraced him with folded arms, and cried, "My dear brother, how could we write against each other, when we both aim at the same thing—the glory of God, and the good of souls? My book lies quietly on the shelf, and there let it be." Toplady died in 1778, when only in the thirty-eighth year of his age, and was buried in a grave, thirteen feet deep, under the gallery of Whitefield's chapel in Tottenham Court Road. Although converted through the instrumentality of one of Mr. Wesley's itinerants, he had been one of his most bitter foes. But the Methodists of the present generation, while holding in utter abhorrence his supralapsarian Calvinism, and his dangerous Antinomianism, have long since forgiven the man who could write so sweetly of Christ, and for years past very many of them have been singing as a chorus to Charles Wesley's inimitable hymn, "Jesus lover of my soul," a part of Toplady's equally well-known, and universally cherished, hymn, "Rock of ages, cleft for me." Lady Huntingdon sought an interview with Mr. Fletcher in view of the peace of the Church. Shirley also visited him when ill at Stoke Newington, and so did Rowland Hill.

Thus the long controversy ended, and Mr. Fletcher remained master of the field. He had cleared away the barriers which were reared in the way of evangelical Christianity, and had gained for Wesleyan Arminianism the right of way to the heart of the world. His "Checks," his "Appeal to Matter of Fact and Common Sense," his "Manual on Christian Perfection," and his "Portrait of St. Paul," must ever remain classics in Methodist literature. They furnished to our fathers, in the ministry and in the laity, the great arguments in their assaults against Calvinism in Europe and America. They were to them the richly stored arsenal from whence they were abundantly supplied with weapons, the keenness of whose edge and the fineness of whose temper made them irresistible in their onslaughts upon this system of horrible decrees and its logical corollary of Antinomianism. It is perhaps hardly worth while, in this brief review, to turn aside to notice the fact that Mr. Fletcher, in his eschatological views of the Scripture, was, without doubt, a millenarian; or to consider his pamphlet on the American struggle, which, while to us it seems unfortunate,

was doubtless regarded by him as simply a proof of his loyalty to his government and his adopted country. It was this pamphlet which Lord Dartmouth carried to King George, who immediately commissioned an official to ask him if any preferment in the Church would be acceptable to him, or whether the Lord Chancellor could do him any service. To all this Mr. Fletcher replied, "I want nothing but more grace."

After these weary years of conflict and strife, which he maintained with so much vigor, although his pure spirit and his brilliant and cultured intellect dwelt in a frail house of clay, which was emaciated with perpetual fastings and enfeebled by lurking disease, he felt the need of retirement and rest. This period was much longer than he had anticipated, continuing for three years. The most of this time was spent in the south of France and in Switzerland, his own native clime and home. Here, as his strength permitted, he preached, taught the children, wrote letters, and composed a poem in French, entitled "La Grace et la Nature." His retirement having improved his health, he returned to England, and we find him preaching in the City Road Chapel, and also in Bristol. Mr. Rankin, who had been in America for five years, and had been driven home on account of the War of Independence, was now stationed in Bristol Circuit. He writes of his visit to Bristol as follows:

> The whole congregation was in tears. He spoke like one who had just left the converse of God and angels. . . . Of all the men I ever knew, I never saw such love to God and man, such deadness to the world, such consecratedness to Jesus Christ, as in him. It often appeared to me that his every breath was prayer and praise. He lived more like a disembodied spirit than a human being.

It was not long after his return to England that his thoughts were directed to the subject of his marriage. His increasing years, his growing infirmities, his many cares, and his conscious loneliness, drew his attention to this question. His heart at once turned toward Miss Bosanquet, whom he had known so long and so well; and, at the same time, her heart was turned toward him. In her efforts to do good to others, both children and adults, she had already expended a large fortune, (£10,500, or $52,250, worth now about $200,000,) and had become involved in financial difficulties. And the impression was deep

in her mind that Mr. Fletcher was the only one who could aid her in her efforts, and relieve her of her embarrassments. The preliminaries of the marriage were arranged upon the most honorable basis, and with the utmost delicacy and Christian refinement, by Mr. Fletcher. At length the day for the marriage arrived. And perhaps the world has never witnessed such a wedding day. Mr. Fletcher, dressed in his canonicals, gave out one of Mr. Wesley's marriage hymns at the house, and read Rev. xix, 7–9. And so before they left for the church, on the way to it, and after their return, the time was spent in singing, prayer, and scriptural exposition. At night there was preaching. Mr. Wesley and all the early Methodists were greatly pleased with this union of two such holy persons. For nearly four bright and beautiful years this union was continued, and then death came and released the blood-washed, seraphic spirit, to find its eternal dwelling-place in the presence of God.

Mr. Fletcher's "Treatise on Christian Perfection," with Mr. Wesley's "Plain Account" of the same great truth, must forever remain the great text-books of Methodism on this so little understood question. He not only saw the truth of this doctrine gleaming from the pages of divine truth, and glowing in the hymns and sermons of John and Charles Wesley, and exhibited in the saintliness of Hester Ann Rogers, Miss Bosanquet, and others; but his own clear and joyous experience enabled him to write upon this subject with a clearness which has characterized no other writer excepting Mr. Wesley. His statement of his own experience, as recorded by Mrs. H. A. Rogers, will always be dear to the hearts of Methodists in all parts of the world. It was given in the fifty-second year of his age, in a select company of friends, and is as follows:

"For many years I have grieved His Spirit; I am deeply humbled; and he has again restored my soul. Last Wednesday evening, he spoke to me by these words: 'Reckon yourselves therefore to be dead indeed unto sin; but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord.' I obeyed the voice of God: I now obey it; and tell you all, to the praise of his love, *I am freed from sin.* Yes, I rejoice to declare it, and to be a witness to the glory of his grace, that I am dead unto sin, and alive unto God through Jesus Christ, who is my Lord and my King! I received this blessing four or five times before; but I lost it by not observing the order of God, who has told us, 'With the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is

made unto salvation.'" After further declaring how Satan had deceived him, he said, "Now, my brethren, you see my folly. I have confessed it in your presence; and *now* I resolve before you all to confess my Master. I will confess him to all the world. And I declare unto you, in the presence of the Holy Trinity, I am now *dead indeed unto sin.*"

No review of Mr. Fletcher's life could be complete without reference to his rich experience of the fullness of Christ's salvation. Holiness unto the Lord was not only realized in the depths of his consciousness as a real condition and blessed experience, but it was also written upon his breastplate, upon his shining face, and upon his whole character and life. In the gallery of the portraits of saints his picture will ever stand nearest to that of the beloved St. John.

At length the end of his wonderful life drew near. The "fever" had been raging in Madeley for many days. His visits among his sick and dying parishioners were unremitting, and his anxieties for them were constantly pressing upon his soul. Even after the fever came upon him, he went out to attend to his parochial duties. On Sabbath, August 7, he preached his last sermon, and continued the service until nearly two o'clock. After the sermon he went up the aisle to the communion table with these words: "I am going to throw myself under the wings of the cherubim, before the mercy-seat." As soon as the service was over he fainted. On the following Wednesday he told his beloved companion that he had received such a full manifestation of the meaning of the words, "God is love," as he could not tell. "It *fills* me," he said, "it *fills me* every moment. O, Polly! my dear Polly! *God is love!* Shout! Shout aloud! O, it so fills me that I want a gust of praise to go to the end of the earth!" Finding his articulation failing, he agreed with Mrs. Fletcher upon a sign which would tell her, when he could speak no more, of God's love. His servant Sally, coming in the room, he said, "O, Sally! God is love! Shout, both of you! I want to hear you shout his praise!" When Mrs. Fletcher repeated the lines of Johann A. Rothe's hymn, as translated by John Wesley,

> "While Jesus' blood, through earth and skies,
> Mercy, free, boundless mercy, cries,"

he cried out, "*Boundless! Boundless!*" and added with great difficulty,

> "Mercy's *full* power I *soon* shall prove,
> Loved with an everlasting love."

His last act upon earth was to raise his right hand again and again in token of the presence of Jesus with him, and of the glory which was breaking upon his soul. After being for twenty-four hours in a comatose state, "he was not; for God took him."

Our purpose in this review has been to give a bird's-eye view of the character and life of this wonderful man of God. Following the full and graphic account furnished by Mr. Tyerman in his invaluable book, we have grouped together, in a succinct form, its salient points. Those who desire ampler information concerning him should by all means obtain and read carefully the entire volume. His name is still, after nearly a century has passed since he went up on high, "as ointment poured forth." The aroma will fill the Church of God for ages to come. Many pilgrims annually make their way to Madeley, to view the place where he labored and wrote and fell asleep in Jesus; and where his precious remains rest. Precious relics of him are shown to visitors by the vicar and his wife: a lock of his silken hair; his study, nine feet by twelve, a portion of whose wall is still stained with his breathings while engaged in prayer; the oaken communion-table at which he celebrated his last sacrament, and the Church Register, containing a list of the baptisms, marriages, and deaths during his incumbency. Two monuments have been erected to his memory—one at Madeley, with an inscription written by his widow; the other in City Road, London, "Methodism's Westminster Abbey," immediately under Wesley's monument, with an inscription by Richard Watson. Mr. Wesley, who for a number of years had designated Mr. Fletcher as his successor, and urged him in vain to agree to his arrangement, lived and labored six years after his departure. So short-sighted is man; so limited his vision. But although the Wesleys, and Fletcher, and Coke, and the Fathers of the Church, have passed away, Methodism still lives, and Mr. Wesley has his successors in all parts of the world.

Art. II.—WILLIAM TYNDALE,

THE FIRST TRANSLATOR OF THE BIBLE INTO THE PRINTED ENGLISH VERNACULAR.

Educational Period, 1484–1519.

In one of the loveliest districts of England, lying along the banks of the Severn, and sprinkled with villages, church steeples, and ancient castles, is the hamlet of North Nibley. Here, under the shadows of the ancestral fortress of the Saxon Earls of Berkeley, was born William Tyndale, the first translator of the Holy Scriptures into the printed English vernacular. The year of his birth is uncertain. Probably it was in 1484. The closing quarter of the fifteenth century was prolific of children who subsequently rose to the highest stature of Christian manhood. The birth of Martin Luther at Eisleben, in Germany, and that of Ulrich Zwingle, the Swiss reformer, on the mountains of the Tockenburg, was nearly synchronous with that of Tyndale, whose history is largely "lost in his work, and whose epitaph is the Reformation." *

Little is certainly known of his ancestry. Some writers state that his forefathers had held baronial rank, and had lost it through faithfulness to the falling fortunes of the Lancastrian claimants of the crown. Certain it is that, under Henry VII., who united in himself the houses of York and Lancaster, his parents were sufficiently wealthy to send their boy, at an early age, to the University of Oxford. There he studied grammar and philosophy in the school of St. Mary Magdalen; and also the learned languages, under the tuition of Grocyn, W. Latimer, and Linacre, the first classical scholars of England. Apt and assiduous, he soon obtained the customary diplomas of proficiency.

Better works than those of heathen antiquity next challenged his scrutiny. The Greek Testament, edited by the celebrated Erasmus, whom admirers called "the light of the world," was rousing Christendom from spiritual torpor. Tyndale turned to it as a work of learning, or manual of devotion, whose rare and manifold beauties were adapted to excite religious feeling. He found it to be all that he had conjectured, infinitely more

* Froude's "History of England," vol. ii, p. 40.

than he had imagined. It spoke to him in tones of divine authority. It pointed out the way of salvation from sin and its sequences. It presented the Lord Jesus Christ as the only and all-sufficient Saviour. It supplied all his religious and moral needs. With rapture greater than that of Archimedes, he shouted, "Ευρηκα!"—"I have found it!"

Gladly accepting the Christ as his Lord and Saviour, Tyndale is freely justified by grace through faith; exhibits such purity of life, and such charms of conversation, that he attracts the younger members of the University; tells them of the treasure he has found; invites them to share it; and dwells on its contents in his lectures on Greek literature. Ignorant and fanatical, the adherents of the papacy take alarm, and overwhelm both Greek literature and Greek lecturer with violent abuse. This is in 1517.

Persecuted at Oxford, Tyndale flees to Cambridge. There he meets with Bilney and Fryth, who have also been enlightened by the entrance of the word. Together they radiate still greater light and love on the spiritual night around them. They boldly declare that no religious rite or priestly absolutions can impart remission of sins; that assurance of forgiveness is to be had through faith alone, and that faith purifies the heart. Their doctrines strike at the root of priestly despotism, and cut off the hope of priestly gains. Who will pay for an absolution that is powerless and worthless? Thus queried the priests, who stormed at the young preachers as the Ephesian craftsmen had done against St. Paul. It soon became expedient for Tyndale, who had received priest's orders in 1502, to seek another field of toil. Full of faith in his Divine Master, and full of hope for the future of England, he left Cambridge in 1519.

The Reformation of the Christian Church had begun in several countries. It originated with God alone, and in the study of "God's word written." In Oxford, Cambridge, London, as in continental cities, the Greek Testament had many and diligent readers.

The times were ripe for the Reformation. The events which had threatened the destruction of Christianity in the East were overruled to its salvation in the West. Constantinople fell into the hands of the Turks in 1453. Greek professors and

Greek literature sought refuge from their merciless tyranny, and were warmly welcomed in the south and west of Europe. Classical learning revived in its new seats. Erasmus collated manuscripts of the New Testament, and edited and published the inspired volume, out of which the doctrines and polity of the Christian Church exclusively sprung. It was eagerly received by prepared readers. Under God, it changed the hearts and lives of many. It impelled them to examine the pretensions and organization of the Church of Rome. It opened their eyes to the hideous fact of that Church's apostasy, debasement, and slavery. Their hearts began to burn with holy desire for its reformation.

No one can paint in colors too dark the degradation and wickedness of the papal Church, as a whole, at that period. The Pontiff was its visible head, and the proud pretender to the vicegerency of Christ upon earth. As a temporal prince, he maintained armies and fought battles; as a diplomatist, he was crafty, intriguing, and deceitful; as a *viveur*, he and his court derided Christianity as a fable profitable to their lusts and pleasures. Rome was drunken with the blood of the saints. Savonarola, John Huss, Jerome of Prague, and many others had been burned at the stake, or otherwise put to a cruel death. England was on the same moral level with other European nations. Her clergy were not only ministers, but also politicians, tradesmen, mechanics, and brewers. They had ceased to preach, except on special occasions, and then they preached monkish fables, but the Gospel never. The priests were unmarried, but many were unblushing fathers of families. Multitudes of them were lascivious and lewd, partners with thieves, drunkards, brawlers, profane, vicious. Monasteries, for the most part, were cages of unclean birds. Many nunneries bore the reputation of brothels. Popery, then as now, was an Antichrist. It would not permit the people to pray in their native tongue. On the 4th of April, 1519, the year that Tyndale left Cambridge, "Dame Smith, Robert Hatchets, Archer, Hawkins, Thomas Bond, Wrigsham, and Landsdale were burned alive at Coventry, in the Little Park, for the crime of teaching their children the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed, and the Commandments of God," * in

* D'Aubigné's "History of the Reformation," vol. v, p. 171.

English. Popery dreads the truth, as the unknown criminal dreads discovery.

The commonwealth of England felt that the Church was mortally sick, but knew not how to diagnose the disease, nor where to find an appropriate remedy. The monks were more detested for their palpable frauds than for their brazen debaucheries. Both were foul and feculent. Ecclesiastical dignitaries openly kept women as concubines. Sometimes an individual would maintain five or six. But all this was borne more patiently than the impositions wherewith the monks extorted money. At St. Anthony's Convent, in Bristol, they exhibited "a tunic of our Lord, a petticoat of the Virgin, a part of the Last Supper, and a fragment of the stone upon which Jesus was born at Bethlehem. All these brought in money."* Mountebanks, tricksters, conjurers, and always liars in these deceptions, they hesitated not to do any thing that would fill their coffers, or gratify their carnal lusts.

The English were nauseated by the corruptions of Rome, and rebellious under her oppressions, but could not free themselves from her shackles until possessed of that Gospel which has brought life and immortality to light. Tyndale was to present them with that priceless boon, and that in their mother-tongue; and by presenting that truth which maketh free to bring them out of Egyptian darkness into Calvary's light—out of bondage into the glorious liberty of the children of God. The England that now is, with her greatness and glory, is instrumentally his work.

Determinative Period, 1519–1523.

Leaving Cambridge, Tyndale returned to the home of his parents. Soon afterward he was requested by Sir John Walsh, the owner of Sodbury Hall, to take charge of the education of his children, and accepted the invitation. Entering upon his new duties, Tyndale finds himself in a plain but large mansion, that commands an extensive view of the beautiful vale of Severn. Sir John is an old companion-in-arms of the puissant Henry VIII., and is a favorite with that willful monarch. He is genial, jovial, hospitable, and keeps open house for the fat rectors, rubicund friars, and all the churchly and civic notables

* D'Aubigné's "History of the Reformation," vol. ii, p. 88.

who delight to visit him. Doctrinal discussions arise between the priests and the tutor, who invariably carries his point by the aid of his Greek Testament. The priests fear the little book, and denounce it as "serving only to make heretics," and as "a conjuring-book, wherein every body finds what he wants." Tyndale replies with loving-kindness, but also with humor and biting sarcasm. "You set candles before images," he said; "and, since you give them light, why don't you give them food? Why don't you make their bellies hollow, and put victuals and drink inside?" The mummery which they called worship was not worthy of more respectful treatment.

Tyndale did not confine himself to controversies with the priests. He preached the evangelical doctrines to the inhabitants of the villages and to the citizens of Bristol. But much of the fruit of his itinerant ministry was lost because the people did not possess the word of God in their own language. They could not search the Scriptures to determine whether what he proclaimed were true or not. "Without the Bible," he exclaimed, "it is impossible to establish the laity in the truth." Then a great idea shot up in his mind: "It was in the language of Israel that the Psalms were sung in the temple of Jehovah; and shall not the Gospel speak the language of Israel among us? . . . Christians must read the New Testament in their mother-tongue." This was the decisive epoch in his life history. Thenceforward the translation of the Bible into the English vernacular became the dominating object of his ambition.

The priests resolved to crush the daring innovator. Rejecting the counsels of God, and following foolish fables, they rushed upon him "like unclean swine that follow their carnal lusts," tore his reputation to tatters, and excited the populace against him. But his purpose took deeper root, and gathered stronger force. "If God spares my life," said he, "I will take care that a plowboy shall know more of the Scriptures than you do." On the verge of arrest and condemnation to death, Tyndale quitted Sodbury Hall. Gathering up his papers and Greek Testament, he kisses the children, presses the hands of his benefactors, bids farewell to the smiling Severn, and departs; not knowing, like Abraham, whither he goes, but firmly set upon placing the Scriptures of God, in good, plain English, in the hands of his countrymen.

England had already enjoyed the gift of the Scriptures in the speech of its people. But those Scriptures were not printed; for the art of printing had not been invented. In 1380, John Wiclif, Rector of Lutterworth, and "the morning star of the Reformation," completed his translation of the Bible. It was the translation of a translation. Of Hebrew and Greek, the original vehicles of revelation, he knew nothing; but he was an excellent Latin scholar, and was assisted by learned men in rendering the Vulgate into nervous English. Between ten and fifteen years he toiled at his noble task. When it was finished, the labors of copyists began; and, ere long, the Bible, in whole or in portion, was circulated throughout England. A gracious revival of evangelical religion followed. The written Bible and Wiclif's works reached Bohemia, and there wrought that mighty religious movement which preceded the Germanic Reformation under Luther. Wiclif gave to England the written Bible, Tyndale was to present his mother country with the printed Bible.

Of all the printed books ever published, none has produced such astounding revolutions as the Greek Testament, edited by the erudite but cautious and vacillating Erasmus. The study of it emancipated nations from their intellectual bonds, and from their thralldom to the Pope of Rome, whose throne it shook to the very foundations. It woke up Christendom to intense activity, and gave an impetus to humanity whose force is unspent to-day, and which augments in proportion to the vigor of its operation.

Tyndale found a powerful auxiliary ready to aid in the dissemination of the Scriptures, and in the great enterprise of Christian reformation. The art of printing had approached perfection. In 1438, Laurenzes John Koster, of Haarlem, in Holland, had printed a work with blocks; in 1444 John Gutenberg, of Mainz, in Germany, invented cut metal types, and used them in printing the Bible; and in 1452 Peter Schæffer cast the first metal types in matrices, and thus brought the art to its consummation. Wiclif had struck the blow for the liberation of the human mind and heart. Germany responded to his heroic efforts. Genius awoke. The press was created. The holiest uses to which it could be applied were the multiplying of copies of the Bible. In those copies were

the seeds of religious and civil liberty, of true science, of high Christian art, of material prosperity, of the wide world's brotherhood, of eternal felicity to untold millions of the human family. The press never did a grander work than in the printing of Tyndale's English Bible.

Emigrant Period, 1523–1524.

After bidding a sad farewell to Sodbury Hall, Tyndale repaired to London, where he hoped for employment from the scholarly statesman, Cuthbert Tonstall, who then filled the metropolitan see. But he was disappointed. Tonstall greeted him with cold graciousness, inasmuch as he was recommended by Sir John Walsh, the king's old comrade; by Sir Harry Guilford, the king's controller; and also by a translation of the Greek orator Isocrates into elegant Latin, made by Tyndale himself. Yet Tonstall dared not employ him. The priests were too clamorous and threatening, and the prelate was too fond of riches, ease, and honor to incur peril by protecting a friend of the Gospel.

Tyndale does not despair. God, he says, will protect him. God did protect him. The daring and faithful Christian, the learned and imaginative scholar, and the touchingly eloquent preacher found a friend in Humphrey Monmouth, a rich but righteous merchant who had been edified by his sermons. "Come and live with me, and there labor," urged Monmouth; and Tyndale did so. Evangelical religion owes much to godly merchants.

In the house of his new friend, Tyndale studied day and night. John Fryth, the eminent mathematician, came from Cambridge to help him. Shut up in a little room, they translated chapter after chapter from the Greek into terse and telling English. The work went on apace. But it could not be finished in England. Tonstall turned persecutor, and men were punished for reading portions of the Bible in the vernacular. What will the courtly bishop do if he detects the translators at their work? The stake is his fiery protest against the translation and circulation of the Scriptures. Tyndale is not afraid of the pyre, but he does not wish to die before the great work of his life is done. A vessel is lying in the Thames, receiving her cargo for Hamburg. It is agreed that he shall

sail in her, and prosecute his undertaking under foreign skies. Monmouth gives him ten pounds. With his New Testament in hand, he shakes off the dust of his feet against the coarse and dissolute priests, and sails for the Elbe.

Lonely but courageous, the departing saint beheld the white cliffs of old Albion fade away in the distance; caught glimpses of the Low Countries which papal intolerance and Spanish cruelty would soon drench with blood and tears; greeted the primitive home of the English people on the Holstein shore, and passed up the crooked Elbe to the quaint free city where he was to enjoy brief repose and safety.

Germanic Period, 1524–1526.

Not in the commerce of Hamburg, not in its net-work of canals, not in its beautiful Binnen Alster, not in its splendid churches, is he now particularly interested. Higher things absorb thought and feeling. In a quiet lodging he perfected the translation of the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, and then forwarded them as the first-fruits of the biblical harvest to the mother-land from which he had been thrust out.

About the end of 1524 he received ten pounds more from the princely Monmouth. By means of that sum he not improbably crossed the sandy plains of Brandenburg, visited Luther at Wittenberg, and took sweet counsel with the sturdy Saxon reformer.

In the spring of 1525, Tyndale turned his steps toward the Rhine, and secretly established himself at Cologne. In that rich and flourishing city were renowned printers, one of whom had warehouses in St. Paul's Church-yard, London. In Cologne, the matchless cathedral was slowly rising, and suggested the construction of a spiritual temple infinitely more glorious than that. The citizens prided themselves on possessing the bones of the English princess, St. Ursula, and her eleven thousand sister virgins. Tyndale's aim was to bring the breath of life upon the moral "dead bones" of his native land. In the cathedral were preserved the pretended remains of the Magi (*drei Könige Köln*) who came from the East to worship the infant Christ. Tyndale's hope was to crown his risen Lord with the love and loyalty of the English people.

Calling on the printer, Tyndale presented his manuscripts,

and ordered three thousand copies to be printed. Overjoyed, he saw the printing go forward. England, through his New Testament, will come into the obedience of Christ. But the brightness of the prospect was quickly obscured by densest clouds. Instigated by Cochlæus, Dean of Frankfort-am-Main, an inveterate persecutor; and by Herman Rincke, an imperial councilor, the Senate of Cologne forbade the printing to proceed. Brave and prompt in all his movements, Tyndale prevented the seizure of his precious goods by hastening to the printing-office, collecting the printed sheets and manuscripts, jumping into a boat, and rapidly ascending the Rhine, bearing with him the fortunes of the Anglo-Saxon race. When the vultures swooped down on their expected prey, it was only to be seized by disappointment and chagrin. The translator had escaped as a bird from the snare of the fowler, and none could guess whither he had flown.

On the historic Rhine, Tyndale and his assistant, Roye, contend for five or six days against the impetuous current. Antique cities and lovely villages adorn its banks; hoary mountains, frowning gorges, gloomy forests, scenes of exquisite pastoral beauty pass by in slow succession; ruined fortresses and Gothic churches, rich in legendary memories, present themselves to his gaze; boats pass and repass the lonely oarsmen; birds of prey soar and scream overhead: but Tyndale thinks little of these. His care is for the treasures of life that his bark contains. He passes the Siebengeberge under the Drachenfels—castle-crowned. Does he recall the myth of Siegfried, and of the dragon whose den was half way up the hill, five hundred feet above his head; that the hero slew the reptile, and made himself invulnerable by bathing in its blood? We know not. The spirit of Byron's beautiful lines was in his heart as he gazed on all the witching loveliness around him:

> "The castled crag of Drachenfels
> Frowns o'er the wide and winding Rhine,
> Whose breast of waters broadly swells
> Between the banks which bear the vine,
> And hills all rich with blossom'd trees,
> And fields which promise corn and wine,
> And scatter'd cities crowning these,
> Whose far white walls along them shine,
> Have strew'd a scene, which " I do see,
> With double joy, O Christ with me!

The last two lines are not as the poet wrote them. Tyndale was not an amorous sensualist. Christ the Lord was with his servant in the rocking boat, and gave him the assurance of victory over a dragon more destructive than that of fable to those who drew near his den. His hopes rose higher than Löwenberg on its dolerite hill, to a land more glorious than that of the Rhine when the sun looks down upon it through summer skies. Coblentz on the right, Ehrenbreitstein on the left, he passes with anxious haste; pauses a while at the mouth of the winding Lahn; pushes on under the shadows of the Königsstuhle, where German emperors have been elected, decrees issued, treaties concluded; and strengthened himself in the resolve to enthrone his Master in the hearts of his countrymen. The twin castles of Sterrenberg and Liebenstein, with their weird legends of faithless love, broken hearts, and chivalrous devotion, move his poetic and impassioned temperament. Germany never saw more faithful and heroic knight than he. He may have tarried at St. Goar to buy provisions; have drained the customary cup of wine presented by the citizens; been crowned and invested with civic rights, and inscribed his name on the Hänselbuch. He did burn with godly desire to enroll all men in the society of the redeemed whose names are written in heaven.

Skillfully steering through the foaming rapids and seething whirlpools above St. Goar, and hugging the eastern shore of the stream, he rows under the cliffs of the Lurlei which, as poets sang, had formerly harbored a nymph whose siren songs enticed sailors and fishermen to destruction at the base of the precipice. Under the Lurlenberg, they said, was hidden the Niebelungen treasure. O Tyndale, braver and stronger than Siegfried!—through what rapids of cruelty, what whirlpools of wickedness, what siren songs of temptation must thou pass, ere the hidden treasure of God's word be freed from the heavy mountain of Romish superstition and lust, and its contents freely scattered among a thankful and joyous people! Although unseen by mortal eye, Christ is his companion in the lonely boat. Wine of divine love cheers his heart as he passes the delicious vintage of the Rüdesheimer Berg, and braces him for conflict with prelates as callous as Hatto of Mentz, whose Mause Thurm (Mouse Tower) he almost touches as it rises from the

bosom of the Rhine. That brutal ecclesiastic was said to have burned the famished poor. Rome then was burning the hungry souls who fainted from desire for the bread of life. Mainz now heaves in sight—Mainz, with its indelible memories of the English Winifred, the apostle of Central Germany—Mainz, the home of the printer Gutenberg, whose invention Tyndale will utilize in benefit of his darkened nation. Mainz also is left behind. Worn and weary, the boatman lands at last before the grand old city of Worms, where, in April, 1521, Luther had stated and defended his doctrines before Charles V. and the Imperial Diet.

Tyndale steps on shore, and lays down his precious burden upon the ground. What knows he of the future—of the enemies that watch for him—of the dangers that await him? His courage is equal to that of Luther, whom nothing could frighten. "Though they should kindle a fire all the way from Worms to Wittenberg, the flames of which reached to heaven, I would walk through it in the name of the Lord." "Go and tell your master that even should there be as many devils in Worms as tiles on the house-tops, still I would enter it," said the great reformer. He did enter it, boldly confessed his Lord, and rose to the heights of moral sublimity as he humbly affirmed before emperor and deputies: "Unless I am convinced by the testimony of Scripture, I cannot and will not retract. Here I stand; I can do no other. God help me! Amen." Wiclif had the English aristocracy at his back; Luther had powerful friends in the Diet, and warriors like Sickingen longed to flesh their swords in his defense; but Tyndale was alone, (except the feeble Roye,) unknown, and unfriended. His was the courage that singly dares the powers of earth and hell. Yet he was not alone, for Christ was with him.

Peter Schæffer gladly lent his presses to Tyndale's godly work. Two editions of the English New Testament were quietly struck off by the end of 1525, and in the beginning of 1526 were sent across the North Sea into England, and were followed night and day by the translator's prayers.

Tyndale's prayers were answered. Five pious Hanseatic merchants concealed his books among their merchandise, and sailed from Antwerp. As the vessel ascended the Thames, an

invisible hand dispersed the preventive guard. Tonstall and Henry VIII. were absent from London, and Cardinal Wolsey was too busy with politics to play the part of police detective. The New Testaments were safely landed. Thomas Garret, the curate of All-Hallows Church, received them into his house; sold them to all purchasers, whether priests, monks, or laymen; and thus the books were distributed over the entire realm. Every one devoured the contents of his purchase. Hearts melted like wax under its revelations, and marvelous moral transformations were wrought, even in the most papal families.

The Romish prelates soon discovered the state of affairs, and were filled with the utmost alarm. Orders were issued on the 3d of February, 1526, to seize and destroy the obnoxious books, so fatal to the supremacy of Antichrist. All that were captured were publicly burned, and the owners—after being compelled to cast their New Testaments into the fire—were immured in noisome prisons. Numbers died from their sufferings in jail, but others lived to become pastors and even bishops in the reformed Church of England. The Papal pursuit was untiring. The clergy asserted that the Holy Scriptures contained "an infectious poison." On the 24th of October the Bishop of London ordered his archdeacons to seize all English translations of the New Testament; and the Archbishop of Canterbury issued a mandate against all books that contained "any particle of the New Testament." * Tyndale's great life-work was now fairly under way, and all the rage and cruelty of his enemies were not permitted to hinder its accomplishment.

Belgic Period, 1526–1529.

The precise date of Tyndale's removal from Worms to Antwerp is not known, but must have been in the course of 1526. While the priests were busily hunting for copies of the Worms editions of the New Testament, a new and more dangerous, because smaller and more easily concealed, edition appeared to terrify them. It was printed by Christopher Eyndhoven, of Antwerp, who had consigned it to his correspondents in London. The chagrin of the clergy was extreme. No sooner had

* "D'Aubigné's History of the Reformation," vol. v, p. 297

they burned one copy of the New Testament than three more made their appearance. They accused the printer Eyndhoven at Antwerp, but their charges were contemptuously dismissed by the magistrates. The Gospel was beginning to free men from the Papal yoke, to restore the domination of just law, and to protect the inalienable liberties of human beings to do any thing and every thing that is in harmony with the revealed will of their Maker.

England was now ablaze with Gospel truth. The abominable wickednesses of Popery were now fully disclosed by its shining light. Tyndale, in his Belgic refuge, applied its teaching to the social and political life of the English people. He vigorously opposed the divorce of Henry VIII. from Catherine of Arragon, denounced the political interferences of the Papacy, and by the issuance of several controversial and devotional publications strove to enlighten and bless his fellow-citizens. Edition after edition of the New Testament, printed on the Continent, poured into England, and the very fury of the priests, who burned all the precious volumes on which they could lay their hands, only helped the work of the reformer by stimulating the desires of the people to possess them.

Cardinal Wolsey now bent all his energies to compass the death of Tyndale, who was repeatedly forced to change his residence. No powerful Duke of Lancaster, no illustrious Elector of Saxony came forward to shield him. Nevertheless, having completed the translation of the New Testament, he boldly began that of the Old. The learned John Fryth, escaped from the prisons of Oxford, diligently assisted him. In the early part of 1529 they published the Books of Genesis and Deuteronomy, and, in homely style, laid down one excellent principle of interpretation for all Bible students: "As thou readest," said they, "think that every syllable pertaineth to thine own self, and suck out the pith of Scripture."

Tyndale, in September, 1528, took up his abode at Marburg, on the Lahn, almost midway between Frankfort-am-Main and Cologne. There, in 1529, occurred the famous disputation between Luther, Zwingle, Melanchthon, and other reformers on the true nature and character of the Lord's Supper. Whether Tyndale were present at the memorable Marburg Conference is uncertain. Translation, rather than controversy, was his

pressing duty; and he and Fryth quietly pursued the pleasing task of rendering the Hebrew Scriptures into their own vigorous vernacular. They were safe while in the territories of the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, the dreaded opponent of Rome. Yet Tyndale did not shrink from controversy when providentially called to engage therein. In 1529 he proved himself to be more than a match as the champion of Scripture against Sir Thomas More, the cultured champion of the Church of Rome. Unable to silence him by literary argument, More and Tonstall grimly resolved to silence his pen by burning him at the stake.

To effect this deadly purpose Tonstall crossed the North Sea to Antwerp, whither Tyndale and Fryth had again repaired, after their residence in Marburg. All that the crafty bishop succeeded in doing was the purchase of all Tyndale's unsold Testaments, wherewith to celebrate a papal *auto da fé*. But the very money paid out to this end only enabled Tyndale to pay off his harassing debts, and to bring out a fresh and more correct edition of the New Testament. The wily and unscrupulous ecclesiastic overreached himself, and had the mortification of helping the man whom he yearned to stifle in the flames of martyrdom.

Dangers thickened around the courageous apostle. Placards posted at Antwerp announced that the Emperor Charles V. was about to prosecute—or rather persecute—all heretics and their writings. Antwerp is no longer safe for him. He decides to sail for Hamburg. Embarking with his books, his manuscripts, and the remainder of his money, he glides down the Scheldt into the German Ocean, is overtaken by a terrible storm, dashed upon the coast, and barely escapes with his life. Books, manuscripts, and money are all swallowed by the remorseless waves. "Deep calleth unto deep at the noise of thy waterspouts: all thy waves and thy billows go over me." But the hero trusts his God with faith sublime as that of Job, boards another vessel, sails up the well-known Elbe, and is once more in his Hamburg refuge.

Germano-Belgic Period, 1529–1534.

Joy waits for Tyndale at Hamburg. Miles Coverdale, afterward renowned as a translator of the Scriptures, is there on

purpose to assist him. The two friends lodge with the pious Margaret Van Emerson, and spend some time in congenial labor, undisturbed by the sweating sickness which is raging around them. Coverdale soon returned to England, and Tyndale was once more left alone.

But, though alone in a strange city, no man's power was more deeply felt by all England. His book, entitled "The Obedience of a Christian Man," and also his translation of "The Testament of Jesus Christ," had fallen into the hands of Queen Anne Boleyn, and had confirmed her in friendliness to the Reformation, and in antipathy to the Antichrist of Rome. "The Obedience of a Christian Man" fell into the hands of King Henry VIII., and captivated him by the soundness of its reasoning, and the vigor of its style. It also added intensity to his own opposition to the papacy; but he did not allow it to lead him into submission to the King of kings. About two years after this Henry sought to induce Tyndale to return to England, rightly thinking that he might render excellent service in the conflict with the papacy. But in vain did he offer the reformer a safe-conduct under the sign manual; in vain did he make the most gracious promises. Tyndale would not hearken. He had not thrown off the yoke of an ecclesiastical to put on that of a secular pope. Besides, Henry himself had opposed the circulation of the Scriptures, which the great Head of the Church had commanded to be circulated throughout the world. Tyndale profoundly mistrusted Henry Tudor, refused his invitation, and gave him some excellent advice. Henry was terribly exasperated, and thenceforth thought only how he could arrest and punish the expatriated servant of God for his faithfulness.

The importation of Testaments from Hamburg went on without effective interruption. They entered England by the ship-load. Enemies bought up and burned some, but still more became the cherished treasures of Christian families. Hitton was burned at the stake in 1530 for importing Testaments. In 1531 the bloodthirsty monster, Henry VIII., spilled the life-blood of Bilney, Bainham, Bayfield, Tewkesbury, and many others "of whom the world was not worthy."

Meanwhile, the multitude of Bible readers and believers had effected something like a Church organization, wholly

independent of Rome, under the name of "The Society of Chrsitian Brethren." They established a central committee in London, and sent out missionaries who distributed the Holy Scriptures, and explained their doctrines in simple language. Several priests, both in city and country, belonged to this organization. Vain was the rage of man. In vain did kings "set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Anointed, saying, Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us." Psa. ii, 2, 3. The word of the Lord could not be bound. The waves of divine knowledge broke through every barrier, brought salvation to longing souls, swept away old iniquities and abuses, and caused England to rejoice and blossom as the garden of the Lord.

Even the English dogs caught the antipathy of their owners to the papacy. One of these, a spaniel with long silky hair, was taken by his master, the Earl of Wiltshire, and Henry's embassador to the Pope, to Rome in the year 1530. Pope Clement, clad in pontifical robes, seated in his throne, and surrounded by cardinals, received Wiltshire and his fellow-diplomats with great pomp. They approached, and made the usual salutations. Willing to show his kindly feelings, the Pontiff put out his slippered foot, in order that the proud Englishmen might kiss the cross embroidered thereon. This they disdainfully refused to do. The spaniel, which had followed his master into the episcopal palace, did more than decline. When the Pope extended his foot, the dog flew at it, caught it by the great toe, and held that sensitive member fast between his teeth. Clement hastily pulled his foot back again. The scene was too ridiculous. The embassadors were ready to burst with laughter, and hid their faces behind their long rich sleeves. "That dog was a Protestant," said a priest. "Whatever he was," replied an Englishman, "he taught us that a pope's foot was more meet to be bitten by dogs than kissed by Christian men." * The revolution of thought and feeling indicated by this singular spectacle was very largely the work of the isolated and persecuted translator.

Tyndale, whose hiding-place in the neighborhood of Antwerp was unknown to his malignant foes, continued to prosecute

* D'Aubigné's "History of the Reformation in the Time of Calvin," vol. iv, p. 25.

his great work of translating and publishing the Scriptures in English. In 1532 he was left alone by his colleague, John Fryth, who returned to England to scatter the Gospel there in person. Fryth fell into the hands of his mortal foe, Sir Thomas More, in the month of October, and in the following year was condemned to the flames. Tyndale wrote him from Antwerp not to fear "men that threat, nor trust men that speak fair. Your cause," said he, "is Christ's Gospel, a light that must be fed with the blood of faith." Fryth neither feared nor flinched. On the 4th of July he was burned at Smithfield—a sweet light shining on his face while he besought God to pardon his enemies.

Tyndale was living at Antwerp, a beloved guest in the house of Thomas Poyntz, a warm-hearted English merchant, when an English ship brought the tidings of his faithful colleague's martyrdom. Fryth's cruel fate foreshadowed his own, and caused him to redouble his zeal in the Master's service. He visited and relieved the poor, studied and preached with intense zeal, and labored unremittingly in his work of translating the Old Testament. "He is master of seven languages," remarked Busche, the disciple of Reuchlin, "Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, English, French; and so thoroughly that, whichever he is speaking, one might believe it to be his mother-tongue." * And yet Rome had no use for such a man, except to burn him. That, however, she could not do till his work was done. Four new editions of the New Testament issued from the Antwerp presses in 1534. Tyndale presented Queen Anne with a handsome copy of his New Testament, which she highly prized and profitably pondered to the hour of her death. Encouraged by her active friendliness, the adherents of the Gospel printed six more editions of the New Testament for sale in the English market. The flood that was to sweep the papal dominion away from English soil was becoming resistless. No efforts availed to stay the swelling torrent. To say that the Romish prelates hated Tyndale as the source of the deluge is not to do justice to the diabolic intensity of their malice. They longed and groaned for his blood, and compassed land and sea to spill it on the ground.

* D'Aubigné's "History of the Reformation in the Time of Calvin," vol. v, p. 31.

CROWNING PERIOD, 1534–1536.

The great translator's enemies were about to effect their nefarious designs. Chief among these foes was Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, the ecclesiastical Fouché of Henry VIII., and a Churchly Scotland Yard detective of the cunningest and most unscrupulous type. His instruments were like himself. Two of them were sent to Antwerp to destroy Tyndale. One was a specious hypocrite, named Phillips; the other a vicious and crafty monk, named Gabriel Dunne. Both received welcome entrance into the hospitable mansion of Thomas Poyntz. Tyndale, attracted by the conversation of Phillips, invited him into his library, showed him his books and manuscripts, conversed with him about his past and future labors, and the means at his command for circulating the Scriptures throughout England. The guileless Nathanael unbosomed himself to the insidious Judas. Phillips, acting under Dunne's instructions, went to Brussels, and concocted plans for the betrayal of his benefactor, Tyndale. Accompanied by the papal officers he returned to the house of Poyntz, who was absent from home, stationed them along the street and at the entrance of the alley leading to the house, and "gave them a sign." "I shall come out with Tyndale," said the new Iscariot, "and the man I point out with my finger is the one you will seize."

With these words he entered the house, complimented Tyndale, and by means of a base lie borrowed thirty pounds of him. Tyndale then invited Phillips to dine with him at the house of a friend. The covetous, miserable wretch gladly accepts. Together they start down the alley. Tyndale, who is of middle size, goes first at the urgent request of Phillips, who is very tall, and who walks with forefinger extended over his victim's head. The officers recognize the traitor's sign. Their hard hearts melt with pity for the simple, unsuspecting prey. They seize him, and conduct him to the house of the imperial prosecutor, who hastens to Tyndale's lodging, and carries off papers, books, and all that belonged to him. This booty, together with his prisoner, he places in a carriage, and drives off. A journey of three hours brings them to the strong castle of Vilvorde, two or three leagues from Brussels,

on the banks of the Senne, surrounded on all sides by water, and flanked by seven towers. The drawbridge is lowered, Tyndale is delivered to the governor, and placed in a safe place. Antichrist triumphs at last. Judas boasts of his exploit. Tyndale will not come out, except to die.

It is the month of August, 1535. The husbandmen are reaping the fruits of the earth in the fat and fruitful Belgium. England is reaping a richer harvest than that of Belgium. It is a harvest of spiritual blessings that spring from the prisoner's sowing. He himself will shortly reap the harvest of life eternal.

Tyndale in prison at Vilvorde is infinitely happier than his betrayer at the imperial court. His countrymen cannot save him. King Henry VIII. and the English prelates gloat over his capture; but he finds abundant consolations in Christ. His prison proves to be a palace—Jesus is with him there. His prison hours are employed in preparing for the humble toilers in his native county, and the counties adjoining, an edition of the Bible in which he used the language and orthography of that section of England. Thus he fulfilled the vow made many years before in the words: "If God preserves my life, I will cause a boy that driveth a plow to know more of the Scriptures than the Pope."

Two additional editions of Tyndale's New Testament appeared during the first year of his captivity. His publication of the Old Testament, translated from the Hebrew text, seemed to have been frustrated by the fiendish treachery of Phillips. But Rogers, who succeeded the martyred Fryth as Tyndale's colleague, had providentially rescued the manuscript of the Old Testament at the moment when Phillips effected the perfidious arrest. He afterward printed it in the great folio Bible, which was issued with such secrecy that it is not yet certainly known in what city it passed through the press. Hamburg, Antwerp, Marburg, Lübeck, and even Paris, have been named. Bonnet, the French bibliopole, affirms that it was printed by Froschover of Zurich. Certain it is that it was published. Then, when his life-work was done, the craft and malice of Rome were permitted to wreak their vengeance on the great translator. His was the joy of perfect and assured success.

Tyndale's last days were full of great peace and divine

sweetness. The jailer, his daughter, and other members of his household, were converted to Christ by the saintly prisoner's life and doctrine. His friends put forth the utmost exertion to save him, but without avail. In August, 1536, he was arraigned before the ecclesiastical court for having infringed the imperial decree forbidding any one to teach that faith alone justifies. The accusation was true, and Tyndale's doctrine was also true. The imperial decree was utterly antichristian and indefensible. Tyndale defended himself with such scriptural logic and touching eloquence as to win the minds and hearts of the court that tried him. "Truly," exclaimed the procurator-general, "truly this was a good, learned, and pious man!" But that was the very reason why the Romish priests, like the murderers of our Lord, thirsted for his blood.

Tyndale was declared guilty, was solemnly deprived of his clerical character, expelled from the Church of Rome, and delivered to the secular power for capital punishment. Can such things be possible on this beautiful earth? What a mystery of iniquity is Roman Catholicism! The secular authorities delayed his execution for two months. Full of faith, peace, and joy, he waited the hour when he should step into the chariot of fire, and ascend far up above all worlds to be forever with the Lord. "Well," said one who observed him closely at Vilvorde, "if that man is not a good Christian, we do not know of one upon earth."

Rome, "drunken with the blood of the saints," was bent on burning him. Friday, October 5, 1536, brought release from all sufferings. In the ripeness of his knowledge, love, and usefulness; his eye yet bright, and his natural strength not abated, William Tyndale passed, for the last time, beyond the outward walls, and halted without the fortifications. A crowd is gathered to witness his death. They behold not the punishment of a heretic, but the triumph of a martyr. Memory is vivid and accurate in this awful hour. But it is not of childhood days in the sunny fields and leafy woods of the Severn vale; not of student years at Oxford, nor of the heavenly light that there streamed into his soul through the pages of Erasmus' Greek Testament; not of pleasant conferences with fellow-heroes at Cambridge; not of the generous hospitalities

of Sodbury, nor of the sojourn at Hamburg, the flight from Cologne, the printing of the Gospel at Worms; not of the labors of Marburg, and the toils of Antwerp; not of the traitor Phillips, nor of the Vilvorde jail, that he thinks now. It is of the dissemination of the Bible in England, the rescue of his people from the slough of superstition and vice, and the glorious liberty of the children of God into which the written word should lead them. Henry Tudor barred the way. Of him the sufferer thinks, and for him he prays. While the executioner fastens him to the post, he cries in suppliant voice, "Lord, open the king of England's eyes!" Like his Lord, like the proto-martyr Stephen, his last prayer is for his murderers. Who shall say that that prayer was not answered? He is strangled, and then burned.

Scarcely had "the apostle of England in this our later age" —as John Foxe termed him—ascended to his celestial home, when Richard Grafton, the printer, went to London, presented Tyndale's Bible to Archbishop Cranmer, and begged him to procure its free circulation. Cranmer examined it, and was delighted with it. Fidelity, clearness, strength, simplicity, unction—all were combined in this admirable translation. He sent the book to Cromwell, "the hammer of the monks," and requested that statesman to present it to his Majesty, and to obtain permission for it to be sold, until such time as the bishops should put forth a better translation, which, he added, "I think will not be till a day after doomsday."

Henry ran over the book. Tyndale's name was not in it. The dedication to himself was well written. He saw that it would help him to emancipate England from papal thralldom, and unexpectedly came to a very astounding decision. *He authorized the sale and the reading of the Bible throughout the kingdom.* Verily, William Tyndale had not lived in vain.

The people received the Bible with enthusiasm. Those who knew its history saw that it was printed with the blood of the apostolic translator. All who could bought and read it; or had it read to them by others. Aged persons learned their letters in order to study its pages. Poor people clubbed their savings together, and purchased copies which they read by turns to the crowds around them. The fetters of popery fell from the limbs of England. Tyndale had prayed that he

might see it on fire by his Master's word, and from his throne in the new Jerusalem beheld the answer to his prayer. "Of the translation itself, though since that time it has been many times revised and altered, we may say that it is substantially the Bible with which we are all familiar. The peculiar genius—if such a word may be permitted—which breathes through it—the mingled tenderness and majesty, the Saxon simplicity, the preternatural grandeur, unequaled, unapproached, in the attempted improvements of modern scholars—all are here, and bear the impress of the mind of one man—William Tyndale." * All judicious critics are unanimous in praise of this immortal work.

Notices and biographies of the great translator are numerous. Tanner, Bliss, Wood, Foxe, Walter, Offor, Wordsworth, Dryden, Newcome, Johnson, Lewis, Cotton, Anderson, Townley, Horne, and many others have kept his memory green. A monument marks the spot on Nibley Knoll where he is supposed to have first seen the light.

The revision of the Authorized, or King James's, Version, of the Scriptures has recalled the memory and services of England's martyr-apostle, and suggested the idea of erecting a statue to his honor. A committee, with Lord Shaftesbury at its head, was formed for that purpose. A fine site on the Thames Embankment in London was obtained from the Metropolitan Board of Works. J. E. Boehm, a sculptor of the highest eminence, and famous for his statue of John Bunyan at Bedford, was requested to prepare a design for the work. Subscriptions to defray the estimated cost of $20,000 were invited from all lovers of the Bible. The clergy of the Established and Dissenting Churches; the universities, counties, towns, and societies of Great Britain; the clergy and laity of the British colonies, and of the United States, gladly poured in their contributions. The bronze statue, representing Tyndale in his doctor's robes, and holding an open New Testament in his right hand, is soon to be placed on its pedestal.

The fathers drove Tyndale out of the country with threats and curses; the sons eulogistically erect a monument in his praise. Noble and eloquent orations will accompany its inauguration. But that creation of art and love is not the principal

* Froude's "History of England," vol. iii, pp. 86, 87.

monument of the holy translator. The Bible itself is his chief remembrancer. His version of "God's Word written" laid deep and firm the foundation of England's greatness. Baptized with the blood of Fryth and Tyndale and Rogers, it laid the foundations of a new and greater England on the American shores of the wild Atlantic, and of other Englands in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. In each and all it is the fountain of liberty, the guide of legislation, the guarantee of law, the glory of the Church, the strength of society, the comfort of the soul, the perennial principle of progress. Those great and growing commonwealths are component parts of one of the grandest monuments possible to the memory of man—a monument on which the instructed eye fails not to see, inscribed in letters of living light, the name of WILLIAM TYNDALE, THE FIRST TRANSLATOR OF THE HOLY BIBLE INTO THE PRINTED ENGLISH VERNACULAR.

ART. III.—BISHOP HURST'S BIBLIOTHECA THEOLOGICA.

Bibliotheca Theologica. A Select and Classified Bibliography of Theology and General Religious Literature. By JOHN F. HURST, LL.D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1883.

BIBLIOSOPHY is quite another thing from Bibliomania. The bibliosopher extracts wisdom from books, the bibliomaniac worships their bindings, even their deformities, knowing seldom more than the eccentricities and title-pages of his idols, sometimes not even that. "He know any thing about books!" exclaimed one of these victims of the *delirium librorum*, when told of the bibliographical attainments of a distinguished scholar; "Perhaps he may, of the insides of them!"

Nevertheless, the bibliosopher is sometimes a bibliographer too; he often knows books by heart *and* by title. Abundant in knowledge, he knows where more can be had; he can tell you what he knows, and also, what may prove more important, where he found it, where unworked beds of it lie yet undisturbed. Bishop Hurst, in giving us a list of titles, such as his "Bibliotheca Theologica" contains, has earned gratitude, if not glory. He has performed one of those services which, like

giving a cup of cold water, cannot lose its reward. Many a young man eager to become a master in some one department of theological literature will find in this book the beginnings of power, the suggestions for a comprehensive self-culture, which he might otherwise seek for years and, haply, not discover. For of the scores who are ready to advise him, not all are competent; he may run, as the German by-word goes, from Pontius to Pilate, receiving only confusion for all his seeking. But here is a classified list of all, or nearly all, the theological literature of any value in the English language. Let him devote himself to what topic he may, he need but turn over these pages to find what is necessary to start him in his studies.

The young minister who is beginning a library must not, however, fancy that the "Bibliotheca" is to be used as the rustic used his bill of fare, that he is to eat his way through from A to Z. On the contrary, he must begin a simultaneous construction of the four great departments of Theology: the Exegetical, the Historical, the Systematic, and the Practical. Bishop Hurst has done well to build his library upon so simple a ground-plan, four walls and an entrance hall, four great departments and an introduction, into which he gathers Bibliography, Lexicography, Cartography, and the so-called Libraries of Theology. The student, also, will do well to build his libraries, the one in his study and the one in his brain, upon a ground-plan equally simple. For each of these departments supports and is necessary to the other. Even exegesis, which, at first blush, might seem to be merely a question of linguistic knowledge and skill, is of little value when sundered from historical fact and from practical acquaintance with the diverse forms of spiritual life and society as displayed in different countries and epochs. What he shall buy is also quite a different question from what he shall read. Bacon's maxim is the final word upon this point. Some books are to be tasted and some are to be chewed. It has sometimes occurred to me that our itinerancy needs an itinerant's library to make it complete. It would require no great contribution from each of us to build up a conference library containing every book in the "Bibliotheca Theologica," and many more, some of which might circulate freely among the members of the conference, while others remained at some central point to be consulted by the brethren

as time permitted or necessity required. But such an arrangement is perhaps impracticable, and in any event there are many books which every man fit to preach at all does well to keep always within arm's length; and the intelligent user of Bishop Hurst's book should mark at once, in each of the great departments, these "indispensables." Certainly that is a foolish, not to say impertinent, criticism which I have somewhere seen, the pith of which is the truism that a list of books cannot be made so self-shrinking and self-intelligent that the would-be buyer needs but show his purse to have the list exhibit to him just what he ought to buy. For intelligent friends, though never found in shoals, are nevertheless discoverable to the earnest seeker; and, moreover, the first two pages of Bishop Hurst's "Bibliotheca" contains mention of more than one book which will help the beginner in theology to discriminate between the dispensables and the indispensables.

As one turns over the leaves of this volume, containing its 375 pages of mere book-titles—these, too, of works in a language not the most prolific in theological lore—one is fain to reflect upon the history of books, the history of creeds, the history of religious thought, or perhaps it is better to say, in view of some of these treatises, of thought about religion. What a long stride from Cadmus to Franklin, from hieroglyph to stereotype, from graver's tool to printing-press, from the parchments of Pisistratus to the vast treasures of the British Museum or the Boston Public Library!

Bibliography among the ancients involved no great labor, yet what has come down to us is scant and fragmentary. What would we not have given had the Alexandrian Library fallen into the hands of some indexing genius like Mr. Poole! Aristotle wrote a treatise upon books of which a few bits only yet remain, but any of "the thoughts that wander through eternity," whose first utterance was the splendid birthright of Hellenic genius, have been pieced together only after wearisome search from page to page and author to author. By such painstaking reconstruction Mullach has enabled us to stand face to face with the mutilated originals of Greek philosophy, the Elgin marbles of the ancient mind. Indeed, nearly all our knowledge of the scope and number of the literary labors of antiquity is due to modern scholars.

But the worker in these fields has one great advantage; production has ceased. Whereas bibliography, in an age of polyglot culture such as ours, is a task to break the spine of Hercules or Atlas. In our time every art has its literature, every profession its treatises, every city books about it as well as within it. We are inundated, overwhelmed, swept away with the flood which pours down from above and wells up from beneath. The pursuit of a specialty is but a form of self-protection, like climbing a mountain to escape a deluge. Nay-even the literature of the specialties is carrying all but the strongest swimmers from their course. Take, for example, Vaihinger's recently published commentary upon Kant. To master the literature there heaped up about a single name is enough to occupy the entire life of a more than ordinary man. For this reason, not to speak of other weighty ones, the future of bibliography must run more and more to monographs. A dictionary of all books is sheer impossible. Even Ebert saw, sixty years ago, the uselessness of any attempt to record the title of all books ever published, and marked out clearly the lines in which the study has since been moving; and we need not bemoan this inevitable abandonment of an enterprise far more ambitious than useful. Bibliography will return to its starting-point of single lists with chastened and clearer mind. It will become auxiliary to science and to literature, surrendering its haughty pretensions to be a science in itself. Certainly we would all have been grateful enough to the Alexandrian grammarian, who arranged the dialogues of Plato, had he also made out for us a catalogue of all the books which in after years were consumed by Omar's fiery logic. But the list of titles, however interesting, without the books, could have served us naught or little; whereas the preservation of Plato has affected the structure of the Aryan mind. I am well aware of Henry Stevens's pregnant saying that the bibliographer must be no respecter of books, not knowing which is destined to immortality. The despised pamphlet of to-day may in the course of centuries become a priceless literary or historical treasure. All of which is true enough, and worthy to be bound upon the frontlets of every librarian in the land. Yet few of us do well to project ourselves so far into the future, or to gloat through our descendants' eyes over the literary trash

which time shall have converted into literary treasure. Our work is for to-day. It must be done between sun-up and sun-down. The book-list we need must bear upon the topic in hand. We have neither patience for waiting, nor strength or wisdom for searching. Happy is the worker among books who has learned to know and use these lists. While other men are ransacking volumes to find a fact or precedent, he cuts straight to the spot. I have seen men waste hours, and even days, searching for what a little skill in bibliography would have given them in a few moments, they being too proud to ask for help, and, in this particular, too ignorant to help themselves.

But, though bibliography will gain rather than lose by this return to its starting-point, such magnificent work as that of Brunet must always excite our admiration. It could have been produced only in a country where the making of books, no matter what their kind, is a work of fine art. The Englishman's sense of the practical, the German's love of moling among the roots of things, make the kind of enthusiasm impossible which is required when the biography of a book is to be studied as though it were a living thing. But the French founder of the science of bibliography seems to have been born to emphasize through seven huge volumes Milton's splendid saying, "Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life." The evident delight with which he dwells upon details which would escape all but the fondest lover would provoke a smile could the sense of wonder for a moment abate. Yet Ebert, whose valuable bibliographical dictionary is one of the very few omissions in Bishop Hurst's book worth noting, has ventured to call the bibliography of Brunet restricted bibliography, and to contrast it with what he boldly terms bibliography pure. The German librarian's point of view is, however, the only one adapted to the Teutonic eye. He must get to the "grund," to the very core and heart of the matter, to the thing in itself, to the book in itself, stripped of its accidents and history.

English bibliography has been essentially practical; helpful to the book buyer and book seller, helpful also to the book reader and book writer.

Now scratch an American and you find an Englishman. So, although our American bibliography has a bigness and a boldness quite Western, it is essentially English in its spirit. What stronger proof of this could we have than the appearance in one year of Poole's "Index," Soule's "Lawyer's Reference Manual," and Bishop Hurst's "Bibliotheca Theologica?" Each of these is thoroughly practical in aim and execution, and the publication of the latter two has brought the practitioners of law and theology somewhere near the bibliographical level of the medical profession, who already possessed an inestimable treasure in the catalogue of the splendid library in the Surgeon-General's office at Washington.

I have already spoken of the simplicity of the ground-plan upon which Bishop Hurst has built; but I am not so sure that I can praise the very numerous subdivisions he has thought best to make. Nor am I altogether satisfied with his admission of books into his list, which, however valuable to the theological student, are hardly theological in purpose or in substance. Kant's remark that the frontiers of the sciences must never overlap is especially binding upon the bibliographer. To neglect it opens the door to caprice; the exclusions are hard to explain upon any principle that does not banish many of those included. On what principle, for instance, admit Mrs. Oliphant's "Makers of Florence" and exclude the far more important works of Burckhardt and of Symonds? What right has Herbert Spencer to a place which cannot be claimed with more of justice for David Hume? But these, if they be failings at all, are failings that lean to virtue's side. More serious are some omissions, of which I might name Locke's "Essay upon Toleration," Laing's edition of the "Complete Works of John Knox," and Lorimer's "John Knox and the Church of England." The yet uncompleted "Thesaurus Syraicus," edited by Payne Smith, should hardly have been passed over. In the list pertaining to the ecclesiastical history of the United States I miss especially Morgan Edwards's "History of the Baptists," a work as valuable as it is rare. The Librarian of Pennsylvania may be pardoned for regretting that he finds no mention of the Mennonites, and the very conspicuous absence of the "Religious Works of William Penn!" To one who loves him, the non-appearance of the Venerable Bede seems like a failure to invite a dear and

honored friend. Montalembert's "Monks of the West," which has here rightly found a place, is a charming book, I know, but it can never supersede (what book could?) the "Ecclesiastical History of England," a translation of which is one of Bohn's Antiquarian Library. And speaking of Montalembert reminds me that Augustin Thierry's "Stories of the Merovingian Times" is nothing more than a splendid rendering of the chronicle of Bishop Gregory of Tours, and should by all means have a place under the rubric France.

But enough of this. The student of theology can hardly turn over this patiently wrought-out table of contents and not awake to the magnitude and dignity of his chosen pursuit. Especially is this true of the departments of Historical and Systematic Theology. The former is the study of human aspiration in both its phases, intellectual and spiritual; the study of the mind in its struggle with falsehood and error; of conscience in its desperate fight with passions inward and outward born; the study of the lives of the chosen few who have risked their all of existence and of hope in the conflict with steel-clad prejudice, with the engineries of organized tradition impatient of light and liberty, or with the tumult of licentious mobs whose unsated and insatiable fury is worse than hail or pestilence or earthquake. Who, on the one hand, can trace the history of doctrines from the *Pistis Sophia* to the New Haven Theology, from Marcion to Newman Smyth, without a touch of sadness to sickly o'er his consciousness of dearly purchased liberty of opinion? Who, on the other hand, does not thrill at the suggestions of names like Bohemia, Waldenses, Moravians, Lollards, Jansenists, Jesuits? What a shrunken thing were human history without the story of man's struggle to break his way toward the light! What a shrunken thing were the human soul, its aspirations for the truth once gone! A burnt out volcano, discarded wrapping of a heart of fire! A waste of sand, hot, stifling, destitute of plant or flower, where once the blue waters reflected the sky and stars!

I cannot sympathize with those who think to make men wise in the truth by keeping them in ignorance of every form of error. Indeed, the perennial heresies—those which originate, as it were, by spontaneous combustion in every generation—originate either among the ignorant or the learned-ignorant.

Many a man rushes forward in these days with a discovery which scholars know to be as old as Celsus; others float into notice upon craft built for all the world like Spinoza's neglected treatise upon the Old Testament, sublimely unconscious how little there is of newness in the model of their ship. But the study of Error is one form of the study of Truth. It is in the study of human thought, what morbid physiology is in the study of the human body. It cannot secure us against disease, but it may help us cure it; it can make us kindlier toward the erring; it may make us careful of our own feet, lest we, too, go astray.

Then, again, in these days of inductive science, we are seeing very clearly that only by comparison can we arrive at causes and measure their respective potencies. Each historical epoch, each genesis of doctrine, is a problem to be solved. Each individual display of grace or power challenges us to discover the reason of its being. If we are ever to know the practical value of Christianity, if we are ever to know just what elements in it have been most effective, we must study it as one of the producing causes of modern institutions, modern societies, modern men. The careless *post hoc propter hoc* method so much in vogue must be abandoned for one more conclusive because more scientific. But in that case we shall need knowledge and more knowledge. We shall have to learn to add algebraically as well as arithmetically, to strike a balance between opposing tendencies, not in one group of historical phenomena only, but in scores and hundreds. The *quod est demonstrandum* which is so often shouted nowadays by those "who think to bear it by being peremptory," will make but little impression unless we are expert in all the facts and methods needful to sustain it. Until then, the plainly told experience of the humblest convert will be more effective to demonstrate the value of Christian faith than any rhetorical outgush of undigested historical generalization. That is a dwarfed and stunted theologian who knows doctrines in their verbal statement only, but nothing of their inception and their growth; that is a sounding brass and tinkling symbol who is forever prating of the value of Christianity to the human race, yet takes no pains to discover precisely what the world was over which Christianity began to flow, or the successive changes which this

new encircling of our planet with light and warmth has induced upon its surface.

Of Systematic Theology it is difficult to speak. What names confront us here! Augustine, Calvin, Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor; Anselm, the conqueror's conqueror; Butler, Dorner, Naville, Bushnell! What topics, too, are here! God and the Universe; Necessity and Liberty; Christ and the Resurrection; Atheism, with its skeleton front; Skepticism, with its hopeless eyes; Pantheism, with its vague sublimity; Agnosticism, with its haughty *non possumus;* Evolution, unbuilding and rebuilding in thought the universe of fact; Dogmatic Science and Scientific Dogma, now approaching, now repelling, each the other, from the days when Tertullian poured out his passionate protests against the alliance of the Gospel of Christ with the philosophy of Greece. Brave old Tertullian, with his heart of fire and his throat of steel—how gladly would I welcome him to a modern college, with its faculty of Christian teachers, or to a theological seminary, with its corps of specialists!

How gladly would I hear his clamor and his protest! One may be disposed to call him a Barbarian, as Ritter called Tatian, but his barbarism was like that of Luther, the outbreak of a healthy nature which feared for the robust life of the young Christianity in an atmosphere laden to stifling with Grecian subtleties and Epicurean sweetness. How healthy that instinct was the whole subsequent scholastic period is a witness. Christian doctrine during its continuance was so overlaid with philosophic embroideries of every sort that the seamless garment of Christ became a Joseph's coat of many colors; simplicity gave place to subtlety; the words of Christ were lost in the jargon of disputation. That the doctrine of justification by faith had to be re-discovered by Martin Luther can only be accounted for by studying the drift which the theologic mind had taken in the centuries between Tertullian and the Reformation. The Greek poison had done its work; love of truth had been swallowed up in the love of intellectual cunning. On the intellectual side Luther's revolt was against the Thomists and their philosophical messiah, Aristotle, who had supplanted Christ and Paul, just as on the political and ecclesiastical side it was a revolt against the supremacy of the

Pope, who, as vicar of Christ, was trying to supplant both earthly and heavenly authority. Tertullian and Luther went too far, for theology cannot absolutely dispense with philosophy. To repel attacks which in their very nature imply a system of metaphysics, materialistic, pantheistic, atheistic, is a task from which theology will not soon escape. But attempts to substitute metaphysical for historical foundations, to build up a theology upon a speculative basis, in the present state of our knowledge, resemble the attempt to build a castle upon a shifting shore, castle and builders alike are apt to be tumbled headlong into the sea. Yet this desire to eliminate as much as possible the metaphysical element from our systematic theology, and to remand what remains to its proper place, implies neither a disinclination to have the truths of revelation worked up into a coherent and logical system, nor a refusal to accept the psychology and metaphysics which such a system may clearly require. To object to systematic theology would be quite as absurd as to object to systematic physics or systematic botany or systematic geology. God gives us facts, and we must make our systems in every department of investigation. But just as Copernicus studied the planets rather than the astronomies of his time; just as Galileo abandoned Aristotle, and sought knowledge of the inclined plane and the telescope; just as Newton reasoned from falling apple to falling moon, and from breaking spectrum to compound light, so the master of systematic theology must return to the truth as revealed in Jesus, in Moses, in Paul, in John. Our theology must be drawn from the facts of the Bible and from the facts of personal experience, not read *into* and reasoned *into* both. Tertullian's *Credo quia absurdum est*, while seeming to shut the door upon all philosophy, has been the frantic expostulation of every metaphysical devil, which a clearer knowledge of the truth in Jesus has tried to expel from the contorted body of his bride. On the other hand, Anselm's *Credo ut intelligam* has been often mutilated into *Credo ut intelligo*. Instead of the belief shaping the understanding, the understanding has shaped belief. Texts have been torn from context, emptied of their meaning, or tortured to express a false one; the part has been made greater than the whole, the letter greater than the spirit, in order to sustain hypotheses that never had any higher

warrant than human speculation, often none higher than human caprice and human passion. Anselm's own *Cur Deus Homo* is a striking example of this tendency; he seems himself to have been so far conscious of his departure from the Augustinian *credimus ut cognoscamus* as to change his maxim into *intellige ut credas*, to which I have no objection as a rule for private guidance, but upon which I declare eternal war when another's *intelligo* is used by him to maim and cripple my belief. I confess, therefore, that in looking over Bishop Hurst's book I have at times wished that he had grouped together somewhere by themselves all the doctrinal topics of the New Testament, and ranged around them the treatises written for their elucidation, or that he had divided Doctrinal Theology into Expository, Apologetical, and Controversial. But for purposes of daily use his arrangement is far more convenient; and although it jars upon my sense of fitness to find "The Incarnation" immediately followed by "Infidelity," still I remember that dictionaries and works of reference must sacrifice logical forms to the demands of constant use. Here, as in most things, we are dominated by the needs of the present. In spite of Copernicus and Galileo, the sun still rises and sets in the almanacs of science, as well as in the speech and to the senses of the vulgar. The maker of a bibliography may well plead in his favor a law so powerful.

The exegetical section of Bishop Hurst's book, which has been built up with loving care, reveals, as hardly any thing else could, the amazing change in the spirit of exegesis which has taken place in the last three centuries. Few, indeed, are the Christian thinkers of any school who would now deal with Scripture as Calvin did. Texts are no longer bits of glass in exegetical kaleidoscopes, to be turned and shifted into all possible combinations, each of which is divinely ordered. The mind of the writer is now regarded as the mirror of the spirit. As no one would think of studying light without studying the nature of the eye, so no one expects to-day to understand the Father of Lights without a careful study of the organ of revelation. All that in any way can help us to such an understanding—local geography, current tradition, ethnological peculiarities, prevalent modes of thought and of speech, political conditions and aspirations, chronological color, and

historical development—are eagerly sought after and seized upon to help us in our efforts. Certainly there is much danger of pedantry here, and of that vermicular erudition which surprises more than it illuminates. Folly is a perennial and ubiquitous crop; but the erudite species of it is perhaps as harmless as any other. Exegesis, to be of marked value, must of course be mixed with brains. But unless we are all wrong about the Bible, such brain-mixed exegesis can never be overdone.

To Martin Luther, especially, we are indebted for the informing spirit of modern exegesis. No one can look through his letters, or read the "Table-talk," without being struck and moved by his attitude toward the Bible. He threw himself upon it to wrestle for its meaning. The cry of Jacob was on his lips: "Tell me thy name! thy nature thou!" The whole of its secret was not disclosed to him, nor has it been to any man. Like the great Being from whom it came, it permits the seeker of its glory to see only the trailing garments of its splendor, the cloud, the blaze, the movement of the spirit. As with Moses, so with him, the very darkness that covers him may be the hiding hand of God, who even in the outbursts of his grandeur preserves a strict economy, and by successive glimpses of his power strengthens his children to at last behold his face.

But though Luther's mental attitude toward the Bible was so frank, so unaffected, and in some respects so bold, how different were his surroundings from those of the modern student! What original texts are at our service! What advances have been made in the knowledge of ancient tongues! To what minuteness of detail have we carried our knowledge of ancient lands and ancient peoples! Could any one have told the Ritter George as he worked away in his room in the Wartburg, sore pressed by his own obtuseness and the cunning of the devil, how in after years the texts of manuscripts would be compared, how even the learning of Erasmus and of his own dear Philip would seem but trifling in an age of Tischendorff, of Ewald, of Tregelles, of Jelf, of Ellicott, of Westcott; could any one have told him what Lepsius and Wilkinson would write of Egypt, what Stanley would write of Sinai and of Palestine, his heart would have turned to water, and his untranslated Bible grown moldy from his tears. "Who am I," he would have cried, "to attempt this mighty work?" "What

need has God of bunglers?" But Jehovah placed him in a cleft of the rock, and covered him with his hand, as he passed by. The future was hidden from him, for had he beheld it, we would have beheld it not! "I will cause that the boy that followeth the plow shall know more of the Scriptures than thou dost!" said Tyndale to the ignorant priest. Brave Tyndale of the Christ-like heart! what wouldst thou say, wert thou living now? God has indeed "provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be perfect."

But I must not forget that the work of Bishop Hurst is confined chiefly to the books which are to be found in our mother-tongue, excepting some few great works in Latin which could hardly be omitted. Yet in looking over the list of translations we must be struck, I think, by the potency of French influence upon our theological development, a fact too apt to be neglected. Calvin, Pascal, Fénelon, our own John Flechière, Chateaubriand, Lammenais, Lacordaire, Montalembert have affected us in a positive direction far more than Voltaire or Rénan in a negative.

We Americans, not living, as our English cousins do, within a day's ride of the heart of France, are quite unconscious of the currents of Gallic influence which are a part of England's intellectual atmosphere. But we need only to think of Calvin's relation to Knox, of Fletcher's relation to Wesley, of the theological and social reaction which found its literary exponent in Joseph De Maistre, and its ecclesiastical champions in Henry Manning and John Henry Newman, to become aware that even our spiritual existence is shaped, or at least colored, by all that reaches England from across the channel.

On the other hand, the absence of all but a few Italian and Spanish names tells a story that needs no comment. The land of Da Vinci and of Galileo has produced in modern times a Galvani, a Secchi, a Cavour, but no second Anselm, no second Thomas of Aquino, no second Savonarola, not even a second Hildebrand. Theological greatness in Spain centered in Loyola and Suarez until Mr. Shorthouse discovered Molinos for us. But in the book before us, Loyola appears only by the portentous shadow which he throws; a shadow not unmixed with light, as every student of Jesuit missions in America must willingly confess.

But of German influence upon English theology it is not so easy to speak. It is apparently very great, but there is such a thing as mistaking sympathy for influence, likeness of mental and spiritual structure for discipleship and pupilage. German influence upon English theology began with the appearance of Erasmus in England, for though from Rotterdam he was essentially a German. It ceased almost entirely with the revolt in the Netherlands and the Thirty Years' War, not to be resumed until the present century, except in the one marked case of the Moravians and Wesley. But a hundred years ago the Germans had answered the French sneer, "Can a Teuton have genius?" by a manifestation of intellectual powers as wonderful as they were various. Kant shook the old dogmatic metaphysics from its foundation, and gave materialism a blow from which it never has, and never can, recover. Herder entered into history like a creative spirit, and chaos began to take on shape. Poets like Schiller revealed a critical faculty of the highest order. Goethe made poetry into science, and science into poetry. Lessing carried criticism to perfection in his "Laoccoon," and yet wrote dramas that still survive. These Germans threw themselves upon nature and upon tradition with an impetuosity and passion seldom, if ever, witnessed. They demanded of the universe its secrets, and of every existing institution its warrant of existence. One is reminded by the fierceness of their ardor of the oldest story about the Teutons recorded in any literature: how when the sea began to rage, the Scythians, arming themselves with helmet, shield, and spear, rushed upon the foaming billows and sought to beat them into calm. But, fortunately for Germany, fortunately perhaps for mankind, the constructive passion has proved greater than the destructive; the poetic, the creative faculty, mightier than the critical. The Germany that gave us Strauss has given us a Dorner also; the Germany that gave us Baur has given us an Ewald; the Germany that gave us Niebuhr has given us a Bunsen, a Curtius, and a Waitz.

Now, the influence of this movement upon England and the entire world is too patent and too potent to deny, or even to discuss. But I am nevertheless inclined to think of it as Milton thought of German influence upon the English Reformation. So far as the influence is a healthy one, it has simply

quickened into fresh activity a spirit essentially English. Be the modern Angle unmixed Teuton, or Teuton tempered, ethe-realized by Celtic fire, he is clearly nearer of kin to the modern German than he is to Frenchmen or to Irishmen. If he has not taken the same road of his own accord it is rather because of disturbing influences than from lack of original impulse. This is true of English life in general, and it is also true of English theology in particular. From the days of Cuthbert and of Bede to the days of Wesley and of Butler, that theology was marked by the same great characteristics, of sincerity, of boldness, of intelligent inquiry, of unconquerable devotion to the liberty of prophesying and the search for truth. Nor can I see that after a century of commingling with German thought these characteristics have been greatly modified. The original tendencies may have been quickened; some tendencies acquired from non-Germanic sources may have lost their hold; some few new ones may have been acquired. So much, but no more. The land whose first great burst of song but paraphrased the Book of Genesis, and which could call around her first poet, Cædmon, such kingly spirits as Bede and Wiclif and Tyndale, to bear him company in his rendering of God's word, had certainly the exegetical impulse in full measure from the start. Latimer and Bunyan—nay, even Francis Bacon—reveal a sympathy with the mind of the spirit which Luther in his happiest moments never surpassed. There is a breadth and majesty in Hooker's handling of the Scripture which at times approaches even the methods of the Master himself, in his sublime treatment of Old Testament revelation. Nor has German erudition to any extent affected this fundamental character of our English exegesis. Our men of science have not yet learned to "botanize upon their mothers' graves;" our biblical scholars have not yet come to value the gospels of our Lord solely as frames upon which to hang their learning, or upon which to display a perverse ingenuity.

In like manner the home of Roger Bacon has never lacked its mighty thinkers whose eyes could search the lands and seas, as well as gaze upon the far-off stars. With what easy mastery Butler rises to the height of his great argument! With what limpid clearness Paley sets before us truths whose very transparency at once reveals and conceals their depth! Turgidity

of phrase for its own sake, the affectation of learning or of science, was as far from these men as it was from Wesley in his preaching. The fogs which settled down upon their island home seem to have created in them a passion for an unclouded intellectual sky. If under the influence of Coleridge a certain nebulosity has come to pervade English theology; if English definiteness and positiveness have been to some extent lost by the immersion of English thinkers in German speculation; at any rate, the old passion for lucidity is not exhausted, the old power of exact expression is not utterly crippled, the old faculty of straightforward and consecutive thinking still survives, and will soon assert themselves in all their native vigor. Then, again, that longing to express the unutterable, to break the bounds of common logic, and scale the heavens by the strength of impulses born and nourished within the soul, is quite as much English as it is German. "The sparrow flies in at one door, and tarries for a moment in the light and heat of the hearth-fire, and then, flying forth from the other, vanishes into the wintry darkness whence it came. So tarries for a moment the life of man in our sight; but what is before it, what after it, we know not. If this new teaching tell us aught certainly of these, let us follow it." Such were the words with which the Northumbrian sage addressed King Eadwine when his wise men came about him to consider of the new faith. These words might well be accepted as descriptive of the spirit which has pervaded the purer minds of England from the beginning: a spirit which showed itself in Hooker, in More, in Fox, in Bunyan, in Baxter, in Wesley, and in poor broken-hearted Irving. The English, too, have vast capacities for faith and despair; neither the one nor the other is due to the influence of German theology or German philosophy in later times.

Nor can I wholly agree with those who trace the Christological tendencies of recent English theology to German sources. It is true that the appearance of Strauss's "Life of Jesus" made men keenly alive to what was really the heart of their faith. But this feeling that a mortal blow had been at last attempted was due to an instinct which has quickened the utterances of every great English preacher from Bede to Wesley; an instinct which led Milton to make the temptation of

Christ the whole argument of "Paradise Regained," which inspired the subtle verse of George Herbert, the touching strains of William Cowper, and at last kindled in the soul of Charles Wesley the raptures which sung themselves in lyrics "that are not for an age, but for all time." Others may say that the writings of Schleiermacher, Dorner, Ullman, have directly and indirectly transformed a mere feeling of English Christianity into an abiding intelligence, a mere instinct into a rational consciousness. Certainly more than this cannot be claimed; to me, even this seems more than should be conceded.

But it is time to end these desultory reflections. Yet I cannot do so without thanking Bishop Hurst for the catholicity which is every-where present in his work. He might have produced a bigger and yet a much narrower book. Though he terms it a "Selected Bibliography," the selections are those of one who contemplates the shock of opinions with that serenity which belongs to the full assurance of faith. Such tranquillity is the only frame of mind that becomes the Christian thinker, but it is not given to all of us, nor to any of us at all times.

In our gloomier moments, as we look out upon the crash of human forces and the collision of systems, tumbling against each other like the billows of an angry sea, only to take on new shape and shatter themselves again, rushing no whither and every whither, we are tempted to believe ourselves upon a shoreless ocean, whose distant horizon must fade away at last into a starless, endless night. But the Spirit of God is upon the face of the waters, to divide them into the sea and into the rain. Their very turbulence is a witness of his presence; the winds that sweep across them are messengers of his to do his will. When Theology and Philosophy shall become vast pools of stagnant and rotting traditions, then, indeed, we may have peace, but it will be the peace of pestilence, of intellectual and spiritual death.

Art. IV.—AGNOSTICISM.

Unbelief is as fond of new names as the unclean spirit was of the swept and garnished house. To a threadbare system a new name is a precious boon; it hides the old blemishes, it promises fresh revelations, it secures a new hearing. From time to time there have arisen many self-confessed pantheists, deists, atheists. To-day a genuine representative of either of these classes is almost a *rara avis*. Even avowed materialists and positivists are ominously scarce. For the time being, the opponents of theism prefer to affect the title of "agnostics." The word itself is not older than the year 1876, being, if the writer mistakes not, the cunning invention of Leslie Stephen, a fellow of Cambridge; but the system, if such it can be called, is not newer than Locke and Hume; than Hobbes and the Baconian theory; than the Greek root from which it was fashioned; than the immemorial attitudes of the human mind. "Waiter," said the newly elected member of a petty bench, "call me 'Judge,' and call it loud." Our contemporary gainsayer likes his new cognomen, and likes to have us call it loud.

Agnosticism, then. What does the new term stand for? Specifically, it stands for the venerable theory that the human mind can neither know nor conceive realities existing outside of the sphere of sense. It takes the position of neither affirming nor denying the existence of God, on the assumption that divine existence is necessarily unknowable. It declares, indeed, that the fundamental axiom of divine being, namely, self-existence, is unthinkable. The mind's primal and universal intuition of a First Cause is suicidal to thought, for, according to Herbert Spencer, "If we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for any thing." "The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it," says he, quoting Mansell, "appears encompassed with contradictions." There *may* be Intelligence and Volition in the world, but he maintains he is forever incapacitated for seeing them. Mind may feel after, but never can find, God. It may build altars and burn incense to the Unknown God, but may never rise to the certainty of declaring him to man.

The new name, all must admit, is prepossessing. It is no iron ding-dong of braggart denial, but a silvery and engaging sound stealing down from what is apparently no mean altitude of thought. There is reason to believe that already it has gone out through pretty much all the earth, and has been received with favor every-where by those who do not like to retain God in their knowledge. Indeed, it bears on its face a subtle plausibility fitted to conciliate and deceive the very elect. For, at first blush, agnosticism seems to admit the existence of a God. Its "perhaps" has the look of an encouraging concession. Perhaps, says our agnostic, there may be over yonder across the gulf, or even here at hand, a God as intelligent, holy, benevolent, philanthropic, as hath entered into the heart of faith. The liberality of such a concession, however, is about equal to that of one who beams good cheer on a beggar and sends him on his way to find Captain Kidd's money. Magnificent treasure, no doubt, if one could get at it; real treasure, too, though far away; a treasure not undemonstrably under the pavement of this very city! A feast, after the Barmacide order.

The new name, moreover, gives its owner a show of deeper wisdom in his generation than the atheist possessed. The fundamental principle of the atheist involved him in the most palpable absurdity. It assumed that, having made the round of the universe, having fathomed all conceivable and inconceivable possibilities, he was prepared to report the impossibility of a divine existence. A prodigious assumption, which began by saying there is no God, only to end by making the theorist himself a god! The agnostic affects an intellectual meekness quite in contrast with all this. He has the manner of one whose increase of information has made him aware how small the sum of his own knowledge is. "Cautious science" has taught him humility. He does not shake his fist skyward, but extends his open palm thither. He recognizes the mystery of existence. He seems to even re-enforce a certain doctrine of the very Scriptures, whose familiarity with the Unknowable must often shock him. He is fond of reiterating the challenge of Job, "Canst thou by searching find out the Almighty to perfection?" He quotes with approval the saying of Paul, "Dwelling in light which no man can

approach unto." He finds a forcible statement of his hypothesis in the declaration of Isaiah, "Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself."

Much of the plausibility of the agnostic's assumption, doubtless, lurks in its new Greek name. Thrust upon us suddenly, and with an air of candor, the glittering coin appears at first glance altogether worthy reception and currency. A little careful examination, however, betrays the art of the plater. Agnosticism involves necessary conclusions quite as fatal and absurd as any that belong to the branded and rejected deism, or pantheism, or atheism, of past generations.

1. Agnosticism is practical atheism.

The agnostic's universe is actually as empty of God as the atheist's. For, if God have an existence, he must avoid all the ordinary modes of existence. He must, indeed, be careful to so create and to so control the world as not to exhibit intelligence. He must descend to the level of David before Achish, and simulate non-intelligence. Let the earth grow never so corrupt and full of violence, he must never betray existence by retributive and penal providences. The Power Not Ourselves must never make for righteousness, lest some sharp-eyed watcher catch a glimpse of the divine glory and joyfully reveal the Promethean secret to men. The agnostic Deity must in some anonymous way cure the human conscience of its universal habit of figuring to itself a Righteous Governor who sides with oppressed virtue and avenges transgression. Man's intuitions must be stifled, or they will filch the secret of divine existence, and keep parallel with the literal truth. Man must be kept from dreaming these startling realistic dreams about eternal life, for there is great danger that he will by means of them live as though he actually knew there were a God.

Practical atheism! For what is this affirming that God will never make himself known in creation, providence, retribution, moral inspiration, and intuition, but a new-fangled way of saying that there is no God at all? Verily, the hands are the hands of an agnostic, but the voice is the voice of an atheist. A God that never thinks, never acts, that has no moral affections—what is that but a nonentity? Putting the treasure at the foot of the rainbow—what is that but a poetical method of saying the rainbow has no foot? A God who does not

think, who makes no moral distinctions, who will not punish or reward men—how far removed is he from the no-God-at-all of the atheist? The most naïve and outspoken agnostics have acknowledged, indeed, that agnosticism really amounts to the annihilation of the divine existence. "We have seen," writes one of them, "the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven to light up a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead." Now, a being that is dead, and always has been, is, in plain English, a being without existence. Let us understand, then, that though the Lorelei is singing a new song in the upper air, the jagged reefs and watery deeps lurk as of old below.

If agnosticism involves all the chilly and revolting consequences of atheism, no more does it escape the grotesque cosmogony of that system. The agnostic must face the same dilemma as the atheist: the world came either from God or from chance. He dare not admit that it was made by his unknowable God, for that would make him knowable to an alarming degree. The God-made heavens would betake themselves to telling his glory. Nor has he the hardihood to adopt the theory of the fortuitous concourse of atoms. The word "evolution" is his god-send, as the theist would say. But the broken and hand-piercing staff is not good to lean upon. The word describes not the origin of things, but their process. I ask a blind man just arrived at my door from a distant city who led him hither. He betakes himself to naming streets, highways, paths, crossings, lanes; he goes on calling off landmarks, sign-boards, finger-posts, historic trees, town pumps, hamlets, villages, cities. "My good man," I break in, "these things could never have brought you hither—whose hand was it that slipped out of yours at my gate?" So the agnostic, striving to eliminate God from his own processes, seizes on the names of certain methods and fashions of operation, which he names laws with especial reverence. These are only the avenues along which matter has been conducted hither. The unanswered question is, Who conducted it hither?

2. The agnostic is inconsistent with his own principles.

Touching matters beyond the realm of sense perception, he professes to affirm nothing. Of the phenomena of matter, he knows much; of God, he can know nothing. Now, the

assertion that we can know nothing about God is far more than an assumption concerning the limits of human perception. It is a tremendous assumption concerning the divine possibilities of self-revelation. It may be admitted that the denizens of a South American ant-hill can hardly send hither an expedition on a voyage of discovery, and go back reporting that such a person as I exists. But, if I choose, may I not make a voyage of revelation, let my shadow fall upon them, feed them, defend them, and though unable to unvail the total contents of my nature to them, could I not reveal to them altogether reliably the fact that I exist? The agnostic's language is far meeker than his theory. His theory knows a good many important things about the unknowable God. Somehow or other it has ascertained that he that formed the ear cannot hear, that he that made the tongue cannot communicate. By some means the agnostic has learned that he who has so marvelously and gloriously hung system on system in everlasting equilibrium, who has inspired ten thousand dialects, is yet powerless to invent the vaguest code of signals to flash across the abyss some trustworthy gleams of himself. The agnostic has gone outside and looked at man, and found him woefully sightless, deaf, and dumb. He has looked at God, taken account of his skill, and discovered that communication is out of the question. Laura Bridgman had her Dr. Howe to find the secret wicket-gate of the imprisoned soul and put it in communion with himself and all the world. But this Almighty of the agnostic can find no needle's eye in the blank walls of human nature for the flashing through of one ray of his divine glory! Such is the necessary inconsistency of the system.

3. Agnosticism ignores the vital distinction between the unknowable and the inexplicable.

The theist insists quite as strenuously as the agnostic on the limitations of human knowledge concerning God. But limitation is something quite different from negation. The agnostic brands all so-called knowledge of God as illusory, unreliable, unreal. The theist maintains that human knowledge of God is real and trustworthy as far as it goes. The peasant knows nothing of actinic and ultra-violet rays, of wave-lengths and angles of refraction; but he does know that a sunbeam is, for example, luminous. Now, the luminosity of light is just as

reliable and real a fact about light as any other. No theist ever dreamed that design and causation express the totality of the divine existence, but that they are true potencies of it, quite as really as any unknowable attributes can be, and that they are clearly and inevitably knowable every theist believes.

The agnostic's refusal to read the divine symbols, on the hypothesis of their total inconceivability, would logically compel him to distrust the alleged existence of his fellow-men; for no human being ever yet had a complete knowledge of the personality of his fellows. Yet such incomplete knowledge of their characters and thoughts was never deemed a basis for doubt as to the reality of their existence. No more should the fact that we cannot by searching find out the Almighty to perfection warrant us in affirming that such knowledge of him as we do possess is chimerical. Far less than complete and exhaustive knowledge of an object is necessary to convey to us its reality.

4. Agnosticism does violence to reason in bidding it deny design in nature.

If there be any thing with which we are acquainted, it is the qualities and habits of mind. More thoroughly schooled are we, than in any thing else, in its characteristic ways, its foresight, its ingenuities and address in the face of difficulties, its insight of laws and forces. When, therefore, we find in nature, say in the human hand, the same shrewd methods, calculations, co-ordinations, multifarious adaptation, structural triumphs, what else can we rationally call it but the presence of thought? If we can ever identify any thing, we can identify that bright-eyed force we have delighted in and consciously exercised from the beginning.

The agnostic admits that the world of matter *looks* as if design were present in it, but of set purpose he will not acknowledge it as design. Well, then, what does he call it? This keen and deft planning, as every man out of a million would acknowledge it to be—from what does it result, if not from either intelligence or accident? Well, he blandly replies, from something or other in the unknown, which is neither intelligent nor non-intelligent. Thus our agnostic Uriah Heep, so cautious and 'umble, that he would not dare say that the sign-manuals of mind all about us are not forgeries, grows

all at once bold and dogmatic. In the face of effects he has seen produced ten thousand times by mind, and never by any thing but mind, he is too timid to say it is a case of mind, but quite brave enough to declare he thinks it is something else than mind, he knows not what. In other words, he heroically creates out of his wanton fancy a third cause, not one of whose traits is known to him, to replace a cause than which nothing can be more familiar.

Our agnostic is an evolutionist. Suppose we apply his method to that hypothesis. He cites multiplied instances of effect of environment, natural selection, and survival of the fittest. We blandly tell him, "It *looks* as though there had been an evolution, but plainly there has not." "What is it then?" he demands. We reply, "O, something or other else, we don't know exactly what; for we, too, are agnostics."

O thou strange Something-or-other, not intelligent, and not non-intelligent, thou cunning mechanism of the agnostic's fancy! Thou art not a Thinker, and yet thou dost think; thou art no Planner, and yet the world is full of thy glorious planning. Thou hast made me like thyself, though it was neither intentional nor accidental, but something or other else. I love to think thy thoughts after thee, though they are not thoughts. But thou couldest not think my thoughts after me, for my thoughts are fraught with design, and an uncounted number of my ways are altogether intentional, and neither accidental nor something or other else! Thou mightest follow the progress of much of my thought, but my most poignant griefs thou couldest not fathom, for those griefs spring from certain sins, and those sins were the result of certain clear and dogged designs!

5. Agnosticism does violence to reason in denying a First Cause.

The human mind can never be better acquainted with any thing than it is with the invariable and necessary relations of cause and effect. In the cradle it began to know itself as a cause, by watching movements of members which it found to be voluntary, and lifting up a voice of its own. As time went on, experience found ten thousand results assignable to nothing but individual personal volition. In millions of instances the fabric of life was found to be woven together with the warp and

woof of cause and effect. The belief in causation is universal, and of the very substance of mind. The tares in the field inevitably suggest the presumptive enemy. The untutored savage, arguing a vanished bear from the broken twig, and the erudite Leverrier, postulating an undiscovered planet from certain celestial perturbations, agree in declaring that every effect must have a cause.

Our agnostic concedes cause and effect, if you will ask him to go no farther than the realm of the senses. As far as the world of matter is concerned, you cannot make your assertion of rigid causation any too strong for him. But venture never so short a distance into the supersensible realm, and he casts it to the four winds.

He prizes causation as a golden key to unlock mystery here —what key does he treasure to unlock mystery out there with his unknowable God? Causation? Nay, nay, that be far from him! Road-bed and steel rails run into the fog. Shall we assume road-bed and metals beyond? No, indeed! Ditch the train at the edge of the fog.

We should never have suspected, if we had not been told, that conscientiousness is at the bottom of the agnostic's caution. Indeed, Clifford went so far as to affirm that a "belief in a power outside ourselves is an immoral doctrine." In the face of this stupendous effect we call nature, it would be sinful presumption, downright immorality, to postulate a stupendous Cause; that is to say, a God. Nay, rather, something or other else! It is the conscientiousness of the colored witness on the murder trial. On cross-examination he testified: that he did see the prisoner taking aim; he saw the puff of smoke, the falling body, and trickling blood; but the bullet?—no, he did not see that! Our agnostic admits that the universe bears all the signs of a genuine case of cause and effect, but that a proper scientific conservatism compels him to say that it may be a case of something or other else, he is not sure what. The reddening of litmus in a test tube cannot get on without a supposititious acid; but an effect a million times more prodigious need not have had a cause!

6. Agnosticism robs human character of its grandest inspirations.

The relations which theism gives man to an Almighty God

have the most important bearing on his character. It has taught him that behind and before him are moving the majestic forces of Divine Providence. It has enabled him to show more than mortal daring and enterprise, because it has taught him to believe himself defended, sustained, and inspired by an Unseen Power. He has gone gayly into the desperate charges of the battle-field, because he has been led to believe that he had more than human panoply; he has been brave and calm in the thickest of the fight, because he believed he saw a sign of celestial promise in the heavens.

The background of divine personality has glorified human life. It is something more than a mere process of vegetation. The issues of existence have seemed of unspeakable moment. Men have been moved to seek a divine way of living the humblest lives. They have borne themselves as though possessed of a priceless charge. Thought? God thinks. Love? God loves. Faithfulness and truth? They are the vital breath of Him who was, and is, and shall be.

The agnostic claims human fellowship for himself. But the theist claims something more—divine fellowship. The theist has found himself transfigured by the consciousness of the divine omniscience. God knew his bosom sorrow. God knew how patiently he was bearing ineffable torture for truth's sake. He has endured as otherwise he never could have endured, because he saw the invisible.

Now, a system which takes away Godward relations from man, thereby deprives him of the most important formative influences which his spiritual nature can have. The battle of life is too fierce and vast for mortal man to go into it single-handed. If human existence is to exert its most potent inspirations, it must be felt to be everlastingly significant. Man cannot approach his own ideal of moral perfection without a more august influence than mere human recognition and sympathy.

We do not like the agnostic's new heavens and new earth. We cannot feel that they are fitted to these souls of ours. His little skies are too low for us. His mountain breezes are the blasts of a steam fan. His man, walking his puny earth, is a victim of vivisection. The intuitions that tell him of the Unseen and all-precious moral distinctions have been withdrawn by a trepanning process, and the rent sewed up again.

He walks the earth, indeed, after the fashion of the poor pigeon, robbed of a part of its cerebral substance, but plainly enough he is not the *man* he was before.

7. Agnosticism removes the foundations of morality. The contest with this genteel foe, then, is no mere abstract issue of formal logic. It is one that comes home to business and bosom. It has to do with the very foundations of human society.

Human instinct has founded the sanctions of right and wrong in the unalterable constitution of the divine nature. Sin, we instinctively feel, is not mere harmless human whim or idiosyncrasy, but an eternally destructive enmity against God. It is no mere human pleasantry, but veritable dynamite in the royal palace. And righteousness is not simply good-naturedness, but the very smile and health of God himself. But, if God be unknowable, that dreadful background of Divine holiness that has so often silhouetted human transgression is removed, and the heinousness of sin with it; that Being of perfect purity and benevolence, ever lamenting over man's iniquity, and yearning to help him out of the calamity thereof, whose smile he has been taught to expect when he does well, whose frown he was to dread when he had done ill, has no existence. It is a great day for the man who has bound us and spoiled our goods, when the omniscient eye is plucked out of heaven.

Now, it is due to the agnostics to say that they have felt the dire sociological peril of declaring the throne of the universe vacant. Accordingly, after cutting the nerve of moral character in its relations to a holy God, they have suggested various galvanic substitutes therefor.

Professor Clifford had signal success in finding the secret of consciousness in the constitution of matter. "The atoms of mind-stuff," said he, "when they fortuitously coalesce in certain ways form a consciousness, and in other ways do not!" Can any one, after pondering that luminous statement, doubt the Professor's ability to give conscience a materialistic basis also? If so, let him note the new atomic thunder from the modern Sinai: "So act that all thy deeds may have molecular, not massive, antecedents." Think of men swearing to their own hurt and changing not, because the fear of the molecules is before their eyes. Imagine the future Nelsons firing the hearts

of their men by crying, "England expects every man to do—deeds that have molecular antecedents!" Fancy the criminal of the future warning his generation from the gallows-tree against the fatal influence of massive antecedents, and bemoaning the lamentable lack of the molecular in his own character! What a sorry parody is such idle vaporing on the majestic, authoritative, and universal morality of the theistic system!

Agnostics have endeavored to find an adequate basis and inspiration for virtue in the interests of mankind at large. Said the same writer: "The dim and shadowy outlines of the supernatural deity fade slowly away from before us: and, as the mist of his presence floats aside, we perceive with greater and greater clearness the grander and nobler figure of him who made all gods, and shall unmake them. From the dim dawn of history, from the inmost depths of every soul, the face of our Father Man looks out upon us with the fire of eternal youth in his eyes and says: 'Before Jehovah was, I am.'" "The face of our Father Man" is, of course, a highly poetical figure applied to the whole race. This, then, is the new deity in whose face our souls are to find moral inspiration, from which approbation is to shine and reproof to frown. Alas! we are already only too well acquainted with our Father Man. We know only too completely the deceitfulness and desperate wickedness of his heart. He is a kind of Father Noah; he has done some pretty good preaching, indeed, but it is too notorious that he has followed it up with very strange ways of living. Nay, we cannot worship our Father Man; we have too many times had to go backward and cover him with a mantle. Worthy enough as philosopher and friend, he may be; but he is no moral guide. It is the too careful walking in some of his footsteps that has hitherto brought us sore travail and remorse of conscience.

But will the welfare of our Father Man keep the needle of conscience true? Frederick Harrison professes to think so. Death to him is personal annihilation. Let us eat and drink, then. Not so, says Mr. Harrison. Think of your posthumous activities The humblest soul that ever turned a sod sends a wave through the ever-growing harmony of human society. There is no God; there is no future life for us or for the race; but there are generations of men coming after us, and moment

by moment we ought to conduct our lives with reference to their interests. Not the cry of Saul, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" but, What would the Hottentots and Tartars and Australians of the twenty-fifth century have me to do? The bare statement of such a theory exhibits its vapidity. It has, as a moral motive force, about as much strength as the tiny galvanic current which a silver coin produces under a man's tongue. The most of us have about all we can do, Mr. Harrison, denying ourselves and laying down our lives for the men of the nineteenth century, with the wail of their sufferings entering in our ears. We are only too conscious of having failed to clothe a naked contemporary in the next ward and visit a personal acquaintance in prison in the next street. That biblical "Thou God seest me" does move us to desire truth in the inward parts, but your coming man of the forty-ninth generation, we very much fear, will be left to take care of himself.

The agnostics have claimed, by sheer vehemence of assertion, that their system inculcates a nobler morality than Christianity, and for confirmation of the assertion have cited certain of their own number. Never was claim more specious and impudent. It is the parasitic mistletoe sucking its life juices from the generous veins of the lordly oak, and then boasting a greener leafage and heavenward tendencies. Christianity breathed into the agnostic the very beginnings of moral life. She poured out the treasury of her heavenly secrets for him when he first began to think. He can no more isolate himself from her influence than he can isolate his lungs from the life-giving oxygen of the atmosphere. The world never saw an agnostic pure and simple. The morality of a person who never existed need not detain us.

Attractive as is the new name, it does not hide the old heartache. To take away the Lord is quite as grim and pathetic an enterprise now as when Isaiah wrote his forty-fourth chapter. To be without God is still to be without hope. The dictum "I do not know" is as little in harmony with the inmost experiences of the soul as with the spirit of the time. Men want to know; and the yielding up, voluntarily or involuntarily, of the fact that they do know leads to despair. A most touching example of such despair is the famous epitaph ascribed to the gallant and outspoken Peter of the agnostic apostolical circle.

Now, a system that is practical atheism, that lacks self-consistency, that ignores such vital distinctions as those between the inexplicable and the unknowable, that denies design and a first cause, that robs human character of its noblest inspirations, that removes the very foundations of morality, must soon demand an epitaph. What words are more fitting than those of its own inspiration: "I was not. I lived. I am not?" .

Art. V. — THE METHODIST DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT.

Historically and doctrinally the atonement is fundamental. Historically, the atonement is the outward, objective fact in the work of Christ—the events of whose life, from the incarnation to the crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, and session, make up the continuous fabric of his mediatorial existence, and constitute the historical foundation of his religion—which makes Christ Jesus a Helper, and his salvation a help, different, in essence and power, from all others that have been offered to humanity. Doctrinally, the atonement is that central truth in Christian theology which gives distinctive character to Christianity as a system of ethical and religious thought. Historically, it is that event in the external order of the actual life of the world which has organized Christianity as the most powerful engine in modern civilization, and as the exclusive religion, for the regeneration of mankind. Doctrinally, it is that dogma in the scientific and intellectual elaboration of the theological teachings of the New Testament by virtue of which Christianity, as revealed and absolute truth, the unique religion, must be intolerant of all external systems, and, in the sphere of apologetics, refuse to co-ordinate with itself any ethnic religion or any set of philosophical doctrines.

Not only does the doctrine of the one atonement in Christ build the wall against all enemies that attack from without: it is the living organizer of all the inward elements of the truth. The doctrine of atonement stands in a relation that is adequately described only as vital and organic to the leading elements of a completed Christian theology. According to the beginning

point, it molds, or is molded by, the other doctrines. As is our doctrine of atonement, so will be our conception of the character of God, of the dignity and worth of humanity, of the heinousness and demerit of sin, of the person and work of the Son of God, of the office of the Holy Ghost, and of the value of the glad tidings which the Church is commissioned to herald to the nations. A degraded theory of atonement drags all the other principles of the Christian system to its own low level. A false or incomplete soteriology works radical and wide-spread mischief. It begets a shallow theology—a fragmentary and partial outlook upon the divine nature; a vicious anthropology—a hasty and superficial diagnosis of the ethical constitution and history of the human race; an unworthy hamartiology—a representation of sin as a light matter, a mere disturbance of external order, to be met by a governmental expedient; an unbiblical Christology, in which Christ may be only the mightiest of many mighty teachers, reformers, and saviours; an impertinent pneumatology, in which there remains little or no place for the gracious leadings and cleansing of the Spirit; and an enervating ecclesiology, in which the Church is stripped of her glory and sinks into the category of the other social and moral agencies which are at work among men. In reverse order, one may begin with inadequate doctrines concerning God, Man, and Sin, and he will as surely reach an inadequate doctrine of Salvation, for Salvation is designed to harmonize God and Man by the destruction of Sin. Salvation is the mediatorial doctrine, as Christ, the Prince of Salvation, is the mediatorial person. In either case, to purify and enlarge the one doctrine of atonement, until the polemic theologian shall bring it to occupy and altogether fill the great place assigned it in the New Testament, is to correct and amplify any system into which it enters, and conform all the components of that system to the biblical standard.

Especially is the right appreciation of atonement necessary to the normal growth of Protestantism. It is the correlate of justification by faith. Rome may have the sacrament of penance, the repeated sacrifices upon the altar, and the Church's deposit of the supererogatory works of the saints of all ages, by which to cover sin. Protestantism—blessed truth!—has only the blood of Christ, and in his name only pronounces blessing upon the head of that man whose sin is covered.

Both the defenders and the enemies of the faith instinctively recognize that in the atonement is to be discovered the one sufficient reason for the being of Christianity. The peculiar end of the Church, separated from communion with the ends of any other society whatsoever, at once the warrant of its organic existence, and the guarantee of its continued life, until the accomplishment of the commission received from the Church's Head, is the proclamation of the finished redemption in Christ. The Church is a mission, celestial in origin and equipment, in the midst of a population foreign and estranged. To this Church is given the ministry of reconciliation, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself; to her ministers is committed the word of reconciliation that, as embassadors for Christ, they may beseech sinners to be reconciled to God. Announcing that God is reconciled to *man*, on the basis of this reconciliation the Church prays *men* to be reconciled to God. Hence arises the desire on the part of rationalists and Broad-Churchmen to explain away the atonement, and on the part of those whose faith has received the supernatural religion, with all of its historical and doctrinal contents, to establish the foundations here once for all.

To this instinctive sense of the situation are to be traced, also, the continued production of treatises and multiplication of theories, which are frequently not professional and theological, but partake of a semi-literary character. Horace Bushnell and a whole school of English and American writers have written for a public wider than the theological, or even the distinctively religious, and have found readers beyond the walls of theological seminaries and the ranks of the clergy. Men hesitate to recognize that element in the eternal and immutable constitution of the divine nature which demands purity and holiness, and pronounces desert of punishment upon sin. Therefore they ask, Is there any thing in God to fear? and we have had a revival of superficial theories, not only of the Socinian, Grotian, and governmental types, but also of a moral and purely sentimental character. As a contribution to the settlement of the true doctrine, as held with almost undeviating uniformity by Methodism, upon scriptural, historical, and dogmatic foundations, this paper is written.

The safest, as well as the most strictly scientific, method of

discussing the atonement would doubtless be, first, after the manner of exegetical and biblical theology, to collocate and carefully interpret all the express texts and all the extended teachings of Revelation upon the doctrine under examination, so as to bring the truth into our minds just as it lies in the Scripture. A classification of truths and summary of results would naturally follow. Reason and the logical understanding would now bring to light the necessary and universal principles and implications of the biblical statements, and, if possible, a single formula would be reached, embracing all the essential attributes of the doctrine, which, for the dogmatic theologian, would be the definition of atonement. Lastly, an historical survey would enable us to apply the test of the truth, as embodied in the definition reached by the processes described, to all the forms of the doctrine as set forth by the teachers and theologians of the universal Church. But the limits of this paper forbid the employment of this complete and scientific Exegetical, Dogmatic, Historical method, and it may the more freely be departed from since the exegetical ground has been frequently gone over with great thoroughness and accuracy, and with comparative freedom from dogmatic bias, while the historical treatment is rather in the interest of caution and additional interest than essential to the establishment of the doctrine. A proper point of departure, therefore, may be from the position of the systematic theologian, while exegetics largely, and perhaps historical theology to some extent, will be made to serve important uses in the progress of the discussion.

Let us make a beginning by placing side by side two Methodist definitions of the atonement. By Methodist definitions, definitions by recognized Methodist theologians are meant. The latest, and, so far as the writer knows, the only, distinct treatise on atonement that Methodism has produced is the work of Dr. John Miley, Professor of Systematic Theology in Drew Theological Seminary. Dr. Miley early in his monograph gives us a formal definition of atonement. It is as follows:

> The vicarious sufferings of Christ are an atonement for sin as a conditional substitute for penalty, fulfilling, on the forgiveness of sin, the obligation of justice and the office of penalty in moral government.*

* Miley, "The Atonement in Christ," p. 23.

The second definition is taken from the unpublished lectures on the Twenty-five Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Churches delivered by the late Dr. Thomas O. Summers, as Professor of Systematic Theology in Vanderbilt University. The definition is in this language:

Atonement is the satisfaction made to God for the sins of all mankind, original and actual, by the mediation of Christ, and especially by his passion and death, so that pardon might be granted to all, while the divine perfections are harmonized, the authority of the Sovereign is upheld, and the strongest motives are brought to bear upon sinners to lead them to repentance, to faith in Christ, the necessary conditions of pardon, and to a life of obedience by the gracious aid of the Holy Spirit.*

An analytical comparison of the two definitions reveals several points of difference. 1. Dr. Summers calls atonement a satisfaction made to God, which form of expression Dr. Miley not only excludes from his definition, but carefully avoids and stringently opposes throughout his treatise, since he identifies the satisfaction theory with the Calvinistic scheme of commercial substitution, always calling this last mentioned doctrine the doctrine of satisfaction. 2. Dr. Summers gives the atonement relation to original as well as to actual sin, as is done by our Second Article of Religion—"whereof is one Christ, very God and very man, who truly suffered, was crucified, dead and buried, to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a sacrifice, not only for the original guilt, but also for actual sins of men."† This Dr. Miley's definition ignores, and his whole essay does not touch the question except when he glances at the relation of the atonement to infant salvation;‡ and in this momentary consideration it would appear that he attaches little weight to the teachings of the fifth chapter of Romans, since he makes no reference to it. A brief statement of exegetical results, if nothing more, would have been very pertinent. 3. Dr. Summers makes the atonement consist of the entire mediation of Christ, *especially* of his passion and death, while Dr. Miley speaks only of the vicarious sufferings, though he is doubtless

* This definition is taken from the writer's notes as a member of Dr. Summers's class. The writer alone is responsible for the form given, but he has every reasonable guarantee that it is an exact reproduction of the Doctor's language.

† Southern Methodist Discipline, ed. 1882, p. 12.

‡ Miley, "Atonement in Christ," pp. 262–265.

in complete accord with Dr. Summers, as is evinced by his masterly treatment of the great passage in the second chapter of Philippians: "The incarnation itself is a great fact of atoning value in the redemptive mediation of Christ. . . . There are two marvelous facts: the self-emptying—ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε—or self-divestment of a rightful glory in equality with God; and an assumption, instead, of the form of a servant in the likeness of men." * Nevertheless, we are not to overlook the superiority of Dr. Summers's definition in point of comprehensiveness. 4. Dr. Summers assigns three results to the atonement, or grounds it in three necessities, though it is but right to state that the last he did not class in respect to urgency with the other two great necessities. In this last particular he and Dr. Miley are again in agreement.† The three results or necessities are, (1) The harmonization of the divine perfections. This follows from the previous doctrine that the atonement is a satisfaction made to God. (2) The upholding of the authority of the Sovereign. (3) The bringing to bear of the strongest motives upon sinners to repent and believe. Here Dr. Summers has most felicitously combined all the elements of truth in the three great theories of atonement, Satisfaction, Governmental, and Moral. Dr. Miley represents the atonement only as a conditional substitute for penalty, fulfilling the obligation of justice and the office of penalty in moral government. His atonement yields only a governmental result, and has its only ground in a governmental necessity. He himself has chosen the title and uniformly calls his theory Rectoral, or Governmental. 5. Finally, Dr. Summers's definition includes the securing of a life of obedience by the gracious aid of the Holy Spirit. He thus effectually guards the doctrine of atonement and its correlate justification by faith from antinomian accusation and abuse. He answers those objections that have been in the mouth of opponents from the time of Paul, the original expounder of these truths, until the present. Here doubtless our two Doctors are also in harmony; but mark the grasp and reach of Dr. Summers's formula. There may be other minor points of difference between these two definitions. It is not necessary for our purpose to be exhaustive; the differences enumerated lie out broadly on the face of the two formulas.

* Miley, "Atonement in Christ," pp. 276–278. † *Ibid.*, pp. 125–126.

But let us be careful that Dr. Miley's doctrine is not mistaken or misrepresented. It may be that he has not been able to include explanation, enlargement, and exposition within the limits of definition. Is it entirely certain that he does not ground the necessity for atonement in the essential nature and immutable character of God apart from his rectoral office and relation? It is granted that there are some passages in his book that on first reading, and considered apart from the underlying and pervading principle of his doctrine, seem to admit such a necessity. But a more attentive examination will often reveal limitations and saving clauses in the passages themselves; and, further, they are rebutted by explicit assertions to the contrary. An extended consideration of Dr. Miley's teaching, as will be shown by large quotation, will make it appear that he does not allow a separate and distinct demand for atonement in the divine nature apart from God's office as a Sovereign. He earnestly contends that if such a demand be allowed it must yield an atonement by commercial substitution, or, as he calls it, satisfaction. So far as a demand for atonement in the nature of God may be regarded as acknowledged by Dr. Miley, he identifies it with, and absorbs it in, the demand that lies in the necessities of government. His section in which he vindicates the necessity for atonement is entitled "Necessity in Moral Government."* "The necessity for the redemptive mediation of Christ lies ultimately in the perfections of God," he says, and we think here is the great truth unequivocally stated, but he immediately adds the saving phrase, "as moral Ruler."† In the same connection he continues:

> We have the truth of a divine moral government as the ground-fact in the necessity for an atonement. We have found the facts and principles of such a government strongly affirmative of this necessity. They thus respond to the explicit affirmations of Scripture thereon. Further, we have found this necessity to be grounded in the profoundest interests of moral government, for the protection of which the penalties of the divine justice have a necessary function. Here we have the real hinderance to a mere administrative forgiveness, and, therefore, the real necessity for an atonement. The true office of atonement follows accordingly.‡

* Miley, "Atonement in Christ," p. 74. † *Ibid.*, p. 73. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

The penalties of divine justice are, therefore, not the manifestation of God's essential rectitude and holiness abstracted from all governmental considerations, nor is there any bar in the divine nature to sovereign forgiveness—this bar is wholly the demand of governmental exigencies. It is not desired to attach any inference to Dr. Miley's doctrine that he does not himself avow, and he shall be freely, but briefly, quoted by passages taken from every part of his book:

In the governmental theory, the scientifically consistent necessity arises in the interest of moral government, and as an imperative requirement of some provision which may fulfill the rectoral office of penalty in the case of forgiveness.* . . . We ground the necessity in the fact and requirements of moral government.† . . . And God, as a righteous Ruler, must inflict merited penalty upon sin, not, indeed, in the gratification of any mere personal resentment, nor in the satisfaction of an absolute retributive justice, but in the interest of moral government, or find some rectorally compensatory measure for the remission of penalty.‡ . . . While divine penalty falls only upon sin, the supreme reason for its infliction is in the rectoral ends with which moral government is concerned. Nor is the penal infliction a moral necessity apart from these ends. § . . . There is no sufficient reason why sin must be punished solely on the ground of its demerit. . . . And, all other ends apart, [the ends of moral government apart from the demands of God's essential nature,] retributive justice may remit its penalty. *It may do this without an atonement.* ‖ . . . And with no absolute necessity for the punishment of sin, it seems clear that but for the requirements of rectoral justice, compassion would triumph over the disposition of a purely retributive justice.¶ . . . But as penalties are remissible so far as a purely retributive justice is concerned; so, having a special end in the interest of moral government, they may give place to any substitutional measure equally securing that end.** The demerit of sin imposes no obligation of punishment upon the Divine Ruler.†† The rectoral ends of moral government are a profounder imperative with justice itself than the retribution of sin, simply as such.§§ The cross is the highest revelation of all the truths which embody the best moral forces of the divine government.‖‖

We challenge that both in the New Testament and in Christian experience the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ is infinitely more than the embodiment of the forces of moral government!

* Miley, "Atonement in Christ," p. 61. † *Ibid.*, p. 63.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 75. § *Ibid.*, p. 226.
‖ *Ibid.*, p. 228; italicizing added by the writer. ¶ *Ibid.*, p. 232.
** *Ibid.*, p. 229. †† *Ibid.*, p. 233. §§ *Ibid.*, p. 233. ‖‖ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

And real as the divine displeasure is against sin and against sinners, atonement is made, not in its personal satisfaction, but in fulfillment of the rectoral office of justice.*

It would be well if Dr. Miley could definitely tell us what is his conception of displeasure against sin and sinners in such a being as the unchanging and holy God. Is it appeased without a consideration? Is it a mere temporary affection, an ebullition of personal feeling, that, after the analogy of human wrath, will burn itself out and gradually die away if let alone?

Yet the atoning sacrifice of Christ neither appeases the personal displeasure of God nor conciliates his personal friendship.† *Could a sinner, without the helpful grace of redemption, sincerely repent and render a true obedience, there would be a coincidence upon him of the divine regards of personal friendship and judicial condemnation.* ‡

Such a conclusion, the legitimate outcome of Dr. Miley's theory, which he has had the frankness to explicitly state, stamps that theory as untrue. The idea here expressed is utterly unbiblical. Dr. Miley cannot produce a single proof-text from the New Testament containing an approximation to the thought contained in this strange sentence of his. We know that God loved us before the atonement, and that his love provided the atonement—this truth will receive full treatment before the discussion closes; but God's love producing an atonement for the satisfaction of his holiness that he may forgive the sinner is widely different from a coincidence of the divine regards of personal friendship and judicial condemnation upon a person for whom no atonement has been made. A man may be the possessor of the personal friendship of God and yet under sentence of judicial condemnation! Almighty God is your friend—your personal friend—and yet you are in danger—in danger of eternal death! This omnipotent personal friend, in whose favor you abide, is powerless to help you! God has constructed a government that ties his own hands and nullifies his own personal friendship! He cannot bless and save a sinner whose attitude and state he personally accepts! God's law is holier than God's nature! The immaculate God, who is a consuming fire to all sin, can endure and

* Miley, "Atonement in Christ," p. 247. † *Ibid.*, p. 249.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 249, 250; italicizing added by the writer.

accept that which his law condemns and punishes! One more quotation will be sufficient:

> But for his regard for these rights and interests, [of moral government,] and, therefore, for the sacredness and authority of his law as the necessary means of their protection, *he might have satisfied the yearnings of his compassion toward us in a mere administrative forgiveness.**

It is very clear that Dr. Miley means to leave us no reason for mistaking his doctrine. If he has passages that speak of God's personal displeasure against sin, he is careful to explicitly inform us that the atonement is not grounded in any necessity for the propitiation of this displeasure. So pointedly does he put this, and so completely does he absorb the personal wrath of God, and the primitive desert of sin, in the ends of moral government, that he tells us that, apart from moral government, mercy and compassion may so dominate justice and holiness in the essential nature of God, without any sort of consideration or satisfaction offered to the offended Deity, that he might forgive sin, so far as it is an offense to his own purity and personal righteousness, by mere Sovereign prerogative, while the only obstacles are interposed by moral government, considered in itself, and these insuperably prevent administrative pardon. Hence the necessity for atonement is grounded in moral government alone.

The question now arises, Is Dr. Miley's the Methodist doctrine of atonement? Can we regard it as fortunate that the only express Methodist treatise on atonement should ground its theory exclusively in a governmental necessity? Does Dr. Miley's theory adequately interpret Scripture in those profound texts which represent the demand for propitiation and reconciliation as arising among the divine attributes in the innermost recesses of the divine nature? Or is Dr. Summers nearer the truth of Scripture, and nearer the Methodist doctrine as taught by Watson, the first, and Pope, the last, of great Methodist writers on Systematic Theology? Can the atonement be represented as a satisfaction to God, a harmonization of the divine nature and attributes, and a reconciliation of God to the world, without the errors of the Calvinistic theory of commercial substitution? Can we hold fast the

* Miley, "Atonement in Christ," p. 272; italicizing added by the writer.

profoundest teachings of the New Testament without abating one jot or tittle of all the meaning that an undogmatic and scholarly exegete will find in them, and yet reject the Calvinistic soteriology? Watson, Pope, and Summers seem to think those Scriptures teach that atonement is a real satisfaction to the demands of the divine nature, and that this is consistent with the true Arminian doctrine of atonement, Dr. Miley to the contrary notwithstanding.

Dr. Miley, to some extent, recognizes the fact that he is not in accord with the trend of Methodist doctrine. Richard Watson is allowed to have made statements which assign him to a theory of atonement that Dr. Miley finds it necessary to criticise and reject.* He acknowledges that many leading Arminians are to be classed with Watson. Dr. Pope's doctrine so little harmonizes with Dr. Miley's that he is but once alluded to, and that upon an insignificant side issue.† The writer does not undertake to say exactly what theories of atonement are held by Drs. Whedon and Raymond, since he has never met with the article and sermon of the former referred to by Dr. Miley, and, while his cursory examination of the "Systematic Theology" of the latter reveals passages which seem to commit him to the doctrine that atonement is a satisfaction to God,‡ he is not sufficiently informed to be competent to classify his system. But in quoting Drs. Whedon and Raymond, Dr. Miley thinks it expedient to argue that the principles held by them issue in the governmental theory, while he candidly admits that Dr. Whedon has never called his theory governmental, and is careful to say that he would not identify Dr. Raymond with a theory which he discards.§ As shown by the two definitions, Dr. Miley's theory is widely different from that of Dr. Summers. Here, then, we have a recognition of Watson as holding another theory of atonement, a tacit acknowledgment of want of harmony with Pope, a consciousness that in formal statement and title of theory the support of Whedon and Raymond cannot be claimed, and of a great gulf between Summers and Miley. Dr. Miley, though not making an issue with the Methodist doctrine as such, certainly would not claim to represent it.

* Miley, "Atonement in Christ," p. 117. † *Ibid.*, p. 205.
‡ Raymond, "Systematic Theology," vol. ii, pp. 249, 310.
§ Miley, "Atonement in Christ," pp. 212–214.

By pointing out these facts, it is not intended to create any prejudice against Dr. Miley, or even an *a priori* presumption against the truth of his theory in advance of the argument upon its merits. It may be freely admitted that advance in scientific theological statement, as in every other department of human thought and activity, must come through the work of the specialist. The monographic treatment of the minute student of a single section of Christian doctrine ought to differ widely, in method, and possibly in results, from the work of the general writer on Systematic Theology. We expect his work to abound in criticisms, and, if the whole truth and the exact truth has not before been reached, he is the man to define, elucidate, establish, and defend it. Certainly Dr. Miley is privileged to work up the doctrine of the Atonement, as Dr. Pope has presented the doctrine of the Person of Christ, Dr. Whedon the doctrine of the Will, and Dr. Summers the doctrine of Baptism. Certainly he may show, if possible, that Watson and Pope and Summers are wrong, and that if Whedon and Raymond had been making a specialty of atonement their acknowledged principles would have developed into a scientific treatment practically one with the doctrine Dr. Miley has set forth. All this may be fairly granted. But the question is, Has he succeeded in accomplishing such a work as this?

Dr. Miley has continually written upon the assumption that there is no middle place between the Rectoral theory and the Calvinistic theory of commercial substitution, which secures the unconditional discharge of all for whose sins Christ's death paid the penalty, and carries with it all the Calvinistic peculiarities of limited atonement, unconditional election, irresistible grace, and final perseverance. This he has misnamed the Satisfaction theory. Watson, Pope, and Summers are certainly satisfactionists; but this is not their theory. Miley denies that there is any scientific place for them. They must either be Calvinists, or give in their adhesion to the pure Rectoral theory. But it is strange that all these Methodist theologians, some of whom were certainly possessed of as much exegetical skill, metaphysical acumen, and logical power as Dr. Miley has manifested in any part of his treatise, should have all lodged in an unscientific and indefensible half-way position, unable to see

that if they abandoned the Calvinistic theory of commercial substitution their principles must carry them over to the governmental theory of atonement. Dr. Miley is free to essay the rescue of Methodism and of these uncritical theologians from an inconsistent doctrine; but, undoubtedly, the whole ground must be very carefully reviewed before he can be permitted to hold the field unchallenged. He must make good his position.

It is an acknowledged principle laid down by Dr. Miley, in common with others, that any theory of atonement, to be valid, must adequately interpret the Scriptures. Systematic theology, like systematic science, is the formulating of general propositions and laws which must fully embrace and explain all the individual phenomena grouped under them. The fatal defect of the rectoral theory, however it may approve itself to a shallow rationalism, is, that it is not an interpretation of Scripture in its profound representations of propitiation and reconciliation. The issue with Dr. Miley is made at once just here. The writer of this paper is not desirous of setting forth his own naked and unsupported opinions and interpretations; when he can add to the native worth of the argument, he advances the authority of those whose theological learning is unquestioned, and who have earned the right to be heard. Dr. Pope is one of the most accomplished of the many learned Greek exegetes of Great Britain, which perhaps leads Germany in the single department of New Testament criticism and interpretation. The pre-eminent merit of his great work on Systematic Theology is its approximation to biblical theology in its close adherence to exegetical methods. Here we have few of those long chains of abstract reasoning that fill so many other bodies of divinity, in which there are no quotations from Scripture, and little attempt to rest the pillars of the argument upon supporting biblical deliverances. Dr. Pope has set forth the true doctrine so lucidly and succinctly that the argument conducted by frequent quotation from him must be largely the gainer thereby. His general preparatory statement is made in this language:

> The teaching of Scripture on this subject may be summed as follows: The Finished Work, as accomplished by the Mediator himself, in his relation to mankind, is his divine-human obedience regarded as an expiatory sacrifice—the Atonement proper. Then it may be studied in its results as to God, as to God and man, and

as to man. First, it is the supreme manifestation of the glory and consistency of the divine attributes; and, as to this, is termed the Righteousness of God. Secondly, as it respects God and man, it is the Reconciliation, a word which involves two truths, or rather one truth under two aspects: the propitiation of the divine displeasure against the world is declared; and, therefore, the sin of the world is no longer a bar to acceptance. Thirdly, in its influence on man, it may be viewed as Redemption, universal as to the race, limited in its process and consummation to those who believe.*

Here Dr. Pope has not thought it necessary even to allude to governmental necessities and results. He employs a biblical vocabulary and such modes of speaking as are not unknown to the Scriptures. In continuation of this thought, he says, in yet more unmistakable language:

As availing for man, by the appointment of God, it is no less than the satisfaction, provided by divine love, of the claims of divine justice upon transgression; which may be viewed, on the one hand, as an expiation of the punishment due to the guilt of human sin; and, on the other, as a propitiation of the divine displeasure, which is thus shown to be consistent with infinite goodwill to the sinners of mankind. But the expiation of guilt and the propitiation of wrath are one and the same effect of the atonement. Both suppose the existence of sin and the wrath of God against it.†

Once more:

As the atonement avails for the human race, and is therefore ours, it must be viewed as a vicarious satisfaction of the claims of divine justice or expiation of the guilt of sin, and propitiation of the divine favor.‡

Dr. Pope now proceeds to the exegetical defense of these dogmatic definitions. There are two families of terms that must be at once brought forward in every discussion of this subject: the nouns *ἱλασμός* and *καταλλαγή* most fitly represent these two groups of terms and ideas. The first group is presented in three leading forms:

Christ is the *Ἱλασμός*, the virtue of the propitiation, and the Propitiator: *He is the propitiation for our sins;* not the *Ἱλαστήρ*, because the process of his propitiating is lost in the effect. He is the living Expiation. He is also the *ἱλαστήριον*, the Kapporeth, or Mercy-seat, according to the use of the word in the Septuagint, *Whom God hath set forth to be a Propitiation*, that is, as a mercy-seat, between himself and sinners. Or, if the word be an adjective,

* Pope, "Compendium of Christian Theology," vol. ii, p. 263.
† *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 264. ‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 269.

then θῦμα is understood, and he is a propitiatory sacrifice. As the high-priest he is said ἱλασκέσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, that is, to expiate sins; though the English translation hides this meaning: *to make reconciliation for the sins of the people.**

Now consider the second group of terms:

The verb καταλλάσσειν signifies the virtue of the mediation of Christ as composing a difference between God and man, and καταλλαγή the result; the new relation in which the world stands to God, he being no longer an ἀντίδικος, and the world being no more an object of wrath. The context in the two passages where the verb is used shows that God is the antagonist.†

Coming now to discuss the specific idea of satisfaction as involved in expiation and propitiation, Dr. Pope says:

As commonly used to signify the unlimited reparation made for the dishonor done to the majesty of holiness by sin, it has no direct, though abundant indirect, sanction in the New Testament. But it evermore blends with the idea of propitiation; God is propitious, or favorably brought near, to the entire race of mankind; there is now but one ἀνθρωπόκτονος for whom eternal right *shall take no satisfaction.* . . . But the idea as referred to the Divine Being is really twofold: it is the satisfaction of his unutterable love which provides the atonement; and it is the satisfaction of his eternal holiness which must be a consuming fire to evil.‡

This is by no means identical with the doctrine advocated by Dr. Miley, that a sinner may be at once possessed of the personal friendship of God and exposed to judicial penalty. It is true that the atonement is to be traced to God's love as its original. But that love does not exclude co-existent divine displeasure against sin and sinners. And in order that that love might have free course to the sinner and be glorified in his salvation, it gave birth to the atonement, not as an outgrowth of governmental necessities, but as a demand arising among the divine attributes, and to remove difficulties interposed by the divine nature. This is very different from Dr. Miley's doctrine, that if the governmental difficulties were out of the way the personal displeasure could be removed without atonement. In substantial accord with Dr. Pope, the writer, several years ago, in a tract issued by the Southern Methodist Publishing House, had occasion to formulate the truths involved in this language:

* Pope, "Compendium of Christian Theology," vol. ii, p. 272.
† *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 272.
‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 274.

The atonement is sometimes misapprehended. Horace Bushnell had the true doctrine exactly reversed when he maintained, in his "Forgiveness and Law," that God made the sacrifice of his Son in order to excite love and forgiveness in his own bosom toward the creature upon whom he had conferred so costly a gift, just as we find that large self-sacrifice on behalf of our enemies and their interests substitutes hate and vengeance by love and forgiveness in our feelings and intentions. Such a system, or any other, beginning with the malignity of God toward his creatures, in whole or in part, dishonors God, and is viciously false. God is love, essentially and inalienably love. God's love was not born of the atonement, but the atonement of God's love. Man lost his place in the *approving* love of God, but not in his *benevolent* love. Antecedently to the atonement of Christ God loved the world: for "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son." He did not give his Son that he might love the world. By this we understand that, while the righteous and rectoral principles of his character and government demanded the punishment of sin, and would have inflicted that punishment, he yearningly desired the salvation of his creatures. Else the incarnation and crucifixion had never taken place. He loved us while we were yet enemies, just as we love our children when we are about to inflict corporal punishment upon them. Upon the death of the Son, however, the race steps up on a new and higher plane before God. God stands in an altered relation to his creature. He not only has a desire to save, but he now has the ability to pardon, and at the same time not infringe upon the righteous demands of his character and law. Is this now, when we turn to man, unconditional? Has the sinner a claim upon God? or, has the sacrifice of Christ purchased him a *right* of forgiveness? Is the commercial conception of the atonement, as held either by Augustinianism or Universalism, according to which the price has been paid, and the bond must be fulfilled by the delivery of the purchased possession, true? Here the Calvinist and Universalist hold the same fundamental principle, for it matters not that the purchase in the one case is a part of the race, and in the other the whole. The questions asked above must be answered negatively; and we avoid Calvinism on one hand, and Universalism on the other, building firmly on the broad foundations of Arminian orthodoxy, when we consider that the demand for atonement lay in God, or in the character of God—not in the value or number of the souls under the condemnation of violated law. The atonement accomplishes simply the removal of the divine disabilities, and God now obtains only the power to consistently pardon. It is not a question of the purchase of a given number of souls by the payment of a stipulated price, but a question of making the pardon of *any* soul possible. Just the same atonement is required to make the justification of one sinner possible that would be required for an infinite number.*

* "Wandering Stars," pp. 4–6.

So Dr. Pope:

Propitiation, from *Prope*, near, indicates in the Bible that the favor and good pleasure of God is attracted to the sinner by the mediation of Jesus. He is the Propitiation because in him God is nearer to man the sinner than even to man the unfallen. The fact that holy wrath is turned away through the atoning satisfaction is a secret behind the Incarnation: in the very essence of the Triune God. *Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son the Propitiation for our sins.* The profound truth remains, that the divine wrath and the divine love are revealed at once in Christ, but love must have the pre-eminence in our phraseology.*

This is sufficient refutation of the following argument of Dr. Miley's:

Why did the Father sacrifice the Son of his love in our redemption? It could not have been from any need of personal propitiation toward us. The redeeming sacrifice itself, the fruit of his love to us, is proof to the contrary.†

Unquestionably all careful exegetes will agree that the noun καταλλαγή expresses

the divine virtue of that mediatorial work which reconciles in God himself love and holiness, justice and mercy: in God himself before the Reconciliation was exhibited in the world. Of the distinction between this Atonement eternally in God and Reconciliation in the world of time we must speak again. . . . We mean by the Atonement the whole economy of our Lord's saving intervention as consummated on the cross. It is the ἱλασμός and ἱλασκέσθαι which answers to the כִּפֻּר and the כִּפֶּר. Just as we employ the term Redemption to designate Christ's work as saving man generally, and the term Reconciliation to signify the ministry through which that salvation is proclaimed; so we use the term Atonement to include the virtue of the redeeming work as propitiating the divine mercy to our race. In fact, it is the theological formula for all that belongs to that work.‡

No systematic theologian has ever excelled Dr. Pope in exegetical skill. It would be difficult to find in the whole realm of theological writing a profounder appreciation of the exact teaching of Scripture than is expressed in the following passage, especially in the concluding sentences:

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* Pope, "Compendium," etc., vol. ii, p. 275.

† Miley, "Atonement," etc., p. 272.

‡ Pope, "Compendium," etc., vol. ii, p. 275.

The divine HOLINESS is exhibited as conspicuously as the divine love, so far as concerns the process of redemption: love is supreme in the origination, and will be supreme at the end—for *mercy rejoiceth against judgment*, not over it, though over against it; but in the actual atoning work the justice of holiness, demanding the punishment and extermination of sin, is displayed in the most awful manner of which the human mind can form any conception. It is important to remember that Holy Scripture never makes such a distinction between the love and the holiness of God as theology thinks it necessary to establish. The mercy that provides and the justice that requires the atonement are one in the recesses of the divine nature. Their union or identity is lost to us in the thick darkness of the light which we cannot approach. The cross of Christ, or rather the whole mediation of the Redeemer, equally and at once reveals both. *Herein is love*—to quote once more the final revelation of Scripture on this subject—*not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son the Propitiation for our sins.* In our infirmity we find it needful to correct our estimate of one attribute by appealing to the other. The Scripture scarcely condescends to that infirmity. It speaks of the divine ἀγάπη as ordering the whole economy of what is, nevertheless, an ἱλασμός or propitiation, and of the divine εὐδοκία as ordering the whole economy of what is nevertheless a καταλλαγή. We shall hereafter see how these four words meet in the sacrifice of the cross, where love reigns through the infinite sacrifice of love.*

Could any thing be more beautifully or more truthfully said? The superficial theology of Dr. Miley's theory is driven away like chaff before the strong wind by such complete presentation of the whole content of the sacred writings. Dr. Pope is as careful as Dr. Miley to leave us in no doubt concerning his conception of the necessities and results of atonement:

> The change of relation is mutual: God lays aside his displeasure against mankind, being propitiated in the intervention of his Son; and all men, through the ministry of the Reconciliation, are invited to enter into a state of acceptance with God, laying aside their enmity. †

Dr. Pope does not for a moment entertain that superficial and sentimental error that the reconciliation is only of man to God, not of God to man. If our view must be one-sided and incomplete, our doctrine would be nearer the truth if it held only the great biblical fact of the reconciliation of God to men:

* "Compendium," etc., vol. i, pp. 278, 279. † *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 282.

Not to betake ourselves to abstract principles, the Scripture must be our appeal. The few sentences containing that aspect of the Saviour's work which views it as the Reconciliation speak in their context of a divine wrath, and in such a way as to give wrath its uttermost meaning. In the classical Corinthian passage we read *not imputing their trespasses unto them*, which has behind it, or rather before it, that most solemn declaration, *Who though he knew not sin*, was MADE SIN for us. These last words give the key to the whole doctrine; closing the statement of it with deep emphasis. . . . When he who *knew no sin* was *made sin for us*, the wrath of God against our transgression was expended upon our Representative, and diverted from us. He reconciled the world to himself by removing from it, as a world, his eternal displeasure. What is now going on through the ministry is the winning of individual souls to the enjoyment of the divine peace. For the full interpretation of this classical passage it is necessary to consider more distinctly the meaning of both terms: Reconciliation and World. The entire world of mankind God is said to have reconciled to himself in Christ, inasmuch as the atoning sacrifice was the actual realization of a purpose which had been regarded as wrought out from the beginning of human history. An economy or relation of peace had always prevailed in his government of a sinful race. . . . The purpose of redemption was an eternal purpose. . . . There was in heaven an Atonement before the Atonement. . . . The term [Reconciliation] may be said to characterize the kind of administration the Supreme Ruler has exercised over a guilty race. . . . As the world has received a Saviour or Deliverer, and the Gospel is preached to the world, so the world has from the beginning had the benefit of the amnesty. But a dispensation of forbearance BEFORE Christ is IN Christ a dispensation of perfect Peace. Hence the Gospel is called the *ministry of reconciliation*. God is administering, through the stewards of this ministry, a system or economy of forgiveness and peace. The embassadors of Christ announce a general declaration of the divine good-will to the world. Their ministry is not so much to induce sinners to lay aside their opposition to God as to persuade them that God has laid aside his opposition to them, not imputing their trespasses. . . . There is nothing said here of a reconciliation between the upper intelligences and man, or between both united and God; it is evident that the atonement is a ground of amnesty in the divine government universal so far only as the human race is concerned. The cross belongs to the world, and to all the world. Its two arms stretch backward and forward, to the beginning and to the end of time. So it is in a parallel place: *For he is our Peace . . . that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby;* what enmity he slew is explained by the reconciliation UNTO GOD. The result is that the life of salvation reigns. . . . The race in its unity is, notwithstanding sin, placed in a relation of

peace with the Supreme Ruler, so that the holy heavens can still canopy an unholy earth. . . . Our being reconciled never means our putting away our enmity, but the revelation in us of God's mercy. This is evident in the apostle's words to the Romans: *For if, when we were enemies,* under the displeasure of God, *ἐχθροὶ ὄντες,* we were reconciled to God, *κατηλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ, by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled,* having become partakers of divine grace, *we shall be saved by his life. He is our Peace,* St. Paul says, just as he is our Saviour, our Lord, our Head. And those who *have received the Atonement,* or who are *justified by his blood;* that is, who do not reject the reconciliation which is announced to them in the Gospel—have *peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.* The preachers of the Gospel declare the message of their embassy, and beseech men in Christ's stead: *Be ye reconciled to God.* But they mean only: Submit yourselves to the mercy of Heaven. St. Paul gives another expression to the same truth: he adds, *And came and preached peace;* after that description of the atonement already quoted, which speaks of his having *slain the enmity* on the cross.*

What a Gospel! Glorious truth! How unspeakably great and precious the message of reconciliation committed to the embassador for Christ! What a response in peace, in joy unspeakable and full of glory, this Gospel receives in Christian experience! How unanimous the testimony of ecumenical Methodism!

"The angel said unto them, Behold I bring you good tidings of great joy, . . . and suddenly there was with the angel a multitude" praising and saying—*Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις Θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας: Glory to God in the highest,* this is one member of the angelic antiphony,—*and peace upon earth among men of good-will*—toward whom God is well-disposed,—here is the responsive member.

Let Historical Theology, in concluding, render us some slight service. Referring to Socinianism, Dr. Pope says:

> It refuses to admit of any immutable qualities whether of justice or mercy in the divine nature, these being only expressions of his occasional will, called out, as it were, by the conduct of man. An eternal justice demanding punishment is inconsistent with an eternal mercy prompting to forgive. Satisfaction for sin is incompatible with love. Against this objection it is enough to say that it opposes the first principles of scriptural teaching concerning God, who is represented as reconciling in himself these opposite attributes by an atonement which is at

* Pope, "Compendium," etc., vol. ii, pp. 283–287. Paragraphs and sentences from all these pages have been grouped for quotation.

once and equally an expression of both, and regulating his will. Thus our doctrine is safe from Socinian censure only when it first shuts itself up in God, and grasps the reconciliation of justice and mercy in the divine nature.* There are two everlasting safeguards of the truth: the constitution of the human mind, which bears witness to the wrath as well as the love of God, and the express revelation of Scripture concerning the reconciliation.†

Once more. In Dr. Pope's final historical summary the beautiful harmony and almost marvelous coincidence of Pope and Summers may be clearly seen:

> Most of the errors that have passed in review have sprung from failure to connect the three leading biblical ideas: the atonement in God, as a necessity in the divine attributes; the reconciliation on earth, as vindicating to the universe the rectoral justice of God; and the exhibition of the redemption to man, as moving upon his conscience and will and heart. Here unite what are sometimes called the SUBSTITUTIONARY, the GOVERNMENTAL, and the MORAL INFLUENCE theories. The union of these is the scriptural doctrine, as it is set forth in Scripture; and especially in the Epistles of St. Peter, St. Paul, and St. John: the last giving in many particulars the finishing touches in the union of the Person and the Work of Christ. Neither of these theories is valid, standing alone. Each is necessary as the complement of the others. The doctrine would commend itself more than it does to the minds of all devout persons if justice was done to every aspect. The champion of either of these theories who thinks it necessary absolutely to deny the truth of the others proves that his own is wrong.‡

The later theologian builds on the same foundation with the older. Watson in his "Theological Institutes," Part II, chapter xx, develops *in extenso* a doctrine in all essential points in accord with that of Dr. Pope. The difference is that between the polemical and argumentative systematic theologian who for several generations was the type of an English divine, and the exegetical, polished, brief, scholarly, uncombative treatment of the theologian who is a master in all the rich developments of the most recent biblical and theological learning both in England and in Germany. Many passages might be quoted from the familiar pages of this twentieth chapter of Watson; but in the special interpretation of the critical passages on which the doctrine turns this would be but to dupli-

* Pope, "Compendium," etc, vol. ii, p. 310. † *Ibid.*, p. 312. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

cate, in some cases very strikingly, the spirit and results of the quotations already made from Dr. Pope. The extended treatment which Dr. Summers gave in his lectures developing his definition was divided into three sections on the Satisfaction, Governmental, and Moral aspects of the atonement. On the doctrine of the atonement, Watson, Pope, and Summers are a unit.

The limits of this paper do not permit us to enter upon the minute discussion of the relation of the atonement to original sin. Suffice it to say that Dr. Miley has accorded no special treatment to this great question in any section of his work; and, moreover, in his cursory allusions to the manner of infant salvation, he shows no critical appreciation of the doctrinal teachings involved in any really adequate exegesis of the fifth chapter of Romans, verses twelve to twenty-one. A special treatise on the work of Christ for the salvation of men that gives no account of this passage can hardly proceed upon so thorough-going a principle as to revolutionize the theology of Methodism. Paul says: "So then as through one trespass the judgment came unto all men to condemnation; even so through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life. For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous." But in Dr. Miley's system there hardly seems to be a place for this Pauline fact.

The scope of this paper will not be mistaken: it is meant to ascertain and present the doctrine of atonement as held by Methodism. Watson, Pope, Summers—all Englishmen, though the last a representative of American Methodism—Miley, Whedon, Raymond—these six authors, all ministers and theologians of Wesleyan and Episcopal Methodism, are the only writers to whom reference has been made. Fletcher might also have been embraced in our *consensus*, but he may serve us a good turn at another time.

Art. VI.—THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF "THE DEVIL."

"The world is very evil," wrote Bernard of Clugny, at the beginning of his famous hymn to the New Jerusalem: but probably the thought was there introduced only as a commonplace—a fact of which all were presumed to be aware, and the recognition of which might heighten the apparent fitness of what he was about to say of that "better country." But the existence of evil in the world is a fact of universal experience. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together," and, as the wisdom of hoary antiquity declares, "man is born unto trouble as the sparks fly upward." Men instinctively pursue courses of life and action, and develop characters and conditions of heart and mind, which surely lead them into trouble. How our world became so bad, and how such an imperfect condition of things can continue in the domain of Infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, is the "mystery of mysteries," which confounds all finite thought; and yet with this question, man's folly and presumption have perpetually busied themselves in futile attempts to solve the inexplicable riddle, "And of their vain disputings find no end."

There is a natural evil which has its seat in the physical system, and is affected by the conditions and environment of sensitive subjects, but of that we have not now to speak, except incidentally. Another form of evil of a purely spiritual nature is recognized and illustrated in the Bible, which it calls SIN, of which the religious and ethical teachers of all others than the Jewish nation appear in no case to have had any adequate conception. Whether or not men are subject to natural evil, except as the result of moral causes or conditions, is a question not altogether undeserving of attention, and it is also beset with very considerable difficulties, however it may be answered. Naturally and philosophically, it would seem that pain and suffering are inseparable from animal existence among the conditions of this present world—if, indeed, irrational creatures are capable of conscious suffering—and yet to concede it would open up some very far-reaching inquiries. The existence of moral evil, SIN, in the world, and the development of its results, under the

divine government, as it is a matter of infinitely deeper interest, appears also as a still more profound and tremendous mystery. When we are asked how this can be, we reply in our ignorance that "an *enemy* hath done this." It is all the work of the DEVIL. And when our children ask us why God allows the Devil to continue doing all this mischief, we are compelled to confess that the whole subject is too deep and high for our thoughts. Proud philosophers have vainly attempted to explain these mysteries with their babbling "Theodicies," prating

> "Of Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
> Fixed fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute;"

but the devout and God-fearing lay their fingers upon their lips and silently confess that they cannot answer, though their faith in God assures them that although SIN exists for the time being, and works its fearful ruin in our world, it is still within the grasp of the divine power, and that the decree has gone forth, "*Thus far* and no *further*."

Perhaps some incidental advantages may have resulted from such futile attempts to solve these deep mysteries, and that, too, among the most favorable conditions. It seems, indeed, to have been the divinely ordered mission of the Greek philosophy, and before that those of Persia and India, to test to its utmost the mind's capability of finding out God and understanding his counsels. "The world by wisdom knew not God," and this was demonstrated and at last confessed; and the enforcement of this intellectual despair was among the processes by which the age of the advent became "the fullness of the time." The human mind demands something to be believed, and philosophy had conspicuously failed to respond to that demand; and men were, therefore, the more willing to listen to the voice of God speaking from heaven, and still more to attend to the words of Him who came in person to reveal to men the deep mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. But these revelations are, however, only in part, and there still remains not a few "secret things" which God has reserved to himself, to inquire into which is neither wise nor reverent. Holy Scripture recognizes the existence of SIN in the world, tells how it became a *fact* in man's history and character, and, best of all, how its curse may be avoided. Beyond this it is silent; and we are

left deeply interested spectators of the sublime drama of the overthrow of the great *Adversary* and the destruction of his kingdom.

The Scriptures in treating of SIN simply recognize it as a *fact*, without attempting to propound any theory respecting its origin, except that it is derived from an extra-mundane source, and brought into the world by a spiritual being, neither divine nor human, called variously the *Devil*, (Διάβολος,) the *Adversary*, and *Satan*. He is also called, on account of his occupations, the "Tempter," the "Accuser," and the "Destroyer." This person is a perpetually felt presence in the doctrinal teachings of Holy Scripture, and a *factor* in all of life's problems. As God himself is the one great object of theology, pure and simple, so in the theo-anthropology of the Bible is the ever-present and always effective "party of the other part," standing over against God—*the Adversary*.

The biblical account of the beginning of *sin*, as a fact in human life and history, presents the Devil as its promoter and procuring cause. Whatever theory may be adopted respecting the drapery of the story of the Fall, the diabolic presence and efficiency remains. Nor does it appear that without that influence the sad event which brought sin and death into our world could have occurred. So, too, the progress of the conflict which the incoming of SIN precipitated is every-where marked by the same presence and power; and the successful accomplishment of the work of the Messiah, as declared in prophecy —which by reason of "the work of the Devil" is a militant campaign—is to be signalized by the complete discomfiture and overthrow of the *Adversary*. Any system of theology, so-called, that fails to recognize and make prominent the personality and the active antagonism of the Devil, is not *quo ad hoc* —so far forth—the theology of the Bible, nor can it be brought into harmony with the chief features of that great body of revealed truth. The scriptural idea of the Devil is that he is the personal embodiment of a great spiritual force, constantly acting in the divine realm—the mental *cosmos*—and which is, as to men's spiritual natures, a steady and terribly perilous impulse toward "the evil." On this pregnant truth St. Peter bases his godly admonition to believers, to which all would do well to take heed: "Be sober, be watchful: your adversary the

Devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist steadfast in the faith."

To examine in order, however briefly, all of the many passages of Scripture in which the doctrine of the presence and spiritual influence of the Devil in human affairs is taught, would entirely transcend our limits; we therefore select a single one, the elucidation of which will largely illustrate nearly all that is given on the subject. That passage (John viii, 44) reads: "*Ye are of your father the Devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do: he was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.*" These are Christ's own words spoken to the Jews, who were violently opposing him in the temple only a few days before his passion.

The conflict in which our Lord was then engaged, which appeared outwardly to be simply between himself and the Jewish rulers, had broader relations, and was of more than any merely incidental significance. It was a conflict of truth against falsehood—of God in Christ against the Devil—and its crisis was even then at hand. Our Lord, too, appears to have been intent on placing the parties to that conflict each in his proper position, himself doing the work committed to him by the Father, and those to whom he spake arrayed against him doing the work of their father—the Devil. And, that all might clearly understand the case in all its bearings, he in remarkably clear and comprehensive terms not only designates the Devil as the active antagonist of the work of Christ, acting through those directly addressed, but he also describes his character and his ever-enduring relations of antagonism against God—alike in character and action.

Looking carefully into these words of Christ, we find in them not only a clear recognition of the Devil as a person, but also a strongly marked expression of his character, with, perhaps, (and perhaps not,) some reference to his history. They also, and especially, indicate his relations to wicked men, and to *sin* as it is found in men. Respecting this last particular, which may be noticed first, it is shown that the wickedness of men, as displayed in their conduct, is, as to its source and procuring cause, of the Devil, and that he holds to evil men the relations

of a father, by some kind of ethical genesis. By some process which from its nature is hidden from human scrutiny, the spiritual and moral characteristics of the Devil have passed over to, and become abiding qualities in, men's spiritual natures; and as the characteristics of the father are reproduced in his children, by the laws of heredity, so the ethical character of the Devil re-appears in wicked men, and therefore he is properly called their "father." And it should be further observed that this form of expression indicates more than simple likeness in kind or similarity of character; it embodies the notion of *causation*—of generation. Men are what they are, in their native depravity, because the Devil has made them so; and their badness, though really their own, is, at the same time, *of the Devil.* Their evil propensities—ἐπιθυμίαι—are therefore called "the *lusts* of your father," as coming from him, though developed in themselves. These lusts are, however, none the less their own because of their derivation, as is well remarked by Meyer, (H. A. W.,) "The conscious will of the child of the Devil is to accomplish that after which its *father*, whose organ it is, *lusts*." All this, indeed, differs but very little from the catholic doctrine of "Original Sin" as it has been taught and held in the Church: that it consists not primarily in the action, but in the depraved condition of the soul, derived by inheritance from a corrupted stock, which itself became such at first through diabolical agency.

The presentation by our Lord of such an awful and profound mystery as that of the relations subsisting between sinful men and the Devil made it proper that some fuller statements should at the same time be made by him respecting that unique and formidable personage. Following the words of our Lord a little farther, we find a clear and explicit recognition of the Devil as a rational and intelligent person, with a fully determined ethical character. These words of Christ, uttered among such circumstances, can be understood only in their most obvious signification. It must not be said that he was speaking according to the prevailing notions of his times, for he was directly antagonizing those notions. He was also speaking as the divine *Logos*—the true Light—and was enunciating original revelations of the things which he had seen with the Father. Whatever, therefore, as is either expressly

declared or naturally implied in these words, must be accepted as the truth; and the things thus clearly and authoritatively ascertained may also be used in order to determine the sense of related passages in other parts of the Scriptures.

First of all we have here to notice how clearly and distinctly the personality of the Devil is recognized. The whole form and conditions of the discourse forbid the supposition that there can be any thing like a figurative personification, as though he was playing with some rabbinical legend or personifying the "abstract principle of evil"—itself an empty figment. There is also running through this whole discourse a coupling together, though with widest contrast, of God and the Devil —each the father of his *own*—so implying personality in the latter as really and fully as in the former; and to both alike personal attributes are constantly ascribed. We can form no conceptions of the attributes of truth and falsehood except as predicates of persons. Even logical and mathematical truth can become any thing more than barren abstractions only by becoming lodged in individualized minds, that is, by appearing as personal attributes. When, therefore, the Devil is characterized as essentially false—"a liar and the father of falsehood," as "abiding not in the truth," and "speaking falsehood from his own nature"—there is all along direct implications of his proper personality, which is quite too clear and manifest to permit them to be set aside as simply figurative expressions for which there are no real objects.

The Devil is also here brought into notice as a *moral force* capable of acting upon other *moral beings*. His spiritual proclivities—"lusts"—evil desires, because of his own essentially evil nature—are reproduced in his children, that is, depraved men, in whom they become laws of action. It is by virtue of this transmissible moral force which inheres in the Devil, and is able to reproduce its kind in other spiritual natures, that he acts as the "Tempter," and becomes the father of sinful men. By the reproduction of his own impulses to evil in other minds—through the mysterious impact of one spiritual nature upon another, a fact of universal experience, and as such steadily recognized in Scripture—the Devil acts as an evil influence among men, and all who receive him and yield to his enticements are changed into his own moral likeness, that is,

become his children. It seems, therefore, that our Lord's words, when he speaks of the Devil as a *murderer*, and *apostate*, and *liar*, could not have been used without very great impropriety in any other sense than as predicates of a real and consciously active individuality, that is, a person.

Having thus set before his adversaries the Devil as their father—in respect to their ethical characters—our Lord next proceeds still further to characterize the great *Adversary*, and in so doing to characterize those whom he addressed. He is, first of all, "a murderer"—*ἀνθρωποκτόνος—a man-killer*, which epithet should probably be understood as descriptive of his character rather than a reference to some fact, though the historical element may not be entirely wanting. The moral character of the Devil is here chiefly under notice, and yet there may also be an allusion to the fact of the seduction of our first parents, by which they and all their posterity became subject to the death spoken of in Rom. v, 12, and the reference will apply equally well whether the death there indicated shall be understood as natural or spiritual, or both. The notion advanced by Schleiermacher that Jesus had no intention to teach any doctrine regarding the Devil, but merely to add force to his reproach by referring to the generally adopted interpretation of the narrative of the Fall, cannot be accepted. We must, on the contrary, conclude with Meyer that he lays down the doctrine, (of the person and character of the Devil,) and also intentionally and explicitly expounds it.

"If the epithet a murderer here applied to the Devil is to be understood as simply a designation of his character, then the qualifying words, *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, from the beginning*, must be understood to refer to the beginning of his own existence; or the phrase may be understood adverbially, *always*, from the beginning onward, without intending to fix any initial point That probably is the primary sense of the passage, which, however, does not exclude the secondary, and not less important, one, that his evil nature was displayed *in the beginning* of the history of our race, in the work of temptation, which "brought death into the world."

That the overt act of killing, either consummated or attempted, is not necessary to constitute one a *murderer* is shown explicitly by St. John, (1 John iii, 15,) who assumes

that "hating one's brother" is a sufficient indication of that character. The whole spirit of our Lord's teaching favors the same idea—making the ethical spirit, of which the completed action is only the formal result, the criterion of character. The same thing is elsewhere illustrated in nature. Certain kinds of animals are accounted carnivorous, and though through the force of circumstances some one of such a kind should be reared without having tasted flesh, that fact would not remove that animal from the category of *carnivoræ*. The lion that has been reared in a cage, and, of course, never engaged in the hunt, is, nevertheless, simply by virtue of his nature, *a beast of prey*. So all in whom the spirit of hate abides and dominates, though they may never have performed an act of violence, are "man-killers;" and such was the Devil when, with murderous purposes, he engaged in the work of temptation in Eden and in the wilderness of Judea. If, however, the application of that epithet to the *Adversary* shall be understood to refer to the temptation and the Fall of our first parents, then the phrase "from the beginning" may seem to point to that transaction. The idea, which has found supporters, that there is here a reference to the case of Cain and Abel, has much less, in all its conditions, to commend it to favorable consideration, though in the passage in the First Epistle of John that case is referred to as an instance in point of the outcome of this deadly hatred of the heart.

It is, however, a rather far-fetched and forced construction of the language of our Lord respecting the Devil, to deduce from it any thing respecting the history of that mysterious person, either as regards his origin, or how he became "that wicked." He bursts upon the field of spiritual vision like an unheralded comet in the heavens, covering half the sky, and filling the nations with alarms—simply ὁ διάβολος, *the Devil, your Adversary*—and all that we know of him in all the past, is what is here told us, to wit, "he abode not in the truth." This clause, however, which if it stood alone might seem to be capable of a historical construction, is deprived of that power by that which immediately follows it, to wit, "because the truth is not in him." "Truth" is not to be contemplated as something apart from its subject, in which he might be considered as abiding, as in an atmosphere, while in himself—his

own moral and spiritual being—there is no truth. His not abiding in the truth is therefore not at all indicative of any *change* in his spiritual *status*, but rather an indication of his historically unchanged and essential *badness*. This text, therefore, affords no support to Delitzsch's inference that, at some point in the past eternities, "the Devil, instead of *taking* his stand in the truth, revolted, as the god of this world, and selfishly, against God, for which reason the world has been 'degraded and materialized' by God." This notion of Delitzsch, it will be seen, implies that certain great cosmical changes have been effected either directly *by*, or else mediately *through*, the development of sin, in the person of the Devil; and that our present world is a reconstruction from the ruins of an older and a better one, into which new world have entered not a few evil conditions and elements. It is enough, at this point, to say of all this that is it *purely gratuitous*, not to say *fanciful*. Meyer's rendering of this passage seems, therefore, to be decidedly preferable: "The passage under consideration," he remarks, "treats merely of the evil constitution of the Devil, *as it is*, without giving any hint of its origin. . . . In respect to the fall of the Devil nothing is here taught. If any such event is taught in the Bible, it must be found in some other places."

Let us, then, inquire of the Scriptures to ascertain, as nearly as we may, what they do, indeed, teach respecting what has been called, perhaps not improperly, the Natural History of the Devil. Turning to "M'Clintock and Strong's Cyclopædia," article *Satan*, (which name is treated as synonymous with Διάβολος, *the Devil*,)—in which article is embodied very happily, though briefly, the whole subject, wrought out in a truly liberal spirit, though not altogether uninfluenced by the traditional and popular notions with which it is every-where beset—we find, first of all, the concession that "of the original state or nature of Satan little is revealed in Scripture;" and to this is added the further significant statement, the correctness of which will not be questioned, that "most of the common notions on the subject are drawn from mere tradition, popularized in English by Milton, *but without even a vestige of scriptural authority*." It is quite evident, however, that the writer of that article, although he seemed to discard the authority of the Miltonian angelology, nevertheless took that

system with him, as a theory to guide him in the interpretation of the Scripture passages made use of—and, with a preconceived theory in one's mind, almost any thing may be proved out of the Bible. The Devil's spirituality, as contradistinguished from any conceivable form of matter, is so clearly and constantly implied in all that is said of him in Scripture, that there is the less need of any direct proof on that point; nor need we for that purpose overstrain the language of St. Paul, (Eph. ii, 2,) where he speaks of "the *spirit* that now worketh in the children of disobedience"—for the term "spirit" is not unfrequently applied in a much wider and freer sense, and even to living men. The descriptive terms there used, however, are highly significant of his relations and influence among men. The entire absence of any possible evidence in Scripture of the Devil's possessing any other than spiritual attributes may be accepted as conclusive evidence that he is truly and properly a spiritual being, without any material *corporeity*. This conception of the personal substance of the Devil must effectually remove from him, in such conceptions, every thing like physical power or agency in nature. When, therefore, we see him designated "the prince and power of the air," we, of course, understand the word "air" in a purely tropical sense. "The power," says Dr. Browne, in Lange's Commentary, "which the prince (that is, the Devil) controls is described as "of the air," for in this (that is, the spirit of the ungodly world—*society*) are found the place and character of the power, its medium, region, and domain, its means and modes." The whole description of his power implies only a spiritual nature and influence, presenting him as a rational and spiritual being of superhuman power, wisdom, and energy. Any thought, therefore, of his acting upon the world as a physical force, whether in the air, or on the sea, or in men's bodies, is puerile and absurd.

It is also necessary to guard against any attempt to identify him with the race of *demons*, either as being of the same nature, or as having any affiliation with them. It should be clearly understood that the *Devil* is not a *demon*, and that the *demons* are not *devils*. The prince of demons spoken of in the New Testament (Matt. xii, 24, 26) is not *Satan*, but *Beelzebub*—quite another and a very different person. Respecting the

latter, we are told by competent authority that "the name was that of a heathen deity, to whom the Jews ascribed the sovereignty of evil spirits. . . . All notices of Beelzebub are exclusively connected with the subject of *demoniacs*." * The name *Devil*, properly applied, has no plural, simply because there is but one Devil, unique, solitary, and without recognized kindred, except human souls perverted to his own nature and image.

Respecting his beginning, the Bible is absolutely silent, and all conjectures or traditions about that matter are worthless, superstitious, and misleading. How he became the "evil one" that he is, and in which character he is exclusively spoken of, is also not revealed to us, and the subject itself is incomprehensible. On the one hand, we cannot conceive that the infinitely pure and Holy One either *would* or *could* create a spiritual being with a moral character the direct opposite of his own; and, on the other hand, we cannot understand how a being all of whose spiritual impulses are in harmony with the divine, having been "created in righteousness and true holiness," could, out of the impulses of his own nature, fall into sin, and become transformed into "that wicked." Here we are brought face to face with the tremendous and absolutely insoluble problem of the *origin* and *perpetuation* of evil—the existence of *sin* in the domain of infinite righteousness.

According to the traditional angelology, the germs of which were brought into the Church from the later Jewish legends—themselves of Oriental origin—and augmented and brought to a system during the Middle Ages, (from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries,) and finally reduced to the form of a history in Milton's great epic—which has both supplemented and superseded the authority of the Bible on that and many other related matters—the Devil is a fallen archangel, himself having been the leader of a great apostasy and rebellion in heaven—whence he was driven by the Son of God, against whom he had especially rebelled. The mythological and legendary origin of many parts of Milton's great poem are well known to all classical scholars, and to adepts in the legendary literature of the Dark Ages and of the Renaissance. This theory appears to have been accepted as a whole by the writer of the Cyclopædia article to which we have referred, and yet he concedes that the

* Smith's "Biblical Dictionary."

passage on which "all this fabric of tradition and poetry has been raised" is Rev. xii, 7, 9, which tells of "Michael and his angels" fighting against "the dragon and his angels," and how "the great dragon, called the Devil and Satan," was "cast out into the earth, and his angels cast out with him," though it is also granted that "this account cannot refer to the original fall of Satan;" and certainly it bears the character of a *prophecy* rather than a *history*. But if the corner-stone of the structure is thus removed, on what shall it now rest? We turn, next, to 2 Pet. ii, 4, and read, "For God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to *Tartarus*, and delivered them into chains [Rev. Ver., "committed them to *pits*"] of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment," which, with the nearly parallel passage in Jude, may be accepted as the nearest approach to a direct proof of the matter in question. The question respecting the canonicity of these two epistles may be passed over with the remark that it is not well to base a very questionable doctrine on an equally questionable, so-called scriptural, statement. These epistles may (and they may not) be integral portions of the inspired record; and their claim to acceptance as such must largely consist in their agreement with the other Scriptures; they are scarcely competent so to teach any thing when standing alone. But if admitted as competent witnesses, what do they prove? The term "angels" is used in Scripture with a good deal of latitude; and, without departing from the biblical *usus loquendi*, it may here refer to either *men*, or *demons*, or *celestial spirits;* the first may be so called in their disembodied state, just as, while in the flesh, they are called the *children* of the Devil. Those who account demons to be of the hosts of Satan (as we do not) may well claim the references of these passages to that order of beings; or if, indeed, they are creatures of a higher order, neither their character, nor the occasion, nor the date, nor the method of their expulsion from heaven is revealed.

The word *Tartarus*, it is well known, is borrowed from the Greek mythology, where it was the name of the prison-house of those who fell under the malediction of the gods. The older writers, as Homer and Hesiod, make it the prison of only the gods, while *Erebus* is the prison for lost souls. As used by St. Peter—if, indeed, the genuineness of the epistle is con-

ceded—it must mean either *Hades* or *Gehenna*, but his words have much more of a mythological than a biblical tone and coloring. It seems, therefore, scarcely allowable to rest so important a doctrine as that of the fall of Satan and a large share of the holy angels, changing them into devils and shutting them up in Tartarus (literally "Tartarizing" them) to await a future judgment, upon so slender a basis of proof. It is too much like balancing the pyramid on its apex. In Matthew xxv, 41, a passage whose authenticity and inspiration will not be questioned, our Lord speaks of "the Devil and his angels," for whom the "eternal fire" was prepared; but as wicked men—lost souls—were to be driven thither, we must believe that it was prepared for them, and therefore that *they*, rather than some other order of beings, of whom nothing is clearly revealed, were the angels of the Devil there named. Angels are uniformly taken to be purely spiritual beings; such is the Devil, and such are disembodied souls. They, therefore, may be denominated "angels;" and as they are the children of the Devil they are his.

Outside of the Apocalypse—which is usually understood to refer to later times, and therefore need not be considered here—still two other passages, one in the Old Testament and one in the New, have been taken as proofs of Satan's expulsion from heaven. On the return of the Seventy, when they had rendered their account of the success of their mission, (Luke x, 18,) our Lord said, "I saw Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven," which to a mind already prepossessed with the traditional idea of his expulsion from heaven can very readily be made a proof-text in its support. But the occasion on which it was spoken, and the evident purport of the whole passage, leave but little room to doubt that it is there used in reference to the discomfiture of the Adversary by the preaching of the Gospel; and, so understood, it is a propheey and not a reminiscence. Meyer renders this passage, "I then perceived" (in sending them out to preach) "the speedy overthrow of Satan from his lofty power, as it were a flash of lightning out of heaven." A passage in Isaiah (chap. xiv, 12) speaks of "Lucifer, son of the morning," as "fallen from heaven;" but its application to the king of Babylon is so obvious that only the fertile imagination of some one of the later Church fathers

could have found in it a reference to the Devil's expulsion from heaven; and yet this was done by Jerome, and others have followed in his steps, though the interpretation is certainly unauthorized and fanciful. No competent critic will now concur in its support.

Having carefully examined all the passages of Scripture that are usually cited in proof of the original angelical state and character of Satan, we are compelled to say that they wholly fail of the purpose, and therefore that it is not a scriptural doctrine. What he was in the ages of the older eternities we are not informed, nor what he will be in the eternities of the future. God knows. But what he now is, in his relations to Christ's kingdom and to our own spiritual estate, we know; and here are our great interests in the matter. The New Testament, interpreted agreeably to its obvious sense, that is, without reading into it what is not there, nor failing to see and accept what certainly is there, very clearly exhibits, standing over against the power and agency of Christ and the Holy Spirit in their great work in this world, another and adverse power and agent, himself a formidable spiritual force, called the *Devil* and *Satan*, the *Accuser* and the *Destroyer*. He is all the time spoken of or referred to as a rational being with a clearly recognized ethical character, and other personal attributes are freely predicated of him. The existence of the Devil as a rational, spiritual person, *powerful*, *adroit*, and altogether *wicked*, is very clearly a doctrine of the New Testament. Our Lord, in all the provisions and processes for setting up his mediatorial kingdom in our world, steadily recognized this adverse power and its agent, and the attitude of Christ's kingdom—the Church—was made thoroughly militant, and its success was to be a triumph, because of the presence and adverse power of the Devil. The warfare on the opposing side is none the less *diabolical* as to its source and inspiration, because it is usually made effective through human agencies, that is, the emissaries of the "god of this world, the spirit that now works in the children of disobedience." The form of Christ's triumph in his Messianic work, in all its intermediate stages, and until the final and glorious consummation, is seen in the deliverance of redeemed souls from the power of the Devil; and the last great victory will consist in the utter overthrow of

Satan, represented figuratively by his being led in chains, after the manner of Roman triumphs, and the complete subversion of his kingdom. That conflict is now proceeding; those intermediary triumphs are secured as souls are being redeemed from sin and Satan by the power of the cross, and as peoples and tribes become subject to the power of the Gospel; and the final triumph—though as counted by earth's calendars that event may be very far off—is steadily, and indeed rapidly, drawing near.

The scriptural method of referring men's evil devices and doings to the Devil—which surely cannot without great and irrational perversion be referred either to prevailing superstition or to the use of figures of speech—necessarily implies both his power and his personal being. In the Book of Job we see "the children of God" coming together, and Satan also coming among them as an *Accuser*. The prophet Zechariah shows us "Joshua the high-priest standing before the angel of the Lord, and Satan standing at his right hand" *as his Adversary*. David, in the pride of his heart, numbers Israel; Judas betrays his Master; and Ananias and Sapphira "lie to the Holy Ghost;" but in each case Satan appears as the prompting cause. The disciples, under the instructions of the Master, were slowly coming to know the truth; but Satan was not indifferent, but desired to have them that "he might sift them as wheat," and when Peter blurted out the worldly impulses of his heart respecting his Master's work he was rebuked as if himself a "*Satan*." The most practical and plainly expressed precepts and exhortations of the New Testament, teaching us our duties and warning us against our dangers, are all along emphasized and treated as critical on account of the assumed presence, the subtlety, the malignity, and the power to do harm, unless carefully resisted, of "your *Adversary* the Devil." These things are, indeed, presented as together constituting a principal factor in the great problem of our spiritual life and the effectuating of our personal salvation. The end aimed at in our Christian diligence is that we may deliver ourselves out of the *snare* of the Devil; and in putting on the panoply of God is that we may be able to stand against the wiles of the Devil; and our confidence is that our Lord himself will "bruise Satan under his feet" in us. This godly jealousy for

our salvation is also intensified by the fearful possibility lest "as the serpent beguiled Eve in his craftiness, your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity and the purity that is toward Christ." Thus at every point, whether of encouragement or warning, of danger to be shunned or victory to be won, the fearful presence of the *Adversary* must be recognized and provided against.

It only remains now that we briefly and concisely recount the conclusions to which our review of this subject brings us:

1. There exists in the spiritual *cosmos* a *being* of vast power, called the Devil, Satan, the Adversary, etc.,—an ever-active force, essentially *wicked*, and perpetually warring against God, *in* and *through* mankind, for the promotion of sin and the ruin of souls.

2. The Holy Scripture gives us no account of his origin, nor any intimation respecting his history before he appeared in this world.

3. Through the *fall of Adam* (by the temptation of the Devil) our world (that is, the whole human race) has come under his domination, so making him *the god of this world;*—"*the prince and power of the air*," "the ruler of this world."

4. This person is himself purely spiritual, and capable of acting upon men's spiritual natures, to deceive and incite them to sin; but wholly independent of all physical laws of subsistence, and unable to act in any wise physically or mechanically.

5. He is now the great inciting and stimulating cause of the actual sin found in our world, as he was the procuring cause of original sin.

6. In the conflict now proceeding in the spiritual *cosmos* Christ (as Messiah) and the Devil are the leading combatants, and every man is abetting one or the other side.

7. The end and outcome of the conflict now pending in our world—of which the human race is at once the subject, the arena, and the prize—shall be the complete triumph of Christ over the Adversary and his own glorification as the Head of the triumphant Church; in which all men who shall have been with him in that conflict, shall share in his triumph and glorification; while the Devil, and all who remain his liege subjects and abettors, shall be driven away to receive the destiny prepared for them.

Art. VII.—PROBATION AFTER DEATH.

[Second Article.]

The Scripture argument on this subject in the January number of this Review, besides making clear that the passages most strongly relied on as favoring the continuance of the day of grace beyond this life do not sustain it, answers a not infrequent inquiry for the proof that a probation after death is impossible, by showing (1) that the teachings of our Lord and his apostles limit probation to the present life, which excludes it from the next, and (2) that they base the decisions of the final judgment upon conduct in this world, and in no way on conduct afterward. Either of these positions is conclusive upon the point for all who accept the Scriptures as authoritative in matters of religion.

There are, indeed, many passages of Scripture which, at first glance, apparently point to the salvation of the race, such, for instance, as tell us that Christ tasted death for every man; that he wills that all men shall be saved; that he will draw all men to himself; that he will subdue all things to his authority; that every tongue shall confess him to be Lord, and the like. Dr. Farrar has made a *catena* of them extending through half a dozen pages. If there were no positive assertions limiting probation, and making conduct in this life the ground of the final decision, it would, perhaps, be natural to accept the apparent meaning as the true one, to be realized, however, under a different system from that which God has framed. But there are such assertions, and to them these passages, rightly interpreted, are in no way antagonistic. They set forth the divine side of the plan of salvation, but with the full knowledge that there is a human side as well, in which free, responsible man, of his own choice, acting in opposition to God, may defeat his gracious intentions, and gain only eternal ruin for himself, thus destroying a soul for whom Christ died.

With these views the discussion might here close, did not the advocates of future probation call us to a range of argument lying outside of revelation, with the frank confession on the part of some of them that their doctrine cannot be argued from the teachings of Scripture, and must be maintained on other

grounds. There may be bravery in thus assuming to penetrate the counsels of the Infinite respecting the destiny and privileges of men, and to discover his unrevealed purposes and methods of mercy in another world for those who spurn him in this; but if their logic be false and their conclusions baseless, their solid rock will prove but shifting sand. The positions taken fall together under one head, which we will denominate,

I. The philosophical argument for future probation.

Extremes meet here. John Murray, the hyper-Calvinist and the father of American Universalism, who logically extended the decree of absolute and unconditional election to embrace all for whom Christ died, and the Rev. Samuel J. Barrows, the ultra-Liberal, who demands that we "remove the stumbling-block of biblical infallibility,"* strike hands here, and agree that the day of grace for the neglectful and the wicked extends into the next life. Be it noted, however, that the doctrine of probation, which throws the responsibility of the sinner's damnation upon himself, is not known to pure Calvinism. That system, by its principle of necessity, takes away his freedom of choice and action, except in the direction in which he is compelled to choose and act, and thus relieves him of all responsibility for his conduct or destiny, and puts it upon God. It makes him a mechanical non-probationer, unrewardable and unpunishable, and then, with a justice equaled only by its reasonableness, remorselessly dooms him to perdition for what he cannot help. Murray's extension of election to include all men, because Christ died for all men, while it does something to relieve the imputation upon the character of a holy God, also leaves man with no proper probation. But both Calvinism and Universalism have become so far removed from their original forms that their founders, were they to re-appear on earth to-day, would not recognize them; and "the progressive orthodoxy" of the former has in "the drift of modern thought," to use Dr. Atwood's expression, gone so far toward the adoption of the theories of the latter that they both agree in the impossibility of vindicating the divine character in giving to every man a fair chance, if probation is limited to this life. Dr. Atwood, as reported in "The Independent," said truly, in the Universalist General Convention in October last,

* "The Doom of the Majority of Mankind," p. 146.

that "the principles of the new orthodoxy are akin to Universalism," though he was compelled to confess it "apparent that, on the part of the leaders of that movement, there is a studious attempt not to recognize the Christian standing and work of the Universalist Church." But let him not be cast down by this unreadiness to acknowledge the kinship, for it needs only the adoption of Dr. Dorner's inability to pronounce dogmatically upon the doctrine of eternal punishment because of human freedom, to place them in the same line. The laws of the oscillation of the psychological pendulum are very certain, and have many illustrations. Dr. Farrar, the freshest and most vigorous living advocate of continued probation, was educated in the school of rigid Calvinism, and in the reaction has gone to the other extreme. Dr. Newman Smyth, a Presbyterian, is now among the foremost in the ranks of the advanced orthodoxy. And the New England Theology, whose adamantine walls once towered so proudly and grandly, is razing its own fortress, and, revolting from itself, is following the revolt of years ago into the happy Elysium of Liberalism. Professor Fisher, of Yale College, bore testimony in "The New Englander" six years ago that, as a historical fact, in the wake of modified Calvinism a belief in restoration and kindred doctrines was springing up. It was not a Methodist, but Professor Park, who, a few months ago, sorrowfully wrote: "I must say that on some of our essential doctrines, as, for example, the doctrine of probation, we must look to our Methodist brethren for light and guidance. On this truth they are sounder than we are; and if it had been told to our fathers sixty years ago that this young denomination would be more orthodox than the Congregationalists, our fathers would have died before their time." Let us hope that the swinging of the pendulum will finally bring our brethren to the solid Methodist ground that every human being who has intelligence enough to be accountable has a probation, and a sufficient probation, in this life.

Dr. Dorner's double standard painfully illustrates the mischief of substituting philosophy for Scripture in the construction of his system. "That some are damned," he says, "rests on preponderant exegetical grounds, but that gives no dogmatic proposition, because this must be derived also from the

principle of faith." * A theology based upon Scripture would lead him conclusively to the doctrine of eternal punishment, but he does not accept it because it does not accord with his previously formed ideas of the absolute Christianity, or, as he terms it, "the principle of faith." This double basis of Scripture and faith, in which the former is frequently compelled to yield to the latter, pervades his whole theological system. So Dr. Smyth admits "Dorner's dogmatic hesitancy when he finds himself unable to reconcile facts of history, or texts of Scripture, with that which faith has already learned to deem Christlike and most worthy of God." Beautiful as this is, it casts us all adrift upon a sea of uncertainties. What we find in Holy Writ we are not to embody in our theology until we have tested it by some previously settled principle. But who shall define for us what is "Christlike and most worthy of God?" Shall it be John Wesley, or John Calvin, or Theodore Parker? Or, shall every man be his own judge and hold himself at liberty to refuse from his acceptance whatever in Scripture does not harmonize with his conception of what is like Christ and worthy of God? This notion of what is becoming God, differing in different men, may, as facts most clearly show, become so greatly changed in the same individual that what was but yesterday proclaimed as truth is in "the progress in theology" to-day rejected as error. Very pertinent here is the remark of Dr. Newman Smyth, that "the feeling of God's being and nature is never fully taken up into any one conception of him, and the religious feeling acts and reacts upon us in a twofold manner, both leading us constantly to think of God, and causing us to become soon dissatisfied with our best thoughts of him. Theology must, therefore, be a progressive science." † And whither it may progress and what may prove its goal, with faith, the religious feeling, or the spiritual intuition, by whichever name it be called, as the arbiter of doctrine, no man can tell. Thus Dorner's principle, that "those views are to be rejected which prevent faith," is practically identical with that of Barrows, namely, this: "We must decline to accept as authoritative any interpretation of the Bible, be it true or false, which affronts the moral sense of

* "The Future State," p. 127.

† "The Religious Feeling," p. 166.

humanity or impugns the righteousness of God." * The most ultra of Liberalists ought to be satisfied with either.

Dorner's argument that human freedom stands in opposition to eternal punishment, and that "so long as freedom of any kind exists, so long the possibility of conversion is not excluded, though it be through judgment and damnation to deep, long woe," is precisely the argument with which Universalism has long made us familiar. It assumes that the moral government of God will be administered in the next world in the same way that it is in this; that probation continues beyond the present life, and even so long as human freedom exists; that the atonement of Christ, though spurned here, will avail as richly in hell as it does on earth; that the gracious aid of the Holy Spirit to repentance and faith, refused by men here, will be freely given there, and that the agencies devised by infinite wisdom to awaken slumbering souls and bring them to Christ in this world, such as the preaching of the Gospel, the strivings of the Spirit, and the example and influence of the good, will be perpetuated in the world to come. Indeed, it is assumed by some that God has in reserve a higher system of agencies which he will there employ for the recovery of those who under the present one die impenitent, although it would seem beyond conception that there can be a higher dispensation than this in which God himself becomes incarnate, manifests to men the full excellence of his character, reveals to them his will, and then by the sufferings and blood of the cross pays the price of their redemption, and in which the Omnipotent Holy Spirit is the minister of salvation to all who will consent to be saved. Infinite love can provide no greater sacrifice, nor can it more clearly manifest itself than it has done; and the only obstacle to its winning all men to its embrace is in the hostile human will.

Over against these assumptions, which not only have no authority in Scripture, but are contrary to it, lies the fact of the distinctive effect of persistent sin. God deals, and will forever deal, with man in accordance with the laws of the nature which he has given him. By one of those laws, the soul that does not turn to righteousness must grow more and more into worldliness and sin. Beginning with simple neglect of the

* "The Doom of the Majority," p. 140.

Gospel, with the continuance of neglect it loses power to receive it, and absorbs from the world around a thousand influences which tend to harden it against the call of God, to deaden its susceptibilities to its own need, and to perpetuate neglect to the end. Character early begins to form, and it solidifies as the years roll on. The influences that can change it lose their power, and it acquires an abiding permanence. Men die very much as they live. There are, doubtless, exceptional cases of genuine death-bed repentance; but, as a rule, the neglecter neglects to the last, the hardened awake to no feeling, the scoffer turns to no prayer. They exhibit no sorrow for sin, no sense of their deep guilt in God's sight, no disposition to holiness, no turning to Christ, no dread of the judgment that awaits them, even if mental unconsciousness does not come upon them before they fairly realize that they must die. And thus do they pass away from the opportunities and influences that have here been inefficacious, carrying with them the characters which they have formed, and which, by the law of our nature, will abide and strengthen. The knowledge of approaching death and coming retribution has failed to arouse them to repentance, and, unless the laws of man's being become entirely changed, there is no reason to suppose that the entrance upon the dread reality will awaken them to a loathing of sin. Nor is the habit of sin to be so easily broken. The longer one lives in sin the stronger do its bonds become, and the harder is it to break them. Every succeeding year increases the chances against him, and there is no reason to suppose that the sinner of fifty years will be more disposed to repent, or find it easier, when he is fifty thousand, and in the atmosphere of hell.

Besides all this, there is the law of self-produced inability. Men close their eyes to the light, and destroy their power to see. They shut their ears to the truth, and lose their power to hear. They refuse obedience, and become unable to obey. They harden their hearts, and settle down in their hardness. A chosen persistence in sin induces in the soul an inability to repent. This is an old truth. Jeremiah discerned it when he said, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." Jer. xiii, 23. A more sad illustration of it cannot be

found than in the Jews of Christ's time, of whom it is written, "Though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him: . . . therefore they could not believe." John xii, 37–39. First, they *did not;* then they *could not.* Thus is it always. Opportunity squandered diminishes power; and too often, it is to be feared, in the full blaze of Gospel light, power for repentance dies away, though earthly life may still be prolonged. Another probationary trial for such souls would be the offer of a chance for repentance to those who have no power to repent, and so a useless mockery.

But may not God, in a probation extended beyond this life, even though there be no higher dispensation of love and mercy, through the sufferings that befall them, recover the impenitent and rebellious to repentance and holiness? It is claimed that all punishment is disciplinary and remedial, from which arises the hope that some, at least, if not all, will be brought to God in the future world who prove incorrigible in this. But let us not confound the punishment inflicted as penalty with a father's chastisement of his erring child intended for his correction, or with what follows sin as natural consequence. That God does in various ways administer discipline in this world, as by afflictions and trials, is involved in the idea of this life as a state of probation, and is by no means to be forgotten; but that he will do it in another implies that his moral government will in a world of retribution be the same as it is in a world of probation, which has never yet been proved. Again, if one thrusts his hand into a blazing fire he is burned, which follows as natural consequence. A murderer's remorse is a consequence of his crime, but his punishment is the judicially pronounced and inflicted sentence of the law. In like manner, sin has its natural consequence in the soul's defilement; but God's punishment, over and above all natural result, is infliction by his own hand as legal penalty for transgression.

Now, in the face of much of the humanitarian philosophy of the day, we deny the tendency of penal suffering to reform the criminal. The records of criminal history amply sustain this view. Punish, and do nothing more, and the thief continues a thief, with a more intense hatred of the law and of society. "Our observation," remarks Dr. F. H. Hedge, whose

position would naturally incline him to the contrary view, "does not detect this medicinal quality in the penal sufferings of the present life." And Edmund Burke, no light observer of men and things, says, "The infliction of penalty has no tendency to reform the guilty." Men do, indeed, come forth from prison and punishment reformed, but it is because of the agencies for that purpose which Christian benevolence, through the State or privately, has gathered around them. The labor of chaplains, Sunday-school teachers, Scripture readers, pious visitors, and others, which is altogether outside of the penalty imposed, is to be credited with the change in character and life of the not absolutely incorrigible, which is wrongly attributed to the punishment itself. Nor is there reason to suppose that punishment in the future world will have a different tendency from what it has in this. There are no reformatory agencies in hell. The only glimpse vouchsafed to us into the dread prison-house discloses a sufferer whose day of grace was past, with none around him to mitigate his pain, and calling, but in vain, for a ministrant from paradise to cool his tongue. Punishment is the operation of retributive justice upon offenders, the prime purpose of which is the vindication of law and the maintenance of government. In the case of lost souls, it falls upon those who in their day of trial so resist the influences of grace that they become confirmed in their evil courses, sinning on in spite of all reproofs and chastisements, and who, it may be well supposed, would sin on in the midst of suffering forever.

An appeal is made to the perfections of God, to his hatred of evil, his power to destroy it, and his infinite love and pity for sinners, as though in a system of probation continued in the next life he could accomplish what is not attainable here. Such conceptions bear the mark of all the arguments which demand for sinners another chance; they are concerned in putting the responsibility of the sinner's ruin on God if he fail to do something more, while the real responsibility is on the sinner himself for his use of what God has actually done. Let us be well assured that in a purpose and plan of salvation devised by his infinite wisdom no shadow can fall upon the perfections of his nature through the perverseness of those who reject its gracious benefits. The height and depth and breadth

of his love cannot be more fully shown than they have been in the sufferings and shame of his dear Son on the cross. His hatred of evil is proved and illustrated by the price he has paid for our deliverance from it. His power to destroy it or to stop men's sinning if he will, is a false putting of the case, for the existence or destruction of sin is no more a question of power than was its beginning. In the nature of things a square cannot be a circle, nor can two plus two equal five. In the nature of things he could not create man intelligent, moral, and free, and at the same time by an act of omnipotence prevent his sinning. And if omnipotence cannot prevent it in this world, without destroying man's freedom, which God will never do until he contradicts himself, how can he by any exercise of it, short of the annihilation of the sinner, prevent it in the future world? .It is in the power of man, confirmed in sin and hardened in obstinacy, to perpetuate it forever. Take away his freedom and he is man no longer, and if saved by an act of divine power he is saved, not as a moral being, but as a machine.

Let it not be feared that evil shall win the victory, and ultimately triumph over God. The struggle is a long one and hard, but the battle was joined and the result determined when Christ was enthroned as universal King. Men come and go with the ages, and as they pass he is set before them that they may bow the knee at his name and confess him Lord. Multitudes have come to adore him, and other multitudes will not have him reign over them. Skeptics sneer, infidels scoff, and "the heathen rage," exalting themselves in their pride, while believing souls, freely accepting him, find their fullest joy at his feet. And thus will it go on until the final consummation. In that dread day his method will change. The hour for rule and the rod of iron and his mighty arm will have come. Rebellion and resistance will be vain. His omnipotent voice, no longer pleading, but now commanding, sinners will be compelled to obey, and whatever power in earth or in hell has exalted itself against him will be subdued. Saints will gather lovingly around him, and wicked men, still impenitent and hard, will at his bidding depart from his presence forever. Satan will be dethroned. Evil will still hate, but, willing or unwilling, all rule and all authority and power throughout the universe shall be under Christ's feet, and God supreme be all in all.

II. The probationary condition of the heathen.

As the Jews denied salvation to the Gentiles, so has the Christian Church, especially from the time of Augustine, adopting the maxim, *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, "No salvation outside of the visible Church," denied it to the heathen, and until a recent day this has been the almost universal opinion. "Romanism and Lutheranism," says Dr. Schaff, "save those only who are brought into contact with the Church and the sacraments, [and] Calvinism those only who are elect from eternity." The Westminster Assembly, in its Confession, allows the heathen a "much less" chance of salvation than it does those who hear the Gospel and disobey it, and in its Larger Catechism says: "They who, having never heard the Gospel, know not Jesus Christ, and believe not in him, cannot be saved, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature or the law of that religion which they profess; neither is there salvation in any other, but in Christ alone, who is the Saviour of his body, the Church."

Zwingli broke in upon this horrid nightmare of doom with his declared conviction that together with the two Adams, the redeemed and the Redeemer, Abel, Enoch, the host of Old Testament saints, and Peter and Paul, will be gathered Hercules, Theseus, Socrates, Aristides, Antigonus, Numa, Camillus, the Catos, the Scipios; "in short," he says, "there has been no good man, there will be no holy mind, there is no faithful soul, whom you may not see there with God." Luther's reply, "If this be true, the whole Gospel is false," only expresses the general sentiment of his time.

Thus the old orthodoxy damns the heathen without a probation, and the new fails to do any better, except in the assumption of a probation in the next life. And Dr. Smyth was constrained to admit before the New Haven Council of Installation that "there is nothing definite in the Scripture with regard to a possible future probation," and that "so far as its possibility is concerned it is a speculation." * This dwindles the chance of the heathen to the thinnest of shadows. It is more than possible that if, instead of beginning its inquiries at Geneva and Westminster, as has been so often done with like result, the new orthodoxy had begun at the Arminian point of

* Verbatim Report in "The Independent," Sept. 28, 1882.

the compass, it would have long since emerged into clear sunshine without its present troubles and perils. But, notwithstanding its disadvantages, it has came to hold, according to Dr. Smyth, "that obligation and ability are commensurate; that no man is guilty before personal choice; that man is accordingly by nature still capable of probation; that a moral person can be reprobated only upon the ground of personal determination in evil; and that the atonement was made for the whole world, and all men are to be finally judged by God in view of the sufficiency of Christ's sufferings." * This so-called "improved Calvinism," from which Calvin is left out, evolved through vast labors and throes and proclaimed as new light in a great darkness, is just about what Methodists have been preaching up and down the world for a century and a half. Why, now, when we come to apply these principles to the question of the salvation of the heathen, turn about and flatly contradict them by making obligation exceed ability, and accountability extend beyond opportunity? Yea, rather, why renounce them for the husks of Westminster, in which there is no salvation for those who have never heard of Christ?

Most assuredly, there is no salvation outside of the atonement of Christ. But the atonement is one thing, and its application is another. By his acceptance of it, God is enabled to act in saving men upon such terms as seem to him wise and good, but in the bestowment of its benefits he has never bound himself to treat all men as if living in the same dispensation of truth and grace, or standing upon the same plane of intelligence. The one all-embracing condition for responsible men is a solemn belief in and self-surrender to him, but he has never ordained that all men of every age must believe in Christ, or even that the atonement shall never avail for a human being unconditionally. It would be neither Christlike nor worthy of God to require actual faith in Christ of one who never heard of him. The divine rule of responsibility is, "Unto whom much is given, of him shall be much required;" and the human rule differs not from it: "To whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more." Luke xii, 48. Responsibility equals advantage. Our Saviour's illustration (verses 47, 48) is very clear: "That servant, which knew his

* Introduction to "Dorner on the Future State," p. 34.

Lord's will," who was in charge of affairs and whose enjoined duty was preparedness and watchfulness, "and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes," who had received no special orders and yet did as he knew he ought not, "shall be beaten with few stripes," for his guilt was less. "Yea, doubtless," pithily says John Goodwin, "had not this servant been in a capacity of knowing his Lord's will, in case he had been duly inquisitive after it, he had not been beaten with any stripes at all, though he had committed such things which had been worthy of stripes in other men." So, in the parable of the talents, the accountability is measured by the trust, five, two, or one; and had there been a servant to whom nothing was given, he would have been a non-probationer and called to no account.

The inequalities of advantage among different people at the same time and the same people at different times constitute an important element in a judgment in which exact justice is to be done in every case. God bestows his gifts of grace as it pleases him, but holds the recipient responsible only according to the gift. He granted light and means of salvation to the Hebrew which he withheld from the Egyptian, to the Englishman which are not given to the Patagonian, and to Jerusalem in Christ's time which it had not in David's time. Cities and countries have shut their eyes to the light, and judicial darkness has enveloped the generations following. "For judgment," said Jesus, "I am come into this world, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind." John ix, 39. Advantage may be abused, as by Chorazin and Bethsaida, and increased advantage may only result in greater condemnation, as in Jerusalem. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin." John xv, 22. And with inferior advantage, as in Rahab, may exist the disposition to so use the truth known as to win acceptance with God. And we may be sure that his judgment will take full cognizance of the opportunity and ability possessed, and the requirement will exactly correspond to the gift.

Men every-where have a knowledge of God which, however small it may be, is always sufficient to leave them "without

excuse" if they disobey him. The eternal Logos gives light to every man that cometh into the world. All nature proclaims him, so that from his works what is knowable of him, his power, supremacy, righteousness, and will is shown to them to whom he has not revealed himself by his word. A traditional knowledge of him, as revealed in the first ages, has gone into all religions, and in the polytheisms the most debasing and the farthest departed from the truth is a conception of the Supreme Deity; and the Holy Spirit, whose office is with the conscience, to reprove sin and awake to righteousness, has never, from the day of Adam until now, been absent from the world. Thus God has not left himself without sufficient witness. Cultured Athens erected its altar to the "Unknown God," the Infinite One, whose offspring, as Cleanthes said, we are; and the Scandinavian skald in the Elder Edda sang of a Supreme, mightier than Odin, whom he "dare not venture to name." In all heathendom there is a recognition of God as supreme, though the conception of him may be widely different from the character of Jehovah made known in the Bible, and also of a law binding on the conduct. And both reason and conscience require that as they see and know God they shall serve and obey him. Not to do so is sin.

St. Paul teaches (Rom. ii, 6–16) that men will be rewarded according to their deeds as tested by the law given to them. The possessor of God's written law will be judged by it, and the heathen by "the law written in their hearts," which, though imperfectly, it may be, points for them the path of righteousness and duty. And a true and acceptable obedience to this law as discovered by the conscience requires a genuine faith in God as discerned by the understanding.

This strictly accords with the principle of faith as the appointed condition of acceptance with God. A true faith grasps God as the mind knows him; and when the personal Jesus is made known it will grasp God in Christ, and cannot until then. For faith has its degrees corresponding to the several dispensations of truth and grace. Thus there is a patriarchal faith, a Jewish faith, a Christian faith, and a heathen faith, each being a true faith in God as he is apprehended. So "Abraham believed God" as Supreme, Protector, and Promiser, with only the dimmest conception of a Redeemer; and his faith "was

counted to him for righteousness." Rom. iv, 3. The harlot Rahab, the devotee of Ashtaroth, believed in Jehovah as Conqueror and Supreme, and is ranked among the heroines of faith. The disciples' faith while Christ was with them was a true faith, but it rose no higher than his kingship of men until his ascension. And a Christian faith grasps God manifest in the flesh, the Redeemer and Saviour, which was not possible until the Pentecost. St. Paul defines the lowest form of acceptable faith in Heb. xi, 6: "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek after him." Mr. Wesley styles it the faith of a heathen. Beyond doubt, multitudes among the heathen have such a faith, and in their dim light grope after God. Such was Cornelius, who sought after him and found him as the Jehovah of Israel. It was in his experience that St. Peter learned the broad truth that "God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him [as he is made known] and worketh righteousness [as its law is discerned] is accepted with him." This is the divine rule, though, as in the case of Cornelius, Christ be not known. In Christian lands, God as revealed in Christ as Saviour and Son must be believed and obeyed. In Mohammedan and pagan lands, where the Gospel does not shed its light, souls that believe and seek God as he is revealed to them are saved. The genuineness of the centurion's faith was proved by the glad heartiness with which it embraced Christ on the preaching of the apostle; and so, doubtless, many a pagan, worshiping imperfectly, and in forms and ways that the Bible disapproves, but sincerely fearing and serving God as best he knows, is accepted with him, and on presentation of the Gospel will welcome it as did Cornelius. We cannot quite say, with Joseph Cook, that such souls do believe in the "essential Christ," for of such a Christ we have no knowledge, while the Christ set forth for our faith is very real and definite. And besides, the real question relates not, as Mr. Cook seems to think, to the perfectness of the object of faith, but to the perfectness of the faith itself in the object as discerned. He is evidently not yet free from the trammles of Westminster.

It follows from what has been said, that in the atonement provision is made for all the race; that opportunity and ability are the measure of accountability; that, through Christ, a

sufficient light and knowledge are given to the heathen whereby they may be saved; that none will be condemned except for their willful rejection of the truth vouchsafed to them; that some do in their relative darkness truly believe in God, and are accepted with him; and, therefore, that a new probation in which to obtain mercy is not needed.

"But if the heathen may be saved, why send them the Gospel, whose added light will increase their responsibility?" For the same reason that we preach it at home, though knowing that to some it will be "the savor of death unto death"—to save men. For the same reason that ministers and Churches, by continued revival services, seek to arouse and bring to Christ those who are neglecting salvation — to save more. For the reason that there, just as here, the great multitude will neglect the truth they have and press on in sin, except good men persistently seek their rescue.

III. Infant non-probation.

The demand for a probation in the next world, for those who die in infancy, has its root in the dogma of infant damnation. Augustine assigned all unbaptized infants to hell, the mildest part of it, to be sure, "but, nevertheless," he says, "they are damned." In this he is followed by the Roman Catholic Church. On this theory the overwhelming majority of those that die in infancy are lost. According to the "Westminster Confession," "Elect infants dying in infancy are regenerated by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and where he pleaseth." Of course, the non-elect are damned, "to the praise of his glorious justice;" but either by baptism or the eternal election of God millions of infants are saved. The new orthodoxy, rejecting these methods, demands that every infant that dies shall be subjected to a decisive probation in the next world. This is monstrous, if it be not necessary for salvation; and if it is necessary, the dying infant is unsaved. If any are shocked at such a conclusion, let them remember the fundamental principles of individual responsibility and the necessity of actual faith in Christ of every human being in order to salvation. Dr. Smyth expressly mentions infants, idiots, and "children born apparently to no moral chance," as among those for whom he trusts God for "some special opportunity for repentance in Hades," holding it to be "a logical deduction

from the biblical principle of individual accountability under a general atonement which has been maintained in our New England theology." And if there be no such opportunity for the repentance of those who have nothing to repent of, this new theology, less merciful than either Romanism or pure Calvinism, notwithstanding its pretensions to nobler conceptions of God, finds no escape from the horribleness of a universal infant damnation.

This notion of infant accountability transcends common sense, for there can be no responsibility where there is and can be no knowledge or power. In so far as the attempt is to *create* an accountability to accommodate a preconceived theory of a necessity of a probation for infants, it goes beyond what God has revealed, and beyond what necessity requires as well. Those Methodist thinkers who anxiously invent a supernatural enlightenment by the Holy Spirit of the infant soul as it is about to depart, that it may believe in Christ, may well reflect whether faith is imposed as the condition of salvation upon any one who is innocent of personal sin. The gracious opportunities and tests of probation are for sinners who, by their own acts, have become personally guilty in order that they may, if they will, accept the offered mercy. But such a probation is impossible to an infant, for he has incurred no guilt and needs no pardon for sin which he has never committed, and, therefore, no believing in order to salvation. He is in the plan of God a non-probationer, without knowledge, law, obligation, power, or responsibility. Moreover, it is time to take exception to this exaltation of an expressive technical term of comparatively recent origin to be the basis of a new theological dogma. We find in the Scriptures that to intelligent and responsible human sinners grace is offered upon conditions within their power, on the performance or non-performance of which their destiny depends; and this for convenience' sake we call *probation*. The term is good for just what it is meant for, and nothing more. Least of all does this use of it warrant the foisting upon it as doctrinal truth inferences deduced from the word itself, and thus creating a need of an infant probation which it proceeds to supply. Such handling of Christian truth cannot be too severely reprobated.

The innocence of the infant does not of itself furnish an

adequate ground for his salvation. Its true ground is to be sought in his relation to Christ. By his relation to Adam he has inherited a fallen, depraved nature, which is not his fault, and for which, on no principle of just dealing, can he be held responsible, but which is, nevertheless, displeasing and offensive to God, because contrary to his own most holy nature. Abstractly viewed, it shuts him out of heaven and shuts him up in hell, which involves so monstrous an injustice that it is not conceivable that a holy God could allow a child to be born into the world without providing an antidote fully equal to the evil. So, over against this "corruption of the nature of every man" he has graciously placed the atonement of Christ, which is a "perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual." If, then, by Adam's sin the race was placed in the position of sinners, by Christ's atonement we are recovered from our displacency, accepted of God, and made heirs of eternal life. Through Christ we come into the world free from condemnation, saved, and children of the heavenly kingdom. "Of such is the kingdom of heaven." This involves not only an external relation, but an inward character as well, fashioned and made pleasing to God by the indwelling Holy Spirit. If the former be justification, the latter is regeneration, or what would be so termed in an adult. *And this is salvation.* In this condition infants are started in their career to retain it until death, or until voluntarily forfeited by sin. If they die, there can be no question of whither they go; they are transplanted to the paradise of God, for whose sweet fields they are so beautifully fitted. To thrust in here upon already saved souls a probation to test their willingness to be saved would seem to be the climax of absurdity. If, on the other hand, they live, and in the fight with temptation fall into sin and forfeit their saved state, what then? Truly, this, and not the question of infants, idiots, and other irresponsibles who die, is the difficult problem, and no man could solve it had not Christ spoken. By his shed blood he has the right to offer them conditionally a restoration to what had been before bestowed unconditionally and lost; and to all such as can hear it he sends the message of his Gospel, *Come unto me, and be ye saved.*

That Christ, on the infant's entrance into paradise, is made

known to him, cannot be doubted; not, however, for acceptance or rejection, which belongs only to probation and involves the idea of contingency which can have no place there, but for recognition, adoration, and love. With the penitent thief and multitudes of untrained and untaught Christians, the infant will learn the great truths and mysteries of God, and sweetly join in the glad song of redemption. But this is not probation. Growth and development there will be, but not change of destiny.

IV. The awards of the Day of Judgment a finality.

"He hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained." Acts xvii, 31. The date of this general judgment of mankind is not revealed, nor are the elements for its calculation given; but we are told that it will occur in connection with the second advent, the resurrection of the dead, and the winding up of this world's history. It is eminently fitting that the rewards and punishments connected with the moral government of the world should be administered at the closing up of the present order of things, and that the transaction should be a public one. The probationary system will then close. The gathering of its results privately would be unseemly, and not after God's usual method. Its administration is in the sight of angels and men; its vindication will be in the presence of the assembled universe. Problems of God's providential dealings that can here be met only with faith in his wisdom, justice, and love will then be solved, and all doubters, murmurers, and complainers be covered with confusion. Besides, sin has not confined itself to a corner or to darkness. It has shown its work openly, exalting itself in hostility to all goodness, and flaunting its defiant rebellion in the face of Omnipotence. The alternate victories and defeats in the war of good and evil must come to an end in a way that will to all intelligences show the latter prostrate and powerless in the grasp of the Almighty. So open and public must be the gathering out of the race of sinners of those who are saved, and so manifestly must they be seen to have been washed from their sins in the blood of Jesus, that no tongue in all the universe can ever accuse the Judge of injustice or lack of goodness in damning, or of partiality in saving. Such a consummation leaves nothing

for subsequent review, and can have no repetition. It will be a finality.

The nature of that day as a day of judgment for men leads to the same result. Our Saviour (Matt. xxv, 31–46) vividly describes the scene, in which he will be seated on his judgment-throne, with angels for his attendants, and all mankind arrayed before him. Unlike the constant divine discrimination now of human conduct is this of the great day for absolute decision upon determined moral character. The tribunal is a judicial tribunal; the inquiry is a judicial inquiry into the testimony of the opened books; the decisions are judicial decisions; the awards are judicial awards, and at the lips of an infallible Judge. Judicial awards are always of force *until they are judicially reversed*; and from these lies no appeal. There is no higher tribunal; there is no second day of judgment: the sentence pronounced is irrevocable.

But if perchance the sinner be by the agonies of his punishment awakened to repentance, may not a merciful God, notwithstanding this judicial condemnation, hear his cry and deliver him from his woe? This implies that character which is determined at or before death may change in hell; that probation continues beyond the judgment as it is in this life; that the judgment of the great day is only an advance step in God's dealings with men; that the mediatorial government of Christ will continue beyond its close in the delivering up of the kingdom to the Father; that the consummation is not the consummation; and that the King and Judge who pronounces the irreversible doom, foreknowing the future repentance and granting of mercy, will contradict himself by its abrogation in the exercise of his sovereignty. Failure in any one of these points is failure in all. Hope of rescue in hell can be only endless despair.

The awards of the judgment, "Come, ye blessed," and "Depart from (*ἀπό*) me," are as opposite as are the characters addressed, and are both eternal. "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." Union with Christ in the heavenly kingdom forever is for the one; separation from Christ in punishment forever is for the other. Notwithstanding Dr. Farrar's sneer at it as a "stock sophism from the days of Augustine," we must hold that any

limitation of *αἰώνιος* in the punishment of the wicked applies equally to the happiness of the righteous.

A second passage, the only additional one to which we can refer, is 2 Thess. i, 9: "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power." This is the penalty on persecuting heathen and unbelieving Jews when Christ shall come "rendering vengeance" to them. Stern as is this expression, it is the right one, eliminating from our conception of it every thing of the humanly capricious and passionate. It means *maintenance of right*, and so, penal satisfaction for injury, or retribution. Christ, then, will award the retribution demanded by justice. In verse 6 we read, "It is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you." We are brought face to face with the divine justice, and St. Paul, contrary to the sentimentalism of punishment solely for correction, asserts that it is a just thing with God to pay in kind—tribulation for tribulation, affliction for affliction. Indeed, this is the law of justice—like for like. It pervades all government, human and divine. It is in the institutions of the theocracy, and the New Testament is full of justice and retribution, while the rule for individual action without process of law is that of love and tenderness. In this view, these wicked people are to be "punished," that is, literally, to *pay a penalty*, and that penalty is "eternal destruction from (*ἀπό*) the presence [or face] of God, and from (*ἀπό*) the glory of his power." The "destruction" is not annihilation. The sinner, separate from God, unbuilds, pulls down, and brings to naught all God's plans for him. He destroys himself while yet living on the earth, and in that day God will destroy him, perpetuating the separation from himself and his plans forever. This is eternal destruction. The preposition employed shows separation in locality. Here, then, we have the consequent of the sentence of the Judge, "Depart from me, ye cursed." Attending angels, the ministers of his power, enforce his words, separating the condemned from his face and his glory, and bearing them away to their eternal prison, where they are forever shut out from God and all goodness and shut in with all evil.

The use of *αἰώνιος* we had planned to discuss, but our limit

of space forbids. We can only refer to some remarks in this Quarterly for April, 1878, from the scholarly pen of Professor W. S. Tyler, and give the following from the late Professor Tayler Lewis:

> The *single* terms (*olam* and *aiôn*) do not of themselves, or necessarily, denote *endless*, but simply unmeasured duration. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is by their fearful reduplications the scriptural writers express that idea which no single noun, unless it be an abstract negative, can fully set forth. But what the single noun fails to do is accomplished by the adjective *aiônios*, as a term of *greatest measurement*. . . . *Æonian* duration is that which is measured by æons, ages, worlds, or eternities, just as finite periods are measured by years and centuries, and are therefore called *centennial*, *millennial*, etc. There being no greater unit of measurement than the *olam*, there is no limit to the conception of the *whole* which it measures or divides. In this way the adjective comes to denote absolute eternity, as is put beyond all doubt by its use, 2 Cor. iv, 18. It is there the *antithesis* of the *temporal*, and can have no measurable bound.*

These words from this eminent scholar amply offset the opinion of Drs. Smyth and Whiton, which they seem to have borrowed from F. D. Maurice, that *aiônios* is not a word of duration. Its import of endlessness proves the finality of the judgment doom pronounced on evil conduct in this life.

The thought of the eternal ruin of a human soul without remedy or hope is appalling. Nor is there relief in the knowledge that it is self-produced by willful persistence in chosen sin in spite of all God's efforts to save him. Look at it as we will, it is terrible. And a free, full, and sufficient probation for every man, in which the means of salvation are urgently placed before him for acceptance, and none is rejected except for his rejection of mercy, is God's sufficient and perfect vindication.

*"The Six Days of Creation," p. 366.

Art. VIII.—THE GNOMIC AORIST IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The best known and most elaborate New Testament grammar* now extant denies the existence of this form of Greek usage in the New Testament. On the other hand, an authority no less eminent for Greek grammatical scholarship † admits this mode of expression in the grammar of the New Testament, and gives a few examples of its use. The contradictory views, expressed by grammarians so eminent, allow the inference that the question is not settled, and that any contribution on such a subject, even viewed as a matter of philological inquiry, is not without value.

When, however, the usage is one which has its application in some of the life-truths of the New Testament, it becomes not only a scholastic delight, but a duty, to investigate the topic. Neither of the grammarians referred to—Winer or Buttmann—have made any use of it in its bearing on difficult exegetical problems. An inquiry into this usage is not out of place, especially if it can be shown to have an application to some interesting and difficult passages of Holy Scripture.

The accuracy of the Greek language in the expression of the finer shades of meaning is too well known to need special argument. It is this which gave to it such a wonderful adaptation to convey to mankind the teachings of Christ and his apostles, and it is one of the recognized providential preparations for the Saviour's advent. It is therefore natural to suppose, that although the language at the time of Christ varied largely from Attic purity, it would yet retain those elements of special value for the conveyance of the loftiest thoughts on spiritual things.

It is at this point, however, that Winer makes his strong objection to the existence of the gnomic Aorist in the New Testament. It is in his view a refinement too subtle for the writers of the New Testament. It is well known that some of the finer forms have disappeared. Especially is this the case in the use of the particles. This laxity in the use of

* "A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek," by Dr. G. B. Winer.

† "A Grammar of New Testament Greek," by Alexander Buttman.

particles is not confined to New Testament Greek, but is found also in some of the Attic prose writers.* Other variations are frequent and need not be enumerated. Without claiming for it the character of Attic purity, it is yet a language which, though modified by Hebraisms and other causes, is well calculated to express the rich thoughts which the sacred writers intended to convey.

The question before us is not whether some of the choice forms of expression had passed away at the time when the New Testament was written, but whether this precise form, the gnomic Aorist, had entirely disappeared. It is not necessary to show that it was frequently employed, but that it is clearly found there. The gnomic Aorist is, as will afterward appear, that form of speech which expresses proverbs or general truths, and is of the nature of a pictorial or vivid presentation of a subject. This is precisely the characteristic which belongs to the New Testament, and is especially characteristic of the writings of the apostle Paul. His style is graphic, and partakes often rather of the characteristics of the orator face to face with his audience than of the prose writer dispassionately and methodically discussing his subject. And yet in his most rhetorical flights logic and precision of expression are rigidly maintained.

One of the finest forms of Greek usage is that of conditional sentences. These distinctions are for the most part rigidly maintained. The force of many passages in the writings of Paul is clearly seen by noticing the form of the conditional sentence employed. It is not intended to maintain the exact conformity to classical models, but a general adherence to them. A clear case of this is found in Gal. i, 8–10:

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἡμεῖς ἢ ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ εὐαγγελίζηται ὑμῖν παρ' ὃ εὐηγγελισάμεθα ὑμῖν, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. ὡς προειρήκαμεν, καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω, εἴ τις ὑμᾶς εὐαγγελίζεται παρ' ὃ παρελάβετε, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνθρώπους πείθω ἢ τὸν Θεόν; ἢ ζητῶ ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκειν; εἰ γὰρ ἔτι ἀνθρώποις ἤρεσκον, Χριστοῦ δοῦλος οὐκ ἂν ἤμην.

Here, within the compass of three verses, three out of the four forms of conditional sentences are employed, with clear discrimination of the meanings of them. If the conditional sentence is so well preserved, why not the gnomic Aorist? If

* Buttman, p. 71.

a probability can be established that such will be the case, it will help in the investigation of the passages where it is supposed to be employed. We propose to give a few illustrations of this usage from classical Greek, taken almost at random from examples in classical grammars in common use, and then to inquire into the biblical usage. That it is a common form in Greek, we can readily see by the following citations:

Curtius's Greek Grammar, sec. 494, says:

The Aorist Indicative is used in statements of experience, implying that a thing once happened, but admitting an application to all times: poet. *τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ δίκη πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτισαμένη*, with time avenging justice always came, (*and hence always comes;*) *καὶ βραδὺς εὔβουλος εἶλεν ταχὺν ἄνδρα διώκων*, even a slow man when well advised overtook (*overtakes*) by pursuit a quick man. In English we employ the Present in such general assertions, and often add such adverbs as *usually, commonly, always*, etc.; *τὰς τῶν φαύλων συνουσίας ὀλίγος χρόνος διελυσεν*, a short time usually dissolves the associations of the bad. This Aorist is called the *gnomic* Aorist, because it is often used in gnomes, proverbs, or maxims.

Jelf, sec. 402, 1, says:

As the force of the Aorist may extend over the whole space of past time, without reference to any single definite moment, it is used to express an action which took place repeatedly in past time, or in the statement of some general fact or habitual practice which operated at different indefinite moments of past time.

Goodwin, "Moods and Tenses," sec. 30, 1, says:

The Aorist and sometimes the Perfect Indicative are used in animated language to express *general truths.* These are called the *gnomic Aorist* and the *gnomic Perfect,* and are usually translated by our Present. These tenses give a more vivid statement of general truths by employing a *distinct* case or several distinct cases in past time to represent (as it were) *all possible* cases, and implying that which has occurred *will occur* again under similar circumstances.

These statements, from strictly classical grammars of the Greek language, show how prevalent this usage was among the best authors.

When we come to the New Testament, Winer objects. His language is: "In no passage of the New Testament does the Aorist express an habitual act." *

* Thayer's Translation, pp. 201, 202.

In reply to this we quote at length from "Buttman's Grammar," already mentioned:

According to Moller's exposition, this Aorist, used alike by poets and prose writers of every age, can, indeed, express habitualness; but just as well, and still more frequently, the necessity or universality of an action or state, which does not, like habitualness, permit of exceptions. Since, now, this Aorist was employed for the most part in general propositions deduced from experience—propositions whose contents are valid not only for the past, but also for the present and the future—the title, "Gnomic Aorist," designates more correctly its essential nature.

Its use in Greek occurs not only in similitudes, propositions involving comparisons, (as so often in Homer,) and ideal pictures, (Plato, Phædr., p. 246, *sq.*,) but also in abstract, maxim-like declarations, founded in practical observation. (See the examples from Thucyd. and Demosth., given by Moller.)

When, then, Winer asserts that the Aorist never in the New Testament expresses what is habitual, the assertion is well founded so far forth as the peculiarity of the Aorist in question is not adequately described by the feature of habitualness; but the occurrence of the gnomic Aorist, according to the above description of it, ought at the same time not to be denied. For the objection that the whole idiom presumes too nice an observance of the laws of classic Greek, and greater familiarity with them than can be supposed in the New Testament authors, may perhaps be decisive for a portion of them, but not for all. On the contrary, the employment of the Aorist, as the most common historic tense, corresponds perfectly to the character of popular expression, which so gladly endeavors to break away from the form of abstract presentation, and spontaneously falls into the tone of narration. Observe the form of the Homeric comparisons, or the description of the shield in the Iliad, where, moreover, Imperfects and Aorists continually alternate in the narrative.

If, then, it is evident, from the exposition given, that the New Testament writers, so far forth as their writings, philologically viewed, are products of Greek modes of thought, must have been led by the very nature of the popular language to use this Aorist as a matter of course when occasion occurred, (and the cases would certainly be more numerous if the compass of the books were greater, since with the present compass they are already pretty numerous,) etc.

He sustains this view by the following examples:

James i, 9, *sq.*: Καυχάσθω δὲ ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινὸς ἐν τῷ ὕψει αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ πλούσιος ἐν τῇ ταπεινώσει αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου παρελεύσεται. ἀνέτειλε γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος σὺν τῷ καύσωνι, καὶ ἐξήρανε τὸν χόρτον, καὶ τὸ ἄνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσε, καὶ ἡ εὐπρέπεια τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἀπώλετο· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πλούσιος ἐν ταῖς πορείαις αὐτοῦ μαρανθήσεται.

The Revised translation reads:

But let the brother of low degree glory in his high estate: and the rich, in that he is made low: because as the flower of the grass he shall pass away. For the sun *ariseth* with the scorching wind, and *withereth* the grass; and the flower thereof *falleth*, and the grace of the fashion of it *perisheth:* so also shall the rich man fade away in his goings.

In the above passage *ἀνέτειλε*, *ἐξήρανε*, *ἐξέπεσε*, and *ἀπώλετο* are employed as gnomic Aorists, and so recognized by the Revisers.

Further, James i, 23: *ὅτι εἴ τις ἀκροατὴς λόγου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ ποιητής, οὗτος ἐοικεν ἀνδρὶ κατανοοῦντι τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ· κατενόησε γὰρ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀπελήλυθε, καὶ εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο ὁποῖος ἦν.*

Revised translation:

For if any one is a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a mirror: for he *beholdeth* himself, and *goeth* away, and straightway *forgetteth* what manner of man he was.

Here the Aorists are similarly translated.

Similar to instance in James i, 11, is 1 Peter i, 24: *διότι 'πᾶσα σὰρξ ὡς χόρτος, καὶ πᾶσα δόξα ἀνθρώπου ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου. ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος, καὶ τὸ ἄνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσε·*

For,
All flesh is as grass,
And all the glory thereof as the flower of grass.
The grass *withereth*, and the flower *falleth*.

From the same source, namely, the requirements of historic presentation, proceed the Aorists in Paul's doctrinal analysis in Rom. viii, 29: *οὓς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν· . . οὓς δὲ προώρισεν, τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσεν· καὶ οὓς ἐκάλεσεν, τούτους καὶ ἐδικαίωσεν· οὓς δὲ ἐδικαίωσεν τούτους καὶ ἐδόξασεν*; hence it is not necessary to assume that the last Aorist (*ἐδόξασεν*) differs in force from all the rest.

Finally, the two Aorists in John xv, 6, may also, in part, at least, be included under the head of the gnomic Aorist, inasmuch as the thought contains an experimental truth set forth figuratively, in which the two momentary acts (*ἐβλήθη, ἐξηράνθη*) come into manifest antithesis to the continuous one denoted by the Present, (*συνάγουσιν*:) *ἐὰν μή τις μείνῃ ἐν ἐμοί, ἐβλήθη ἔζω ὡς τὸ κλῆμα, καὶ ἐξηράνθη, καὶ συνάγουσιν αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς πῦρ βάλλουσι, καὶ καίεται.*

Revised translation:

If a man abide not in me, he *is cast* forth as a branch, and *is withered;* and they gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned.

The above examples are taken from Buttman, but we have introduced the Revised translation to show that our recent revisers understood them in the same way.

It thus appears from unquestioned grammatical authority that the gnomic Aorist exists in the New Testament.

It is further to be noticed that the same usage prevails in the Old Testament, affording a further reason why it should be found in the New Testament. It is distinctly recognized by Hebrew grammarians.

Driver, "Use of Tenses in Hebrew," speaking of the Hebrew Perfect, (preterite,) says: "It is used to express general truths known to have actually occurred, and so proved from experience; here again the idiomatic rendering in English is by means of the Present." He also remarks, in note under the Perfect: "Both the Perfect and Aorist (the gnomic Aorist) are similarly used in Greek, that is, to express general truths known to have occurred."

Job xxviii, 8–11, LXX, is an instance: *καὶ οὐκ ἐπάτησαν οὐτὸν υἱοὶ ἀλαζόνων, ὀυπαρῆλθεν ἐπ' αὐτῆς λέων, sq.*

The Hebrew, of special interest, is from the ninth and tenth verses:

בַּחַלָמִישׁ שָׁלַח יָדוֹ הָפַךְ כַּשֹּׁרֶשׁ הָרִים: בַּצֻרוֹת יְאֹרִים בְּקַע וְכָל־יְקָר רָאֲתָה עֵינוֹ:

The lion's whelps have not trodden it, nor the fierce lion passed by it.

He *putteth* forth his hand upon the rock; he *overturneth* the mountains by the roots.

He *cutteth* out rivers among the rocks; and his eye *seeth* every precious thing.

The English translation treats the Greek and Hebrew as instances of the past, with the gnomic meaning.

It will be noticed that in this passage the Hebrew verbs are in the preterite tense and the Greek in the Aorist, while the English translation is in the present tense.

Another instance is found in the first psalm: "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor

standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful." Gesenius* cites this as an instance of the gnomic Aorist. The Hebrew הָלַךְ, עָבַר, יָשַׁב, which are verbs in the Hebrew Preterite, are rendered in the Septuagint by *ἐπορεύθη, ἔστη, ἐκάθισεν*, and in the English by the Present. So, also, the passage already cited, 1 Peter i, 24, is a quotation from the Septuagint of Isaiah, and shows in the Old Testament and in the New the gnomic characteristics.

Ewald,† also, speaks of the Hebrew Perfect (preterite) as expressing "general truths which are plainly taught, and already fully established by experience," as "*the wicked man*, נָאַץ, *despises God*, and frequently in comparisons and proverbs."

It thus appears that this form of syntax exists both in Greek and Hebrew.‡ It is found in Homer, as well as in the authors who wrote in the most polished period of Greek literature. It belongs, therefore, to the language of the New Testament by right. We may fitly claim that it may legitimately enter into the discussion of such passages of the New Testament as may be affected by it.

If the gnomic Aorist be recognized as a part of the structure of New Testament Greek, it follows that it may be legitimately employed in the exposition of passages which involve doctrinal distinctions as well as in mere historic presentation.

It may be well to begin with a passage in Galatians, chap. ii, 10: *μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα μνημονεύωμεν, ὃ καὶ ἐσπούδασα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.*

The late Revision translates, "Only *they would* that we should remember the poor; which very thing I was also zealous to do."

What is the nature of the Aorist *ἐσπούδασα*? The apostle, in this part of the epistle, is proving the independence of his apostolic authority, and that although he, with Barnabas, had gone up to Jerusalem, as delegates to the apostolic council, he, nevertheless, had derived no special information from that body which should dictate his teachings. He declares that they had only enjoined upon them the duty of remembering the poor, "which very thing I was also zealous to do." When

* Mitchell's Edition, sec. 126, 3.

† "Syntax of the Hebrew Language of the Old Testament." Translated by James Kennedy, B.D., p. 5.

‡ See also Green's Hebrew Grammar, sec. 262, 3.

was he zealous to do it? At the point of time when the injunction was delivered, or at a subsequent period? He evidently means to say that on this point he needed no special counsel, as his zeal in this direction was habitual to him. Alford says, "Then and always: it was my habit"—and refers to Rom. xv, 25–27; 1 Cor. xvi, 1–4; 2 Cor. viii, 4; Acts xxiv, 17, as proof of his habitual σπουδή.

Ellicott finds it difficult to evade the force of Alford's view, and shelters himself behind Winer's denial of this usage in the New Testament. His bent is manifestly towards regarding it as a gnomic Aorist. His language is: "The Aorist is here correctly used, not for the Perfect, (Conybeare,) nor even for the Pluperfect, nor yet exactly as expressing the *habit*, (compare Alford,) this usage being somewhat doubtful in the New Testament, (see Winer, etc.,) but simply an historical fact which belongs to the past, without its being affirmed or denied that it may or may not continue to the present." This distinguished and very accurate grammatical exegete seems here to feel the force of employing this as a gnomic Aorist, but shrinks from adopting in the exposition a usage not sanctioned by the recognized grammatical authority of Winer. The other passages adduced, however, justify the use here, and show that Paul employs the Aorist in this case to assert his habitual zeal in remembering the poor, and hence that the counsel they had received had added nothing to him.

The passages, however, of the greatest importance in this connection are yet to be considered.

Rom. iii, 23, is well worthy of attention in regard to its Aorist. It is, πάντες γὰς ἥμαρτον, καὶ ὑστεροῦνται της δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ. This verse is translated in our late Revision, "For all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God." That our revisers have felt a difficulty in the employment of this Aorist, in the usual Aoristic sense, is clear. It was one of the cardinal laws of the Committee to translate tenses uniformly, and they have adhered to their law in the case of the Aorist with great pertinacity. The difficulty of connecting the ordinary sense of the Aorist with the present tense, in the second clause of the sentence, confronted them, and they translate the Aorist by the Perfect. On the other hand, the very same word, in the very same tense, in Rom. v, 12, is translated "sinned," without the "have." If

ἥμαρτον (Rom. iii, 23) should be translated as a gnomic Aorist, the difficulty would be removed, and a plain and simple proposition would result—"All sin, and fall short of the glory of God."

Is not this translation of the Aorist demanded by the context? Paul is aiming to convince the self-righteous Jew, not merely of past sinfulness, but of present transgressions which prevent him from procuring salvation by the works of the law, and hence he urges their present condition as a reason for their acceptance of salvation by grace through faith. (See Tholuck on Romans, l. c.)

Dr. Shedd ("Commentary" on Romans, l. c.) declares, that "the apostle has in mind a particular historical event, the same, namely, with that alluded to in πάντες ἥμαρτον, of chap. v, 12, the sin in Adam," while Tholuck, Meyer, and Phillipi regard the reference of the Aorist to individual transgressions. The force of this Aorist is nowhere, however, more clearly put than by Dr. Whedon, (see "Commentary" on Romans, l. c.,) who declares that "the phrase is tantamount to *all men sin.*" The only point on which we insist here is, that it is the expression of the gnomic usage, a general fact which they could not deny, which the apostle is urging upon their attention. It is not sufficient to claim that their sin is merely that of sinning in Adam, which produced corruption of nature and consequent actual transgressions; for he has discussed, in the first and second chapters of this same epistle, the present condition of Jews and Gentiles, as actual transgressors, and has shown that they cannot extricate themselves from their condition without gracious interposition. It is their habitual state as sinful and sinning that is before the mind of the apostle.

Another important passage is found in Rom. v, 12: Καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. The late Revision translates: "And so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned." As already noticed, they have here preserved a strict Aoristic sense. But is not this also best rendered, as a gnomic Aorist, "for that all sin?"

Having shown that this is a legitimate use of the Aorist in the New Testament, we may well inquire whether it is not the proper and intended use of the Aorist in this particular passage.

The Revisers' translation carries with it the dogmatic inference that all sinned in Adam, and places death as the penalty

of that single sin. Is that the only sin that receives this penalty, or is it the habit of sinning which belongs to man's nature and which is ever working death?

This gnomic usage gives a philological basis to that form of interpretation which has been accepted by so many writers on the theological conceptions of Paul. Dr. Whedon, who has in his "Commentary" stated so clearly the train of thought of the apostle, has forcibly presented the force of the Aorist in several of Paul's passages. The fact, then, that so many writers, including De Wette, Stuart, and Whedon, have given a meaning to this clause which is most natural and in harmony with this usage, is a strong proof that the gnomic Aorist is not foreign to the idiom of the New Testament.

The sixth chapter of Romans is an instance of similar usage of the apostle. We place in connection Rom. vi, 4–9, in Greek, and in the two latest English versions:

Συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου οὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα, τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ, πιστεύομεν ὅτι καὶ συνζήσομεν αὐτῷ, εἰδότες ὅτι Χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει, θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει.

Therefore we *are buried* with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also *in the likeness* of *his* resurrection: Knowing this, that our old man *is crucified* with *him*, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now if *we be dead* with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him: Knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him.—*Authorized Version.*

We *were buried* therefore with him through baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life. For if we have become united with *him* by the likeness of his death, we shall be also *by the likeness* of his resurrection; knowing this, that our old man *was crucified* with *him*, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in

bondage to sin; for he that hath died is justified from sin. But if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death no more hath dominion over him.—*Revised Version.*

The early English translations, Wiclif, Tyndale, Rheims, Geneva, translated these Aorists, namely, *συνετάφημεν*, *συνεσταυρώθη*, etc., in a Perfect sense, apparently assured that it was a general fact or experience which the writer was enforcing. The consensus by so many translators as to the meaning of the apostle may serve as a justification of the view that here also he is employing this Aoristic usage.

The passage in Romans viii, 29, 30, is an additional text which claims attention here. The Revised translation is: "For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren: and whom he foreordained, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." Allusion has already been made to these verses in the reference to Buttman's Grammar. The ordinary method of explaining these Aorists is that of Winer: "In Rom. viii, 30, *ἐδόξασε* is used because he in regard to whom God has accomplished the *δικαιοῦν* has already obtained from him the *δοξάζεσθαί* also, though the reception of the *δόξα* as an actual possession belongs to the future."

It is as if God looked upon the *δόξα* as already accomplished, and that Paul introduced several Aorists in their ordinary sense, and then the last one on the ground indicated by Winer. Is it not better to assume with Buttman that *προέγνω*, *προώρισεν*, *ἐκάλεσεν*, *ἐδικαίωσεν*, *ἐδόξασεν*, are gnomic Aorists, and set forth God's plan of securing the final salvation of his people, which must inevitably bring them to glory? "For whom he foreknows, he foreordains: and whom he foreordains, them he also calls: and whom he calls, them he also justifies: and whom he justifies, them he also glorifies."

It would not be wise to make dogmatic considerations the basis of grammatical laws; nor, on the other hand, should grammatical rules override the plain sense of any passage. Our grammars arose out of a careful study of the meanings of the writings discussed, and not the writings out of the

grammars. Grammar is still a progressive science, and every attempt to add to the meaning of passages through philology cannot be entirely without use.

When we take into consideration that the gnomic Aorist existed through all the ages of Greek literature, from Homer onward, that it is a recognized usage in Hebrew grammarians, and is employed clearly in the Septuagint, that it is supported by the best grammatical authority, and that it is clearly stamped on several New Testament passages, it is impossible not to recognize it as a usage of New Testament Greek grammar, and to give it a wider application than it has thus far received.

Art. IX.—SYNOPSIS OF THE QUARTERLIES AND OTHERS OF THE HIGHER PERIODICALS.

American Reviews.

Bibliotheca Sacra, January, 1884. (Oberlin, Ohio.)—1. Sketches of Pentateuch Criticism: by Rev. Samuel Ives Curtiss. 2. Essential Christianity; by Rev. J. W. Weddell. 3. Immortality and Science; by Prof. James T. Bixby. 4. Proposed Reconstruction of the Pentateuch. 5. Church History as a Science, a Theological Discipline, and a Mode of the Gospel; by Rev. John DeWitt, D.D. 6. Prof. Max Müller on the Origin and Growth of Religion; by Prof. S. H. Kellogg, D.D. 7. Luther and his Work; by Rev. Judson Smith, D.D. 8. Current Periodical Literature. 9. Recent German University Intelligence.

Education: an International Magazine. Bi-monthly. Devoted to the Science, Art, Philosophy, and Literature of Education. January–February, 1884. (Boston, Mass.)—1. The Normal School Problem, and the Problem of the Schools; by Prof. H. Straight. 2. Manual Training; by Prof. C. M. Woodward. 3. Notes on the Origin of the Italian Language; by W. C. Wilde. 4. The Function of the Normal School; by E. C. Hewett, LL.D. 5. Music in Public Schools; by Prof. H. E. Holt. 6. The Teacher's Influence. 7. What has been Done for Education by the Government of the United States; by Hon. John Eaton, LL.D. 8. The Imagination; A. P. Markle, Ph.D. 9. The University—How and What; by W. W. Folwell, LL.D. Editorial—10. LeRoy Brown, Ph.D. 11. Report of U. S. Commissioner of Education for 1884.

North American Review, February, 1884. (New York.)—1. Corporations, their Employés, and the Public: by Carl Schurz. 2. Henry Vaughan, Silurist; by Principal J. C. Shairp. 3. John Brown's Place in History; by Senator J. J. Ingalls. 4. Must the Classics Go? by Prof. Andrew F. West. 5. Race Progress in the United States; by J. R. Tucker, M.C. 6. Defects of the Public School System; by Rev. M. J. Savage. 7. Rival Systems of Heating; by Dr. A. N. Bell and Prof. W. P. Trowbridge.

March, 1884.—1. Is our Civilization Perishable; by Judge J. A. Jameson. 2. Agricultural Politics in England; by William E. Bear. 3. A Defenseless Seaboard; by Gen. H. A. Smalley. 4. Neither Genius nor Martyr; by Alice Hyneman Rhine. 5. The Story of a Nomination; by W. O. Stoddard. 6. Literary Resurrectionists; by Charles T. Congden. 7. How to Improve the Mississippi; by Robert S. Taylor. 8. The Constitutionality of Repudiation; by D. H. Chamberlain and John S. Wise, M.C.

PRINCETON REVIEW, January, 1884. (New York.)—1. Agnosticism in American Fiction; by Julian Hawthorne. 2. On the Education of Statesmen; by Prof. Henry C. Adams. 3. The Railway Problem. 4. A Study of the Mind's Chambers of Imagery; by President M'Cosh and Professor Henry F. Osborn. 5. The Morrow of the Gladstone Administration; by Canon George Rawlinson. 6. The College of To-day.

March, 1884.—1. The Study of Greek; by George P. Foster, D.D., LL.D. 2. Our Colleges Before the Country; by Prof. Wm. G. Sumner. 3. The Tariff on Works of Art; by Henry Marquand. 4. The Modern German Novel; by Hjalmar H. Boyesen. 5. Some Aspects of the Divorce Question; by Samuel W. Dike. 6. Our Experience in Taxing Distilled Spirits; by Hon. David A. Wells.

PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, January, 1884. (New York.)—1. The Sacraments and the Children of the Church; by Rev. H. J. VanDyke, D.D. 2. Degeneration of Romanism Since the Reformation; by Prof. Thos. Croskery, D.D. 3. Healing Through Faith; by Rev. R. L. Stanton, D.D. 4. The Mediæval Communists; by Rev. Maurice G. Hansen. 5. A New Principle in Education. 6. Notes and Notices. 7. Reviews of Recent Theological Literature.

QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, SOUTH, January, 1884. (Macon, Georgia.)—1. Greek Mythology and Philosophy; by Professor J. C. C. Newton, A.M. 2. The Soul; by President G. T. Gould, D.D. 3. Suicide—Causes and Cure; by Rev. H. M. DuBose. 4. Methodist Church Membership; by D. C. Kelley, D.D. 5. Locke on Government; by Dwight M. Lowrey, Esq. 6. Hayne's Poems; by Rev. George Williams Walker. 7. Atonement—Its Conservative Force; by Rev. W. Jackson. 8. Two Women; by Isabel D. Martin. 9. Human Freedom—Divine Necessity; by Rev. W. I. Gill, A.M. 10. Mary of Bethany; by A. A. L.

NEW ENGLANDER, March, 1884. (New Haven.) — 1. Scientific Ethics: by Hon. H. T. Steele. 2. Darwinism and Christianity; from the German of Wm. Bender; by E. G. Bourne. 3. Woman's Suffrage; by Prof. Goodwin. 4. Teleology, Old and New; by F. A. Mansfield. 5. The Extradition of Criminals; by F. M. Stone. 6. Moral Defects in Recent Sunday-school Teaching; by Rev. J. M. Whiton. 7. The Substitutes for Christianity Proposed by Comte and Spencer; by Julia H. Gulliver. 8. Personal Characteristics of Luther; by C. W. Ernst. 9. Catharine Adorna; by Rev. B. Hart. 10. Notices of New Books.

The Rev. Burdett Hart, after an appreciative analysis of the experience of Catharine Adorna, remarks:

If we are not mistaken, it is a very common opinion among Christians that it is *necessary* to sin while they remain in this world. They would not put that statement boldly into their creeds; they would not assert it in their exhortations to young disciples; they would not dare to state it in form in their prayers to God. But their confessions of daily sin have that undertone in them, and their daily lives are graded down to that standard. They are not surprised at themselves when they see that they have need of the confession of sin; they would be surprised if they had no such need. They do not regard it simply as a certain truth that they will sin, but as a necessary truth that they must be expected to sin. They regard sin, especially in regard to Christians, more as a misfortune than a crime. Because they have been sinners, they look upon it as a kind of unavoidable doom that they must be so still. It belongs to their imperfection. . . . With such views there cannot be that struggle against sin which is the duty of the believer, nor that freedom from sin which should

be the aim of a holy life. There must be the hope of success to encourage effort, and the accepted promise of success also.

The book before us presents a different view. "Her business, as she understood it," says the narrator of Madame Adorna, "was not to transgress against God, but to believe in him and love him, and to fulfill, with divine assistance, all his holy purposes."

So far all can go. So far Christians ought to believe. That standard is a practical and a practicable one. To go beyond this, and to claim that we are free from sin, actually and entirely, to claim that they have attained and are already perfect, *must be within the domain of radical error.*

If this last sentence be true, why are those Christians to be censured who think, as stated above in the first paragraph, "that it is necessary to sin while they remain in this world." And how can it be made to harmonize with the sentence that next precedes it, which claims that Christians "ought to believe" with Madame Adorna, that it is not their business to "transgress against God, but to believe in him and love him, and to fulfill, with divine assistance, all his holy purposes?" Is not one who possesses faith and love, and fulfills all God's purposes, "free from sin?" Surely this writer unwittingly involves himself in palpable contradictions. And this, evidently, not from any lack of sympathy with the conception of a sinless life, but because he fails to make the Wesleyan distinction between absolute and Christian perfection. The latter is not properly claimed to be ideal, angelic, or legal perfection; but it is the complete sovereignty of divine love over the affections, and such an outworking of that love in holy actions as makes its possessor, in the words of St. James, "perfect and entire, wanting nothing." Was James living "within the domain of radical error?"

CATHOLIC WORLD, January, 1884. (New York.)—1. The Protestant Episcopal Convention. 2. The First Christmas Eve. 3. Psyche, or the Romance of Nature. 4. Reminiscences of Bethlehem; by M. P. Thompson. 5. The Coiner's Den; by C. U. O'Keeffe. 6. Wicked No. 7; by Wm. Seton. 7. A Story of Nuremberg; by Agnes Repplier. 8. The Turk in Ireland; by W. P. Dennehy. 9. Armine, Chapters 31–33; by Christian Reid. 10. New Publications.

February.—1. The Supposed Issue between Religion and Science; by Rev. G. M. Searle. 2. The True Beatrice Cenci. 3. Some Aspects of the Negro Problem; by Rev. J. R. Slattery. 4. The Youth of Pedro de Ribadeneyra; by J. M. Stone. 5. A Haunt of Painters; by E. G. Martin. 6. Uncle George's Experiments; by M. M. Meline. 7. What Shall our Young Men Do? by Rev. A. F. Hewitt. 8. An Answer to Neal Dow; by Rev. C. A. Walworth. 9. Armine, Chapters 34–36; by C. Reid. 10. New Publications.

Mr. Walworth utters some strong words against the worst class of liquor sellers, against drunkenness, and, alas! also against

the constitutional prohibition of the liquor traffic. He "cannot believe that a wide-spread intemperance is inseparable from the sale of alcoholic drinks." He is evidently sincere in this unbelief, but if he will read the lesson of modern history he will learn that the liquor traffic and wide-spread intemperance have been generally, if not always, related as cause and effect. They are like the Siamese twins, in that the death of one involves the destruction of both.

English Reviews.

British and Foreign Evangelical Review, January, 1884. (London.)—1. Martin Luther, the Hero of the Reformation; by Rev. C. H. H. Wright. 2. A Glimpse of the Waldensian Valleys; by Rev. Hugh Macmillan. 3. The New Theology; by Rev. R. M. M'Cheyne Edgar, M.A. 4. The Christian Attitude. 5. The Visions of Zechariah; by Rev. Wm. Burnet. 6. Modern Biblical Criticism: Its History and Methods; by Prof. Howard Osgood, D.D. 7. The Metaphysical and Theological Applications of Induction and Analogy; by Prof. R. L. Dabney, D.D., LL.D. 8. The Philosophical Basis of Theism; by B. G. Stevens. 9. Current Literature.

British Quarterly Review, January, 1884. (London.)—1. Mr. Gladstone. 2. The Inspiration of Death in Folk-Poetry. 3. Palestine West of the Jordan. 4. Lay and Medical Functions in Hospital Administration. 5. Ulster and Home Rule. 6. Recent Theories of the Pentateuch. 7. Political Survey of the Quarter. 8. Contemporary Literature.

Edinburgh Review, October, 1883. (London and New York.)—1. Prowe's Life of Copernicus. 2. Early Law and Custom. 3. Letters and Memorials of Cardinal Allen. 4. Russian Railways in Asia. 5. The Scottish Language. 6. The Hartfordshire Pomona. 7. Schubert—Chopin—Liszt. 8. Vicksburg and Gettysburg; by the Comte de Paris. 9. The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen.

Westminster Review, October, 1883. (London and New York.)—1. Great Britain and the United States on the Irish Question. 2. Henry Greville and Lord Ronald Gower. 3. Gold Fields: Ancient and Modern. 4. The Belief in the Immortality of the Soul. 5. Australian Federation. 6. Ernest Renan. 7. Politico-Economical Heterodoxy; Cliffe Leslie. 8. Dr. Tuke's History of the Insane in the British Islands. 9. Contemporary Literature. India and Our Colonial Empire.

Edinburgh Review, or Critical Journal, January, 1884. (London and New York.)—1. Government of the Indian Empire. 2. The Spencerian Philosophy. 3. The Anarchy of Paris. 4. Edersheim's Life and Times of the Messiah. 5. The Egyptian Question. 6. The Literary Life of Anthony Trollope. 7. Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. 8. An Embassy to Rome. 9. Parliamentary Reform.

Of lives of the Christ there seems to be no end. Happily, both the theme and the demand are inexhaustible; and although that Life has been so much discussed, and in so many lights, there yet remains, and always will remain, something to be

said which has not been said before. Of the "Life and Times of the Messiah," by Dr. Edersheim, the Review named above claims that it is of "an unusual character, both as to its contents and the peculiar qualification of the author." It contains, says its writer, "an amount of archæological information, of facts illustrating Jewish thought and feeling, of acute analysis of character, and of graphic delineation of civil and religious life at the beginning of the Christian era which renders this a unique work." We give the following passage from Edersheim, and the remarks with which the reviewer introduces it:

Much of the opposition to Jesus in the gospels is inexplicable on modern principles. The miracles, which are an obstacle to belief in a skeptical and scientific age, as Dr. Edersheim justly observes, were precisely what was expected in the times of the Messiah. The Jews are not represented as denying that Jesus did many wonderful works, yet they reject his divine mission. In the present day, the concession of miraculous powers to Christ is instantly followed by professed obedience to his claims as a teacher, but the Jewish rulers admit the miracles and then crucify the Christ. From our stand-point this is inconsistent, but not from theirs. Dr. Edersheim thus explains their conduct:

"It was enmity to the *person* and *teaching* of Jesus which led to the denial of his claims. The inquiry, By what power Jesus did these works? they met by the assertion that it was through that of Satan, or the chief of the demons. They regarded Jesus as not only temporarily but permanently possessed by a demon, or as the constant vehicle of satanic influence. And this demon was, according to them, none other than Beelzebub, the prince of the devils. Thus in their view it was really Satan who acted in and through him; and Jesus, instead of being recognized as the Son of God, was regarded as an incarnation of Satan; instead of being owned as the Messiah, was denounced and treated as the representative of the Kingdom of Darkness. All this because the kingdom which he came to open, and which he preached, was precisely the opposite of what they regarded as the Kingdom of God. Thus it was the essential contrariety of Rabbinism to the Gospel of Christ that lay at the foundation of their conduct toward the Person of Christ. We venture to assert that this accounts for the whole history up to the cross."

In the closing paragraph of his paper this reviewer says:

No one can read this book without receiving fresh light upon this story which no repetition can render stale. Nor can it be perused without confessing that of all the tragedies this world has witnessed not one has been so sad and so moving as the passion of the Man of Sorrows.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, October, 1883. (New York.)—1. Rev. Edward Hawkins, D.D., Provost of Oriel College, Oxford. 2. Socialism in England. 3. Saint Teresa. 4. The Fur Seals of Commerce. 5. Marshal Bugeaud, Duke of Italy. 6. Trade Routes to China, and French Occupation of Tonquin. 7. Ecclesiastical Courts Commission. 8. Disintegration.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, January, 1884. (London.)—1. National Education at Home and Abroad. 2. The Uncertainties of Science. 3. The Antiquity of Civilization. 4. The First Principles of Early Methodism. 5. Luther and his Critics. 6. Spain. 7. The Church Congress. 8. The Pauline Doctrine of Union with Christ. Short Reviews and Brief Notices.

The Review is fully abreast with the times. In its second and third articles it meets the skeptical scientists of the day on their own ground, applies to their alleged facts and to their philosophy tests similar to those by which they test revelation. And it must needs be confessed that they do not escape unshorn. They are, in fact, "hoist with their own petard." Placed on the defensive, they appear far less formidable than when, with great flourish of trumpets, they rush to assault the truth. We greatly misjudge the spirit of society if it be not already passing out of that mist of scientific doubt which for a few years past has threatened to establish itself and to unsettle public faith in Holy Scripture.

German Reviews.

THEOLOGISCHE STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN, (Theological Essays and Reviews.) 1884. Second Number.—*Essays:* 1. HERING, The Beneficence of the German Reformation, (second paper.) 2. Orations delivered at the Universities of Halle and Wittenberg on the occasion of the fourth centenary of Luther's birthday, one oration by Prof. J. KÖSTLIN, and one by the Rector, Prof. BORETIUS. 3. RIEHM, Luther as a Bible Translator. *Thoughts and Remarks.* HOFSTEDE DE GROOT, Luther in his Study. *Reviews:* KÖSTLIN: Views of new additions to the life of Luther in the year 1883. *Miscellanies:* 1. Programme of the Teyler Theological Society of Harlem for the year 1884. 2. Programme of the Society of the Hague for the defense of the Christian Religion.

From the above table of contents it will be seen that this number of the above periodical is almost entirely confined to Luther. The shadow of the great reformer seems to hover over the German theological mind of late, to the exclusion of every other subject. Of the above articles we opine that the one of most interest to general readers will be that of Prof. Riehm on "Luther as a Bible Translator." Among the blessings which God bestowed on the German nation through Martin Luther one may well claim the German Bible as the greatest

and the noblest. With good reason one may ask: "If among the blessings of the Reformation this one failed, what would have become of the others?" In the jubilee year, therefore, it is befitting to pay marked attention to this perennial treasure that the nation possesses in its Luther Bible. Even that learned Catholic scholar, Dr. Döllinger, recently declared that this work alone made him the greatest benefactor of his nation, and that all Catholics should forget all else than this, and for it join in the national celebration. Luther himself laid no claim to the entire work which he commenced on the Wartburg. He was ready and willing to call to his aid those loyal companions who sat by his side and counseled with him in all his difficult labors. He said repeatedly, "It is a great work, and worthy of our best powers, because it is for the common good." And again he said, "I will not touch the Old Testament unless you, my friends, assist me. If we all work together we shall have enough to do in the Bible, the one with his learning and the other with his understanding."

Melanchthon was his great helper. Before he put the translation of the New Testament, which he had performed on the Wartburg, in the hands of the printers, he called to his aid several of his friends for a thorough revision. But he was so impatient to bring it out that he was hardly willing to allow himself and his colleagues the necessary time for the work. At a later period he and Melanchthon revised this on the basis of the Greek and Latin texts. But, thankful as Luther was for the assistance of his friends, and to whom he had done full justice before the world, he had a good claim to say of his translation: "It is my Testament and my translation, and shall remain mine." The creative work belonged entirely to him; that of his collaborators consisted only in suggesting, completing, or improving. His colleagues always regarded him as the translator called of God, and as the only one sufficient for the great work.

One must make an effort to realize the great task that he had undertaken in order rightly to judge and appreciate his immortal masterpiece. And he who knows the ruling conceptions of his period in regard to the art of translating can alone admire him as the fortunate pathfinder in this new and unexplored field. There was a species of German Bible, before

that of Luther, by a monk of Halle, of which several small editions were printed. But it was a translation from the Vulgate, and in which no allowance was made for the peculiarities of the Latin or the German tongue; there was a slavish imitation of the Latin text which was often totally misunderstood. Luther used not the Vulgate as a basis, but rather the original text, following each expression as nearly as possible up to its original source. But it required a great deal of courage in him to free himself fully from the chains of ecclesiastical authority, and as translator to follow the current of his intentions against the numerous and violent accusations of his opponents that he was abandoning the old and accepted text of the Christian Church.

And added to these troubles there were whole mountains of difficulties to be overcome from the state of linguistic science at that period and the narrowness and imperfection of the means at his command. He repeatedly declared, in reference to Job and the prophets, that he labored and worried in conjunction with his assistants until the work became at times so discouraging that he almost came to the conviction that he had undertaken too much, especially in the matter of the Old Testament. But under all discouragements and trials he still labored on, and called to his aid all outside means that could in any way afford him light and aid. In many technical matters he did not hesitate to call even unlettered men into his confidence and counsel. He would consult the anatomist and the butcher in regard to the slaughter of animals and their preparation for the sacrifice, to make sure that he would give no imperfect idea of the subject which he was describing. And thus he at last prepared a book that has been a source of national as well as religious culture, and one which lies nearest to the heart of the German people. It is with them, indeed, the Book of books, and more read than any other. It is the inestimable national treasure, and the broad basis of the religious development of all German Protestantism.

French Reviews.

REVUE CHRETIENNE, (Christian Review.) November, 1883.—1. FALLOA, Laical Religion. 2. SECRÉTAN, The Philosophy of George Sand. 3. BERSIER, The Religious Crisis of Coligny. 4. WAGNER. Luther. Monthly Review by PRESSENSÉ.

December, 1883.—ASTIÉ, The Fear of the Protestant Principle in the Ranks of French Protestantism. 2. SABATIER, Madame de Remusat and Her Son. 3. ***, The Conscience of the Heart. 4. Correspondence by BOUVIER. Literary Notices. Monthly Review.

January, 1884.—1. STAPIER, The Question of Biblical Versions. 2. DARTIGUE, Contemporary Catholic Preaching. 3. BRIDEL, Philosophical Chronicle. 5. The Old Messenger of the Vosges, by L. R. Bibliographical Notice by HOLLARD. Review of the Month by E. DE PRESSENSE.

Revue Chretienne opens its volume for 1884 under very encouraging prospects. It is understood to be the most popular and acceptable representative of French Protestantism, and is so because of the breadth of its views and the latitude of its aims. It is necessarily popular in its character, because it must respond to the needs of many who have scarcely any other literary resource under the lead of the Protestant Church, and it must necessarily be broad to enlist the sympathy of Churches that are quite different in their individual character, while supporting a common cause and having one Christian aim. We have simply to look over a table of contents of the last year to perceive in the work of its contributors acceptable articles in the various literary, philosophical, and religious domains, on subjects most worthy of occupying the attention of French Protestantism. For the coming year the editor promises new and more energetic efforts to reach the height of their mission, in both the Christian and liberal spirit to which they invariably remain true. The amount of matter offered to the editorial corps is so great that they much desire an increase in the capacity of the *Revue*. This shows an energy and activity in the ranks of the French Protestants that augurs well for the future.

The *facilis princeps* of the *Revue* will continue to be the energetic and aggressive Edmond de Pressensé, notwithstanding the fact that he has recently been elevated to the rank of senatorial dignity. In the bulletin for the coming year, he calms the fears of his friends by assuring them that his new duties will not prevent him from performing the same labor for this periodical in the future that he has devoted to it in the

past. This will be welcome information to some who are not aware that Pressensé has the working power and energy of two ordinary men.

In the closing number of the last volume of the *Revue* he expresses his gratitude for the marks of sympathy received from all shades of French Protestantism and of the Liberal party, on the occasion of his election to the Senate. He acknowledges this to be a powerful encouragement to the performance of his duty in the severe conflicts of the near future. And he foreshadows the energy and boldness of his purpose in his new capacity by giving his friends very clearly to understand that in his senatorial position he will meet and oppose the recent action of the Chamber of Deputies in its vote on the Budget for Public Worship. He unhesitatingly declares that the reduction of the appropriation for this purpose indicates the real character of the policy of the majority in the question of the relations between Church and State, already sufficiently indicated by the passage of a municipal law of the same character, by the City Council of Paris. He declares these to be like attempts to impoverish and enfeeble the Church, in order to reach a separation of the two powers, when this *régime* has become impossible to the cause of religion, and this in the name of free thought, flaunted as a political flag. He condemns these resolutions from every point of view, and promises to meet them in this spirit when they shall be brought before the Senate; and we have no doubt but that this promise will be kept, and that the great champion of French Protestantism will be a fearless combatant on the senatorial arena.

The leading article in the December number by Astié, on "The Fear of the Protestant Principle in the Ranks of French Protestantism," is extremely suggestive of the fears and doubts that trouble the heart of the Church. For many years before the great National Synod, held by the permission and under the *régime* of Thiers, the French Churches were so essentially divided and estranged from each other that it was no easy matter to decide on the essential principle of Protestantism. After they came together in apparent unity, they learned that there was a great divergence in their views in regard to the major principle that bound them together. For some years, therefore, the leading thinkers of the Church have been

discussing this question in books, reviews, and sermons. It finally reached the platforms of their pastoral conferences, and in this field our author appears, with the reply to a question, presented by the Central Committee of a Pastoral Association of Switzerland. This question was as follows: "What is the principle of Protestantism?" And Astié replies to it in substance as follows:

"The three questions which we must examine from an historical point of view, in order to remain faithful to the programme of your Central Committee, will be these: What have we been? What have we become? and, What is the future in reserve for us? And we thus reply: 'What is the primitive idea of Protestantism, that from which all others have sprung, and which brings them all back to unity by imprinting on them its seal?' We call attention to the fact that the question concerns the primitive idea of *Protestantism*, and not that of the *Reformation*, which began by a fact, and not by an idea. Neither is it a question of the principle of Protestant theology, which did not appear until a later period.

"This elimination conducts us to the Diet of Spires in 1529, when our fathers accidentally received a name which has been accepted with more or less good grace by all the Churches that have sprung from the movement of the sixteenth century. Frightened by the incessant progress of the reformatory work, said Diet decided that they would accept the accomplished facts, but that in the future it would no longer be permitted to attempt new conquests. It was against this assumption of settling the religious question by a majority of votes that our fathers protested. 'We cannot,' they said, 'act otherwise than according to the demands of our own conscience.' But what is it that gives to conscience the courage and the strength to protest? It is because it has imbibed the conviction of its rights, or rather of its duties. The minority declared that, in all matters that concerned the salvation of our soul and eternal happiness, each one is responsible before God alone, and that it is to him only that we must render an account for our convictions.

"In this way the *subjective* character of Protestantism above all else is established in an historical manner. But what is the nature of this subjectivism? The object of the protest clearly

indicates the reply. Our fathers protested when the Diet wished to rob them of the right of pursuing the conquests of the Reformation of which they were already the children, and of which, in case of need, they were ready to be the martyrs. Now, why and how was the Reformation effected? The most bitter enemies which it provoked could tell us in case of need. They wished above all things to bring back their protesting colleagues to the confessional, and to the tribunal of penitence. It is on the indispensable intermediary of the sacrament, of which the hierarchy possesses the exclusive administration, that it bases its power to hold the conscience captive. What rendered the Reformation possible, and that which served it as a lever, was the intense conviction in both Luther and Zwingle of the absolute importance of Jesus; in clinging directly to him as the only source of salvation they emancipated the human conscience from the yoke of the Church, and in spite of themselves.

"I have said *in spite of themselves*, and this reservation is decisive. In the beginning our fathers intended, as faithful sons, to be the reformers of the existing Church; nothing was farther from their intentions than the project of founding *new* Churches. All the ideas which they advanced they presented as having the right of citizenship in the dominant Church, of which they themselves formed a part, and which had taught them these same ideas. The subjectivism of the reformers was, therefore, not exclusive—it was eminently social, both as to its bases and as to its aspirations. And this brings us to that which constitutes both the strong and the weak point of the work of the sixteenth century. It was in yielding to this social element that our fathers were reformers and not simply the representatives of a contemplative and quietistic tendency, seeing that God himself, and the circumstances of the period, were assuming the task of reforming the Church. But our fathers clung too much to the idea of remaining ecclesiastical reformers, and this was their weak point.

"It is true that religious and moral interest rules every thing; when it was a question of sacrificing the rights of conscience to enter into direct communion with Jesus Christ, they prefer to break with the Church, but they do it in spite of themselves, in self-defense, and as little as possible. It is for this reason

that their work remained incomplete, and that in many regards it failed. We are therefore in harmony with those who find their origin in the one single principle of Protestantism. The ancient distinction between the formal principle and the real principle appears to us singularly apocryphal. At a later period, undoubtedly, our fathers were greatly desirous of being in accord with the Scriptures; but in the beginning they first appealed to ecclesiastical law, to tradition, and to the general council as the only legitimate and definitive authority. They began to insist on the authority of the Scriptures only in the course of the conflict, and not until they saw themselves obliged to renounce the hope of reforming the Church; for then they needed to invoke an authority in order to justify their doctrines and the claims of God, in opposition to a majority which repudiated them, and with whom they had differed for other reasons. Having been forced into a minority by the majority of the ruling Church, they were compelled to prove that they possessed an authority superior to that which condemned them."

This significant discussion we consider a very healthy one for the period, and believe that the French Church need not fear to raise such a standard as their principle of Protestantism, namely, direct appeal to scriptural authority.

Art. X.—FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE FREE CHURCH OF FRANCE.

The Free Church of France seems to be holding its position very fairly against many counteracting influences. At its late synod there were reported thirty-four congregations with 4,500 members, and besides this about twenty mission stations, of which some are on the point of rising into the dignity of independent congregations. This comparatively weak body has in about two years collected 335,000 francs for its ecclesiastical wants, while giving considerable to works of private benevolence. At its recent synod some very vigorous thoughts were expressed by distinguished speakers, indicating an ardent desire for a sound, manly, and popular religion. This key-note of the assembly has since been brought out in bold relief by the *Journal du Protestantisme Français*, which says: "We have never ceased to defend these views, since we claim for our Protestantism the right to develop itself in harmony with the highest endeavors of the spirit of our age." Pressensé, as usual, was the controlling figure of the occasion, in a splendid address

on the debt which French Protestantism owes to Russia. In another address, by Pastor Pezzi, on the history of the principles of the Free Church since 1848, he laid down the following three as the cardinal ones, namely, confession of the name of Christ, individual confession of faith, and the autonomy of the Church. A point worthy of notice was the fact that a prominent member of the body declared himself opposed to bequeathals for the Church, because the self-sacrifice of the individual members might thereby be rendered torpid. Another member would receive them only under the condition of immediate wants for the uses of the Church, but not for capitalization. Several important resolutions were adopted, first, that the name should be changed from *Union des Eglises Evangeliques de France* to *Eglises Evangeliques libres.* A new article was added to the fourth chapter of the constitution, as follows: "Baptism and the Holy Communion shall be administered as institutions;" but without fixing, in regard to baptism, the manner and the period of its application. Another question of general interest was concerning the consecration of the evangelists. There was a difference of opinion in regard to the amount of New Testament Greek to be demanded in their examinations. The synod finally resolved that if the candidates were found competent in other respects to admit them to consecration without any knowledge of the Greek. But it was distinctly declared that the full consecration for pastoral work should not be granted without a knowledge of the Greek. We are pleased to see that the independent position of these *Eglises libres* is being more and more acknowledged by other Protestant bodies of Europe, and it was proved, by the fraternal deputations from other ecclesiastical organizations that were received and greeted, that the Free Church of France is a nucleus for liberal and untrammeled theology, that may grow from the mustard-seed to become a great tree in French Protestantism. The main difference between this Church and that of the National Reformed Church of France is the fact that the former is independent and the latter dependent. The spirit of the age is the triumph of independence in the Church as in the State.

A CATHOLIC CONGRESS IN ITALY.

The Catholics of Italy are following the example of their Protestant opponents in holding congresses for the discussion of the leading questions that interest them in the great ecclesiastical conflicts. Shortly after the Pope gave audience to the small army of clericals and laymen who sought his presence in the Vatican and St. Peter's, an Italian Catholic Congress was held in Naples. According to the report presented to this body, the members of the association number about 60,000, divided into provincial, diocesan, and parochial associations, showing a very systematic organization and combination of these clerical and lay forces in the Italian realm. That the convocation was a brilliant and significant one may be inferred from the fact that there were present about thirty bishops and archbishops, together with numerous distinguished

representatives of the Italian nobility and members of municipal authorities, which latter, in the great centers of Italy, are beginning more and more to assume the clerical character.

The Prince of Bisignano was made president of the meeting, and in his opening address called earnest attention to the necessity of standing closely around the successor of St. Peter in his trials and tribulations. He presented, as a principal means of opposing atheism and Protestant propaganda in the schools, the most careful culture of Catholic education for youth. And on the same subject there were two other earnest reports, by Canon Mineo and Prince Macchia, of Naples. The latter called attention to the fact of the necessity for the immediate establishment of Catholic schools in Naples, and the preservation of religious instruction in the municipal schools now in operation. The Bishop of Foggia recommended the foundation of a great theological faculty in Naples, which he declared would be the crystallizing center for a complete Catholic university, with all the departments. We surmise that no small share of this anxiety in regard to Naples is the recently developed activity of our own Methodist mission work in that city, which is felt by the authorities of the Church to be the beginning of great danger for their Catholic parochial schools. Another important question was a comprehensive plan of organization for the Catholics of Italy who were truly loyal to the Holy See. The army of papal supporters, for elections in Catholic interests, for protests against godless laws, and for sacrifice for the purposes of the Church, must in every parish have a central direction for its organization, in order to be ready, at a given watch-word, to enter into concerted action. Even the pilgrimages are to be controlled by a regular organization; and each pilgrim is to be provided with a "Pilgrim's Manual." A long and patient discussion was devoted to the social questions of the day, namely, the establishment of kitchens for the people, the Christianizing of the family, and the condition of the working classes. In these matters the Neapolitan nobility was entreated to be especially active. It was even resolved to cultivate a taste for historical investigation of the Church according to the method of the Pope. All this clearly proves the increasing and dangerous activity of the Papal Church of Italy.

THE LUTHER FESTIVALS IN ITALY.

The Luther festivals that have been so surprisingly numerous and enthusiastic in Italy have doubtless pierced the Vatican between the joints of its armor, and irritated it to unusual activity. The papal power has considered it a special challenge that the poisonous rebel of the sixteenth century, the doctor and master of a great portion of Germany, should thus rise from his tomb to renew his persecutions of the Church. The climax was added to this when it was one morning announced that in the palace of the German embassy there would be a religious ceremony in honor of the great reformer. The *Popolo Romano* also announced that, besides the embassy and its *personnel*, there would also be present

the nephew of the emperor. This fact alone was necessary to signalize the character of the ceremony. A Luther festival in the chapel of the German embassy, with the presence of one of the German princes, was quite enough to give a most defined character to the occasion. The Vatican press spoke lightly of the affair, forgetting that this religious celebration of the occasion was by order of the emperor. Even the special German embassador exhibited so little diplomatic tact as to appear on that occasion, with the Prussian and Baden princes, and a hundred other German Protestant dignitaries. This official leading off of the Luther festivals in the land of the Pope and capital of the papacy was a significant hint to the German Protestants of all Italy, who were profited and strengthened by the example. In Naples, Rome, Florence, and Palermo the celebrations were very brilliant. Every-where the churches could scarcely contain the masses that crowded to the ceremony, and every-where the orators seemed inspired to strike the effective key-note without indulging in useless polemics. In Florence the festival was international, and the addresses were delivered by a German, an Italian, an Englishman, and a Frenchman. Even in the famous Protestant military chapel of Capellini were found a large number of Italian soldiers listening to the story of the conflicts of the great German reformer with the Pope. After the regular services of the occasion were ended several of the subordinate officers among the Italians absolutely delivered addresses and led in prayer; and the services were concluded by the enthusiastic singing of the great battle-hymn of Luther in Italian. It is scarcely possible to comprehend the significance of such an event in the city of the Pontiff, or to grasp by the imagination the extent and the influence of these exercises themselves throughout the Italian peninsula.

PROTESTANT WORK IN AUSTRIA.

The Protestants of Austria have had a fearful struggle to obtain and maintain the rights granted to them a few years ago in that country, largely at the instance of the Evangelical Alliance. But they were recently allowed to hold in Vienna a general synod of both branches of their Church. The emperor kindly received a deputation of the synod, and in return for the assurance of loyalty to the state were, for their part, assured by the monarch that the Protestant Church might rely in the future on the protection and support of the authorities. Those of the Augsburg Confession counted forty-three members, and of the Helvetian Confession twenty-one members. The curious and troublesome question of nationality and the language to be used in the transaction of business was the first to present itself, and it was resolved that the principal record of the proceedings should be made in the Bohemian tongue. Unfortunate as this may seem, it was just; because in Bohemia and Moravia the Protestant congregations number 120,000 souls, while the German congregations in the provinces of Vienna and Galicia count but 8,000. The Germans do not understand Bohemian, while

nearly all the members from Bohemia and Moravia understand and speak the German. It is a great pity that the Protestants of Austria thus introduce into their convocation the same apple of discord that is now dividing the politicians. If these synods hereafter shall insist on the use of the language that a large number of the leading members of the body cannot understand, the result will be a division of the forces.

The proceedings were of a very broad and general character, referring to the Protestant theological faculty of the University of Vienna, to the elementary schools for their children, and the marriage laws. They desire that the connection of their faculty with the State University shall be genuine, and not apparent. The Academic Senate is opposed to this, but the synod demands it as a logical sequence of the privileges granted to their body. In the matter of the schools they make two complaints, one is in regard to the legal position of Protestant schools, and the other as to the use of Catholic prayers in the public schools. As to the Protestant schools, it was resolved to appeal to majesty for a revision of the late school law, which declares Protestant elementary schools to be private institutions, and thus dispossesses them of general rights under the school law. The revision desired would give to the Protestant schools the character of public schools, and enable them to collect the school funds from their adherents. It is much to be hoped that this appeal to the monarch may have a fortunate result, and it now seems that such a hope will be likely to be realized. The deputation of the synod appointed to present the petition has been kindly received by the emperor, and it is hardly possible now that he could do otherwise than throw the weight of his influence in favor of relief and protection to the Protestant schools. A far more troublesome question for the Protestants of Austria is that of the laws concerning marriage that are extremely narrow and tyrannical, and there is but little probability that the resolutions of the synod will effect much in this regard. It is now impossible for Catholic priests who leave their orders and become Protestants to marry; and mixed marriages, where permitted, are indissoluble, and in nearly all cases are permitted only on the condition that the children issuing from such marriages shall be inscribed on the public records and educated as Catholics. The entire question of mixed marriages in Austria is the most sensitive one in the social organization, and is bound to cause much trouble in the future. The late Austrian cardinal was opposed to any modification of these laws, as also to the admission of a Protestant faculty into the university, and his influence still remains after him.

Art. XI.—FOREIGN LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

The theological periodicals and reviews of Germany are absolutely filled with all sorts of matter concerning Luther, his labors, his contemporaries, and the thousands of festivals of every shade that have taken place, in the Fatherland and elsewhere, in honor of his deeds and memory. Therefore, to reflect the theological spirit of the hour, we are forced to follow suit. The rarest literary innovation in this line is a drama, entitled "Historical Exposition of Luther, in Seven Parts." This so-called drama was absolutely played by the students of Jena on the dramatic boards of that little city; and it is said to have produced the most profound impression by the poetic power with which the principal episodes of the life of the reformer were presented, by a sober but attractive *mise en scène*, and the vivacious dialogue, enlivened by unique and original expressions. It was, in short, a history of the Reformation dramatized and performed like the ancient mystery plays of the Middle Ages, with a language completely modern, and with the sentiments of our own era. Except the characters of Luther and Katerina von Bora, confided to actors of the highest merit, the drama was played, and very well played, it is said, by students and citizens of Jena. At Worms they were even still bolder. A dramatic work of Professor Hering, declared to be equal to that of Devrient himself, was performed by the very faithful in person, in the very church of the Trinity. The role of Luther was performed by Dr. Bassermann, of Stuttgart. The grand scene of the Diet of Worms, where the immortal reformer, surrounded by all the princes of Germany, cast into the face of Charles the Fifth his undying expression, "I cannot do otherwise, so help me God," produced an immense effect. This strange event is the theater reconciled with the Church, at least for a day—the theater returning to its original use in the Middle Ages—returning to the Church, which was, in fact, its mother.

From the German press there still continues to flow a steady stream of Luther literature of the highest order. The association for the preservation of the literature of the Reformation has opened its column with Professor Kolde's "Luther and the Diet of Worms." Friedrich Soldan treats the same subject, with special reference to the surrounding localities of Worms. Dr. Lorenz, in collaboration with the corps of German professors and pastors, has published a calendar of the Luther festival, in which the various relations of Ehrfurt to the humanistic aims of the period of Luther, to the Reformation, to Gustavus Adolphus, and to the Catholicism of the period, are exhaustingly treated. General Superintendent Erdmann, in Berlin, presents us with an extremely rich and learned monograph on "Luther and the Hohenzollerns." In this work each separate investigation in regard to Luther's relations to this influential ruling house enriches our knowledge and discloses the

far-seeing political eye of the reformer, as well as his delicate and well-digested tact.

The parent Bible Society of Prussia has published Kleinert's treatise on Luther's prefaces to the Sacred Scriptures. Pastor Ninck, in Hamburg, gives a very judicious extract from the favorite monograph of Luther, "Of the Liberty of a Christian Man," under the peculiar title, "Free from Every Body and Yet the Servant of All." With a skillful hand Musical Director Stein, in Wittenberg, treats of Luther's "Musical Significance and Activity." The same author has composed several popular chorals for the liturgical festival on the jubilee day. In addition to these, the same Bible Society has published a goodly number of liturgical devotions for the use of the churches during the festival days.

Luther's hymns have also been the object of the greatest attention. During his life-time he received the *sobriquet* of the nightingale of Wittenberg, and his undying notes have ever resounded, even through years of darkness, down to the present light of day. One of the works is entitled "The Nightingale of Wittenberg," and introduces his hymns with most instructive notices. The Christian songs of the German Churches would be a comparative blank without the hymns of Luther, for on these has been based all the hymnology of the German Protestant Churches since that day. Some of these publications are accompanied with Luther's proverbs, adages, and fables, because of their peculiarly poetic character, and the fact that many of his hymns were based on these. In connection with these we may mention some of the artistic productions of the Reformation, now revived and republished, especially the large ones of Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli, Frederick the Wise, and Hutten. A very excellent engraving of Luther, at the ridiculously low figure of three cents apiece, and in quantities at even a lower rate, has been published by tens of thousands, and, in spite of its low price, is really an acceptable ornament for the modest households of the masses.

The relations between Wiclif and Huss are being brought out into a clearer light under the inspiration of the large attention being paid to the history of the Reformation. That there were close connections between the Bohemian movement of the beginning of the fifteenth century and that of Oxford are no longer simple suppositions; indeed, that such relations existed was clear to all concerned in the Council of Constance. But in the course of time, when the works of Wiclif became more inaccessible, the consciousness of the close connection between the two reformatory movements fell into the background. But since, during the last few years, the publications concerning Wiclif are commanding more attention, we are gradually perceiving how much Huss was indebted to Wiclif. The first step in this direction has now been made by Professor Loserth, of the University of Czernowitz, under the title of "Huss and Wiclif." This work will be of great value to theological

investigators. Loserth's very thorough and very diligent investigations are from many stand-points of scientific importance. Loserth seems to present valid proof that the Bohemian movement was, in the main, a repetition of the English one; that Wiclif was the highly gifted and energetic master, and Huss the docile scholar.

Dr. Guthe, the famous Palestine explorer, has just published an extended and valuable report of his latest labors in the line of excavations around Jerusalem. The accounts mainly concern the southern wall of ancient Jerusalem, the old sites and buildings on the south-eastern eminence, as well as the surroundings of the Pool of Siloam. Eleven plates of large form, partly lithograph and partly crayon, serve as illustrations; a map based on Wilson's, but corrected by Guthe and Sandel, affords an instructive view of the entire work. The journal of the German Palestine Association has, in the first number of its sixth volume, much interesting matter in regard to the present condition of the inhabitants of Palestine. It has also an article on the names of the squares, streets, and passages of the present Jerusalem by the missionary Sandreczki; also a treatise in regard to the so-called temple associations of Palestine, by one of the co-workers in that enterprise, as well as a description of the workmen and the sphere of work of the German Protestant mission in Jerusalem. The last article of the issue treats of the *personnel* and the condition of the various Christian confessions in the Holy Land, as well as those of the Jewish inhabitants. This German publication is one of the most valuable now issued in regard to contemporaneous activity in Palestine, and is invaluable in its contents to that portion of the Christian world that looks with interest and favor to all that concerns the regeneration of the Holy Land.

Under the title of "Exegetical Commentary to Nine Epistles of the Apostle Paul," we have a new work by Karl von der Heydt. It is to the Germans a gratifying as well as a rare occurrence, that a layman should use his extraordinary genius to throw a brilliant light on the living word of God, and so to delve in the original text of the New Testament as to find and give new significance to many of its words and expressions. The author of this work has discovered a rare worth in these Bible words, and seems greatly to enjoy all their meaning. His exegesis is not given solely on his own responsibility, but is based on the present status of investigation and the commentaries and authorities of the most thorough Greek scholars.

Two Christological works antagonistic in their character have recently appeared to attract the interest of the Christian world. The Ritschel theology has forced the Christological question into a new position by its distinction between metaphysics and dogmatics, but a work now comes to its relief from Alsace, from the pen of Professor Lobstein, in Strasburg. It is in French, and bears the following title: "The Idea of the Pre-existence of the Son of God: A Fragment of Experimental Christology." This work has just been published by the Protestant

house of Fischbacher in Paris. While asserting that he desires to serve neither the liberal nor the orthodox theology, he makes an effort, exegetically and critically, to furnish the proof that in the original New Testament text the idea of pre-existence of the Son of God did not exist. He makes assertions as follows: The Acts of the Apostles acknowledges his eternity only after death, and Peter asserted the pre-existence of Christ only in the thought of God. The Revelation contains the first assertion of a pre-existence of the Messiah. Paul, with rabbinical terminology, takes up the thought, and arrives in later epistles at the assertion that Jesus is to be comprehended as the living principle, and as an independent eternal personality. The Epistle to the Hebrews, on the basis of the Alexandrian philosophizers, makes the Son equal to the Father, as a symbol of his nature, etc. It is plain to be seen, from his short review of the quotations of Lobstein, that he starts from the supposition that the Lord himself has nowhere asserted his pre-existence, and that where it occurs it is only a human construction, and may, therefore, lay no claim to objective authority. He who can satisfy himself with this result of scriptural investigation may see how he will finally fare with his "historical and critical" testimony.

The other Christological work which we have here to name proceeds from a diametrically opposite basis. It is that of the Oxford professor, P. H. Liddon, which has just been published in German, to gratify the theologians of that land with an antidote for the works above named. The title of Liddon's book is, "The Divinity of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ." It is in the form of lectures, with a preface by a pastor of Nice. The views of this subject which we here find are of no extraordinary novelty. The most difficult problems of this Christological question, namely, the relation of the divine nature to the human, as well as the difference between the God-man existence of the Lord in the so-called condition of humiliation and in that of his elevation, is scarcely touched; and, indeed, the mode of treatment which Christology experiences in the school of Ritschel is not even mentioned, much less debated. Nevertheless, the book is calculated to furnish a rich blessing to earnest Christians seeking for a Godlike Christ, and will, doubtless, exert a wide and wholesome influence in Germany, as it has done in England.

Art. XII.—QUARTERLY BOOK-TABLE.

Religion, Theology, and Biblical Literature.

The Revised Version.—Heb. vi, 4–6: 'Αδύνατον γὰρ τοὺς ἅπαξ φωτισθέντας γευσαμένους τε τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς ἐπουρανίου καὶ μετόχους γενηθέντας πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ καλὸν γευσαμένους θεοῦ ῥῆμα δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αἰῶνος, ἱκαὶ παραπεσόντας, πάλιν ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετάνοιαν, ἀνασταυροῦντας ἑαυτοῖς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ παραδειγματίζοντας.

For it is impossible those once enlightened, having tasted the heavenly gift, and become partakers of the Holy Spirit, and tasted the good word of God, *and* the power of the future state, to renew again unto repentance, *they* recrucifying to themselves the Son of God, and exposing to disgrace.—*Literal rendering.*

For as touching those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age to come, and *then* fell away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame.—*Revised Version.*

This passage of Scripture is justly regarded as among the most interesting and solemnly important of the whole Bible. It is interesting as a critical study, since its finer discriminations of meaning can be clearly determined only by careful attention not only to the accepted sense of the words used, but also to the structure of the sentences, and especially to the tenses of the several verbal participles. It is also interesting as a dogmatic study, on account of its direct bearing upon a much-disputed point of the theology of evangelical Protestantism, the possibility or impossibility of the fatal and final apostasy of real Christians; and likewise for its awful lessons and solemn warnings against the sin of apostatizing. It embodies with great fullness and richness of expression the facts and phenomena of Christian experience, and shows the high estate, at once so precious and so perilous, in which the believer stands; and it also seems to intimate that, while a fall from that high estate is supposable, the condition resulting from such a lapse is terrible beyond all comparison.

In respect to its grammatical form and structure, the passage is not a difficult one. The words used are not unusual ones, nor do they appear to be carried out of their ordinary application, and the whole structure of the sentence is agreeable to the best understood and universally accepted grammatical rules. A certain process (to renew again unto repentance) is indicated as *impossible* (*ἀδύνατον*) to the class of persons who are included under the four designations (the last one twofold) first given, and who have fallen away from that state; and a further explanation

is added showing that this impossibility is conditioned and rendered irreversible by the position and practice of those who have so fallen away, because they "recrucify" and "contemn" Christ. In respect to the grammatical sense of the whole passage, there is really no difficulty at all, and the objections raised against allowing it to be accepted and understood as it seems obviously to mean arise simply from dogmatic reasons, as teaching one or more points of doctrine that stand opposed to certain other accepted beliefs.

It is the established and the only defensible rule for interpretation of a discourse, spoken or written, that it shall be understood agreeably to the ordinary sense of its words and phrases, and where that is clearly ascertained there can be no appeal from its determination. The rule sometimes insisted upon, that particular texts (and the whole Bible is made up of such) must be interpreted agreeably to "the analogy of faith," can be legitimately used only when all other methods fail, and then the passages so interpreted cannot be employed as proof-texts. As an element in criticism dogmatic considerations must always occupy a very low place, and they must be used, if at all, only with very great caution, and when other and more rational processes fail to give any probable sense to the matter in hand—a consideration which certainly will not apply in this case.

The purport and design of the discourse of which the passage under consideration is a part should be clearly apprehended and its bearing properly conceded. Accordingly, we find the evident intent of the Epistle to the Hebrews to have been to dissuade those addressed from apostatizing from their Christian fidelity, toward which there seem to have been among them, at that time, strong incentives. The passage therefore appears as giving a reason why the threatened defection should not be allowed to take place, and the motive urged is the certain, fearful, and irreversible perdition of those who so apostatize.

The persons in whose interests these instructions appear to be given are indicated by certain facts that are assumed to belong to their history, and by referring to certain spiritual attainments to which they had come; the whole taken together constituting a deep and broad presentation of the religious or spiritual life, having very few parallels in accurate delineation of personal experience and Christian attainments.

The adverb of time or order, ἅπαξ, applies naturally to all of the first four terms or clauses, which are all in one or other of

the preterit tenses, and it accordingly gives to all of them an historical value, as if it were said that these things having taken place, and now still another important fact having intervened, the inevitable outcome must be considered. As a fact, the case is no doubt a supposed one, and yet its pertinency for the use to which it is put supposes something more than its possibility. It indeed seems to say to those addressed that, having themselves been made the subjects of the things named as having once (ἅπαξ) occurred, and being now tempted to "fall away," they have need to be warned of the fearful consequences that would be sure to follow such a backsliding. Respecting their experience, they are first spoken of as *having been enlightened*, φωτισθέντας, a term often met with in both the Septuagint and the New Testament, meaning primarily "to bring to light," or "to cast light upon;" but a little later, and especially among the early Christian writers, it is used in the sense of "being enlightened," and in that sense it was used to indicate the work of the Spirit in the conversion of the soul. (See chapter x, 32.) After the apostolic age, and when baptism had become the accepted synonym for regeneration, that ceremony was styled the "illumination;" but even then, as is shown by Suicer, (*sub voce*,) "the word never came to simply and purely signify outward baptism, but it always included (in its meaning) that *illumination* of the new birth which is the thing signified in the sacrament." Erasmus coincides with this, and describes those here spoken of as having been "once enlightened," as those "who had escaped from the darkness of their former life, being illuminated by the doctrine of the Gospel," which evidently pertained to the heart no less than to the outward understanding, so making these illuminated ones the truly regenerate.

This first clause, as naming a single past event, is expressed in the indefinite past tense, but the second, indicating a continuous experience, is in a tense which brings the action down to the immediate past—"having tasted"—γευσαμένους—having been all along tasting—"the heavenly gift," the peculiar gifts of the Spirit of which only real believers partake. "This heavenly gift," says Alford, "these persons are supposed to have tasted for themselves." And thus it would appear that the whole process must fall within the sphere of the personal spiritual consciousness.

The effort is made by a class of Biblical interpreters in order to meet the exigencies of their dogmatic pre-determinations, to

evade the force of this language by minifying the word "taste," (γευσαμένους, twice used,) so that it shall mean not really *partaking of,* or *feeding upon,* but only testing by the organ of taste —a rendering directly opposed to the use of the same term elsewhere, (Psa. xxx, 8; Matt. xvi, 28; John viii, 52; 1 Peter ii, 3,) and manifestly used only as a makeshift, and yet it has been accepted by not a few able and respectable divines. Dr. Doddridge sees "no necessity for extending, in this place, the energy of the Spirit beyond his *extraordinary* (outward) gifts," and instances Simon Magus as an example. Stuart, with characteristic candor, confesses that the words, taken as usually employed, would imply that the persons described were real Christians; but he thinks they *may be used* in a lower sense, which, in obedience to the demands of his traditional creed, he seems to timidly prefer. Dr. Cowles, of Oberlin, concedes that the text speaks of real Christians, but most absurdly claims that the cases here given are only supposititious, and such as can never be realized; and in all this he is substantially repeating what was before said by his great exemplar, Rev. Albert Barnes, who dissents from Stuart's half-assumed position that a lower state of grace than actual conversion is intended; but still he holds fast, with a kind of death-grasp desperation, to the doctrine of the indefectibility of the saints. "It is not," says he, "an affirmation that any *had* actually fallen away, or that in fact they *would* do it; but the statement is, that on the supposition *that they had fallen away* it would be impossible to renew them again." We confess our inability to appreciate the intellectual condition of any one who could soberly assume such a position. The question is not as to what *had* actually occurred, or *would* occur, but the essential conditions of the problem in hand require that the conditions named shall be possible—that they *might* occur; and the *possibility* of falling away is precisely the question at issue. If there could be no *falling away* there was really no danger, and the warning uttered was based upon a falsehood, and there could be no condition admitting of a renewing unto repentance, and so the whole thing must appear as a solemn farce, a bugaboo with which to alarm children about fictitious but really impossible perils. We are asked to believe that the inspired teacher knew very well that their actual fall was sure not to occur, and yet he speaks of it as not only possible, but so likely to take place, that the utmost carefulness ought to be exercised to prevent it, and for that purpose he pictures the horrible ruin that would follow that

impossible event, *should it only take place*, which it is "morally certain" it never will!

We find our own views happily expressed in the subjoined remarks of Dr. S. H. Turner, ("Commentary on Hebrews,") which are at once moderate in tone but forceful. After presenting the arguments noticed above at length, he says:

> Such a mode of reasoning appears to me wholly unsatisfactory. The object of the apostle is to prevent the actual falling away of the persons whom he describes as real Christians, and with this view he sets before them the horrors of a state of apostasy. It is incredible that he should feel and show such concern to prevent what he knew could not occur. Such *a statement* might indeed be made, but such *a moral motive* could not be presented by an inspired or judicious man to free moral agents. It were preposterous to offer motives in order to dissuade creatures from falling over a precipice who were physically in a condition which made such a fall impossible. And as to the *use* of such a warning, it may well be asked, What practical good effect can result from showing the greatness of a merely hypothetical sin, which can never possibly occur? And surely there are real sins enough to warn men against, without denouncing threats against such as are merely supposable. With equal consistency the Universalist might allow that the doctrine of future and eternal punishment is revealed, [in Scripture,] and yet regard the representation as made simply in order to deter men from sinning.

The impossibility (*ἀδύνατον*) of renewing unto repentance (*ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετάνοιαν*) those who have fallen away (*παραπεσόντας*) is declared to be because they are (present—*now*) recrucifying (*ἀνασταυροῦντας*) and putting to shame (*παραδειγματίζοντας*) the Son of God. The form of the declaration is in no sense uncertain, or within itself other than absolute and indicative of something sure to occur. "The import of the expression," says Luneman, "is absolute, and to weaken it into *per difficile est*, (as some have done,) according to which we should have to suppose a rhetorical exaggeration, would be an act of caprice. Nor may we assume (as some others have) that the impossibility is wholly on man's part, and not at all on the part of God. The impossibility of this renewing is, in itself, emphasized only on the part of its efficient agent, (God.) Had it been otherwise, the passive and not the active form of the verb would have been used." The impossibility in the case is, therefore, as to man, *objective* rather than *subjective*. Since "there is no other name given under heaven, nor among men, whereby we may be saved, but Christ Jesus;" if he is rejected "there remains no more" (no other way of) "remission of sin, but a fearful looking for of judgment."

It is important that we observe, that while all the preceding propositions, indicating both the religious experiences and the falling away, are expressed in the past tense, this one—the *recrucifying*, etc.—is in the present, and of course the act itself is continuous; and so long as that is the case repentance and restoration

are absolutely precluded. "The question," says Alford, "is not whether man's ministry or God's power is to be supplied as the agent, nor even whether the verb is active or passive; the impossibility lies merely within the limits of the hypothesis itself. Whether God in his infinite mercy and almighty power will ever by judgment, or by the strong workings of his Spirit, reclaim the obdurate sinner, so that even *he* may look upon Him whom he has has pierced, is—thank him—a question which neither this nor any other passage of Scripture precludes us from entertaining." And, on the other hand, it should be noted that no passage of Scripture, legitimately interpreted, casts the faintest ray of hope into that abyss of spiritual ruin which the rejecters of Christ have taken as their alternative portion.

By another class than those already referred to, (sometimes, however, very nearly related to them,) this passage has been understood to teach the utter impossibility of the recovery of those who have apostatized,—those who, having been truly converted, have turned again to sin, and rejected Christ and his salvation. But the text itself does not proceed to that extent; and since the presumed "impossibility" is conditioned on the continuous recrucifixion and exposing to obloquy of Christ, if a cessation of doing this is supposable, then may there be a possibility of renewal unto repentance. On that point this passage makes no utterance, either for or against such a hope; and while on the one hand the oft-reiterated declarations respecting the divine long-suffering and tender mercies give room for the hope that even such may be recovered and saved, on the other hand the whole tone of this passage, and still more so the parallel one in the tenth chapter, is fearfully significant of the almost absolutely hopeless condition of the soul that, having been raised to such heights of grace, *willfully* rejects, crucifies anew, and casts open reproach upon the Son of God in his relation of the Saviour of men. The shutting up of the possibility of this sin to the times and circumstances of the early Jewish Church—as seems to be Dr. Clarke's view—does not appear to be in accordance with either the evident design of the warning nor with the language used. It is still a fearful truth, universally applicable, that "a gracious soul may fall from grace;" and a joyful one that we are not forbidden to hope, to pray, and to labor for the restoration of those the farthest gone in apostasy. And still the solemn thought remains, "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

Studies in the Christian Evidences. By ALEXANDER MAIR, D.D., Morningside, Edinburgh. Crown 8vo. pp. 399. New York: Scribner & Welford.

Dr. Mair has given us an excellent book, It consists of a series of discussions, eleven in number, of selected fundamental points in the Christian Evidences, intended especially to meet the wants of those in the Church and out of it who have become perplexed, though not convinced, by the religious doubts and difficulties of the age. Starting from simple Theism as an accepted basis, it leads us, by a path of beautifully lucid and scholarly argument, into the center of the Christian system.

Taking up first "Christianity and Physical Science," Dr. Mair concedes that the present age has its full share of unbelief, though he denies it to be greater than in the latter part of the eighteenth century. He doubtless speaks of Great Britain. We know it in this country to be less. Nevertheless, these are times of skepticism. Much of it is nebulous, and more is simply the fog arising from inability to solve the adroitly put queries of infidels. Positive unbelief now takes mainly the form of blank atheism or materialism, or, if it calls itself by some other name, it ultimately comes to the denial of a personal God. Largely conducive to these results is the fact that this is emphatically the age of physical science, which demands methods of proof peculiar to itself. Its field is the world of matter; its instruments are the five senses. Its method of proof, the easiest known to men, is perfectly good within its own domain, and totally inapplicable out of it.

There is, rightly viewed, no antagonism between Christianity and physical science. Their methods of proof are entirely different. The facts and truths of religion and criticism cannot be ascertained by the chemist's crucible or the geologist's hammer, any more than Kepler's laws can be proved from the testimony of consciousness. Nor does eminence in physical science give weight to one's testimony in a department which he has never studied. A theologian who is nothing else is of no authority in chemistry; a chemist who is nothing else is of no authority in geology; nor is a physicist who is nothing else than a physicist of any authority in religion. No greater absurdity can be found in the present age than the assumption to subject historical events and moral questions to the tests of physical proof, and no blindness is greater than that of men who first determine that only matter and force exist in the universe, and then shut their eyes to the proper proofs of Christianity and declare that nothing is to be seen. Happily, the larger proportion of physicists in the

foremost rank are of another sort, and stand with Brewster, Faraday, Thomson, Gray, Dawson, and Winchell as believers in Christ.

Yet equally absurd and blind is the class of unbelievers, not mere physicists, who subject the facts and truths of Christianity to their previously established philosophy. Thus, Baur pronounces the question of supernatural or no supernatural to be a "purely philosophical question." Strauss holds that "an event cannot be historical which is inconsistent with the known and otherwise universal laws of phenomena." Renan declares it "an absolute rule of criticism to grant no place in historical narratives to miraculous circumstances." They start with the idea that the supernatural is impossible, and then, dismissing the evidence for it, coolly set themselves at explaining away as they best can whatever savors of the supernatural. They thus prejudge the whole question beforehand, and disqualify themselves for a hearing.

In considering the "Intellectual Difficulties in Religion," Dr. Mair thinks they arise partly from the objects contemplated, and partly from the finiteness of the mind that contemplates them. One of those objects is God, a pure spirit, without form, and infinite. The more we try to comprehend him the deeper is the mystery. The farther we travel in infinity the vaster do we conceive infinity to be. Another object is man, of whom, after all the study of the centuries, we know so little. Whence does he come? What is he? Whither does he go? Of him Goethe truly said, "He knows little of the world, and least of all of himself." And yet this finite man is expected to comprehend the infinite God! To do it he must himself become God. It must be expected, then, that a religion emanating from God will contain difficulties and mysteries and truths that we may not be able to explain, but are nevertheless bound to believe on their own proper evidence. None will more bravely decry this principle than a class of scientists, and yet within their own field they constantly act upon it, and both unquestioningly believe and openly proclaim the facts they have gathered, not an element of which they can explain.

It is hardly conceivable that God could create a being with religious capacities, instincts, and necessities, and leave him to grope his way through the darkness as best he might, with no manifestation of himself and no revelation of his will. The human soul, free to utter its own voice, cries out for nothing in the wide universe as it does for the living God, to whom it may

speak, whom it may hear, and in whose embrace it may lie; and it is incredible that God has no open door for the hearing of this cry and the relief of this want. And who shall say that a revelation of religious truth to men by an infinite God is an impossibility? How such a revelation shall be given, whether vocally, written on stone, or printed in a book, as one man imparts new truth to another, is wholly immaterial. Nor does the question of inspiration, or any particular theory of inspiration, properly come in here, for, as to the New Testament, all our knowledge of any inspiration of it at all is derived from its pages, and it is yet to be settled whether the book itself is truthful and authoritative. This grand question is a historical one, in which the proof is historical proof, and must depend on testimony. The histories of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John have come down to us as have the histories of Xenophon and Tacitus, and are to be judged and received upon the same principles with theirs. Are they competent, trustworthy witnesses of what they saw and heard and learned? If so, their testimony is authoritative, and must be received until it is impeached.

The historical testimony to the New Testament books as productions of the apostolic age is abundant. The three great MSS., the Alexandrine, Vatican, and Sinaitic, carry us to A. D. 350. Back of that time are the Versions, the Fathers with their numerous quotations, some of whom overlap the age of the apostles, as Papias, Polycarp, and Clement of Rome, and the testimony of the heretics themselves, besides the numerous catalogues of the accepted books. The argument is familiar to biblical students. But a long step is gained in the admission by the chief representatives of the school of negative criticism that the first four epistles of St. Paul—Romans, First and Second Corinthians, and Galatians—are genuine and undisputed productions of the apostle, and that he lived at the time usually supposed. These epistles contain a clear, decisive statement of every fundamental historic fact of the Gospel, and their author is a competent, trustworthy witness, unimpeached and unimpeachable.

The study on "The Christian Miracles" is a piece of splendid argument. Its definition of a miracle as a visible result produced in nature by a superhuman agent, and more particularly by the special and direct volition of God, is sufficiently full for the purpose in hand. It does not admit that a miracle is a "violation of the laws of nature," as Hume claims, but, on the contrary, it is an occurrence in the interests of the highest order. In the

gradation of nature we find matter, chemical force, vegetable life, animal life, spiritual life, in which the lower exist and work for the higher. If, now, disease and disorder attack the highest rank, as they have done in man, God may use the lower laws and forces of nature for its restoration to health and order if he sees it best, even though it be by miracle. The possibility of it ought not to be questioned by a believer in a personal God. Physical science never has proved, and never can prove, its impossibility, while its facts do show supernatural intervention on his part. There was, for instance, during unnumbered ages, an established order of things under the laws of nature, when suddenly by the divine volition a living man, thinking, willing, moral, and free, was brought into being. Here was a supernatural new beginning in nature by divine interference. And can not he who created nature and its laws use them and modify them, if he pleases? Every plan of man to which he gives effect in action uses these laws, counteracting them if he holds up a stone, combining and utilizing them if he builds a steam-engine; thus from time to time making new beginnings, and exhibiting what is the very essence of the supernatural. God did this in the creation of man by his power and will, and by the same power and will he manifested himself by miracles in the supernatural beginning of Christianity. Hume argued that miracles are contrary to experience, and so incredible. Well, it is contrary to experience, in Hume's sense, that man should come into the world in any other way than by ordinary birth, which would prove that man has existed from eternity. But science proves that somehow there was a first man, which, on his theory, ought to be incredible. And, after all, the world does believe the most astounding things on trustworthy testimony, and it is contrary to all human experience that such testimony, multiform and cumulative, as we have for the Christian miracles should be false. The direct personal testimony of the sacred writers to miracles, which is the subject of a separate study, and, in particular, that of St. Paul in his four epistles conceded to be genuine, is strongly and conclusively stated. He testifies to receiving revelations, to seeing the risen Christ, to miracles in the early Church, and to having himself performed them among the very people to whom he thus wrote, among whom were bitter opponents of his apostleship, who would have contradicted and exposed him had his statement been otherwise than notoriously true.

The studies on "The Resurrection of Christ" and "The Unique

Personality of Christ" are masterly examinations of their subjects. For them, and also for the two concluding the series, on "Important Converging Lines," with its unique application of the mathematical doctrine of Probabilities, and "Proof from 'Survival of the Fittest,'" we must refer our readers to the volume itself.

The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The Ninth Series of the Cunningham Lectures By GEORGE SMEATON, D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology, New College Edinburgh. 8vo, pp. 372. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford.

The motive which led Dr. Smeaton to make the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit the topic of these six lectures was a desire to counteract the influence of "the representatives of modern theology, who, it is well known, have almost wholly ignored it." He had also found it impossible to divest his mind of the impression that, "among those who take religion in earnest, a disposition exists in no small measure to pass over the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit." To accomplish his purpose he found it necessary to take "a general survey of theology from the viewpoint of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit." To give completeness to the discussion he has given us first a dissertation in which "he endeavors to bring out the testimony of Scripture to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as contained in the Old and New Testaments;" next follow "Six Lectures," which contain "a brief outline or sketch of the positive truth—the form in which the Church dogmatically holds the doctrine." In a "third division" is a "historical survey," or condensed history of the doctrine from the apostolic age to the present time.

In the first part the subject is treated exegetically—at least sufficiently so to "evolve what the Scriptures say," and to show what was the teaching of the prophets, from Moses to Christ, and of the apostles subsequent to the resurrection. To mark the contrast between their doctrine of the Spirit and modern Sabellianism was the writer's leading object. His argument in this part is cumulative and conclusive on the main question; albeit it is not satisfactory to an Arminian thinker where it affirms the invincibility of the Spirit's influence, and asserts the dogma of the necessary final perseverance of those who, being once led by the Spirit, "CANNOT omit duty or neglect privilege."

The scope of the "Six Lectures" is wide, embracing the Personality and Procession of the Holy Spirit, the Work of the Spirit

in the Anointing of Christ, in Revelation and Inspiration; in the Regeneration of Individuals, and in the Church. These transcendently great topics are quite profoundly discussed, with rare dialectic skill, much theological learning, and in a reverent spirit. Yet it must be confessed that the impression resulting from their careful perusal is more perplexing than satisfactory. The sublime problem of the Trinity in Unity remains an unsolved and unsolvable mystery, notwithstanding our author's earnest and able attempt to find a key to its solution. It may, indeed, be honestly questioned whether the effect, on some minds, of his reasonings upon the personality of the Christ and of the Holy Spirit will not be to unsettle rather than to establish their faith in the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. In treating the distinctions between the divine personalities he frequently pushes his theories so far that, logically extended, they must lead to tritheism. In trying to pilot his readers through the currents of heterodox dogmas, he is so anxious to keep them from striking against the rocks of Sabellianism that he narrowly escapes steering into the vortex of tritheism. Assuredly, his work proves his preliminary assertion, that it is not his province "to explain the mystery of the doctrine of the Trinity." Nevertheless, like one attracted from his purpose by a fascinating object, he ventures to make the impossible explanation. Richard Watson wisely remarks of such ventures: "It would perhaps have been well, if divines, in treating this awful and mysterious subject, had confined themselves to the expressions of Scripture, for the moment we begin to explain it beyond the written word of God we plunge ourselves into inextricable difficulties."

Following the "Six Lectures" is a brief "historical survey of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit," in which the developments of the doctrine, and the discussions to which it has given rise during the progress of the centuries, are traced, not in detail, but in outline; touching only marked epochs in the history of the doctrine, and condensing a multitude of historic facts into small spaces. This is admirably done, excepting in its anti-Arminian passages. Dr. Smeaton is an ultra-Calvinist, as he shows most unmistakably both in the Lectures and in this dissertation. Hence his views of the work of the Holy Spirit are determined by the Genevan theology, which he freely applies both to the doctrine of the Spirit and its development in the Church. He does this with an unshrinking dogmatism which might dispose a reader unversed in the history of theological discussions to fancy

that the great body of the Christian Church accepted Calvinism as the truth, and that its opponents rank, by general consent, as errorists. It is refreshingly cool, in view of both the past and the present status of that theology, to be told by this really able writer that Arminianism "insinuated itself into the Reformed Church and became a very formidable power which spread in all directions, and *can scarcely even yet be said to have spent its force!*" Perhaps if the learned doctor would look beyond little Scotland, and out into the great world, he would discover genuine Arminianism—not the numerous types of error to which its adversaries unjustly gave its name—to be, not a force nearly spent, but a power so formidable and growing as to be leading all the Churches back to that faith in the universality of the atonement, in the freedom of the human will, in election conditioned on faith, and in the efficacy of the Spirit's operations except in those who persistently resist him, which was the common possession of the Church before the time of Augustine. If this book is to be taken as evidence that Scottish theologians intend to revive the declining power of old Calvinism as a means of counteracting the influence of the "New Theology," its appearance is to be regretted, since nothing would more surely promote that theology than the revival of that unscriptural system.

Clark's Foreign Theological Library. Fourth Series. Vol. XXIII. Keil's Introduction to the Old Testament. 8vo, pp. 529. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1871.

Our readers are informed, by a passage quoted in our notice of Dr. Ladd, that the only leading thinker in Germany who still maintains the "traditional" view of the Old Testament Canon is Keil. He is the Abdiel in the general defection, "faithful among the faithless," who pays no homage to the *Grundschrift*. Accordingly his Introduction presents the best view as yet accessible to the readers of English alone of the Pentateuchal question. Its last edition was issued by the author in 1868, and the date of the translator's issue is 1869. It is too early for the later manifestoes of Kuenen, Wellhausen, and Robertson Smith. The opponents it meets are De Wette, Bleek, Tuch, and Reihm. As an Introduction it may well be read by our theological students in addition to Harman's. And to those awakened by the present aspects of the Pentateuchal discussion its pages will possess a special interest. The style is now and then clumsy, and should have been a little straightened by the translator, Prof. Douglas; but

the additional bracketed passages, by the editor, are uniformly pertinent and valuable.

When he comes to the treatment of the Five Books of Moses, Keil opens his battery upon the *Grundschrift*, or, as he significantly styles it, "the imaginary Fundamental Document," which the manipulations of the disintegrationists have professed to find as the Pentateuchal skeleton. He spreads before us the groundscripts of Tuch and Bleek, and gives full exhibition of Dr. Davidson's programme of the respective parts of the Elohist, the Younger Elohist, the Jehovist, and the Redactor, a programme which at once demonstrates its own absurdity. To the investigating student Professor Douglas gives the following suggestion how to manage with the Elohistic, Jehovistic, etc., contributions::

If any one wishes to study the subject in his Hebrew Bible for himself, perhaps no way will be found at once so easy and so thorough as to conceive of the existing Pentateuch as if it were the result of successive deposits or strata, and to paint them with different colors, as the geologist paints the successive deposits or strata on his map. For instance, let him leave the fundamental document untouched by the natural whiteness of the paper. Let him give a blue tint to the Jehovist, and a yellow tint to the Vor-Elohist of *Vaihinger*, or the Younger Elohist of Davidson, (for these will be found to have much in common;) and let him reserve the red, which is sorer on the eyes, for the rarer work of the Redactor. Immediately the composition of the Pentateuch, according to the critical school, will stand out distinctly before him.

Keil then gives an analysis of the skeleton, showing, first, that while it pretends to furnish a continuous fabric it presents lamentable gaps, vertebræ absent from its spine, and missing members of its corporeity. He shows that the eliminated parts of the text are tied to the skeleton by distinct references, and presuppose a unity, and, on the whole, obliterates the imaginary dividing line.

How small the capital upon which the Elohistic-Jehovistic theorists do business is manifest from the extreme fewness of the passages in which either one of the names is used exclusively. The following statement tells the whole story:

(A.) *Elohim* alone occurs in ch. i–ii, 3, (the creation of heaven and earth;) xix, 29–38, (Lot's departure from Zoar, and settlement in the mountains of Edom;) xxv, 1–11, (Abraham's last marriage, children, death, and burial:) xxvii, 46–xxviii. 9, (Jacob's dismission from his father's house;) and i, (Jacob's burial and Joseph's death.) (B.) Jehovah alone, in ch. x, xi, (table of the nations, confusion of tongues, Shem's genealogy; xii, xiii, (Abraham's journey to Canaan and Egypt;) xxiv, (Rebekah engaged, and brought to be the wife of Isaac;) xxviii, 10–22, (Jacob's dream at Bethel;) and xxxviii, (Judah's incest.) (C.) The two names conjoined only in ch. ii, 4–iii. 24, (paradise and the fall:) in fact, Jehovah-Elohim united twenty times, and Elohim alone three times; then alternating in ch. iv, (Adam's sons. Cain's fratricide, and his descendants.) In all the other sections we find other names of God along with these: *Ha-Elohim*, both in our Elohistic context (v, 22, 24; vi, 9, 11, etc.) and in a Jehovistic context, (vi, 2, 4;

xx, 17; xxvii, 28;) in addition, *Adonai* only in addresses to God or conversations with God, in a Jehovistic context, xv, 2, 8; xviii, 3, 27, 30–32; xix, 18, and in one that is Elohistic, xx, 4. *El* in Genesis and Exodus only as an appellative, with various epithets to determine the conception more precisely, xiv, 18–20, 22; xxi, 33; xvii, 1; xxviii, 3; xxxv, 11; xlviii, 3; xvi, 13; xxxv, 7; xlix, 25; xxxiii, 20, and others besides, not only in so-called Elohistic portions, like xiv, [?] xxviii, xxxi, xxxiii. xxxv, xliii, xlvi, and xlviii, but also in the Jehovistic portions, like xvi, 13, and in closest connection with Jehovah, xvii, 1, and xxi, 33.

He then furnishes a theory of the principle that guided the sacred writers in the use of the respective names. The translator, however, properly interposes the remark, that while there will be a manifest propriety often guiding a writer which term to use, yet the distinction would often be overlooked, and either term be used indiscriminately. We might illustrate this view by the uses of the two names, Jesus and Christ.

History of the Christian Church. By PHILIP SCHAFF. A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Vol. III.—Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, from Constantine the Great to Gregory the Great, A. D. 311–600. 8vo, pp. 1049. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

It is a matter of very small concern to the public how Dr. Schaff is able to accomplish the more than herculean labors that are continually brought into view by his publishers, ostensibly as his own, It is, however, a matter of very great interest, and a cause for a profound satisfaction, that such works as appear over his name are prepared and published. To be able to render available other people's labors, in whatever calling one may be engaged, is a faculty scarcely less admirable than the ability to do large things by one's own efforts; and in respect to available productiveness, the latter is often of the better quality. In some way Dr. Schaff contrives to be a wonderfully prolific author, without falling into the usual faults of mere compilers of books.

About twenty years ago he began issuing his "History of the Christian Church," of which the third and last volume, coming down to A. D. 600, appeared in 1867. Of the public estimate of that work it is enough to say that it successfully contested the field with Neander's great work; and by improving the advantages afforded by the lapse of time, and the researches and discussions of later writers, some valuable improvements were made. He now returns to revise, enlarge, and greatly enrich his own work, and has at length the great satisfaction, so often denied veteran authors, of seeing the revisal completed, and the whole work in its rejuvenated form appear—a finished production.

The work, as it now appears, is much more than simply a

revision, with corrections and emendations, of the former one, being largely a new production in respect to both the matter and its arrangement. The history of the whole period from the Advent down to A. D. 311 was comprised in the first volume (528 pages) of the former work; but in this one, two whole volumes (I and II) are given to the same period; and this third volume of the new work is enlarged so as to comprehend what constituted the former second and third volumes. The period thus traversed is among the most deeply important in the history of the whole post-apostolical Church, not less so than that of the Reformation. It was especially the period of great men—Constantine the Great and Julian the Apostate; St. Anthony and St. Benedict; Athanasius and Arius; Augustine and Pelagius, and of Leo the Great. It was the period of theological development and organization, of heresies and counter-heresies, of synods and councils, in which nearly every form of theological opinion that has since appeared in the Church was propounded and canvassed with a degree of force and acumen that has scarcely since been equaled. These things are brought forward in this history with a satisfactory degree of fullness, and in such order and with the kind of grouping of subjects and events that help to a ready appreciation of the whole subject. No doubt, as in every case, the predilections of the writer unconsciously affect his statements. The author's own views may be traced in his writing; and while making due allowance for these, it may still be said that very few works of the kind are so free from that kind of faults.

The Faiths of the World. St. Giles's Lectures. 12mo, pp. 364. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

This volume contains twelve lectures by eleven leading Scottish divines, treating Brahminism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Religion of Persia, Religion of Ancient Egypt, Religion of Ancient Greece, Religion of Ancient Rome, Teutonic and Scandinavian Religion, Ancient Religions of Central America, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity in relation to other Religions. Of necessity so many themes discussed in so small a volume cannot be treated exhaustively nor in detail. Hence these very able lectures are condensations, pictures in broad outline of the central features in the faiths of mankind. They give the results of much patient study on the part of their highly accomplished writers, who, having intelligently grasped the characteristic principles of the religions of the world, show why they existed, why

they spread, wherein they failed, and what are the points of contact between our Christianity and those false systems which still continue to exist. Hence the book is not unworthy to be regarded as an introduction to the "great science of comparative theology," deserving the attention of advanced students, and especially of those busy laymen whose innumerable duties forbid profound research, but who desire sufficient insight into the religious thought of the world to establish them in their conviction that, the more thorough is one's acquaintance with false theologies, the more ready will one be to subscribe to the truth of the final sentence in this volume, that "not one of the features or doctrines of Christianity will fail to appear in a brighter sight and with a diviner beauty after they have been compared and contrasted with the correlative features and doctrines of other religions."

The Life of Christ. By Dr. BERNHARDT WEISS, Professor of Theology in Berlin. Translated by M. G. HOPE. Vol. II. 8vo, pp. 403. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford.

In the pretended form of a life-story of Jesus of Nazareth, many modern writers, and especially those of Germany, have found opportunity to re-examine and restate the historical and doctrinal contents of the four evangelists, and to make of them just what their own predilections called for. "The Life of Christ" by Dr. Weiss differs very considerably from all others, being widely separated from those of both Strauss and Renan, and about equally far from those of Hase and Schenkel; and yet he will not be accepted as a safe authority by the evangelical Churches of Protestantism. There are peculiarities in the German methods of thinking and writing which the more direct and logical Anglo-Saxon fails to appreciate, and this unlikeness of methods renders much that seems to be especially learned and profound in many German works practically unavailable for English readers. This work seems to be of this class. It is learned, able, and thoughtful; it accepts the supernatural and the spiritual in the Gospel, recognizes Christ's divinity, and, in some sort, the inspiration of the Scriptures; but his way of viewing and putting these things is not such as to commend his work to English-speaking Christians. Some of his discussions, as that on "The Demoniac," and "The Leper," are interesting, but unsatisfactory. Whether for critical or for devotional purposes, better books on the same subject may be found that have not come to us from another language.

A Popular History of Christian Doctrine. By T. G. CRIPPEN. 8vo, pp. 357. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford.

The author of this comprehensive compendium enters upon his work with a profession of modesty that seems scarcely to be called for, in view of its character—that it is designed for a class of readers who may not be "able to appreciate the scholarly works of Hagenbach, Shedd, and Cunningham," for, though less voluminous than those, there is no reason why its scholarly qualities should be depreciated in advance. The author's plan is, after a preliminary statement of the "Sources of Religious (Theological) Knowledge," to examine the several chief subjects of doctrine, in order, tracing them in their manifestation from the apostolic times to the present. The discussions of the several points, which he presents in eleven classes, are necessarily brief, and yet they are so presented as to clearly indicate the subject with the principal arguments on both sides. For most readers, even for most ministers of the Gospel, this amount of reading will suffice; but if any wish to go further, this work will prove a valuable introduction to the subject, and a desirable guide to further and fuller sources of information. The author's own opinions, which seem to accord with those of the Scotch Presbyterians, are quite obvious at a variety of points, while some subjects, now much disputed, are readily disposed of, and the disfavored views quietly dismissed as "heresies." His information in respect to the doctrinal positions of some now existing bodies is often at fault, *vide* Methodism on Baptism. The chapter on "Last Things" is suggestive, but not of the final settlement of the questions involved. The Appendixes are especially valuable.

Philosophy, Metaphysics, and General Science.

Creation; or, the Bible Cosmogony in the Light of Modern Science. By ARNOLD GUYOT, LL.D., Blair Professor of Geology and Physical Geography in the College of New Jersey; Author of "Earth and Man," Member of the National Academy of Sciences in America, Associate Member of the Royal Academy of Turin, etc., etc. 16mo, pp. 136. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884. Price, $1 50.

This admirable volume is an antidote to the attempts of some men of science to array the testimony of nature against the cosmogony of Moses. Its author, whose scientific knowledge cannot be truthfully questioned, believes that nature bears witness to the order of creation as stated in the book of Genesis.

The grounds of this conviction Professor Guyot lucidly sets forth in sixteen brief chapters, in which the descriptions of the cosmogonic week given by Moses are first subjected to expository treatment, and then compared with what the earth and the heavens now reveal concerning the order of their creation. In stating the results of his inquiries he says: "To a sincere and unprejudiced mind it must be evident that these great outlines are the same as those which modern science enables us to trace. . . . Whatever be the opinion which we may entertain as to the correctness of the history of the creation of the universe and the earth, such as the present results of inductive science can furnish, we may affirm that the best explanation science is now able to give on this great topic is also that which best explains, in all its details, the first chapter of Genesis, and does it justice."

French and German Socialism in Modern Times. By RICHARD J. ELY, Prof. in Johns Hopkins University. 16mo, pp. 274. New York: Harper & Bros. 1883.

This valuable and interesting history illustrates how largely the differences of human conditions are based in stupendous differences of human character. For the very narrative of socialism is a narrative of a succession of eminent characters, of mind-monarchs, who towered above the humble masses whose condition they studied and toiled to elevate. The line is almost as unbroken as the line of French kings before Louis XVI. They were men of great heads and great hearts, and their labors may not be evil to mankind. In our own country the immense and ever-widening distance between the millionaires and paupers is matter for profound thought. We are by no means free from danger. Our two palliatives are universal suffrage, which greatly forestalls resorts to violence, and the absence of entails, which divides up great estates. But legislation must have a sharp eye to the dangers of war between capital and toil.

Locke's Theory of Knowledge. With a notice of Berkeley. By JAMES M'COSH, D.D., LL.D., D.L., President of Princeton College; Author of "Method of Divine Government," "Intuitions," "Laws of Discursive Thought," "Emotions," etc. 8vo, pp. 77. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884. Price, 50 cents.

This pamphlet is No. 5 of a series of philosophic tracts which aim to disseminate among the people right views of the leading principles and facts in modern philosophy. The name of the author is sufficient guarantee of the value of his work.

History, Biography, and Topography.

History of the Literature of the Scandinavian North from the Most Ancient Times to the Present. By FREDERICK WINKEL HORN, Ph.D. Revised by the Author, and Translated by RASMUS B. ANDERSON, Author of "Norse Mythology," "America Not Discovered by Columbus," "Viking Tales of the North," and Other Works. With a Bibliography of the Important Books in the English Language Relating to the Scandinavian Countries. Prepared for the Translator by THORVALD SOLBERG, of the Library of Congress. Washington, D. C. 8vo, pp. x, 507. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. New York: Baker, Pratt, & Co. 1884. Price, $3 50.

The publication in this country, a little more than forty years ago, of translations of Frederika Bremer's stories of Swedish life and of Hans Christian Andersen's Danish tales, legends, and fairy stories at once turned a large popular attention to those lands, which was greatly increased by the appearance, a few years later, of Bayard Taylor's account of his travels in Sweden, Denmark, and Lapland. Since that period there has been a growing interest in the Scandinavian peoples and their literature. To this several things have contributed, among which are the work of evangelical Christian missions in those countries, the excellent character of our Scandinavian population, the introduction to our acquaintance by translations of more or less of the old literature of the fatherland, and, in particular, the production of original works in this country. In this Mr. Anderson is among the foremost, if not the chief. His "Norse Mythology" and "The Scandinavian Languages: Their Historical, Linguistic, Literary, and Scientific Value," not only attest their author's scholarship, but have aided in the creation of a demand for a wider opening into the field of Norse literature. Chicago is the chief center of American original supply, and from its press has already issued quite a library of standard volumes. Yet the bibliographical references in English to Scandinavian countries number about two thousand, while a list of the titles of English translations from Scandinavian authors fills nearly thirty pages.

Very naturally, therefore, a history of this literature has become a desideratum for popular use, as well as for the student's table, and Dr. Horn has very ably supplied it. His work divides into three parts: I. "The Old Norse and Icelandic Literature;" II. "Denmark and Norway;" and III. "Sweden." The old Norse properly continues to near the close of the fourteenth century, when modern Icelandic begins, although the modifying influences of Christianity were earlier felt.

The date of the severance of the Scandinavian branch from

the great Gothic-Germanic, or Teutonic, stock cannot be definitely ascertained, though it is assumed to have occurred at about the time of the birth of Christ. Its people were rude and brave, who became the dread vikings, loving battle and adventure, and by no means destitute of a high degree of barbaric culture. Independent knights they were who brooked no superior, and when monarchy was established in Norway the best and proudest preferred emigration to submission. Iceland thus was settled by people of the noblest birth, or, as Dr. Horn says, "the flower of the nation." Here was the real home of the Old Norse, where it flourished in its beauty and glory. Tradition preserved among them the unwritten books that they had brought over the sea, and the later productions born after the settlement of the island. They told the stories of their ancient gods, and sang the exploits of their noble heroes. And when Christianity came, their chiefs became their priests and were interested in perpetuating the old culture and the old history, even though Odin and Thor were with Jupiter and Mars relegated to the realm of fable. They were ready for the art of writing long before it reached them. The Eddas are simply fragments, some of which belong to the turbulent times of the vikings, and others reach farther back to a period of greater refinement. The skalds were the poet-laureates and history-tellers, the Homers and Tennysons of their times. Of the form of their verse we could here give the reader but little idea, but its laws were as established as those of the Greek or Latin, and much more difficult. There must be meter, alliteration, rhyme, and abundant ornament. In metaphors it is extravagant. Thus gold is "Freyja's tears," because Freyja is said to have shed golden tears when deserted by her husband. But who can interpret the following from an Icelandic skald? "The moon of the eyebrows of the white-clad goddess of the onion soup shone beaming on me as that of a falcon from the clear heaven of the eyebrows, but the beaming splendor from the moon of the eyelids of the goddess of the gold ring causes since then the unhappiness of me and of the goddess of the ring." In plain prose it means, "The eye of the woman clad in white shone beaming on me as that of a falcon from her forehead, but the beaming splendor of her eye causes my and her unhappiness."

The relation of Christianity to Scandinavian literature, and the influence upon it of the printing-press and the Reformation, constitute most interesting passages in this history. Coming from Germany, they first appear in Denmark. The new culture

sought in the universities at Cologne, Heidelberg, Paris, and elsewhere turned thought into the direction of theology, philosophy, and the canon law, to the damage of the popular spirit. But the time came again when the work done was for the people, and from their ranks sprang many of the most powerful intellects of the age.

It is instructive to follow the steps by which the trammels of foreign culture are thrown off and a new national spirit aroused which settles a language and builds a literature of its own, which revives its old antiquity, and at the same time enters upon a new and expanding life. The successive phases of this progress are graphically described by our author, with the names and works of many authors who are reflecting honor on their age and country. "Blood is thicker than water," and though they be four peoples yet are they one Scandinavia.

Echoes from Palestine. By Rev. J. W. MENDENHALL, A. M., Ph.D. With Seventy Illustrations. 8vo. pp. 736. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1883.

Dr. Mendenhall is not "a gatherer and disposer of other men's stuff," nor an imitator of "the thousand and one" travelers who have told the story of their travels in the Holy Land. He is an independent, original observer and thinker, and has produced a volume which, though treating of men and places hackneyed by multitudinous descriptions, is as fresh, entertaining, and instructive as if its subject were unfamiliar. Much of this freshness is attributable to its author's purpose not to make it "like a picture from an old negative," but a record of the impressions made on his own mind by what he saw. It was his purpose not to write as a mere sight-seer, nor as the composer of a diary, but as a student viewing Bible truth in the light of his personal observations on the scenes in which its events occurred and its most distinguished characters lived and moved. In his opening "Statement" its author says: "The book is not, therefore, primarily a panorama of travel, but a panorama of truth, with Syrian landscapes for the background."

Dr. Mendenhall, pursuant to this purpose, first sketches with sufficient fullness for general readers the topography of such parts of the Holy Land as were embraced in his tour from Jaffa to Jerusalem, and from the Dead Sea to the sources of the Jordan. This part of his work shows that while enthusiastically alive to the great events which make those places memorable and sacred, he did

not suffer his enthusiasm to cast a false glamour over the scenes amid which they were enacted. He viewed them, not through his imagination, but simply with open eyes. Hence, for example, he discovers no beauty, as other writers have done, in the women of Bethlehem. With more frankness than gallantry, he says, "Nothing has surprised me more than the extolling, on the part of travelers, of the women of Bethlehem for their beauty, even the guide-books . . . pronouncing them the rivals of the beautiful and graceful women of Nazareth. Whether from lack of appreciation of Oriental beauty, or from a disposition to be independent in our mode of thinking, we have to write that the usual report on this subject is a fiction." Writing of Jerusalem, while admitting that if viewed from the Mount of Olives Jerusalem presents a stately appearance, he claims that when approached from the west "no vision of beauty, no scene of magnificence, Oriental or otherwise, captures the senses." Within its walls he saw it to be, as Lieutenant Conder writes, "a very ugly city. There is nothing in its site or architecture, as a whole, which can save it from the imputation of ugliness." His estimate of the Jordan is equally realistic. He found its waters "too muddy for clean bathing, too swift for navigation, not typical of any thing bright or beautiful; . . . its approaches are unpleasant; its currents make it dangerous; contact with it is defiling." Curiously enough, he finds an argument in this river against immersion as John's method of baptizing. "It is evident," he says, "that if the beach was as muddy in the days of John as it now is, candidates could not get to the water's edge; if the river was as swift as it is now, it would have been unsafe for any except the strong to enter the water; and again, if the river held in solution the alluvial deposits of its banks, John himself would have forbidden baptism in it. With an irrepressible immersionist this may have no weight, but with the traveler on the spot it is usually decisive of all controversy." But, notwithstanding these illustrations of our author's disposition to paint things just as he saw them, and as he would if they were barren of sacred associations, it must not be supposed that he viewed Palestine in the spirit of an iconoclast seeking to destroy impressions made on the Christian public by his predecessors in travel. On the contrary, wherever he finds the beautiful in art or nature he delights to do it ample justice.

The characteristic feature of this volume is found in its combination of doctrinal dissertations and serious reflections with

topographical descriptions and historical statements. In this respect it is a piece of mosaic work, ingeniously and quite artistically wrought. Each place he visited suggests its topic. Jaffa, for example, brings up Jonah and the whale, Peter's vision, and Dorcas, the "patron saint of the sewing circle," each of whom, Peter especially, is pertinently and sensibly discussed. The Jordan and the baptism of Christ are made the text of a brief dissertation on the Trinity which he strongly maintains, but finally summarizes his own view by saying, "As Angelo was poet, sculptor, painter, and architect, so God had his diversity of manifestations in unity of character:" an illustration, by the way, to which the heretical Sabellius would scarcely object. Happily, however, the doctor does not present it as conclusive, for he very cautiously adds: "No adequate explanation of the trinity is possible."

By following this method, Dr. Mendenhall aptly, and in the main acceptably, discusses most of the leading doctrines of the Christian faith, and of the ethics of which that faith is the only root. Though constantly passing from the topographical to the theological and moral, his transitions are so smoothly made as to appear perfectly natural. He is evidently an independent thinker, having the courage of his opinions, and that, too, on disputed points of theology. To these opinions he gives clear, vigorous expression, with their reasons tersely set forth; yet he is never offensively dogmatic. He writes so vivaciously that the attention of his reader rarely flags. Taken as a whole, the book admirably fulfills his purpose, and may be commended as worthy to be ranked with the best of our numerous popular works on the land which the Christian Church will always regard with peculiar affection because it was the birthplace and abode of the Son of Man.

Kadesh-barnea: Its Importance and Probable Site, with the Story of a Hunt for It, including Studies of the Route of the Exodus and the Southern Boundary of the Holy Land. By H. Clay Trumbull, D.D., Editor of the "Sunday-School Times." 8vo, pp. 478. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

It is an interesting fact, that while the enemies of our faith are searching with unresting toil for facts and arguments with which to impeach its venerable record, the providence of God is, as never before, bringing forth fresh and convincing evidence of the strict accuracy of its statements down even to its topographical descriptions. The noble volume before us, a magnificent specimen of book-making, is a valuable contribution to this end,

albeit it is devoted to only one biblical site, Kadesh-barnea. Concerning this place it discusses: 1. Its Manifold Importance; 2. The Biblical Indications of its Site; 3. The Ancient References to it Outside of the Bible Text; 4. The Later Attempts at its Identifying; 5. The Story of a Hunt for It; 6. Its Sites Compared; 7. A Special Study of the Route of the Exodus.

One's first impression on glancing over this volume is, that its author thoroughly understands his subject. He is master of the literature of the Sinaitic desert. The story of his travels shows that he possesses the spirit, the tact, the persistence of a genuine explorer, and though he sought for Kadesh-barnea under the inspiration of a belief that he should discover it, not where so high an authority as Robinson, with other noted explorers, had located it, but in a spot designated by the Rev. John Rowlands, in 1842, yet he steadfastly reins in his imagination lest it should be captured by that inspiration, until it is confirmed, as he thinks, by the testimony of his senses, and by a careful investigation of the locality and its environments, made in the light of the Mosaic record. Hence it is no imaginary Kadesh-barnea that he describes, but, as he believes, the veritable spot where Israel made his "head-quarters or rallying-point" for some thirty-seven years, and from which he finally marched into the land promised to Abraham.

Kadesh-barnea is a pivotal point in determining the route and abiding places of the Israelites in the Sinaitic desert. Its site determines several others. Hence the importance of certainty as to its location. Robinson fixed it at Ain el-Waybeh, although that site failed to meet all the conditions of the Mosaic narrative. Mr. Rowlands, shortly after the publication of Robinson's "Biblical Researches," accidentally discovered a spot named Ayn Quadees by the Arabs, and perceived that it did fill all the requirements of the Scripture, as to fertility, extent, the rock pouring forth its perennial streams of delicious water, its contiguity to the southern border of Judea, and its lines of approach toward the Holy Land. Many German writers of note favored Rowlands's view. But Robinson, who had never seen Ayn Quadees, condemned it, and his influence won most English and American writers to his side, especially as subsequent travelers failed to find it, owing to various causes explained by Trumbull. In the work before us, this gentleman relates the story of his search for it, and gives his reasons for believing it to be the identical spot of Israel's principal encampment, and his point of

final departure from his forty years' wanderings in the Sinaitic desert. His descriptions and his reasoning upon them appear conclusive; but time and future investigations will put them to the test. We give our readers his graphic picture of Ayn Quadees:

"It was a marvelous sight! Out from the barren and desolate stretch of the burning desert waste, we had come with magical suddenness into an oasis of verdure and beauty, unlooked for and hardly conceivable in such a region. A carpet of grass covered the ground. Fig-trees, laden with fruit nearly ripe enough for eating, were along the shelter of the southern hillside. Shrubs and flowers showed themselves in variety and profusion. Running water gurgled under the waving grass. . . .

"Standing out from the earth-covered limestone hills at the north-eastern sweep of this picturesque recess, was to be seen the large single mass, or small hill of solid rock, which Rowlands looked at as the cliff (*sel'a*) smitten by Moses to cause it to give forth its water when its flowing stream had been exhausted.

"There was a New England look to this oasis especially in the flowers and grass and weeds. . . . Bees were humming there, and birds were flitting from tree to tree. Enormous ant-hills, made of green grass-seeds, instead of sand, were numerous. It was in fact hard to realize that we were in the desert or near it."

As to the extent of this region our author says: "It has a mountain-encircled plain of sufficient extent for the encampment of such a host as Israel's. . . . It is a region where a mighty host could abide many days; and as such a region it stands absolutely alone among all the localities yet discovered on the southern border of Canaan, or near that border."

Among the Holy Hills. By HENRY M. FIELD, D. D., Author of "From the Lakes of Killarney to the Golden Horn," "From Egypt to Japan," and "On the Desert." 12mo, pp. 243. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884. Price, $1 50.

Dr. Field in this delightful volume tells us what he saw, thought, and felt while traveling in Palestine from Jerusalem to Beyrout. He passed over a track often described, yet never uninteresting to Christian readers when sketched with an intelligent, observing, and picturesque pen, such as this writer wields. Evidently the doctor is not a disciple of the Dryasdust school, since he seems unacquainted with the art of literary dullness. His eye is trained to catch the picturesque in nature, the curious things in

art, and the characteristic features of men. His mind is given to reflections which are natural, suggestive, and useful, abounding in sound sentiments, yet free from sickly sentimentality in expression. His geniality never forsakes him, the discomforts of travel never sour him, the rascalities of guides and dragomen never betray him into fretfulness of soul. The dignified familiarity and friendly spirit of his style puts his readers at their ease, and beguiles them into such pleasant companionship with him that when his journey reaches its close they regret to bid him adieu. Hence, "Among the Holy Hills" will no doubt meet with cordial acceptance from all who love Palestine, not for its soil, climate, archæological treasures, and present inhabitants, but because it is "the cradle of our religion;" and because, "of all that we have, not of religion only, but of liberty also, we must trace back the origin to the Galilean hills."

The Conquest of England. By JOHN RICHARD GREEN, M.A., LL.D., Honorary Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford; Author of "History of the English People," "Short History of the English People," "The Making of England," etc. 8vo, pp. 607. New York: Harper & Brothers.

This last production of Mr. Green's pen was composed in the shadow of death. Yet it bears no marks of weariness or mental decay. It displays the same complete mastery of his subjects, the same sound historic and judicial judgment, conscientiousness, candor, insight into character, descriptive power, and vigorous vivacity of style as the best of his previous works. It relates the stirring events of English history from A. D. 758 to A. D. 1071, ending with the conquest of the Saxons by the Norman knights under the leadership of William I. The story of this period in English history has never been more charmingly and adequately told. It may be a long time before England produces a writer so rarely endowed with genius for historical composition as was this brilliant gentleman.

A Short History of Our Own Times, from the Accession of Queen Victoria to the General Election of 1880. By JUSTIN M'CARTHY, M.P., Author of "A History of Our Own Times." 12mo, pp. 448. New York: Harper & Bros. 1884.

Mr. M'Carthy's reputation as a fascinating writer of history is too generally known to need further praise. His original history has successfully passed the ordeal of criticism on both sides the Atlantic. This abbreviation of it will be read and welcomed by many who are not well able to purchase the larger work. It meets a popular want, and will doubtless be very widely circulated.

Educational.

Christian Educators in Council. Sixty addresses by American educators, with historical notes upon the National Educational Assembly, held at Ocean Grove, N. J., August 9–12, 1883. Also Illiteracy and Education tables from the census of 1880. Compiled and edited by Rev. J. C. HARTZELL, D.D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

Ocean Grove, a summer city by the "sounding sea," has been made pretty familiar to the American people by its annual religious meetings; but it is becoming more and more a field for all the great reformatory movements of the country. Its convenience of access, its capacity for disposing of a crowd, its great auditorium, and its freedom from all the irregularities produced by alcoholic drinks, give it immense advantages for certain annual meetings and other important gatherings. Hence it was chosen, last year, as the place of meeting for the National Educational Assembly, which, under the organizing ability of Dr. Hartzell, proved to be a great occasion, and for three successive days commanded the attention of an audience consisting of five or six thousand interested hearers. The large book before us, of over two hundred and sixty pages, printed in double column, contains the proceedings of this long intellectual "camp-meeting," together with such other matter pertaining to education as must make Dr. Hartzell's volume a convenient hand-book for all who seek full information on that subject.

The range of discussion embraces all the "problems," and is as wide as the needs of the country. Some idea of its fullness may be gathered from the topics which called forth so many addresses. Among these were, Education as Related to Improvement; The Various Aspects of Illiteracy; National Aid to Common Schools; Education as Related to the Negro; Education as Related to Wealth and Poverty, also to Crime; Education and the Indian; Education and the Mormon; Education in the South; Education and Christianity.

What may perhaps be regarded as the chief point, that which relates to the duty of the national government, received less attention than any other. But the Corresponding Secretary (Rev. C. C. Painter) tells us in his report that there is a great change discernible among the people on that subject, and that public meetings, memorialists, newspapers, and influential individuals are every-where urging Congress to immediate action. It is now nearly forty years since a golden opportunity for governmental

intervention was thrown away. After paying off the national debt an inconvenient surplus accumulated in the Treasury, and there was a strong feeling in the North to have it appropriated to the work of general education. But, unfortunately, the South did not then want public education, and the great sum was distributed to the States and mostly wasted. The case is very different now. Education has become a matter of interest through all the South, and the chief obstruction is a want of adequate means. Hence there is a general willingness apparent in Congress to do something efficient. But the work is delayed by the difficulty of agreeing on a measure which will insure the needful aid without offering a bounty to sharp administrators.

The action of Congress cannot be too prompt. No thoughtful man can fail to see that some system of national education is imperiously demanded. While it is true that there are liberal and efficient systems in many of the States, and that the South will ultimately fall in with the general current and provide for her own people, it is also true that the country cannot afford to wait. Something bold and strong needs to be done at once. The next generation ought to be lifted out of the dark cloud of ignorance that now broods over the land. It is not too much to say that the harmony, the peace, and the good order of the Republic depends upon it.

It appears from the late census (it is in the volume before us) that the number of persons who cannot write is over 4,200,000. People naturally suppose that the great majority of these is among the colored freedmen of the South. But, in spite of their disadvantages, great numbers of them have, in one way or other, picked up a considerable degree of knowledge, so that the lines are now pretty evenly drawn between the colors. As a fact, the negroes are a little ahead, or were when the census was taken, but the white illiterates have not much to boast of. Their number is 2,056,463, while that of the negroes is 2,147-900—only a little in advance. But the nation should not long be required to answer for such a mass of ignorance. It is a perpetual threat of danger, and in large portions of the country it means riots, mobs, and public disorder. But the danger line, as one of the speakers said, "is not Negro education, but the lack of it." Hence we should not lack it long. A very grave duty devolves on Congress. The first interest in a Republic is its citizens. If these are incompetent the State will be incompetent; if these are disorderly the State will be disorderly; and if these are intelli-

gent and self-governed the State will be well and easily governed. But especially is the country bound to care for the freedmen. They have been wrenched from their servitude by a violent *stroke of state*, and their dependence on the government is so great, that they have been universally regarded as its wards. But what kind of a guardian is he who brings up his ward in ignorance and turns him out on the world without any equipment for its most ordinary affairs?

On the subject of the future of the Negro race in America, we have been interested in noting the evident tendency of public thought toward the views of Dr. Stevens, as expressed in his admirable article in the last number of our Quarterly. Some of the speakers, naturally enough, ignore a subject so distasteful, and confine themselves strictly to the matter of education. But others cautiously show what must be the end. Rev. J. W. Hamilton says: "No two races can live side by side in this land, one the reproach of the other. We cannot be confederated. We *must* be assimilated. All the social, intellectual, and constitutional elements in our civilization must mingle in a oneness of relation, inseparable. There can be no distinction of rights, as there must be no restriction of privileges." Rev. Dr. Tanner, editor of the "Christian Recorder," (Philadelphia,) said: "Whether the whites and the blacks of the country shall mix is no longer an open question. It is settled by the fact that the mixture has already, and to a very large extent, taken place. The black man already shares in the best blood of the land."

So the discussion goes on, and meanwhile time is in no hurry, and gives the most abundant opportunity for all the great changes that statesmen see in the future.

Literature and Fiction.

Folk-Lore of Shakespeare. By Rev. T. F. Thistleton Dyer, M.A., Oxon, Author of "British Popular Customs, Past and Present," etc. 8vo, pp. viii, 559. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1884.

Other works on folk-lore in general, and the folk-lore of Shakespeare in particular, have done good service and won excellent reputation, but none of them has been so well adapted to popular use as this production by the Rev. Mr. Dyer. He has made himself familiar with the popular customs of his country, as is evinced by his previous work, as well as by the present one, though the

preparation of the latter required a broader study. For, while Shakespeare makes much use of that purely English folk-lore which sprang from the superstitions, legends, rural tales, and social life of the time of Elizabeth and the two or three centuries preceding, it so happened that into the folk-lore of England in his day there entered the folk-lore of many other lands, which, like many American games, is traceable, not only to various countries of Europe, but to ancient Greece and Rome, and even to the East. In almost all of his dramas, wherever the scene is laid, he shows his rich stock of this kind of knowledge, and employs it with delightful effect. But to thoroughly appreciate it requires an acquaintance with it which most readers of Shakespeare do not possess. A carefully and copiously annotated edition of his plays will lay open for them much of this beauty, but none that we have seen answers the purpose which Mr. Dyer accomplishes. With his explanations he gives such admirable selections from the plays that not a few passages are made to appear in a new light.

Our author groups his subjects in twenty-three classes, two of them entitled "Sundry Superstitions" and "Miscellaneous Customs, etc.," serving for a large number that would fit in nowhere else, and are yet too important to be omitted. And thus he discourses of "fairies," "witches," "ghosts," "demonology and devil-lore," "birds," "animals," etc., with abundant historic information as to use, and tracing each subject to its origin so far as known. In the poet's day, to illustrate, the fairies were both familiar and in fashion, and much of his knowledge of their realm he has put into "A Midsummer-Night's Dream." They are charming little folk, "to whom a cowslip is tall," with Oberon (Auberon in French, and Elberich in German) for their king, and Titania, their queen. As Shakespeare is the first to give her this name, it would seem that he identifies the fairies with the classic attendants of Diana whom Ovid calls Titania. She is the mischievous Queen Mab "that plats the manes of horses in the night." Puck, the prankish jester of the crowd, "which most men call hob-goblin"—"hob" being the diminutive of Robert and Robin—is Robert the Goblin, that is, Robin Goodfellow, who misleads night wanderers, and then laughs at them, and, again, will "grind corn for a mess of milk, cut wood, or do any manner of drudgery work." Popular fairy characteristics were beauty, power, perpetual youth, immortality, ability to assume various forms and to become invisible at will, love of music and dancing, pinching slovens and sluts till they were black and blue, hating

the wicked, and protecting and enriching the good. Shakespeare might thus be called the poet of fairydom.

Mr. Dyer brings together in a chapter of thirty-two pages the principal proverbs either quoted or alluded to by Shakespeare. Some of them are identical with proverbs in use on the continent, and some are of Latin origin, while others are plainly of English birth, as, for instance, "Make hay while the sun shines," which Mr. Dyer is very sure could have originated only under such variable skies as those of England. Many of these have been perpetuated by Shakespeare, and are in current use in this as well as in the mother country. Equally curious and interesting would be a list of the pithy sayings originating with the poet himself which have come into use as proverbs since his day. This, however, did not fall into our author's plan.

Who's to Blame? By HENRY FAUNTLEROY. 16mo, pp. 355. Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Methodist Publishing House. Printed for the Author. 1883.

The author of this volume writes under the inspiration of intense antagonism to that prevailing epidemic of financial corruption which was begotten by the necessary expenditure of vast sums of money during the War of the Rebellion. It is inevitable, human nature being what it is, that such prodigality as war compels, associated as it always must be with a vastly inflated currency, will create a passion in many minds for the rapid accumulation of wealth. That passion blinds and paralyzes the moral sense, and men learn to transact business, not in the spirit of the second great commandment, but under the impulses of that supreme selfishness which is utterly reckless of moral obligations and consequences. Out of these base impulses come the adulteration of food, fraud in manufactured articles, lying misrepresentations, grinding of *employés*, financial trickeries, gambling, speculations of various kinds, breaches of trust, defalcations, bribery, collusions between lawyers and judges, the corruption of legislators, and a multitude of kindred deeds degrading to their perpetrators, operating mischievously on society, and, if permitted to continue indefinitely, breeding confusion, distress, and serious disturbances in the nation.

Mr. Fauntleroy, profoundly impressed, apparently, by the extensive prevalence of these Protean forms of corruption, seeks to illustrate their operations and effects in a story which, though it cannot be accorded very high literary rank, does, nevertheless,

produce a deep impression on its reader. It brings before him a young man of moral stamina sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, to keep him honest, but not tough enough to resist extraordinary temptations presented in moments of extreme trial. He places this man in a business house whose head, though a member of a Christian Church, and actively engaged in Christian work, conducts his extensive business on methods requiring misrepresentations on the part of his poorly paid clerks. Our author's hero refuses to lie and is discharged. Unable to find other employment, he and his delicate wife are reduced to extreme want. One of his old employer's men, already corrupted by his enforced habit of lying for the benefit of the business, meets him in the crisis of his troubles, persuades him to rob the store, and then betrays his intention to the firm. He is consequently shot on entering the store, and subsequently tried for burglary. Nothing saves him from the state-prison but the sympathy of an upright lawyer, who, having learned the facts in the case, so exposes the immoral conduct of the firm that the jury spontaneously acquits him. The details of this part of the story are sensationally wrought out; but they move the reader's heart to indignation against those who were chiefly to blame for the wrong, to hatred of their unprincipled methods of business, and to sympathy with *employés*, to whom such men virtually say, "You must tell lies for our benefit or starve."

One is loath to believe that there are many business houses in the land such as this book so mercilessly exposes. Neither can one very willingly admit that there are many such tricky lawyers and unprincipled judges as it describes. Yet the citations from several highly respectable metropolitan journals, found in its appendix, indicate that at least in some States there are some such. One of these journals affirms that "courts have become 'shops' where law, judgments, and final processes are turned out to applicants according to the expenditure that is made. This does not imply that the judges sell their judgments, but it does imply that the system is so framed and administered that, "by the expenditure of money, justice may be delayed and defeated, and irreparable wrong committed." Conceding that these statements are justified by far too many facts, constantly transpiring even in this State, they forecast an evil future. Viewed in connection with the unprincipled methods of greedy millionaires, gigantic railroad and other corporations, and with the organization of labor to resist the encroachments of capital, they portend

social and political storms before which much of the wealth so wrongfully acquired will be swept into bottomless abysses. Every social wrong has its Nemesis, as all history demonstrates. The reign of injustice is sure to be succeeded by the reign of terror, unless the latter is averted by timely repentance. Hence the need of the hour is a wide-spread ethical reform in law, in business, and in political life. And since this can only be brought about by spiritual and divine forces, it behooves the Church of God to elevate and enforce the ethics of her life within her own pale, and then to go forth in the spirit of her Lord and regenerate the life of the nation. The volume under notice, despite its lack of superior literary merit, especially in its conversations, which in places have a savor of sentimental cant, may contribute somewhat to this end. For this reason, it is commended to such readers as prefer learning truth through fiction to its graver but more profitable study in didactic essays.

Miscellaneous.

The Gospel according to St. Mark. With Introduction, Notes, and Maps. By THOMAS M. LINDSAY, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Church History, Free Church College, Glasgow. 12mo, pp. 272. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford.

This is one of a series of hand-books for Bible classes and private students now in course of publication in Edinburgh, under the supervision of Drs. Dods and Whyte. Its notes are brief, yet without obscurity; based on an intelligent exegesis, though not critical in form, and well adapted to the needs of the classes for whose use it was designed.

Christianity and Humanity. A Course of Lectures delivered in Meiji, Knaido. Tokio, Japan. By CHARLES S. EBY, B.A. Including one lecture each by Prof. J. A. EWING, B.Sc., F.R.S.E., of the Science Department, Tokio University, and Prof. J. M. DIXON, M.A., of the Imperial College of Engineering. 8vo, pp. 296. Tokio, Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn & Co. 1883. [All rights reserved.]

These Lectures are a curious exhibition of the fact that the discussions awakened and prosecuted here in our Anglo-Saxondom are agitated in Japan with the same earnestness, a country so recently absolutely closed to all Western approaches. These Lectures were delivered in English, and on a subsequent evening repeated in Japanese. Spencerism, Darwinism, Antiquity of Man, etc., are discussed in free, clear, popular, and effective style.

They would be found very readable, and do much good, if republished in America.

HARPER'S FRANKLIN SQUARE LIBRARY: *More Leaves from the Journal of a Life in the Highlands from* 1862 *to* 1882. 8vo, pp. 42. *A Short History of Our Own Times from the Accession of Queen Victoria to the General Election of* 1880. By JUSTIN M'CARTHY. 8vo, pp. 89. *Red Riding Hood.* A Novel. By FANNY E. MILLETT NOTTEY. 8vo, pp. 84.

Light to the Path. A Compend of Bible Teachings concerning God and the Creation, Fall, and Restoration of Man. By JOSEPH LONGKING. 32mo, pp. 126. New York: Phillips and Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe.

Sound in doctrine, concise, clear, forcible in statement, this little book is exceedingly valuable for the religious instruction of youth in the family, and as a text-book for catechumen classes. It is a body of divinity compressed into a nutshell.

HOME COLLEGE SERIES: Tracts with Covers. Phillips & Hunt. No. 78. *Art in Greece.* No. 74. *Hugh Miller.* No. 87. *Charles Lamb.* No. 89. *The Regicides.* No. 90. *Sketch of Amos Lawrence.* No. 91. *John Knox.* No. 92. *Margaret Fuller.* No. 93. *The Life-Current.* No. 94. *Charlotte Brontë.*

This series of tracts, numbering 100, is an admirable conception of Dr. Vincent's, designed to create a taste for literature in such as have not been favored with literary training in early life.

Luther: A Short Biography. By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, A. M., Honorary Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Reprinted from the "Contemporary Review." 16mo, pp. 90. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884.

Mr. Froude evidently wrote this epitome of Luther's career *con amore.* It is, as usual with this writer, graphic in its descriptions, clear and forcible in statement, and thoroughly sympathetic with the heroism, if not with the beliefs, of its subject, of whom, in his closing sentence, he says: "A living belief can rise only out of a believing human soul, and that any faith, any piety, is now alive in Europe, even in the Roman Church itself, whose insolent hypocrisy he humbled into shame, is due in large measure to the poor miner's son who was born in a Saxon village four hundred years ago."

A Commentary on the Shorter Catechism. By Rev. ALEXANDER WHYTE, D. D., Minister of St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh. 12mo, pp. 213. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford.

While some Scottish theologians are striving to create a new departure in theology, others are equally strenuous in their endeavors to revive the declining influence of the dogmas of Augustine and Calvin. Hence this commentary, or *catena* rather, in which much skill and considerable learning are employed in giving interpretations to Scripture, many of which, we opine, neither Christ nor Paul could indorse.

A Day in Athens with Socrates. Translations from the Protagoras and the Republic of Plato. New York: C. Scribner & Sons. 16mo, pp. 145.

It was a happy thought which moved the translator of this delightful volume to bring some of the thoughts of Plato, the greatest and best of the ancient thinkers, within the purview of men unacquainted with Greek. Written in pure idiomatic English, yet faithfully rendering the original, it cannot fail to be an aid to the culture of the popular mind.

Wesley's Designated Successor. The Life, Letters, and Literary Labors of the Rev. John William Fletcher, Vicar of Madeley, Shropshire. By Rev. L. TYERMAN, Author of the "Life and Times of the Rev. Samuel Wesley, M.A., Rector of Epworth," "The Life and Times of the Rev. John Wesley, M.A.," "The Life of the Rev. George Whitefield, B.A.," and "The Oxford Methodists." 8vo, pp. 581. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1883.

The name of John Fletcher is a household word wherever Methodism is known. For his portrait in our present number we are indebted to Mr. Tyerman's recently published Life of this saintly man, entitled "Wesley's Designated Successor." It is "taken from an exceedingly scarce engraving in the Methodist Museum at Centenary Hall, London."

Mr. Tyerman, in his modest preface, says that this volume contains "all the facts of any importance that are known concerning Fletcher, and that here, more than in any previous publication, is illustrated the intellectual and saintly character of one of the holiest men that ever lived."

The appearance of this volume is timely, since its wide circulation would be an antidote to that spirit of worldliness which is tempting the Church to be content with a lower type of the Christian life than was illustrated in Fletcher's experience, and which is taught by Christ when he says to his disciples, "Abide in me, and I in you."

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